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2A b st r a c t
The thesis approaches the development, stability and change of party systems in 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics since the collapse of communism 
from a comparative politics perspective, thereby raising questions about whether party 
systems have developed, about the peculiarity of these systems and about the factors 
that drive party system development and change. The analysis of East Central European 
party systems therefore invites questions about party systems theory in general, 
hypothesising that parties are becoming increasingly independent of extra-parliamentary 
constraints. Applied to East Central Europe, this suggests that party system 
development has been driven by the parties, principally their strategic choices under 
conditions of economic and political transition. Nationalism provides a further 
dimension without which post-communist party competition and coalition building 
cannot be fully understood. The comparative politics analysis of the four East Central 
European party systems warrants a three-level set of conclusions. First, the Lipset- 
Rokkan cleavage model is re-worked, with particular focus on the definition and 
structure of cleavages (including non-structural cleavages) and the context in which 
they are translated in to political competition; the newly negotiated rules of the game; 
the comparatively weak links between voters and parties; the organisation and structure 
of the parties; and most significantly, party strategy as the key driver behind party 
system development, stability and change. Second, come the 1997/98 series of 
elections, the four party systems had developed from anarchic competition to party 
systems characterised by a degree of stability and predictability in terms of party 
competition and co-operation. Third, and finally, the project concludes that party system 
change and stability is driven primarily by the political parties. If comparative West 
European politics is influencing analyses of East Central European party systems, the 
East Central European experience has prompted re-working of comparative party 
system theory. And the parties have stolen the show.
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AC Milan Milan Football Club, Italy
ADSR Alliance o f Democrats (Aliancia demokratov), Slovakia, split from HzDS, joined DU
AN National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), Italy, formerly MSI
AWS Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosc), Poland
BBWR Anti-party Bloc for Reform (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform), Poland,
Pilsudiski’s Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (Bezpartyjny Blok 
Wspolpracy z Rzadem) bore the same abbreviation in inter-war Poland
BRD Federal Republic o f Germany
C Centre Party (Centrepartiet), Sweden
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union), Germany
CMWC Connected minimal winning coalitions
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSD Czech Social Democratic Party (Ceska strana socialne demokraticka)
CTK Czech News Agency (Ceska tiskova kancelao)
DC Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana), Italy
DDR German Democratic Republic
DEUS Democratic Union o f Slovakia (Demokraticka unia Slovenska) initially the Alternative
for Political Realism (breakaway from HzDS), later DU
DNA Norwegian Labour Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti)
DS Democratic Party (Democraticka Strana), Slovakia, part o f the SDK
DS Democratic Left (Democratici di Sinistra), Italy, see PDS
DU Democratic Union (Demokraticka unia), Slovakia, part of the SDK, founded by ex-
HzDS members (DEUS and ADSR)
EC European Community
Egyutteles Coexistence (Spoluzitie), past of SMK
ELDR European Liberal Democratic and Reform Parties
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
Fidesz Alliance o f Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokratak Szovetsege), Hungary, name
changed in 1995 to Fidesz-MPP, Alliance o f Young Democrats - Hungarian Citizen's 
Party (Fiatal Demokratak Szovetsege - Magyar Polgari Part)
FF Fianna Fail (‘warriors o f destiny’), Ireland
8FG Fine Gael (‘family-group o f the Gaels’), Cumann na nGaedheal (‘the club o f the Gaels’)
before the 1933 merger with the Centre Party
FI Forza Italia, sometimes translated as ‘Go for it, Italy’ (a football chant)
FKgP Independent Smallholder's Party (Fuggetlen Kisgazda Part), Hungary
FrP Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), Norway
H Conservative Party (Hoyre), Norway
HSD-SMS Movement for Moravia and Silesia (Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii Moravy a
Slezska), Czech, split into HSMS-MNSJ (Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and 
Silesia -  Moravian National Unification), CMSS (Czech-Moravian Party o f the Centre)
and MNS-HSMF (Moravian National Party -  Movement o f Moravian-Silesian
Unification)
HzDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko)
IMF International Monetary Fund
KDH Christian Democratic Movement (Krestansko demokraticke hnutie), Slovakia, part of
the SDK
KDS Christian Democrat Party (Krestanskodemocraticka strana), Czech, merged with ODS
KDU-CSL Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (Krestanska a demokraticka
unie - Ceskoslovenska strana lidova), Czech
KDNP Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszteny Demokrata Neppart), Hungary
KLD Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno Demokratyczny), Poland, merged
into UW
KPN Confederation for and Independent Poland, (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej)
KrF Christian People’s Party, also translated as Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig
Folkeparti), Norway
KSC Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska)
KSCM Communist Party o f Bohemia and Moravia (Komunisticka strana Cech a Moravy),
Czech
LN Northern League, (Lega Nord), Italy
LSU Liberal and Social Union (Liberalne socialni unia), Czech, combines the Farmers’ party,
the Green Party and the Czech Socialist Party
MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Forum)
MDNP Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (Magyar Demokrata Neppart), split from MDF
MIEP Party o f Hungarian Truth and Life (Magyar Igazsag es Elet Partja)
MK Hungarian Coalition (Magyar Koalicio), Slovakia, see SMK
MKDH Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Madarske krestansko demokraticke
hnutie), part o f SMK
9MOS Hungarian Civic Movement (Madarska obcianska strana, MOS), part o f SMK
MSI Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano), changed into the National
Alliance, AN (Alleanza Nationale)
MSZOSZ National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek Orszagos
Szovetsege)
MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Socialista Part)
MWC Minimal winning coalitions
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ND New Democracy (Nea Demokratia), Greece
NDS-NA Democratic Party -  New Alternative (Narodno-demokraticka strana -  National-
democratic), Slovakia, breakaway from SNS, joined DU
NyD New Democracy (Ny Demokrati), Sweden
ODA Civic Democratic Alliance (Obcanska demokraticka aliance), Czech
ODS Civic Democratic Party (Obcanska demokraticka strana), Czech
ODU Civic Democratic Party (Obcianska demokraticka unia), Slovak, metamorphosed to
SKD (Strana konservativnych demokratov, Slovak Conservative party) and merged 
with DS
OF Civic Forum (Obcanske forum), Czech
OH Civic Movement (Obcanske hnuti), renamed Free Democrats (Svobodni demokrate),
merged into SD-SLNS, Czech
Ojczyzna Polish National “Fatherland” Alliance (Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe “Ojczyzna”), led
by ZChN (Christian National Union) in 1993 election
OPZZ All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwi^zkow
Zawodowych)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Panellino Socialistike Kinima), Greece
PC Centre Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum), Poland, ran in 1991 as POC (Porozumienie
Obywatelskie Centrum), Civic Alliance Centre
PCF French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Fran9ais)
PCI Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiana)
PDS Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra), Italy, renamed DS,
Democratic Left (Democratici di Sinistra)
PL Peasant Alliance (Porozumienie Ludowe), formerly PSL-PL
POC Civic Alliance Centre (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum), Poland, see PC
10
PPG The Polish Economic Programme (Polski Program Gospodarczy), a faction o f the PPPP,
joined KLD
PPPP Polish Beer Lovers’ Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa), merged into UW
PR Proportional Representation
PSI Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiana)
PSL Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
PSL-PL Polish Peasant Party -  Peasant Alliance (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe -  Porozumienie
Ludowe), name simplified to PL when SLCh (Peasant Christian Party, Stronniclo 
Ludowo-Chrzscijanskie) split off
PvdA Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid), Netherlands
RdR Movement for the Republic (rucz dla Rzeczypospolitej), Poland, split from PC
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
ROAD Citizens’ Movement for Democratic Action, Poland, faction o f Solidarity , transformed
into UD
ROP Movement for Poland's Reconstruction (Ruch Odbudowy Polski), by RdR leader
Olszewski
SD-LSNS Free Democrats - Liberal [Social National] Party (Vobodni Demokrate - Liberalni
Strana Narodni Socialni), Czech, a merger o f the LSU and OH
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition (Slovenska demokraticka koalicia), comprises DU, DS,
KDH, SDSS, SZS
SDL Party o f the Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej lavice), Slovakia, part o f SV for the
1994 elections
SDSS Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Socialno-demokratika strana Slovenska), part of
SV for the 1994 elections
SdRP Social Democracy for the Republic o f Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej), part o f the SLD
SFIO French Socialist Party (Section Franchise de 1’Internationale Ouvriere)
SKL Conservatives People's Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno - Ludowe), Poland
SLD Alliance o f the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej), Poland, comprises
the SdRP
SMK Hungarian Coalition Party (Strana madarskej koalicie), formerly MK, Slovakia,
comprises Egyutteles, MKDH, MOS
SNS Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana)
SOP Party o f Civil Understanding (Strana obcianskeho porozumenia), Slovakia
Sp Centre Party (Senterpartiet), Norway
SPD Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), Germany
11
SPR-RSC Assembly for the Republic - Czechoslovak Republican Party (Sdruzeni pro republiku-
Republikanska strana Ceskoslovenska), Czech
STV Single Transferable Vote
SV Common Choice (Spolocna volba), Slovakia, comprised the SDL and SDSS
S WB BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts
SzDSz Alliance o f Free Democrats (Szabad Demokratak Szovetsege), Hungary
SZS Green Party o f Slovakia (Strana zelenych Slovenska), part of the SDK
UD Democratic Union, (Unia Demokratyczna), Poland, merged into UW
UP Labour Union (Unia Pracy), Poland
US Freedom Union (Unie Svodody), Czech
UW Freedom Union (Unia Wolnosci), Poland, merger between DU, KLD, PPPP
VPN Public Against Violence (Verejnost proti nasiliu), Slovakia, split into HzDs, MOS and
ODU
VVD Liberals (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie), Netherlands
WAK Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka), Poland, ZChN (Christian
National Union) in 1993 election
Z Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet), Denmark
ZChN Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe)
ZRS Association o f Slovak Workers (Zdruzenie robotnikov slovenska)
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C h a p t e r  O ne  
In t r o d u c t io n
“In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten days: perhaps in 
Czechoslovakia it will take ten days! ”
- Timothy GartonAsh, Prague, 23 November 1989 ( ‘Day Seven’)
The ‘negotiated revolutions’ of 1989 in East Central Europe -  Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia -  set the scene for the successful transition from communism towards 
liberal democracy in the region. General agreement by all major players on the new 
rules of the game meant rapid consolidation of new institutions, with democracy soon 
becoming “the only game in town”.1 However, even if the new political systems 
incorporated the institutional features of West European liberal democracies, the 
development of party competition has been more problematic.2 It has been subject to a 
series of constraints that differ considerably from those of early Twentieth Century West 
European politics. Yet the party system remains the cornerstone of representative liberal 
democracy. The new rules of the game centre on uncertainty of outcome, i.e., 
‘institutionalised uncertainty’, and this in turn is based on political (and economic) 
competition.3 Hence the focus on the locus of political competition, the party system.
The rupture with four decades of communism and the wholesale adoption of liberal 
democratic institutions warrant analysis of post-communist East Central Europe in 
terms of theories developed for analysis of West European liberal democracies. A 
primary aim of this thesis is therefore to approach post-communist politics through a 
comparative (West European) framework, taking Lipset & Rokkan’s “cleavage model”
1 G. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990) advocates this minimalist definition o f ‘consolidation’, coining the ‘only game in 
town’ phrase.
2 G. Smith stressed party formation as the key potential problem in 1991. G. Smith, “Transitions to 
Liberal Democracy”, in S. Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional Architecture o f  Eastern Europe, 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993), delivered as a lecture at the School o f Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University o f London, spring 1991.
3 The relationship between economics and politics is contentious, but Przewoski’s focus on 
institutionalisation o f uncertainty provides a key that links these elements. This matter is dealt with in 
chapter seven, below. See A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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of party systems development as a starting point.4 Theories developed for analysis of 
West European party systems can be applied to East Central European politics, though 
not without some major analysis of the implicit and explicit assumptions behind these 
theories. The aim is therefore twofold: first, a comparative analysis of the East Central 
European party systems, and second, a reappraisal of theories of party system stability 
and change in the light of developments in East Central European politics. In other 
words, the re-working of party system theory required for analysis of East Central 
European politics should permit a more comprehensive analysis also of West European 
politics. This is particularly relevant to new West European party systems such as post- 
Junta Greece and major party system change, e.g., leading to the ‘new’ Italian party 
system of the ‘Second Republic’. However, it should also throw some light upon party 
systems that have been considered ‘difficult’ in terms of comparative politics, notably 
that of the Irish Free State and the Republic. In the words of Peter Mair, “it is only by 
comparing established party systems with those which are still in their infancy that we 
can really begin to understand the freezing process.”5
The second part of this project applies this theoretical framework to post-communist 
East Central Europe. However, this is done on a comparative basis, not by way of in 
depth country-by-country analyses. The aim is to offer a coherent account of the 
development of post-communist party systems, based on a rational choice approach to 
party systems theory. Though in-depth country analyses would contribute further to 
understanding of these party systems, the main point here is comparative analysis rather 
than merely an explanation of their peculiarities in a country-specific context. Three 
main questions emerge: first, whether party systems have developed in the four cases; 
second, how far these systems are peculiar; and third, what are the factors which have 
shaped this development of party systems.
One subsidiary thread that runs through the entire argument is peculiar to East Central 
Europe, at least compared with much of West European politics: nationalism. More
4 S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an 
Introduction”, in S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, (New York, The 
Free Press, 1967).
5 P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), p. ix.
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specifically, competing ‘ethnic’ and ‘liberal’ approaches to political questions raised by 
nationalism have been translated into political competition. Given the role of 
nationalism in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century East Central European politics, a 
second-order aim is an analysis of the role of nationalism in post-communist political 
competition. Nationalism, or rather competing approaches to political questions linked 
to nationalism, is therefore central to the peculiarities of post-communist politics.6 
However, nationalism may be considered as a cleavage, derived from the process of 
state-building and related to regime change. To the extent that it is derived from the lack 
of congruence between state and national boundaries this is more than a centre- 
periphery cleavage. Whereas a centre -  periphery cleavage may raise questions about 
distribution of power within a state, nationalism questions the legitimacy of the 
boundaries of the state (and therefore the regime’s legitimacy). Yet this far from 
peculiar to East Central Europe. The questions related to the role of nationalism or 
regime change in party competition are particularly relevant to party systems that reflect 
divisions over regime change across Western Europe, again notably the Irish, Greek and 
Italian party systems.
Though the East Central European cases alone warrant re-appraisal of comparative 
politics approaches to party system development, stability and change, the apparent 
triumph of liberal democracy across the globe at the close of the Twentieth Century 
lends further legitimacy and urgency to the question of how far party systems theory can 
be applied outside its West European core area. Even if the ‘End of History’ has ushered 
in an era in which liberal democracy is the dominant normative model for politics, 
questions still remain concerning whether the new regimes qualify as liberal 
democracies, let alone stable liberal democracies.7 And party systems are central to 
representative liberal democracy, at least once the institutional questions have been 
solved through adoption of new rules of the game. Liberal democracy is about political 
competition constrained by an agreed set of rules, and the party system is the locus of 
this competition.
6 G. Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), p. 277-279, 297-299.
7 F. Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992); G. Smith, 
“Transitions to Liberal Democracy”; J.J. Linz & A. Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
Introduction 15
Th e  S c o p e
Though much of the argument may be applicable to post-communist Eastern Europe8 in 
general (or even beyond), there is a case for focusing on Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in particular. All the post-communist (or post-totalitarian) states 
shared a common starting point, communist regimes, and a common catalyst, 
Gorbachev’s ‘Sinatra doctrine’.9 They can therefore be said to have formed a fourth 
wave of democratisation in Europe.10 In contrast to previous transitions to democracy, 
which involved only political change, both political and economic system change was 
called for in 1989. Moreover, the states in question faced potential territorial or 
nationalist disputes, which made for a ‘triple transition’ featuring political, economic 
and national dimensions.11 Yet, if the fourth wave links all post-communist states, the 
four East Central European stand cases out in terms of the negotiated nature of the 
revolution. The Polish and Hungarian cases represent textbook examples of negotiated 
transition by way of regime -  opposition pacts, and the Czecho-Slovak arrangements in 
1989-92 were described as “thoroughly consociational” by Lijphart himself (though in 
this case the communists capitulated, rather than negotiate the transition).12 This is not 
the case to the same extent for the remaining post-communist cases.
Furthermore, a case has been made for approaching East Central Europe, or even 
Eastern Europe as a whole, as one area in terms of its political history. Schopflin 
situates the Eastern European long-term political tradition between that of Western 
Europe and Russia, and this has implications in terms of “the conception, generation,
8 This term refers to the four East Central European states plus the former Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Albania and the Baltic states.
9 A term devised by Gorbachev’s spokesman, G. Gerasimov. C. Binns, in conversation.
10 A term adopted from S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman, University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991).
11 C. Offe “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East- 
Central Europe”, Social Research, 58:4 (1991), 865-892.
12 A. Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 
1989-91”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 4:2 (1992), 207-223. This study is based on the model set out 
by S. Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study o f  the Process o f  
Development, (Olso, Universitetsforlaget, 1970). This can also be found in A. Lijphart & B. Crawford, 
“Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New  
Institutions, hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures”, Comparative Political Studies, 28:2 (1995), 
171-199, p.198.
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legitimation and exercise of power.”13 The region did not share fully the West European 
concepts of separation of state and church, of church and scientific learning, or political 
and economic power and contractual relationships. The result was a greater, or more 
dominant, role for the state. But within Eastern Europe, a ‘fault line’ runs (or at least 
once ran) between the Catholic lands of Austria-Hungary and the Orthodox or Muslim 
territories sometimes under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Szucs has East Central 
Europe combining ‘“Eastern European’ conditions [...] with defective ‘western-like’ 
structures”, and Schopflin argues that the state as lees dominant under the Hapsburgs 
and more so under the Ottomans.14 In any case, the post-war ‘people’s democracies’ 
reinforced and developed Eastern Europe’s status as a single region, if only as ‘Soviet- 
occupied Europe’. Likewise, the ‘people’s democracies’ entered the post-communist era 
at the same time, driven by a single set of events (predicated on Gorbachev’s policy), 
and therefore shared a common starting point. By 1990 they all featured nascent party 
systems, through a development from conglomerate opposition parties (or ‘fronts’) 
toward political parties. However, after this point, the East Central and South East 
European cases diverge.
Apart form keeping the number of cases manageable, there are few good reasons for 
excluding East Germany, the Balkan and Baltic states from this project, i) The ex-DDR 
is excluded because it was absorbed wholesale by the BRD, thus more or less adopting 
the latter’s party system; ii) Romania and Bulgaria did not go through the complete and 
negotiated revolution comparable to the (then) other three cases in 1989: in both cases 
the old regime -  opposition cleavage continued to dominate politics well into the 1990s, 
up to and including their respective 1996 and 1997 elections; iii) exclusion of the former 
Yugoslavia from comparative projects is frequently justified in terms of its civil wars. 
This project is no exception. However, Slovenia could have been included. Arguably, 
little would be gained by including this case, which has been subject to rather sui 
generis external factors, including the Yugoslav wars; iv) among the USSR’s successor 
states, the Baltic Republics provide most relevant cases. However, the Russian minority 
questions and the proximity of Russia has proved problematic in terms of party politics
13 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p.6.
14 J. Sziics, “Three Historical Regions in Europe”, in J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State, (London, 
Verso, 1988), p.322; Schopflin, “Politics in Eastern Europe, p .l 1.
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and government -  opposition relations (the governments have been plagued by the 
‘Russian question’ and their failure to resolve it).15
Hence the focus on Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, hereafter 
collectively referred to as East Central Europe. These four states are considered an 
‘area’, set aside from West European ‘areas’ by their common communist experience, 
and from other former communist ‘areas’ by their ‘western’ heritage and the nature of 
the transition from communism. Nevertheless, reference will be made to developments 
in other post-communist states where appropriate, and the comparative analysis draws 
heavily on past and present West European politics.
C o n t e x t : Th e  A c a d e m ic  L it e r a t u r e
The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe prompted a major effort of adjustment on the 
part of the western academic community, opening the way for a rapidly expanding 
literature on comparative transitions, country specific studies of post-communist politics 
and comparative edited volumes.16 However, the effort to adapt and apply theories 
developed in West European politics to the region has been more limited, despite a 
number of outstanding early contributions.17 This project represents an effort to redress 
this balance, by offering a comprehensive and systematic analysis of post-communist
15 A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Path to Independence, (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1993).
16 K. Dawisha & B. Parrott, The Consolidation o f  Democracy in East-Central Europe, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); A. Przeworski Democracy and the Market; Linz & Stepan Problems 
o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation', K. Von Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern 
Europe, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996); A. Bozoki, A. Korosenyi, & G. Schopflin (eds.), Post- 
Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1992); and 
Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe; S. White, J. Batt & P.G. Lewis (eds.), Developments in East 
European Politics, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993); G. Pridham & P. G. Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile 
Democracies: Comparing New Party System in Southern and Eastern Europe, (London, Routledge, 
1996); A. Lijphart & C. H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe 
and Latin America, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996).
17 G. Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”; Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional 
Choice...”; H. Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society, 
20:1 (1992), 7-50; G. Evans & S. Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f  Party Competition in Eastern 
Europe”, British Journal o f  Political Studies, 23 (1993), 521-548; and more recently, P. Mair, “What is 
Different about Post-Communist Party Systems?”, Studies in Public Policy No. 259, (University of  
Strathclyde, 1996), also as chapter eight in Mair, Party System Change.
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party systems in terms of West European party systems theory.
Moreover, much country-specific and general literature on post-communism focuses on 
the peculiarities and uniqueness of the case(s) at hand. Though this represents an 
essential contribution to the overall literature on post-communism, the result has 
sometimes been problematic in terms of theory. For example, the idea of the supposed 
existence of a vast ‘social democratic constituency’ in East Central Europe was not 
necessarily vindicated by the former communists’ victories in Poland, Hungary and 
Lithuania.18 The present rational-choice based approach to party systems theory and 
East Central European politics sets out to address this problem and offer a coherent 
account of post-communist party competition.
The second major problem in East Central European politics, the role of nationalism, 
has been subject to relatively close scrutiny. However, with one or two exceptions, the 
literature has centred on potential nationalist conflict rather than the impact of 
nationalist questions on political competition in the new liberal democracies. Two major 
efforts stand out from this generalisation: George Schopflin and Arend Lijphart have 
both addressed the problems of nationalism with reference to inter-party politics.19 This 
project aims to develop this further, based on the centrality of inter-ethnic and 
nationalist questions to post-communist party competition. While the salience of 
nationalism may be obvious in the Czecho-Slovak case, it is also relevant in the more 
homogeneous cases (Poland and Hungary) because of minorities living in neighbouring 
states or questions about the nature of the state and citizenship.
Finally, this project is set in the context of West European party systems theory. Lipset 
& Rokkan’s 1967 article set off a debate on the ‘freezing hypothesis’ and party system 
development and change. The period of increasing volatility in the 1970s and the return 
to stability in the late 1980s prompted a wide debate on the subject, a literature which
181. Selenyi & S. Selenyi, “The Vacuum in Hungarian Politics: Class and Parties”, New Left Review , 187 
(1991), 121-137; N. Sitter, “I vincitori sono degli sconfitti?”/“Are Winners Losers?”, Acque e Terre, No. 
1, 1997.
19 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”, Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe; G. 
Schopflin, “From Communism to Democracy in Hungary”, in Bozoki, Korosenyi, & Schopflin (eds.), 
Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary.
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has expanded to include a focus on parties as organisations that adapt to changes in the 
political system.20 This project represents an effort to examine the theory from a rational 
choice perspective, considering the assumptions and premises inherent in much of this 
work. Moreover, the aim is to deal with the emergence of party systems as well as their 
further development. A comprehensive analysis of party systems theory in the context 
of a study of post-communist party systems should generate theoretical conclusions 
pertinent to party systems theory in general. Each of these points will be developed 
further in the theoretical chapters.
H y p o t h e s e s
The outline of the key aims and the context of the present project set out above has set 
the scene for three main hypotheses.
First, theories of party systems have (naturally) centred on West European politics, but 
application of these theories to post-communist East Central Europe should reveal 
assumptions and premises that must be amended in the light of new contexts. This is 
also relevant to the development of West European party systems in the 1990s, 
particularly new systems such as that of the Italian ‘Second Republic’. The Lipst- 
Rokkan model provides a starting point, but it is specific to a given time and place -  
early Twentieth Century Western Europe.21 Application to East Central Europe requires 
a re-working of the model, based on analysis of the nature and structure of cleavages, 
the role of institutions, the link between parties and voters and the significance of party 
organisation and party strategy.
20 P. Mair (ed.), The West European Party System, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990); H. Daalder 
& P. Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, (London, Sage Publications, 
1983); G. Smith, “A Systems Perspective on Party System Change”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 1:3 
(1989), 349-363; S. Bartolini & P. Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: the 
Stabilization o f  European Electorates 1885-1985, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. 
N. Franklin, H. Valen & T.T. Mackie (eds.), Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and 
Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Katz & 
P. Mair, “Changing Models o f Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence o f the Cartel 
Party”, Party Politics, 1:1 (1995), 5-28.
21 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments.
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Second, theories developed for comparative analysis of West European politics are 
relevant to East Central European party systems. The East Central European countries 
are not so peculiar as to invalidate comparative research. In fact, comparative analysis 
explains the development of post-communist party systems. The hypothesis is that the 
development of these systems can be explained in terms of the key actors concerned (the 
party leaderships) and the dynamic development of their strategies under conditions of 
economic transition and potentially salient nationalist questions. Taking a rational 
choice view, this suggests that a Lipset-Rokkan type ‘freezing’ of post-communist party 
systems can be expected as inter-party relationships are consolidated. However, 
nationalism provides for a difference from some of the West European cases, inasmuch 
as ‘national’ or ‘Christian national’ democracy has played a role in East Central Europe 
that is analogous to that played by Christian democracy in West European politics. The 
dynamics of post-communist party competition and coalition-building cannot be fully 
understood without reference to this dimension.
Third, party strategy is increasingly important. The hypothesis suggests that party 
system change and stability is driven primarily by the political parties, and that party 
competition therefore takes centre stage in party system theory. This applies not only to 
East Central Europe, but also to West European party systems. Developments in post- 
Communist East Central Europe are no merely re-runs of the development West 
European party systems, but reflect changes in the conditions that characterised Lipset 
& Rokkan’s core cases. The re-working of the Lipset-Rokkan model, with an increased 
focus on the role of the parties, provides a framework for analysis of West European 
politics that suggests conclusions which are compatible with developments in party 
competition and party systems in the 1980s and 1990s.
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T h e  K e y  C o n c e p t : W h a t  is  a  P a r t y  Sy st e m ?
“And what is a party system?” In 1966 Gordon Smith’s reply emphasised the party 
element of party systems, focusing on the requirements that the parties control the 
government and a fluid relationship should exist between parties and the state.22 “The 
existence of a bona fide party system depends on these two fundamental requirements: 
power of the parties over fundamental decision-making and the absence of a ‘fixed 
identity’ between state and party.” However, this approach focuses primarily on the 
party and less on the system. Yet a party system can be understood to include not only 
the party or parties as key elements in the political system, but also on the extent to 
which the parties in question form a system. Or even a single system. And a system 
suggests a degree of stability and predictability, or ‘patterned interactions’ between 
parties.23 Thus, a collection of parties is distinguished from a system in which the parties 
interact with each other in a stable and predictable way and develop both institutions 
and strategies in response to challenges from their opponents.
Any set of elements existing in a common context can be said to form a ‘system’ 
inasmuch as they must exert some influence upon each other (as per laws of physics), 
even if this is minimal. Nevertheless, the notion of a party system suggests something 
about the interaction between the component parties, an element that has been neglected 
in some of the literature on party systems theory. Though much has been written about 
the development of party strategies and party competition, particularly centring on the 
‘catch-all’ parties, less has been written on the relationship between party competition 
and party system change and stability.24
Two recent developments have highlighted the importance of focus on the development
22 G. Smith, “What is a Party System?”, Parliamentary Affairs, 19:3 (1966), 351-362.
23 Mair, Party System Change, 191-192; G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework fo r  Analysis 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.43.
24 G. Smith addressed this point in later work, including G. Smith, “Western European Party Systems: On 
the trail o f a Typology”, West European Politics, 2:1 (1979), 128-143, and M. Maor & G. Smith, 
“Govemment-Opposition Relationships as a Systemic Property: A Theoretical Framework”, ECPR Joint 
Session o f  Workshops, Leiden April 1993. Peter Mair addresses it in Party System Change.
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of party systems in terms of inter-party competition: the increasing power of the 
European Parliament and the development of party systems in formerly communist 
states in Eastern Europe and Russia. In these cases there can be no doubt that party 
systems exist in terms of a minimalist definition centring on the existence of a collection 
of parties that exert at least some power or influence over decision-making. But they are 
more problematic as far as competition is concerned. It is therefore not surprising that a 
recent Russian definition of party systems includes not only the relationship between 
parties and the state, but also “the nature of the interaction between political parties” and 
their relationship with “other organisations under their patronage which serve as a mass 
base and source of renewal of both party ranks and cadres”.25 Both are weak, if not 
missing, in Russia (and, to a lesser extent, in the European Parliament). The relationship 
between the parties is developing only slowly, and that between parties and extra- 
parliamentary organisations barely at all. If a party system requires inter-party 
competition and mutual adjustment of party strategies, it may be premature to describe 
either the Russian Duma or the European Parliament in terms of fully developed party 
systems.
Factors such as the number of parties, their size and nature, ideological distance and 
relationship to social cleavages may, to borrow G. Smith’s words, certainly “help us 
understand the nature of party systems: they are not suitable criteria for deciding 
whether a system exists”.26 Nevertheless, there is a case for including inter-party 
relationships as a defining property of party systems, or at least fully developed party 
systems. Starting from Dahl’s work on govemment-opposition relationships,27 Maor & 
Smith set out four principal levels and dimensions of party interaction which make up 
government -  opposition relationships that are considered a systemic property:28
25 Tu. I. Aver’yanov (ed.), Politologiya - entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Politology - an Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary), (Moscow, Izd. Moskovkogo Kommercheskogo Universiteta, 1993), “Party system”, p.234-5. 
Translation by C. Binns, May 1997.
26 G. Smith “What is a Party System?”, p.362. Here Smith’s reference to ‘factors’ and ‘criteria’ is 
specifically to the number o f parties, their size and the type o f state within which they operate, but the 
point is valid for later factors including volatility, ideology and de-/re-alignment.
27 R. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1966).
28 Maor & G. Smith, “Govemment-Opposition Relationships as a Systemic Property”.
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Levels o f interaction:
• Electoral
• parliamentary
• intra-coalition
• inter-party
Dimensions o f  interaction:
• left -  right
• new politics -  old politics
• EC integration
• ‘maverick issues’
In the context of the debate on party system stability, Sartori argues that the party 
systems should be understood as an independent variable, but this is based on inter­
party competition and collusion.29 A party system is “the system of interactions resulting 
from inter-party competition”.30 Maor & Smith see the “‘system’ itself not as an actor 
but [as] dependent on the interaction of parties”.31 “A party system involves the totality 
of relationships of parties one with another....”.32 What then if there is only limited party 
interaction?
The question may not have been particularly significant in West European politics, 
where universal male suffrage and the development of party systems were inextricably 
linked to alliances, negotiation and competition between new and old parties.33 This 
provided the basis for Lipset & Rokkan’s analysis of West European party systems.34 
Yet stability and change in West European party systems can be analysed in terms of 
changes in party strategies, notably the development of catch-all and ‘cartel’ parties.35 
Even if the ideological or policy difference between parties may have declined, this does 
not mean that competition, let alone interaction, has been limited.
29 G. Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties: A Critical Review”, in O. Stammer (ed.), Party Systems, Party 
Organisations, and the Politics o f  New Masses, (Berlin, Free University o f Berlin, 1968); P. Mair, “E. E. 
Schattschneider’s The Semi-Sovereign People”, Political Studies, 45 (1997), 957-954.
30 Sartori Parties and Party Systems, p.44.
31 Maor & G. Smith, “Govemment-Opposition Relationships as a Systemic Property: A Theoretical 
Framework”, p.5.
32 Smith, “A Systems Perspective on Party System Change”, p.349.
33 G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins o f  
Regimes in Interwar Europe, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991); Lijphart, “Democratisation and 
Constitutional Choice...”.
34 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”.
35 O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, in J. LaPalombara & M. 
Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966); 
Katz & Mair “Changing Models o f Party Organisation and Party Democracy”.
Introduction 24
In contrast, the creation of the Russian parliament and the EP preceded that of their 
party systems. Hence the ‘emergence ’ rather than existence of a party systems. In both 
cases the levels of interaction are institutional and national (EC) or personal (Russia) 
rather than confined to the four levels, let alone the four dimensions, cited above. If 
party system is taken to imply systematic interaction between the parties, then 1989-90 
East Central Europe can at best be described as featuring ‘emerging’ or ‘nascent’ party 
systems. The ‘parties’ competing in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1989-90 were better 
described as proto-parties or conglomerate parties than westem-style political parties, 
and the governments were better analysed in terms of individual members of the 
governments than in terms of party government. Only in Hungary did the MDF and 
Fidesz constitute more than broad opposition movements, and 1989-90 saw mutual 
adjustment of the MDF, SzDSz and Fidesz, and even the MSzP’s strategies.36
Yet within half a decade all four states featured well-developed party systems. The 
period covered by the first parliaments (and in the Polish case also the second) featured 
both polarisation and the development of party strategies, in addition to the development 
of party organisations. By the time of the 1992 elections in Czechoslovakia two distinct 
party systems had emerged in the state’s two constituent republics. The focus on the 
relationship between the parties and inter-party competition is crucial to this 
observation. The Slovak nationalist parties, in particular, operated primarily with respect 
to their ‘national’ competitors and against the federation as such, rather than as part of a 
single federal party system.
In the four cases the development of party competition during the first parliaments 
centred on all Maor & Smith’s four levels of interaction. In Czecho-slovakia the 
‘hyphen debate’ over the republic’s name illustrated the duality of the system, elections 
were fought at the republican level and the two governments faced very different 
oppositions. The 1991 Polish elections saw the opposition parties competing on 
platforms explicitly critical of the government’s performance, and in the run-up to the 
1993 elections systematic competition and co-operation between potential coalition 
parties developed. Introduction of a 5% threshold for parliamentary representation
36 A full list o f all abbreviations is provided on pages 7-11.
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contributed to a degree of ‘freezing’ of the party system. Only Hungary featured a full 
set of parties by the first election (1990), a party system which has proved remarkably 
stable for a new democracy. Yet until well into the first parliaments even Hungary’s 
parties were better described as ‘milieu’ groups of like-minded politicians than fully 
developed parties.37
Hence the argument that the definition of a fully developed party system must include 
not only the existence of a number of parties and party control over or influence on 
governmental decision making, but also an element of inter-party competition. In short:
• Without a number of parties there can be no party system, a one-party system is an 
oxymoron. A political system featuring one party is possible, but this is not a party 
system since a system, by definition, requires more than one component. ‘One-party 
system’ is thus short for a one-party political system, and not the contradictory ‘one- 
party party system’.
• Without a degree of party control over governmental decision making the parties are 
relegated to being mere appendages of the state or the ruler. Should parties cease to 
control (even indirectly) aspects of decision making, the ‘“party state’ ceases to exist: 
the parties remain merely as a shell”.38 In this case the party system is both redundant 
and meaningless, unless there is a prospect of parties regaining control over power.
• The development of cartel parties has made Smith’s point about the relationship 
between the parties and the state more complicated, though separation of the two 
remains necessary.
• Inter-party competition is a crucial element of a party system (of course this makes 
the first point redundant, as inter-party competition requires more than one party). A 
fully developed system requires a degree of systematic, stable and predictable
37 G. G. Markus, “Parties, Camps and Cleavages in Post-Communist Hungary: Is the Weakness o f Social 
Democratic Forces Systemic?”, (manuscript, 1992).
38 G. Smith, “What is a Party System?”, p.361.
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• interaction between the component parties. Where a competitive relationship between 
parties (and government and opposition) is lacking, the party system must be 
qualified as ‘emerging’ or ‘nascent’. It does not inevitably develop into a fully 
developed party system.
This argument suggests that a party system can be less than fully developed. Several 
factors may make for a ‘nascent’ party system rather than a fully developed and 
integrated system.
• A party system may consist of several ‘sub-systems’ that are more significant than 
the system as a whole, i.e., the system is not fully integrated, and the sub-systems are 
dominant. Examples include the European Parliament and the Czechoslovak party 
system 1990-92.
• The party system and parliament may not be the key location of political conflict. In 
other words, non-party or extra-parliamentary competition may be more significant 
than inter-party competition. Both Russian and EC politics have been more 
concerned with inter-institutional and national/personal competition than inter-party 
competition.
• Inter-party competition may take second place to intra-party competition. The early 
stages of the East Central European party systems were dominated by the 
development of parties rather than competition between these parties.
• Inter-party competition and co-operation may be highly unstable, i.e., the relationship 
between the parties could be fluid. This has been the case in some of the East Central 
European party systems, notably the Hungarian.
Any of these developments can affect fully developed party systems, threatening the 
system or at least the electoral prospects of ‘dysfunctional’ parties. For example, the 
Belgian party system has been under pressure from the development of two sub­
systems. The ‘clean hands’ scandals in Italy took political competition beyond the party
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system temporarily in 1990-92. Disproportionate intra-party competition contributed the 
British Labour Party’s dysfunctional strategy following their 1979 defeat, and 
something similar could be happening to the Conservative Party in the context of 
divisions over European integration.
Therefore, this definition of party systems in terms of the integrity of the system, the 
relationship between the party system and the state, and stable inter-party competition 
provides the context for analysis of the development of East Central European post­
communist party systems as well as a framework for considering potential pressure on a 
fully developed party system. Given this potential for instability, the term ‘nascent’ 
party system is preferable to ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ party systems as far as Russia 
and the European Parliament is concerned. This avoids the certainty of outcome 
suggested by development theory. The term ‘nascent’ will be used in the analysis of 
East Central European party systems as well, though it will be argued that by 1998 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics had achieved more or less fully 
developed party systems.
D isc l a im er
Before proceeding to the theoretical approach, sources and the outline of the thesis, a 
disclaimer is warranted. The above discussion should have made it clear that this project 
is primarily concerned with: i) theories of party system development; ii) the East Central 
European party systems (which make up an essential component of liberal democracy); 
and within this context: iii) the dynamics of party competition; and iv) the role of 
nationalism.
By extension, there are several things that this project is not about, notwithstanding the 
fact that they warrant closer study in their own right. First, it is not an empirical study of 
all the parties that make up the East Central European party systems, or even a complete 
study of all party strategies. Some literature on this is beginning to emerge, though on a 
case by case basis. There is evidently ample scope for comparative studies that focus on,
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e.g,. the agrarian parties. The present project aims to provide a theoretical framework for 
analysis.
Second, it does not constitute an evaluation of transitions to democracy or theories of 
transition, let alone a study of the 1989 revolutions. Linz & Stepan have provided a 
comprehensive comparative framework for the study of regime change, transition and 
consolidation, and Garton-Ash an authoritative account of the events of 1989.39 The four 
cases were chosen partly because of the relative success of their transition to liberal 
democracy, which was arguably consolidated by the time the communist parties 
accepted defeat and all major new players accepted the legitimacy of the new rules of 
the game.
Third, by extension, this project is not concerned with the development of the 
institutions of liberal democracy except insofar as this has a direct bearing on the party 
systems. This is perhaps the most contentious exclusion, as institutional arrangements 
such as electoral systems, the rule of law and free media are crucial to political 
competition in liberal democracies. The matter has however been expertly dealt with by 
Lijphart.40
Finally, in the context of nationalism and politics, this project does not offer a general 
theory of nationalism. The focus is on the role of issues raised by nationalism in party 
politics, in other words problems related to the lack of congruence between national and 
political boundaries in East Central Europe. Within this more limited context, one or 
two theoretical conclusions may be offered.
O n  I n s t it u t io n s
The exclusion of institutions is easily the most potentially controversial point, as a 
considerable body of literature addresses the impact of institutions on politics in general 
and on party system change and stability in particular. New institutionalists and
39 Linz & Stepan Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation; T. Garton-Ash, We the People, 
(Cambridge, Granta Books, 1990).
40 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”; see also D. Olson & P. Norton (eds.), The 
New Parliaments o f  Central and Eastern Europe, (London, Frank Cass, 1996).
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historical institutionalists focus on the extent to which institutions (rules of the game 
and ideas) can obscure efforts to achieve rational change and how they affect the 
trajectories of change.41 There are even some studies of the impact of institutions on 
public policy developments in East Central Europe.42 However, as far as the 
development of party systems is concerned, the initial period is characterised by 
institutional flux rather than stability. The new rules of the game enjoy legitimacy 
precisely because they are the result of negotiations between the main protagonists on 
the political scene, i.e., the political (proto-)parties. Hence the introduction of PR 
electoral systems across Western Europe as part of the democratisation process, as the 
conservative and liberal parties sought to limit any potential manufactured majority the 
socialist parties might be accorded under a plurality electoral system and the social 
democrat parties sought to guarantee their parliamentary presence.43 The same applies to 
East Central Europe.44 Institutions such as electoral systems are therefore dependent 
rather than independent variables during the early phases of party system development. 
Unless these institutions have been imposed from the outside, they therefore reflect the 
party system (or political constellations) rather than shape it. Only once the new system 
has been established and party systems have emerged do institutions affect party 
systems, e.g., in the form of barriers to entry. In short, they contribute to party system 
freezing rather than shape the party systems.45 This point is taken up in the second 
section of Chapter Three, below.
41 J. G. March & J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis o f  Politics, (New 
York, The Free Press, 1989); K. Thelen & S. Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics”, in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
42 S. Hanson, “The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change”, Comparative Political Studies 28:2 
(1995), 306-314; B. Geddes, “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 28:2 (1995), 239-274, and E. Commisso, “Legacies o f the Past or New  
Institutions? The Struggle over Restitution in Hungary”, Comparative Political studies, 28:2 (1995), 200- 
238.
43 Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties; A. Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation: Pluralism and 
Democracy in the Netherlands, (Berkeley, University o f California Press, 2nd ed. 1975).
44 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”.
45 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability.
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M e t h o d o lo g y  & S o u r c e s  
Th e  C o m p a r a t iv e  A p p r o a c h
The thesis draws on the advantages of a comparative approach to East Central European 
politics. It is based on the argument that a comparative approach is qualitatively 
different from an empirical examination of each of the cases, and analysis of party 
systems benefits from a theoretical and a comparative approach. Despite the legacy of 
the communist regimes, it will be argued that the East Central European states can be 
analysed in terms of theories developed for liberal democracy. Given the negotiated 
nature of the transitions and all major actors’ acceptance of the new rules of the game, 
consolidation of the new democracies was relatively swift.46 Therefore there is a case for 
analysing developments in these states in terms of theories developed for analysis of 
liberal democracies, thus providing an account of developments in post-communist East 
Central Europe that is not based on culture or unique conditions.
Though a number of factors contributing to the development of party system in each of 
the four cases may well be sui generis, these will be analysed through a comparative 
framework. Moreover, it will be argued that the key factors in the development of party 
systems are not peculiar to each state, but are related either to the specific nature of 
transition from communism or can be understood in broader theoretical terms. For 
example, the propensity of post-communist electorates to vote against the incumbent 
could be explained in terms of each specific historical case. But a comparative rational 
choice approach focusing on problems of economic transition, low party identification 
and retrospective voting provides a different explanation, and one that does not depend 
on the ‘peculiarities of post-communism’. It also forces rethinking of the incumbency 
advantage sometimes observed in West European politics.47
46 Di Palma, To Craft Democracies', Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. A similar definition is 
adopted by Linz & Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p.3.
47 See, e.g., R. Rose & T. Mackie, “Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability?”, in Daalder & Mair 
(eds.), Western European Party Systems, p. 115. E.g., in the Netherlands, a 10-seat ‘prime minister’s 
bonus’ in elections has been usual since 1977 for the party that furnished the incumbent prime minister 
(M. Van Hulten, London, 2 May 1997).
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Pa r t y  S y s t e m s  Th e o r y  a n d  R a t io n a l  C h o ic e
Party systems theory rests on three main pillars: theories of political parties and party 
ideology, theories of voting behaviour, and theories of party strategies and party 
competition. In the context of parties and ideology and voting behaviour there has been 
a conflict between rational choice approaches stressing the autonomy of actors and 
sociological approaches focusing on the social phenomena that shape politics.48 Even a 
number of theories of party competition have been based on sociological phenomena, 
notably Inglehart’s theories of post-materialism and party system change and Pedersen’s 
explanations of party system change in the 1970s.49 On the other hand, even Lipset & 
Rokkan’s ‘sociological’ approach has been praised for the extent to which it focused on 
party strategies and parties as rational actors, and the volatility expected in the 1970s did 
not materialise.50
In fact, looking at parties and party systems in terms of rational choice under given 
constraints overcomes several of these problems. The party systems debate moved into 
the 1990s with the debate between Bartolini & Mair’s focus on party system stability 
and Franklin, Mackie and Valen’s focus on electoral change.51 Rational choice theory 
offers one possible reconciliation of these alternative arguments, based on political 
parties as rational actors which act under certain constraints such as electoral change. 
Even if electoral change is related to changes in parties’ electoral strategies a rational 
choice analysis permits a dynamic relationship between voters and parties. And this
48 Alan Ware offers a slightly different but basically similar breakdown, based on sociological, 
institutional and competition-based explanations of parties and party systems. Within each o f these 
approaches parties and party systems can be considered more or less responsive to change in the factors 
that created them. A. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1996), p.8.
49 R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977); M. N. Pedersen, “Changing Patterns o f Electoral Volatility 
in European Party Systems; 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation”, in Daalder & Mair (eds.), Western 
European Party Systems.
50 Respectively, Sartori ‘The Sociology of Parties”; Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral 
Availability.
51 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability; Franklin, Valen & Mackie (eds.), 
Electoral Change.
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takes place within a wider institutional and social context. In other words, a rational 
actor-based approach provides room for institutional and sociological factors, but these 
are understood as constraints under which parties, voters and even party systems act and 
develop. This accounts for the continuing relevance of the left-right dimension despite 
changes in West European party programmes, as the main parties attempt to maintain 
the dominance of left-right competition in the name of self-preservation.52 The long term 
stability of West European party systems is thus explained in terms of parties as rational 
actors, whether from a 1960s or a 1990s perspective.53
Given the weakness, or at least fluidity, of institutional and sociological factors under 
the condition of post-communism, the rational choice approach becomes all the more 
relevant. If West European politics has left considerable scope for party strategy, the 
post-communist scene is more or less dominated by it. Not only is the rational choice 
approach necessary to reconcile the findings of the major studies on West European 
politics cited above, but it offers a coherent explanation of the development of East 
Central European parties in a comparative context. The key arguments featured in this 
thesis are therefore based on rational choice under a series of constraints, some of which 
are related to the ‘condition of post-communism’.54 If anything, post-communist party 
leaderships have enjoyed considerably more freedom that many of their western 
counterparts. The history of East Central European party systems is that of their 
development of party strategies at electoral and parliamentary level, a development 
which has been constrained by a number of factors relevant to party systems theory and 
which has taken these systems from nascent to fully developed party systems.
52 On left -  right competition, I. Budge, D. Robinson & D. Hearl, Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: 
Spatial Analyses o f  Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987).
53 Sartori, “The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review”; G. Smith, “A Systems Perspective on Party 
System Change”.
54 The term and concept is from Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, Chapter 10.
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S o u r c e s
Choice and availability of sources remains a key question for the political scientist
engaged in comparative research. Key questions include the degree to which local
language sources are required and the role of mass media as a source.
• The thesis is essentially theoretical in orientation, which means that theoretical work 
remains part of the source material and that this remains relevant throughout the 
thesis rather than merely for the theoretical chapters.
• The thesis is essentially comparative, it is not an empirical investigation. Language 
constraints mean that only a limited number of sources in original Hungarian, Polish, 
Czech or Slovak languages have been used, though original material in translated 
and/or reported form has been used. Though this might constitute a significant 
problem for in-depth qualitative empirical research, this research is carried out on the 
assumption that this will be more than compensated for by the theoretical and 
comparative approach.
• Much of the empirical evidence is quantitative rather than qualitative. Two chapters 
are concerned primarily with quantitative data such as election results, opinion polls 
and survey data (often published in German) and the rise and fall of coalitions.
• As far as qualitative sources are concerned, post-communist East Central European 
politics offer some potential problems, and Chapter Seven focuses on party 
alignments, clearly a matter of qualitative judgement. The transition from 
communism has involved a remarkable degree of consensus on political system 
change and the desired goal of a free market economy. Ideological debate has been 
limited at best, with most party manifestos expressing commitment to the free 
market. Furthermore, on key issues such as nationalism, programmatic consensus 
often covers over divisions in terms of policy that are evident in speeches, legislation 
and the use of myths in electoral appeal. This question is addressed in more detail in
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Chapter Seven. Suffice it to point out that the analysis is based primarily on 
statements by parties or party leaders as reported in the media, journalists’ and 
commentators’ observations and actual policies and voted on or carried out. English 
and German language summaries and translations, such as BBC’s Summary of 
World Broadcasts, RFE/RL and Deutsche Welle Monitor-Dienst have proved 
particularly useful in this context.
T h e sis  Str u c tu r e  an d  C h a pt e r  O u t lin e
The key to this thesis is comparative politics and theories of party system development, 
and Lipset & Rokkan’s ‘freezing hypothesis’ remains the most influential theory of 
party system development and change, or rather lack of change. The subsequent debate 
on party system change and stability brings theories of party system development up to 
date. However, less has been written on the emergence of party systems after the 
‘classic’ period around the end of WW I discussed by Lipset & Rokkan. It will be 
argued that the Lipset-Rokkan model featured a series of assumptions about party 
competition, party structure and electorates, and that these were specific to the context 
of West European politics in the early Twentieth Century. Though the Lipset-Rokkan 
model provides a useful starting point, it must be amended if it is to be applied to post­
communist politics. The structure of the thesis reflects this argument, with a first section 
focusing on theory and theoretical arguments, a briefer second section focusing on 
comparative historical developments and the role of nationalism in East Central 
European politics in particular, and a third and more substantial section focusing on 
post-communist politics in East Central Europe.
S e c t io n  O n e  features two predominantly theoretical chapters. Chapter Two addresses 
party systems theory, including the development and change of party systems and party 
strategies. In this context theories of transition to democracy and political system 
change are reviewed critically, with a view to comments on the peculiarities and 
comparative features of the transition from communism in East Central Europe. Finally, 
this sets the scene for questions concerning the emergence and development of party
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systems in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Chapter Three proceeds 
to an analysis of the Lipset-Rokkan model and its potential application to East Central 
Europe. First, state-building and nationalism have proved more problematic 
impediments to liberal parliamentary democracy in this region than in West European 
politics, at least as far as Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases are concerned. Second, voter 
alignments are considerably more fluid under the condition of post-communism than 
was the case in early Twentieth Century Western Europe. Third, the West European 
political parties have developed considerably, and the new parties in either part of 
Europe have relatively little in common with the mass or ‘wing’ parties that dominate 
the Lipset-Rokkan model. Finally, and this is the core of a rational choice based 
approach, party strategy is crucial. Each of these factors must therefore be considered in 
analyses of post-communist East Central European politics.
S e c t io n  T w o  contains only one chapter, Chapter Four, devoted to a brief historical 
analysis. Party systems do not develop in a vacuum, even when they emerge after four 
decades of communism. Given the focus on state-building developed in Chapter Three, 
the historical analysis is primarily concerned with the development of party systems and 
party competition in the context of nationalism and democratisation. This will be 
developed further in Chapter Seven on post-communist party alignments.
S e c t io n  T h r e e  focuses on developments since 1989, and features four chapters: 
Chapters Five to Eight. Chapter Five takes a rational choice approach to voters, 
elections and the development of party identification under the condition of post­
communism. A combination of anti-incumbency voting, low party identification and 
problems of economic transition provide constraints for post-communist governments -  
they tend not to get re-elected. The new parties operate under conditions of considerable 
volatility, but party leaderships are relatively free from constraints imposed by members 
or extra-parliamentary organisations. Chapter Six considers the role of party 
organisation, again concluding that the party leadership enjoys considerable freedom of 
action in most cases. Populist parties, liberal elitist parties, social democrat parties and 
agrarian/peasant parties are compared, and though no form of organisation has proved 
superior, some forms of party organisation are more volatile and thus entail both
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advantages and great risk. The most substantial chapter of the section, Chapter Seven, 
analyses the post-communist party systems in terms of party alignments. Though inter­
party competition in East Central Europe can be analysed in terms of economic and non­
economic factors in a two-dimensional grid borrowed from analyses of West European 
politics, there are considerable advantages in incorporating issues derived from 
nationalism into the analysis. Again the analysis is based on rational choice theory, with 
a view to the subsequent chapter. Chapter Eight draws conclusions in terms of party 
competition and coalition strategies, explaining developments in post-communist 
politics in terms of the development of party systems and rational choice under the 
constraints considered above. This chapter serves as the main conclusion on the 
development of post-communist party systems.
T h e  C o n c l u s io n  focuses on party systems theory in the context of post-communism. 
Developments in post-communist East Central Europe have warranted analysis and re- 
evaluation of several premises and assumptions upon which theories of party system 
development and change rest. However, these theoretical conclusions are not limited to 
East Central European politics, but have implications for analyses of late Twentieth 
Century West European politics. The Italian second republic is the best case in point, 
analysis of its new party system requires similar theoretical considerations in terms of 
voters, parties, party alignments and party strategies. Therefore, though ‘the East 
Central European party system’ might in fact exist, it has very much in common with 
several countries otherwise classified as part of ‘the West European party system’.
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C h a p t e r  T w o  
A p p r o a c h e s  to  P o st -C o m m u n ist  P o l it ic s  
in  E a st  C e n t r a l  E u r o pe
“Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe”
- Daedalus, title o f  the Winter 1990 volume
Pa r t y  Sy st e m s  T h e o r y : D ev e l o pm e n t  a n d  C h a n g e
Party systems theory is based on three main pillars: parties as rational actors; the link 
between sociology and politics, including theories of voting behaviour; and patterns of 
inter-party competition. The nature of the party system, and of party system change, is 
therefore generally explained in terms of its component parts (the parties); sociological 
and other external constraints (cleavages); and patterns of inter-party competition 
(which can be shaped by changes in the rules of the game, i.e., the institutions). This 
distinction is reflected in three main works on party system stability and change, 
published in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Budge, Robinson & Hearl focus on 
changing party strategy; Mackie & Valen and Franklin on social change and its impact 
on party competition; and Bartolini & Mair on institutional and bloc stability.1
The debate over party system change and stability is therefore fought at three levels. 
First, parties are the main components of a party system, even if the system is more than 
the mere sum of its components. These can be understood primarily as office-seekers,2 
or, alternatively, as representatives of social groups or ideological families, or reflecting
1 I. Budge, D. Robinson & D. Hearl, Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses o f  Post-War 
Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987); S. Bartolini 
& P. Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: the Stabilization o f  European Electorates 
1885-1985, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. N. Franklin, H. Valen & T.T. Mackie 
(eds.), Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). Mair notes a similar division, before proceeding to 
caution against excessive focus on electoral change, P. Mair, “Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A 
Challenge to Party?”, West European Politics, 7:4 (1984), 170-184.
2 A. Downs, An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, (New York, Harper & Row, 1957); and elitist theories, 
e.g., R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study o f  the Oligarchical Tendencies o f  Modern 
Democracy, (New York, Dover, 1959); J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 
(London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1943).
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cleavages.3 In either case, changes in party organisation and party strategy are linked to 
party system change -  either precipitating it or responding to it. Sartori’s approach to 
parties as agents that translate cleavages into political competition combines the two 
roles of the party, office seeker and interest-representative, while allowing the party to 
remain an independent variable.4 This approach to parties as rational actors that operate 
within given parameters helps resolve the question of whether parties shape voters’ 
preferences and drive politics, or whether they primarily respond to external factors. 
Parties make a strategic choice whether to persuade voters through ideology or interest- 
specific appeal, or to adopt a catch-all strategy. In other words, parties can be interpreted 
as more or less independent agents attempting to persuade voters to vote for them 
(preference shapers), or as more responsive to changes in parameters (accommodating 
voters’ preferences). Variations in dependence have been explained with reference to 
several factors, including reliance on external organisations, availability of resources, 
ideological commitment and organisation, or type of party.5
Second, party systems development and change directly reflect the strategic choices 
made by parties. The nature of competition is an integral element of the party system.6 
The rules of the game, as negotiated by the parties at some point during the last century 
and a half, and the development of institutions of party competition shape the 
development of the party system. If one form of party organisation proves superior, the 
pressure is on the rival parties to adopt this form, or better still, an improved form of 
organisation and strategy.7
3 K. von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (Aldersgot, Gower, 1985); Duverger, 
Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, (London, Methuen, 1954); S. M. 
Lipset & S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction”, in S. 
M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, (New York, The Free Press, 1967); 
Budge et al., Ideology, Strategy and Party Change.
4 G. Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties: A Critical Review”, in O. Stammer (ed.), Party Systems, Party 
Organisations, and the Politics o f  New Masses, (Berlin, Free University o f Berlin, 1968).
5 A. Panebianco, Modelli di partito: Organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici, (1980), translated as A. 
Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); 
P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science, 
(London, Harvester, 1991); O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, in 
J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1966); Duverger, Political Parties', D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western 
Democracies, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1967).
6 G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976).
7 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems”; Duverger, Political Parties', 
Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies.
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Third, the relationship between sociological factors and party systems remains 
contentious. Even if one were to accept, provisionally, that voters are the driving force 
and parties primarily respond to voters’ demands, the extent to which cleavages affect 
voting is highly contentious. Down’s rational voter acts more or less completely 
independently of social cleavages, whereas party identification approaches usually draw 
on cleavages.8 Moreover, a considerable degree of party identification has been 
explained in rational choice terms, as a voter’s iterated rational analysis of parties at 
subsequent elections may lead to party identification as a short-cut to future elections.9
This debate is to a large extent about structure and agency, with political sociologists 
stressing structure, institutionalists stressing the rules of the game, and rational choice 
theorists focusing on agency. Each can and does focus more or less on the parties, party 
competition and the extent to which voters shape the party system. Lipset & Rokkan’s 
framework for analysis combines actor-based theories with structural constraints. Parties 
are agents that translate cleavages into political competition, and the resulting party 
system depends on the alliances offered and accepted. Cleavages, institutions and the 
closure of electoral space provide structural constraints on party competition, i.e., 
parameters within which parties must work. In the Lipset-Rokkan schema the agents’ 
freedom of action is severely constrained, but the role of parties as translators of 
structure into politics is crucial.
This combination of structure and agency characterises most of the literature on post­
communist politics. The structure -  institution -  agency debate remains within each of 
the three main approaches, which comprise i) transition theories, influenced by 
previous comparative work on transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America; ii) 
approaches that stress the specific nature of East Central Europe or each individual case 
study that can, for the want of a better term, be called East Central European
8 R. Rose & D. W. Urwin, “Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems since 1945”, Political 
Studies, 18:3 (1970), 387-319; Franklin, Mackie & Valen (eds.), Electoral Change; P. Dunleavy & C. 
Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s, (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1985), on changing patterns and definitions o f class voting, from class defined by 
production cleavages to consumption-based definitions.
9 M. P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1981).
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exceptionalism; and iii) comparative approaches that analyse post-communist East 
Central European developments in terms of theories developed in the field of 
comparative West European or US politics. The main characteristics of the three 
approaches, as applied to East Central Europe, are set out in table 2.1, below. A fourth 
approach builds on the International Relations literature. Though the primary focus 
here is domestic politics, international relations provide ‘super-rules’ within which the 
domestic games are played and external actors who influence processes of party system 
development.
Theories of transition and consolidation focus primarily on the paths of liberalisation 
and democratisation, particularly on negotiated transitions from authoritarianism to 
(liberal) democracy. The most influential work in this strand is the four-volume 
O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead project, which has since been updated to 
incorporate and explain the transitions from communism in East Central Europe.10 
These approaches focus primarily on the old regime, the paths of transition and viability 
of negotiated pacts, and the relative strength of the old regime’s institutions and civil 
society. Alternatively, Di Palma and Przeworski’s approaches owe more to rational 
choice and game theory, as they focus primarily on the legitimacy of the new system in 
the eyes of the main actors.11 Consolidation of democracy is achieved with the adoption 
of a new set of rules of the game, accepted by all major players.
However, more can be learned from previous waves of democratisation in Europe than 
theories of democratisation based on a comparison between southern Europe and Latin
10 G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter & L. Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects fo r  
Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
in particular volume IV, published as G. O’Donnell & P. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986); G. Pridham & P. G. Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party 
Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, (London, Routledge, 1996); P. G. Lewis, “Democratisation in 
Eastern Europe”, Coexistence, 27 (1990), 245-67; A. Agh, “The Transition to Democracy in East Central 
Europe: A Comparative View”, Journal o f Public Policy, 11 (1991), 133-151; G. Ekiert, 
“Democratisation Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration”, British Journal o f  
Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; A. Agh, “The ‘Comparative Revolution’ and the Transition in 
Central and Southern Europe”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 5 (1993), 231-252; J. J. Linz & A. Stepan, 
Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post- 
Communist Europe, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
11 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991); G. Di Palma, “To Craft Democracies: 
An Essay on Democratic Transitions”, (Berkeley, University o f California Press, 1990).
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America alone. The democratisation process in Europe in the run-up to and aftermath of 
World War One provides examples of transitions leading to the consolidation of liberal, 
social democratic, fascist regimes as well as ‘traditional dictatorships’. Luebbert holds 
that this can be explained primarily in terms of alliances offered and accepted by the 
main parties, though the viability of such alliances depended on structural constraints.12 
Rokkan’s work on democratisation is in the same vein, and, like Luebbert’s is directly 
linked to the party systems in the new democracies.13
Offe’s “triple revolution” stresses the special character of the 1989 transitions, which 
sets the transitions from communism apart from earlier waves not only in terms of 
economic transition but also due to the process of state-building.14 In contrast to the 
regime-only transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, these transitions also 
feature change of the economic system and challenges to national boundaries. 
Moreover, they all move toward the same end, liberal democracy and the free market (at 
least nominally, given the lack of normative alternatives). Likewise, Fukuyama’s “end 
of history” thesis holds that the collapse of communism saw the end of ideological 
struggle between alternative models.15 The 1989 transitions lacked ideological 
alternatives to liberal democracy, leaving it (or a bastardised version) dominant by 
default. To be sure, Western pressure, the prospect of the EU and NATO membership, 
and IMF involvement in economic transitions reinforce this outcome in most cases.
The transition theory approach is challenged and rejected by a series of approaches that 
share a common focus on East Central European exceptionalism. Briefly, the 
transitions from communism in East Central Europe are considered more or less sui 
generis, and are therefore not directly comparable to previous waves of transitions, 
whether West European, South European or Latin American. First, the historical East
12 G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins o f  
Regimes in Interwar Europe, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
13 S. Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study o f  the Processes o f  
Development, (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970).
14 C. Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East- 
Central Europe”, in G. Lengyl, C. Offe & J. Tholen (eds.), Economic Institution, Actors and Attitudes: 
East Central Europe in Transition, (Budapest/Bremen, Working Papers, 1992); C. Offe “Capitalism by 
Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East-Central Europe”, Social 
Research, 58:4 (1991), 865-892.
15 F. Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
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Central European tradition emphasises the long term differences in political, 
institutional or sociological terms between Western and Eastern Europe, based on 
factors such as the strength of civil society, political traditions and etatism, or 
nationalism.16 Second, analyses grounded in comparative communism draw on the post­
war period and the destruction of civil society, emphasising the differences between the 
people’s democracies in Eastern Europe. Again the focus is either on the structure of 
civil society, on political culture and economic problems, or on the institutional 
legacy.17
However, neither the transition theories nor the East Central European exceptionalism 
approaches say much about the new regimes, i.e., the outcome of the transition. They 
are primarily concerned with the success of the transition process and the consolidation 
of democracy, and potential obstacles. While transition theory focuses on the process of 
transition, East Central European exceptionalism tends to focus on the conditions that 
inhibit or promote transition to liberal democracy. Considerably less has been written 
about the new regimes from a comparative West European politics perspective, and 
though this literature is growing it has tended to make crude extrapolations from West 
European politics.18 Nevertheless, a few efforts stand out. Gordon Smith’s approach to
16 Respectively, J. Szucs, “Three Historical Regions in Europe”, in J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the 
State, (London, Verso, 1988); G. Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1993); E. Gellner, “Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe”, New Left Review, 189 (1991), 127-134; 
H. Kohn, The Idea o f  Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background, (New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1944), J. Plamenatz, “Two Types o f Nationalism”, in E. Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism: The 
Nature and Evolution o f  an Idea, (London, Edward Arnold, 1976).
17 Respectively, J. L. Curry, “Pluralism in East Central Europe: Not Will it Last, but What is it?”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 26:4 (1993), 446-461; S. Hanson, “The Leninist Legacy and 
Institutional Change”, Comparative Political Studies 28:2, (1995), 306-314; B. Geddes, “A Comparative 
Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe”, Comparative Political Studies 28:2 (1995), 239- 
274 , and E. Commisso, “Legacies of the Past or New Institutions? The Struggle over Restitution in 
Hungary”, Comparative Political studies, 28:2 (1995), 200-238.
181. Selenyi & S. Selenyi, “The Vacuum in Hungarian Politics: Class and Parties”, New Left Review, 187
(1991),121-137; R. Rose, “Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies”, Party Politics, 
1:4 (1996), 549-563; K. von Beyme, “L'europeizzazione dell'Europa occidentale”, in M. Calise (ed.), 
Come cambiano i partiti, (Bologna, II Mulino, 1992); K. von Beyme, Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, 
(Frankfurt-am-Main, Suhrkamp, 1994). Even Korosenyi borders on committing this fallacy on an 
exploratory level, though he warns against it as he does so, A. Korosenyi, “Revival o f the Past or a New  
Beginning? The Nature o f Post-Communist Politics”, in A. Bozoki, A. Korosenyi, & G. Schopflin (eds.), 
Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1992). 
Rivera’s test o f the Lipset-Rokkan model falls into this category, S. W. Rivera, “Historical Cleavages or 
Transition Mode: Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia”, 
Party Politics, 2:2 (1996), 177-208.
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post-communist democracy draws on the comparative West European politics literature, 
posing questions about parties as well as electorates and institutional arrangements.19 
Peter Mair shares this comparative politics approach, as East Central Europe is analysed 
in the context of factors that shape party system stability and change in Western 
Europe.20 Kitschelt’s focus on the legacy of communism in terms of actors’ resources 
draws on rational choice analysis on the part of voters and party elites, while leaving 
room for institutional manipulation. The contrast with West European party competition 
is based on differences in the relationship between political and economic liberalism.21 
Relying less on sociological factors than Kitschelt does, Lijphart nevertheless takes a 
similar approach. Drawing on Rokkan’s work, he analyses the institutional frameworks 
set up in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in terms of early Twentieth Century 
West European developments.22
Though the International Relations literature has not had much of an impact on party 
system analysis, the international system provides the wider context within which 
democratisation and party system development is located. Some of the transition theory 
literature has emphasised the extent to which the end of the Cold War has affected 
political developments in East Central Europe. The competition between communism 
and fascism that provided alternatives to liberal democracy in the inter-war period (and, 
after the war, between communism and liberalism) has been replaced by a liberal 
democratic consensus, if not the ‘end of history’.23 Though little literature has been 
dedicated exclusively to the impact of external forces on party system development, the 
role of Moscow in directing West European communist parties and Washington’s 
involvement in post-war Italian politics has been discussed extensively.24 Tsebelis’ work
19 G. Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, in S. Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional 
Architecture o f  Eastern Europe, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993). Also as paper presented at the School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1991.
20 P. Mair, “What is Different about Post-Communist Party Systems?”, Studies in Public Policy No. 259, 
(University o f Strathclyde, 1996).
21 H. Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society 20:1
(1992), 7-50.
22 A. Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 
1989-91”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 4:2 (1992), 207-223.
23 Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man.
24 D. Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997), p.448, 
460-461; G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, (Aldershot, Gower, 1989), 176-
182.
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on ‘nested games’, i.e., games in party politics at several levels, can therefore be 
extended to include supra-national games.25 Moreover, the literature on the mutual 
impact of European Union and Member State systems, i.e., ‘policy syncretism’, could 
be extended to suggest that supranational parties in the EU have an impact on national 
party systems.26 In post-communist East Central Europe, this has pulled all party 
systems in one direction, towards general acceptance of liberal democracy and the free 
market as normative models.
25 G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, (Berkeley, California University 
Press, 1990).
26 S. Eyre & N. Sitter, “From PTT to NRA: Towards a New Regulatory Regime?”, in K. A. Eliassen & M. 
Sjovaag (eds.), European Telecommunications Liberalisation: Too Good to be True?, (London, 
Routledge, 1999); J. Gaffney (ed.), Political Parties and the European Union, (London, Routledge, 
1996).
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Table 2.1 Approaches to analysis o f post-communist politics in East Central Europe.
M a in  f o c u s  
o f  t h e
APPROACHES:
(R a t io n a l ) A c t o r  
E l e m e n t  
(A g e n c y )
In s t it u t io n a l
E l e m e n t s
(In s t it u t io n s )
S t r u c t u r a l  E l e m e n t s  
(S t r u c t u r e )
T r a n s it io n
T h e o r ie s
Transition
Democratisation
•  rational actors
•  negotiated outcom es
•  leadership control
•  actors’ acceptance o f  
new  rules
•  alliances offered and 
accepted
•  the path o f  transition
•  viability o f  pacts
•  the role o f  the military
•  new  rules o f  the gam e, 
and their legitim acy
•  uncertainty
•  com petition or 
restricted com petition
•  the strength o f  c iv il 
society
•  structural prerequisites 
for liberal dem ocracy
•  econom ic structure
•  m ulti-ethnic states
•  irredentism
E a st  C e n t r a l
E u r o pea n
E x c e p t io n a l is m
Long term 
1945-89
•  historical 
institutionalism  limits 
rational choice and/or 
shapes preferences.
•  the left is discredited
•  inexperienced elites
•  politics conducted in 
absolute terms
•  choices affect w hich  
legacies are important
•  institutional legacy o f  
com m unism
•  national d ivisions and 
a w eak state-system
•  etatism: the strong  
state vs. c iv il society
•  precarious liberal 
dem ocratic institutions
•  w eak c iv il society  is 
the legacy  o f  
com m unism  and/or 
pre-com m unist era
•  historical cleavages
•  ethnic d ivisions
•  irredentism
•  political culture
C o m p a r a t iv e  
W e st  E u r o pea n  
P o l it ic s
Party system  
development
Stability vs.
Change
•  rational actor 
assumptions: o ffice  
seekers or p olicy  
makers
•  alliances and 
coalitions
•  econom ic policy  seen  
as the priority
•  parties and party 
organisation: change 
and adaptation
•  parties preserve the 
party system
•  challenges to the 
status quo and 
responses
•  new  rules o f  the gam e  
negotiated by rational 
actors
•  barriers to new  
parties: thresholds to 
com petition
•  party competition: 
adversarial, polarised  
or consensual 
(consociational)
•  institutional freezing  
and stability (inertia)
•  agenda setting and 
m aintenance o f  left - 
right com petition
•  c leavages
•  c leavage structures
•  re- and de-alignm ent
•  left -  right dim ension
•  actors’ resources
I n t e r n a t io n a l
R e l a t io n s
Big power/super­
powers influence
European
integration
•  im pact o f  W est 
European and U S  
ideology
•  im pact o f  the 
supranational system  
on dom estic system s 
(syncretism )
•  nested (m ulti-level) 
gam es
•  international relations 
institutionalism
•  im pact on dom estic  
policy , o f  the IMF and 
the European U nion
•  im pact o f  security  
arrangements (O SCE, 
N A T O , CE etc.)
•  the ‘end o f  h istory’ 
m eans there are no  
alternative m odels to  
liberal dem ocracy
•  end o f  the C old War
•  East Central Europe 
betw een (free from ) 
R ussia and Germany; 
R ussian and the w est
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T h e o r ie s  o f  T r a n sit io n  a n d  Sy st e m  C h a n g e :
Tr a n s it io n  Th e o r y
As a separate field within political science, transition theory owes its existence to 
comparative studies of transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s. 
Together with Rustow’s theoretical model for transitions to democracy, the most 
influential work on transitions has been the four-volume O’Donnell, Schmitter & 
Whitehead project on Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy in 
Latin America and Southern Europe fr Their main conclusions centre on liberalisation, 
the paths from authoritarianism, the viability of pacts, and on the role of civil society 
and state institutions. Transition theory therefore deliberately departs from the 
sociological or political culture explanations advanced previously to account for 
democratisation and/or the failure of democracy, replacing functionalist approaches 
concerned with long-term socio-economic developments and modernisation with 
genetic approaches that stress the scope for political choice.28
The process of transition and the legacy of the previous regime are therefore seen as 
crucial variables that affect the development of new institutions. As the new rules of the 
game are negotiated “institutional stability thus becomes an integral part of party
27 O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Rustow’s work 
straddles the border between transitions theory and studies o f ‘first transitions’, D. A. Rustow, 
“Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics, 3 (1970), 337-363. Two 
useful compilations are G. Pridham (ed.), The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in 
Spain, Greece and Portugal, (London, Cass, 1984); G. Pridham (ed.), Transitions to Democracy: 
Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, (Aldershot, 
Dartmouth, 1995).
28 This distinction is made in G. Pridham, “Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic 
Consolidation in Southern Europe”, West European Politics, 13 (1990), 103-117, p. 107; G. Pridham & P. 
G. Lewis, “Introduction: Stabilising Fragile Democracies and Party System Development”, in Pridham & 
Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies, p.4. On political culture see, G. Almond & S. Verba, The 
Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1963); on modernisation see S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1968); S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
(Norman, University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991); B. Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making o f  the Modern World, (London, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 
1967).
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competition.”29 Party competition is to some extent about maintaining and modifying 
the new rules of the game. The problem of applying transition theory to Southern 
Europe is that it does not explain the differences in transition. Though the outcome was 
similar in all three cases inasmuch as liberal democratic regimes were installed and 
survived, the three paths of transition differed considerably. In Spain regime reformists 
and the King acted while the rest of the state’s institutions stood aside (except for the 
1981 attempted military coup), in Portugal the regime was overthrown by state actors 
(the younger officers), while in Greece the military (as a state institution) transferred 
power from the military regime to civilians.30
More significantly, transition theory says little or nothing about the emergent party 
systems, despite the integral role of parties to the transition and consolidation process.31 
In other words, the development of South European party systems cannot be explained 
in terms of transition theory, even if the path of transition clearly affects it, and neither 
can party system stability. The response on the part of country specialists has been to 
explain each party system in terms of sui generis factors, without a theoretical 
framework. The new parties are understood in terms of their past, e.g., New Democracy 
and PASOK failed to modernise, holding on to old clientelistic practices rather than 
developing into modem catch-all or mass parties respectively.32
Transition theory’s focus on the path of transition to democracy is, therefore, more 
useful in terms of institution-building than for party system formation.33 It is more of a 
tool for classification of cases of transitions, and for identifying the obstacles to the
29 Y. Papadoupoulos, “Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change”, West 
European Politics, 12:2 (1989), 55-71, p.64; G. T. Mavrogordatos, “The Greek Party System: A Case of 
‘Limited but Polarised Pluralism?”, West European Politics, 1 ’A  (1984), 156-169.
30 Hence Fishman argues the need to distinguish between state and regime. R. M. Fishman, “Rethinking 
State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transitions to Democracy”, World Politics, 42 (1990), 422-440.
31 E.g., K. Medhurst, “Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy” in Pridham (ed.), 
The New Mediterranean Democracies', P. N. Diamandouros, “Transition to and Consolidation of, 
Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-1983: A Tentative Assessment”, in Pridham (ed.), The New 
Mediterranean Democracies.
32 C. Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case o f ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism?”, West 
European Politics, 7:2 (1984), 99-118. On the Iberian cases, see J. R Lewis & A. M. Williams, “Social 
Cleavages and Electoral Performance: The Social Basis for Portuguese Political Parties, 1976-83”, and M 
Caciagli, “Spain: Parties and the Party System in Transition”, both in Pridham (ed.), The New 
Mediterranean Democracies.
33 A. Lijphart, “The Southern European Examples of Democratization: Six lessons for Latin America”, 
Government and Opposition, 25 (1990), 68-84.
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establishment of liberal democracy.34 The negotiations during the period of transition, 
between the old regime and the opposition in Hungary and Poland, and the two 
constituent republics in the Czecho-Slovak case, provide part of the context in which 
party systems developed. Rustow’s assertion that “national unity is [...] a background 
condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of democratisation but 
that otherwise its timing is irrelevant” may hold for the prospects for transition towards 
democracy.35 The impact of national divisions on party systems in Finland, Greece and 
Ireland indicates that this assertion does not hold for the development o f  party systems. 
Though cleavages and the timing of their politicisation might not determine the outcome 
of transitions, they certainly provide parameters within which party competition takes 
place.
D e m o c r a t is a t io n  a n d  C o n s o l id a t io n
Though transition theory attaches considerable weight to the main actors’ strategies, 
much of this is abandoned in the work on the consolidation of democracy. As they move 
to analyse consolidation, even authors who focus more or less exclusively on actors in 
transitions shift their attention toward structural factors and country-specific conditions. 
However, a ‘minimalist’ approach provides an alternative that focuses on acceptance of 
the newly negotiated rules of the game and the players’ incentives to comply with these. 
Both strands permit conclusions about the emergence of party systems, though neither 
tends actually to draw them. In fact, parties and party systems are usually considered as 
variables that affect the process of consolidation, rather than as affected by it. 
Exceptions to this rule include analyses of the relationship between parties and the new 
rules of the game.
Liphart’s focus on institution-building as the crucial element of transition is echoed in 
minimalist approaches to consolidation, which investigate the development of new 
institutions and major players’ acceptance of the rules of the game in Portugal, Spain
34 A case in point is T. L. Karl & P. C. Schmitter, “Modes o f Transition in Latin America, Southern and 
Eastern Europe”, International Social Science Journal, 128 (1991), 269-284, where successful transition 
is considered less probable in Eastern Europe; and more optimistically, with the benefit o f some 
hindsight, Linz & Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
35 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”, p.351.
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and Greece.36 The crucial point is that though institutions may contribute to the freezing 
of political alternatives and the party system, they are designed by the actors involved in 
building the new regime and therefore reflect the nascent party systems rather than 
shape them.37 The exception would be cases in which external powers determine the 
institutional set-up, e.g., in both halves of Germany after WW II. This has not been the 
case in Southern or East Central Europe, even if external influence cannot be denied.
One problem in transition theory lies in comparing transitions in which the key pacts 
between the major players are rapidly agreed and there is no effective resistance to the 
new regime and cases in which an institution like the military retains a degree of control 
and the pacts are far less certain. Hence the consolidation literature’s concern with the 
stabilisation of ‘fragile democracies’ and potential disruption of the democratisation 
process. The ‘minimalist’ approach owes much to Di Palma and Przeworski, both of 
whom stress the legitimacy of the new rules of the game in the eyes of the players that 
may disrupt the game.38 These are actor-based models, in Przeworski’s case based on 
rational choice analysis and game theory linking the economic and democratic 
transitions. In contrast to the minimalist approach and the actor-orientation found in the 
transition literature, ‘maximalist’ approaches to consolidation stress structural factors.39 
Social and historical cleavages, clientelist practices, and the strength of civil society all 
shape the prospects for consolidation, even if “the primary (but by no means exclusive) 
determinant of consolidation of democracy (and type of ensuing democracy) is the mode 
of transition.”40 The minimalist approaches are directly applicable to post-communist 
East Central Europe inasmuch as the four cases featured near total acceptance of the 
new rules of the game. Of course this sets the scene for the development of party 
systems, but it says little about the emerging party systems (though one may infer from 
Przeworski that economic questions will assume a high priority). The maximalist
36 G. Di Palma, “Government Performance: An Issue and Three Cases in Search o f a Theory”, West 
European Politics, 7 (1984), 172-187.
37 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability', Lijphart, “Democratisation and 
Constitutional Choice...”; Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties.
38 The term is Di Palma’s, To Craft Democracies', Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
39 This is the case even where they are transition theorists, e.g. G. Pridham, “Political Actors, Linkages 
and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe”, West European Politics, 13 (1990), 
103-117.
40 P. C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation o f Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences and 
Types”, in Pridham (ed.) Transitions to Democracy, p. 567.
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literature says even less, treating the parties and their relationship with the state and 
society as crucial variables in explaining consolidation.41 Where parties and party 
systems are the main subject of research, they are considered from the same perspective 
as consolidation and as influenced by the same structural factors.42
Analyses of transitions to full democracy in early Twentieth Century Western Europe 
point to the significance of negotiated settlements by political parties (domestic, within 
states), whether in the Netherlands (1917), Sweden (1907) or on a comparative basis.43 
These analyses stress the link between democratisation (introduction of the universal 
male franchise) and proportional representation electoral systems, as all parties to 
negotiations take cautious approaches and protect themselves from worst-case scenarios 
by opting for PR. Lipset & Rokkan’s thresholds to political participation are thus 
lowered, legitimising opposition, providing full political rights, easing the procedure for 
new parties to gain representation while providing an institutional check on majority (or 
plurality) power. New rules of the game are designed, which entail uncertainty of 
outcome but clear legal constraints on the limits of majority power. In this schema 
alliances and bargaining provide the key to democratisation, even if the parties act under 
structural constraints.44 In other words, parties act under constraints, their action is not 
wholly determined by them. The new institutions reflect the party system, inasmuch as 
they are the product of negotiated transition. The main problem in terms of East Central 
Europe is that the regime change was not driven primarily by domestic political parties, 
and to the extent that it was, these were conglomerate opposition movements.
41 P. C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups”, American 
Behavioural Scientist, 35 (1992), 422-449; Pridham, “Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions”; and G. 
Pridham (ed), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, 
(London, Published for Centre for Mediterranean Studies by Routledge, 1990).
42 Papadoupoulos, “Parties, the State and Society in Greece”; Pridham & Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile 
Democracies.
43 A. Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, (Berkeley, 
University o f California Press, 2nd ed. 1975); Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”; Rokkan, Citizens, 
Elections, Parties.
44 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy.
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Th e  E n d  o f  H is t o r y ? E c o n o m ic  a n d  N a t io n a l  Tr a n s it io n s  a f t e r  t h e  C o l d  Wa r
The East Central European transitions stand out from earlier waves of transition not 
only because they form part of a given area, but also due to their common starting point 
and the timing of this ‘fourth wave’. To be sure, the ‘one area’ thesis has been 
disputed.45 Yet despite their internal differences, all the post-communist cases share the 
combination of political and economic system change. Differences between communist 
economies pale before the comparison with the market-based economies that they have 
made models for economic transition. However, the transitions from communism faced 
no contests about the goal, which was capitalist liberal democracy (however ill-defined). 
Though interpretations of this concept might differ, liberal democracy was universally 
accepted as the prescriptive model. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ point is thus well taken. 
Though conflict may continue, it will not be over major ideological alternatives. If the 
need for economic transition complicated the democratisation projects, then the ‘end of 
history’ removed competing and potentially destabilising ideological alternatives. The 
East Central European cases also differ considerably from previous non-European 
transitions because proximity to West European markets is a significant factor in 
institutional change in East Central Europe.46 The post-war and 1970s West European 
waves of democratisation demonstrated this effect, directly through occupation in 
Germany and Italy and thorough EC membership in the Mediterranean cases.
Offe coined the term ‘triple transition’ to distinguish the transition from communism 
from previous transitions not only in terms of economic transition but also in terms of 
state-building. Hence the problems of comparative work on transitions. Given the task 
of economic system change and the problems of ethnic minorities and territorial 
integrity, “the suggestive temptation to add a fourth group to these [Italy, Japan and 
West Germany; the South European cases; and the South American transitions] -  i.e. 
that of the Central and East European states -  and to analyze them with the proven 
instruments supplied by this tradition turns out, however, to be unsuitable and
45 Special issue on “Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe”, Daedalus, 119:1 (Winter 1990).
46 Hanson, “The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change”.
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misleading.”47 Linz & Stepan’s attempt to deal with this problem represents a major 
development in transition theory. They rightly point out that most of the literature on 
nationalism is not concerned primarily with the links between democracy and 
nationalism, but then proceed to consider this primarily as a question of territorial 
integrity. In inter-war Eastern Europe, the “priority given to nation-building in the state 
contributed to democratic instability, crisis, and sometimes demise in later decades of 
the state itself.”48 Other theories of nationalism suggest that the phenomenon might be 
more complicated.49 Translated into political competition, the principle that the world is 
divided into nations and that each nation should have its own state amounts to more 
than conflict between states.50 Divisions within states, between parties holding different 
views on the implications of multi-ethnic states, can and do affect political competition.
The debate on consociationalism and democratic stability in Western Europe illustrates 
the point, i.e., the potential danger of majority abuse of power in key areas such as 
education policy, media control, appointments to state institutions, and through indirect 
discrimination or, in economic terms, biased land and voucher distribution.51 To be sure, 
as the problems of the Northern Irish peace process illustrate, the consociational 
approach depends on a degree of consensus on borders (or at least willingness to 
postpone the question). Ethnicity may therefore be a more serious problem than 
religious divisions (which frequently come equipped with hierarchical organisations) for 
the politics of accommodation.52 Nevertheless, this suggests that nationalism is not a 
specifically East Central European problem. Though it is invoked to explain and justify
47 C. Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East- 
Central Europe”, Social Research, 58:4 (1991), 865-892, p.868.
48 Linz & Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 24.
49 G. Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West”, in C. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism 
and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995); G. Schopflin, “Ethnic 
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: Analyses and Solutions”, (manuscript, 1996); G. Schopflin, 
“From Communism to Democracy in Hungary”, in Bozoki, Korosenyi, & Schopflin (eds.), Post- 
Communist Transition", see also J. Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, (Budapest, Central European 
University Press, 1994).
50 Gellner’s definition, E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p .l.
51 This is derived partly from McGarry & O’Leary’s analysis o f Northern Ireland and efforts to reach 
power-sharing arrangements. J. McGarry & B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1995).
52 B. Barry, “Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy”, British Journal o f  Political 
Science, 5 (1975), 477-505; H. Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme”, World Politics, 26 
(1974), 604-621.
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East Central European exceptionalism, there is no shortage of nationalist cleavages or 
issues in West European politics. In other words, the nationalist dimension complicates 
the application of transition theory, and warrants focus on the impact of national 
questions on political competition. The case for exceptionalism is considered below.
E a st  C e n tr a l  E u r o pe a n  E x c e p t io n a l ism
The comparative presumptions that characterise transition theory are challenged and 
rejected by analysts focusing on the exceptional characteristics of democratisation in 
East Central Europe. Offe’s triple revolution argument merely asserts that the transitions 
from post-communism are different from previous waves, not that comparative analysis 
is therefore futile. However, there is no shortage of analysts of East Central European 
history and politics who argue that, for one reason or another, this is an exceptional 
region that cannot be approached on a comparative basis. Or rather, comparisons are 
warranted only within the region. The specific characteristics of each state are more 
significant than their similarities with other cases outside this particular region.
This series of arguments can, for the sake of simplicity, be collectively filed under the 
heading ‘East Central European exceptionalism’. The two main sub-groups reflect pre­
occupation with long-term political and structural factors on the one hand, and the 
effects of four decades of communist rule on the other. In both cases, the arguments are 
grounded in culture as well as structure and institutions. One or two approaches are even 
actor-oriented. Long-term factors are divided into three categories: i) approaches to 
nationalism, ii) the relationship between state and civil society, and iii) political 
competition. Comparative communism has produced a series of works on the conditions 
of post-communism based on the legacy of communism, again a question approaches 
from structural, institutional and actor-based approaches.
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Two N a  t io n a l is m s
The French revolution is sometimes seen as the starting point in the development of 
nationalism as a political movement. This starting point draws attention to the link 
between national identity and politics, i.e., the political aspects of nationalism (political 
power is justified in the name of the citizens, or the nation). However, though 
nationalism can be defined as a political doctrine (which holds that the world is divided 
into nations and that each nation has the right to its own state), nations are based on 
ethnic identity to some extent.53 In other words, the nation is a concept that rests on both 
political and sociological bases.54 However, a considerable share of analysts of 
nationalism argue that there is a substantial difference between nationalism in Western 
and Eastern Europe in terms of their bases in citizenship and ethnicity, to the extent that 
they must be considered East Central European exceptionalists.
Though the logical consequences of such arguments range from nationalism as a factor 
that must be taken into account to fully fledged pessimism concerning the prospects for 
democracy under ‘nasty’ variations of nationalism, these approaches share a common 
presumption that East Central Europe is different. The dichotomy has been referred to in 
terms of eastern (organic) and western (voluntarist) nationalism, territorial and 
ethnic/cultural varieties, and based on the contrast between German and French 
nationalism.55 The arguments can be derived from structural as well as actor-based 
interpretations of nationalism. Distinctions have been based on the existence of a French 
state and the need to build a German Reich (and hence on the needs to build states in 
Eastern Europe); on the difference between bourgeois nationalism (Czech) and its 
aristocratic counterparts (Hungary, Poland); and whether a national ‘high culture’
53 In A. Smith’s words, the ethnie, A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nation, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1986).
54 This argument is developed in Schopflin, “Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: Analyses 
and Solutions”.
55 Respectively, Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism, echoed by Plamenatz, “Two Types o f Nationalism”; A. 
D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations', K. R. Minogue, Nationalism, (London, B. T. Batsford, 1967), 
and R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1992).
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existed.56 Kohn mixed philosophy and structure, with political developments dependent 
on whether the organisation of the state preceded the development of nationalism as a 
political phenomenon.57 More actor-oriented analyses emphasise the role of nationalism 
within political parties, notably the tension between nationalism and liberalism.58 In this 
context, ethnic groups are easy targets for political mobilisation.59 Whether structural or 
actor-based approaches are taken, the common conclusion is that the relevance of 
national questions during the process of democratisation had a major impact on political 
competition. Hence a series of questions have been raised as to whether 1989 heralded a 
‘return to the past’ given the relevance of long-term historical factors.60
However, the ‘two nationalisms’ argument is more relevant to political competition that 
to classification of nations. Most cases of nationalism feature a combination of ethnic 
and political elements, but the movements that invoke nationalism in the process of 
state-building (even in the same case) do not necessarily share a common approach. The 
competition between Pilsudski and Dmowski over the nature of post-WW I Poland is a 
case in point: Dmowski’s right focused on a concept of nationhood closely linked to 
Catholicism and assimilation or expulsion of minorities, Pilsudski’s left on the old 
commonwealth-model based on a multi-ethnic, federal state.61 The question facing 
comparative analysts is, therefore, whether national questions and regime support can be 
considered a cleavage on a par with Lipset & Rokkan’s four cleavages. Daalder 
suggested as much one year before the Lipset-Rokkan volume was published, adding
56 Respectively, Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism”; P. F. Sugar, “External and Domestic Roots o f  
Eastern European Nationalism” in P. F. Sugar & I. Lederer (eds.), Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 
(University o f Washington Press, Seattle, 1969); Gellner, “Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe”.
57 Kohn, The Idea o f  Nationalism-, a similar historical approach can be found in A. W. Orridge, “Varieties 
o f Nationalism”, in L. Tivey (ed.), The Nation State: The Formation o f Modern Politics, (Oxford, 
Robertson, 1981).
58 H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 3rd Ed. (London, Methuen, 1956); Schopflin, Politics 
in Eastern Europe', Szacki, Liberalism after Communism.
59 A. Lijphart & B. Crawford, “Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, 28:2 (1995), 171-199, p. 188; A. Breton (ed.), Nationalism and 
Rationality, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995); Tsebelis, Nested Games.
60 J. Rotschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History o f  East Central Europe since World War I, (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1989); B. Lomax, “Hungary” and J. Eyal, “Romania”, in S. Whitefield 
(ed.), The New Institutional Architecture o f  Eastern Europe, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993); Korosenyi, 
“Revival o f the Past or a New Beginning?”.
61 J. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (Seattle, University of Washington 
Press, 1974), p.31-47.
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that these might reflect elite conflict rather than social divisions.62 This may well be 
more significant than Lipset & Rokkan’s centre-periphery cleavage, as indicated by the 
Irish case where the centre (Westminster) -  periphery (Irish nationalism) division is 
about regime-support and state-building.63 Similar points have been developed in other 
cases, such as Greece, where, true to Lipset & Rokkan, “notwithstanding changes in 
modes of party organisation and party labels, the three political families generated from 
the two major cleavages which marked modem Greek history [the ‘national schism’ and 
the civil war] show a remarkable persistence.”64
From an exceptionalist point of view, the new Greek party system is a “spectacular 
confirmation of the historic tripolar structure which has been the single most stable 
element the Greek political landscape since the beginning of this century,” and “it is 
also doubtful whether an analysis of the formation and consolidation of party systems 
can benefit from the accumulated, if not cumulative, research on system change.”65 In 
other words, the party system rooted in the civil war and the national schism is unique, 
or at least exceptional. The same argument has been advanced concerning the 
peculiarities of Irish politics.66 This suggests that East Central Europe is hardly unique, 
even if, like in several West European cases, competing approaches to nationalist 
questions have been translated into party competition and prompted some analysts to 
argue that it is sui generis. Nationalism may be relevant to party competition, but the 
‘two nationalisms’ do not so much make this region (or Greece or Ireland) exceptional 
as indicate a possible cleavage that can be translated into party competition.
62 H. Daalder, “Parties, Elites and Political Developments in Western Europe”, in LaPalombara & Weiner 
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, p.67-68.
63 R. Sinnott, “Interpretations o f the Irish Party System”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 12:3 
(1984), 289-307. This is not uncontroversial, T. Garvin, The Evolution o f  Irish Nationalist Politics, (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1981); R. K. Carty, Party and the Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in 
Ireland, (Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1981).
64 Papadoupoulos, “Parties, the State and Society in Greece”, p.58.
65 Mavrogordatos, “The Greek Party System” , p. 168 and 156 respectively.
66 J. Whyte, “Ireland: Politics Without Social Bases”, in R. Rose (ed.), Electoral Behavior: A 
Comparative Handbook, (New York, Free Press, 1974); Garvin, The Evolution o f  Irish Nationalist 
Politics.
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B a c k w a r d n e s s  (M e s o -S tr u c tu r e s)
The significance of national questions for inter-war East Central European politics was 
undeniable, and Linz & Stepan’s point that this contributed to the collapse of the inter­
war regimes is well taken. However, East Central European exceptionalism is not based 
exclusively on the national question, but also on the structure of civil society, 
backwardness, agrarian politics and the limited success of liberalism. Szucs stresses the 
long-term weakness of civil society and the limited potential for liberal democracy, a 
point taken up by Schopflin in terms of limited institutions available to resist the state, 
and Luebbert by way of limited class politics during the inter-war years.67 This leads to 
the difference between interest-based agrarian politics (Scandinavia, Czech lands) and 
populist peasantism (Eastern Europe), a strategic choice by parties that is shaped by 
agrarian structures.68 However, the presence of both stands within parties like the 
Norwegian Agrarian/Centre party indicated that this dichotomy may apply to options of 
party strategy rather than regional differences. To be sure, a structuralist approach 
would suggest that in any case communist modernisation removed the basis for 
populism where agriculture was collectivised.69 The point could equally be applied to 
social structures or ideology. Here the inter-war legacy includes the development of 
liberalism in East Central Europe in the context of traditional conservatism and Catholic 
politics, both of which challenged liberalism’s focus on the individual over the 
community and considered rights in collective, not individual, terms.70 The communist 
regimes perpetuated this development, limiting the pressure on conservatism to develop 
into a market-oriented ideology and contributing further to coining rights in collective 
terms.
67 Sziics, “Three Historical Regions in Europe”; Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe; Luebbert, 
Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy.
68 M. Canovan, Populism (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); D. Urwin, From Ploughshare 
to Ballot Box: the Politics o f Agrarian Defence in Europe, (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1980).
69 J. Held, “Antecedents”, in J. Held (ed.), Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism, and 
Society, (East European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 
1996).
70 Szacki, Liberalism after Communism.
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Th e  l e g a c y  o f  C o m m u n is m  a n d  t h e  C o n d it io n s  o f  P o st -C o m m u n is m
Comparative analyses of communism offer further versions of East Central European 
exceptionalism. The ‘legacy of communism’ debate reflects the broader structure -  
agency debate, and the importance of the impact of structural and political factors is 
contentious.71 Sociological or structural accounts of East Central European 
exceptionalism draw on the destruction of pre-communist civil society, the legacy of 
communist modernisation and the structures that the post-communist states inherited. 
“Missing middle” approaches focus on “the absence of stable social cleavages or any 
mezzo-structures based upon them,” i.e., post-communist politics takes place more or 
less in a vacuum.72 Gellner’s assertion that the prominence of nationalism in Russian 
politics “is based on the importance of high culture in, precisely, a structureless mass 
society” could presumably be extended to East Central European (if modified).73 In the 
absence of social cleavages upon which to base competition, parties revert to appeals 
based on nationalism, traditional values of populism, or to competition based on the 
pace of dismantling the communist political and economic system, allegedly rendering 
the Lipset-Rokkan model inapplicable.74 These analyses are supported by the observed 
weakness of organised interests, notably trade unions, due to communist destruction of 
civil society.75
Modernisation theory offers a similar approach, with collectivisation and Stalinist 
modernisation destroying the agrarian structures that formed a significant part of the 
basis for pre-communist party competition.76 Even if the modernisation angle is played 
down, East Central European societies undeniably went through considerable change
71 Hanson, “The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change”, suggests that the ideological and institutional 
legacy o f Leninism should be overcome quickly, but the cultural and socio-economic legacy could be 
more enduring.
72 G. Evans & S. Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe”, British 
Journal o f Political Science, 23 (1993), 521-548, p.528.
73 E. Gellner, “Nationalism in the Vacuum”, in A. Motyl (ed.), Thinking Theoretically about Soviet 
Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study o f  the USSR, (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1992), p. 249.
74 Rivera, “Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode”.
75 Cf. the special issue on pluralism in East Central Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
26:4, (1993).
76 The general theory is developed in Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
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under communism.77 This allows for class-based analysis derived from the structure of 
communist society, which form the context for post-communist political competition.78 
However, the result may be convergence with the West European politics rather than 
East Central European exceptionalism, at least if a considerable social democratic 
constituency is identified.79
Nevertheless, the structural legacy of communism need not be as direct as the above 
approaches suggest. The structures inherited from communism provide the parameters 
within which party competition develops. If political competition centres alternatively 
on social-economic issues, valence issues or ethnic divisions, this provides three distinct 
patterns of party competition derived from social structures.80 Taking this approach, the 
development of socio-economic party competition depends on the prospects for 
successful economic transition, which in turn depends on ethnic homogeneity and low 
relative and absolute deprivation. Alternatively, a less structuralist version sees the 
resources with which actors enter post-communist political games as important 
parameters, which means that East Central European politics is different from, but still 
comparable to, West European politics. This leaves considerable room for rational 
choice and strategic decisions on the part of actors, and is comparable to West European 
politics.81 Finally, Geddes stresses the weak link between interest groups and parties and 
the rapid democratisation process, leading to weak party loyalties. However, in this case 
even new institutions with shallow roots structure political behaviour. In other words, 
the legacy depends on new institutions and party strategies, and the new institutions 
reflect institution-builders’ preferences.82
77 For an analysis o f the effects o f Stalinist modernisation see F. Fejto, A History o f  the People's 
Democracies: Eastern Europe since Stalin, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974); R. Bova, “Political 
Dynamics o f the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective”, World Politics, 44:1 (1991), 
113-138.
78 The classic text is M. Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis o f  the Communist System, (New York, 
Praeger, 1957).
79 Kolosi et al. analyse post-communist political developments, concluding that a large social democratic 
constituency is present in Hungary, T. Kolosi, I. Selenyi, S. Selenyi, & B. Western, “The Making of 
Political Fields in Post-Communist Transition (Dynamics o f class and Party in Hungarian Politics, 1989- 
90),” in Bozoki, Korosenyi & Schopflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition", I. Selenyi & S. Selenyi, “The 
Vacuum in Hungarian Politics: Class and Parties”.
80 Evans & Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f Party Competition in Eastern Europe”.
81 Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”.
82 Geddes, “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe”.
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If communist modernisation destroyed the social bases of inter-war political 
competition (or what was left by it after WW II),83 the communist political system 
eliminated the old institutions. In contrast to the pluralist institutions set up in 1989-90, 
“it was [the] extensive and highly centralized state that constituted the real Leninist 
legacy...”84 But the relevance of this legacy depends on political strategies and 
institutional choices. One case study concludes that the communist legacy’s effect on 
politics depends on actors and their policy stances.85 Moreover, there is considerable 
evidence that the framers of post-communist institutions looked not only to Western 
Europe but also back to the inter-war period for guidance.86 “The choice of institutions, 
the particular economic circumstances, and the norms that emerged dominant after the 
fall of Communist regimes all worked to determine which legacies would become 
politically relevant.”87 This reflects actor and strategy oriented analyses of transition 
theory and rational choice analysis, and thus rejects East Central European 
exceptionalism.88
Though the institutional legacy of communism may depend on post-communist 
institutional and political choices, the legacy of communist political practices is, by 
several accounts, more threatening to new democracies. At a basic level, political 
culture analyses stress the extent to which East Central Europe lacks the political culture 
required in a liberal democracy, at least in the Slovak case.89 Though surveys reveal low 
trust in democratic institutions and low confidence in parties, this is not a unique East 
Central European phenomenon.90 Commenting on the political culture debate in
83 Schopflin argues that the war amounted to a revolution in political and social terms, Schopflin, Politics 
in Eastern Europe.
84 Commisso, “Legacies o f the Past or new Institutions?”, p.235.
85 Land restitution in Hungary depended on former owners’ appeal to both the privatising gesellschaft 
camp and the traditionalist gemeinschaft camp, and the elites’ political ambitions to accommodate these 
‘median voters’. Commisso, “Legacies o f the Past or new Institutions?”.
86 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”.
87 Lijphart & Crawford, “Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe”, p. 176.
88 B. Geddes, “Initiation o f New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America”, in A. 
Lijphart & C. H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996).
89 M. Carpenter, “Slovakia and the Triumph o f Nationalist Populism”, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 30:2 (1997), 205-220. This analysis uses the framework developed in Almond & Verba, The 
Civic Culture.
90 A comprehensive set o f data can be found in P. Gerlich, F. Plasser, P. A. Ulram (eds.), Regimewechsel: 
Demokratisierung und Politische Kultur in Ost-Mitteleuropa, (Wien, Bohlau, 1992). On Spain, see 
Caciagli, “Spain: Parties and Party System in the Transition”.
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comparative communist studies, McAuley has pointed out the inconsistency in deriving 
current political culture from past beliefs (political culture), while deriving the latter 
from that period’s political practices.91 Post-war democratisation in Italy and Germany 
illustrates the point, a supportive political culture developed gradually, with the former 
regime (and the DDR ‘counter-regime’) providing negative reinforcement. The French 
process was even slower, and the Fourth Republic can be considered a transitional 
regime.92
Nevertheless, the new East Central European democracies undeniably lack recent 
experience in liberal democratic politics. Across the board, this is a matter of 
technocratic approaches to politics that entail a lack of trust in pragmatism.93 
Communism reinforced and elaborated political rights formulated in collectivist (class, 
ethnicity) rather than individual terms.94 Even if the East Central European regimes 
abandoned monolithic communism after Stalin’s death, opposition was conducted in 
terms of absolute right (civil society) and wrong (the communist state) rather than 
pragmatism and pluralism.95 “The category of civil society, central in the self- 
understanding of the actors in the drama of the ‘end of communism’, seems suddenly 
more problematic after the events of 1989.”96 Moreover, politics was discredited under 
communism, leading to mistrust and disapproval of politics per se, and a “retreat from 
politics into the private sphere” since “citizens cannot affect law making, but they can 
live around the law to protect their lives.”97
Therefore, even if the political culture approach is not accepted, post-communist 
political parties entered the new games with some political baggage. But is this
91 M. McAuley, “Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, in A. 
Brown (ed.), Political Culture and Communist Studies, (Basingstoke, Macmillan in association with St. 
Anthony’s College, Oxford, 1984).
92 G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe, p.7.
93 J. Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1991), p.45.
94 R. L. Tokes, “Human Rights and Political Change in Eastern Europe”, in R. L. Tokes (ed.), Opposition 
in Eastern Europe, (Baltimore, Md, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p.9.
95 This was o f course a deliberate strategy, see e.g. V. Havel, “The Power o f the Powerless” in J. 
Vladislav (ed.), Vaclav Havel, or, Living in Truth: Twenty-Two Essays Published on the Occasion o f  the 
Award o f  the Erasmus Prize to Vaclav Havel, (London, Faber, 1987).
96 A. Arato, “Civil Society in the Emerging Democracies: Poland and Hungary”, in M. L. Nugent, From 
Leninism to Freedom: The Challenges o f  Democratization, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992).
97 Curry, “Pluralism in East Central Europe”, p.450 and 457; see also Batt, East Central Europe from  
Reform to Transformation, p.47ff.
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sufficient to warrant exceptionalism? The reformed communists suffered from 
discrediting of the left, but the Spanish and Greek right suffered similar problems with 
their involvement with the non-democratic regimes, and the losers of the Finnish and 
Irish civil wars were excluded from parliamentary politics for some time. More 
problematically, the right in East Central Europe failed to develop into a modem free- 
market oriented right, and therefore focused on its inter-war ideological roots.98 Similar 
points have been made about Karamanlis’ failure to turn New Democracy into a modem 
West European right-wing party.99 Though exceptionalist arguments draw attention to 
several difficulties inherent in the transition from communism in East Central Europe, 
these are not necessarily unique to the region.
D o e s  E a s t  Ce n t r a l  E u r o p e a n  E x c e p t io n a l is m  M a  t t e r  ?
As East Central European exceptionalism is based on the full range of approaches, there 
is little consensus on its impact on the post-communist party systems. At the 
sociological or structural level, several approaches suggest that the new party systems 
should be shaped by long or medium term historical factors. In a weaker form the 
exceptionalist approach suggests that the actors on the post-communist scene are 
affected by the resources with which they enter the post-communist games, which are 
determined partly by their position under the previous regime. This provides the link 
between legacies and rational choice, with room for institutional manipulation. East 
Central European and West European party competition is based on different links 
between political and economic uncertainty.100 At the institutional level Lijphart & 
Crawford focus on constraints and incentives that shape choices. Liberal norms set the 
parameters for political debate and participation, international pressure supports the 
liberalisation process, and new institutions provide for political and economic
98 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p.292-299.
99 Mavrogordatos, “The Greek Party System”; Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece. On the 
Irish debate, see M. Laver, “Are Irish Parties Peculiar”, Proceedings o f  the British Academy, 79 (1992), 
359-381.
100 Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”. This model has since been 
complicated by the introduction o f ethnicity, H. Kitschelt, “Formation of Party Cleavage in Post- 
Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions”, Party Politics, 1:4 (1995), 447-472.
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competition.101 New institutions are the product of negotiation between the major 
players, and are therefore not (yet) independent variables derived from legacy alone.
As far as East Central Europe is concerned, the exceptionalist approaches warrant 
questions concerning the sui generis nature of each specific case: first whether the 
factors that led to exceptionalism are common to the four East Central European cases; 
and second, whether the factors that engender exceptionalism are in fact comparable to 
factors that shaped the development of West European party systems. A series of factors 
contribute to the suggestion that East Central Europe represents a specific area: i) the 
common starting point derived from their communist experience; ii) their common 
history as Soviet satellite states and the common catalyst, the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’; and iii) 
the problems of economic as well as political transition (with national questions in some 
cases). Nevertheless, East Central European exceptionalism can be approached within a 
comparative framework, drawing on the West European party systems literature. 
Several of the exceptionalist arguments apply equally well to Irish and Finnish 
democratisation in the inter-war period, and to the 1970s transitions to democracy in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Transition theory draws attention to the importance of 
institutions and the process of negotiating new rules of the game, processes that are very 
comparable with West European and Latin American cases.102
In short, theories of transition and exceptionalism provide indications of the parameters 
within which East Central European post-communist party systems have developed. The 
East Central European and several West European cases appear exceptional only 
inasmuch as they do not share all the conditions that characterised the development of 
fully fledged liberal democracy in the core West European cases. However, rather than 
making it necessary to reject West European models, this suggests that the assumptions 
inherent in such models must be reconsidered if they are to be applied outside the core 
West European cases. This also applies to inter-war Ireland and Finland, to Greece, 
Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and Italy in the 1990s.
101 Lijphart & Crawford, “Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe”.
102 Lijphart & Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies.
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P a r ty  Sy st e m  D ev el o pm e n t  a n d  C h a n g e
Despite the Lipset & Rokkan model’s reputation as the most frequently quoted piece on 
party system development, it has not been applied widely to post-communist East 
Central Europe. Given that the model in its original form is of limited use to East 
Central Europe, this is perhaps not surprising. Rivera rejects its applicability to East 
Central Europe without any adaptation of the model, while Korosenyi modifies it 
somewhat, suggesting that 1989-90 might prove the point of freezing.103 However, both 
transition theory and the literature on exceptionalism suggest that theories of 
comparative West European politics should not be applied to East Central Europe 
without reassessment of the assumptions upon which the models are based. Yet the 
similarity in the structure -  institutions -  agency debates suggest that the challenges to 
West European models can be incorporated into those very models, probably with 
implications for comparative West European politics.
Though it is often presented as a sociological approach due to its focus on cleavages, the 
Lipset-Rokkan model was quickly praised for its focus on actors that translate 
cleavages into party competition. In fact Lipset & Rokkan’s approach leaves 
considerable room for alliances between parties or political groups. A similar 
combination of structure and agency can be found in Luebbert’s account of the 
development of liberal, social democratic and fascist regimes in inter-war Europe, 
which includes Eastern Europe’s ‘traditional dictatorships’.104 Lijphart’s assessment of 
Rokkan’s work similarly stresses the importance of negotiation between the parties as 
far as institutional change is concerned.105 Hence the importance of the Lipset-Rokkan 
model lies in combining political and sociological approaches.106 In other words, the key 
to party system formation is actor-based as well as structural: rational action on the part 
of parties subject to a series of conditions and constraints. If these constraints were so
103 Rivera, “Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode”; Korosenyi, “Revival o f the Past or a New 
Beginning?”.
104 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy.
105 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”. He refers to Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, 
Parties.
106 Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties”.
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significant during the early Twentieth Century as to make the Lipset-Rokkan model 
predominantly ‘sociological’, or cleavage-driven, that does not necessarily imply that 
the same is the case in the late Twentieth Century.
Lipset & Rokkan make two major assertions, one concerning the development of party 
systems as cleavages are translated into politics, and the other suggesting that party 
systems freeze after the initial period of party system development. The perceived 
increase in party system volatility since the 1960s prompted a major debate about the 
validity of the Lipset-Rokkan model, but one that has centred on the freezing hypothesis 
rather than their model of party system development. This has been driven by perceived 
increases in electoral and party system volatility, in turn driven either by social change 
or party strategies and the dynamics of party competition.
S o c io l o g ic a l  F o c u s  -  D e -A l ig n m e n t  a n d  R e -A l ig n m e n t
Society-driven or structural approaches to party system volatility differ as to whether i) 
cleavages and social structures are becoming less salient and political competition is 
therefore more issue-oriented, or ii) new cleavages or social divisions are replacing the 
cleavages that shaped West European party systems. In both cases it is assumed that 
party system volatility is caused by electoral volatility, which in turn reflects social 
change, and that electoral stability is evidence of party system stability. However, 
systems featuring a high number of parties or changes in the number of parties may be 
more prone to electoral volatility.107 To be sure, several case studies of electoral and 
party system change combine de-alignment and re-alignment, with one possibly leading 
to the other.108
The de-alignment thesis challenges the continued relevance of cleavages. If Rose &
107 M. N. Pedersen “Changing Patterns o f Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems; 1948-1977: 
Explorations in Explanation”, in H. Daalder & P. Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems: 
Continuity & Change (London, Sage, 1983). Bartolini & Mair find that the number o f parties account for 
some 8% of total variance in volatility, Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral 
Availability, p. 135.
108 This is the case in most o f the case studies in R. J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan & P. A. Beck (eds.), 
Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?, (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984).
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Urwin’s studies of electoral volatility and parties’ social cohesion confirmed the 
freezing hypothesis, data from the 1970s indicated that “European party systems cannot 
now be regarded as inherently stable structures.”109 Electoral alignments were 
“decomposing”, as were the party systems.110 The trend toward instability was 
confirmed, again based on electoral change, in the 1980s.111 Yet the increased volatility 
in the 1970s did not reveal stable patterns of system change, possibly because the 
system format affects volatility.112 De-alignment approaches thus suggest that “the 
decline of cleavage politics means that electorates are free to react to completely 
unexpected developments...” and “the most salient feature of the political landscape that 
emerges with the end of cleavage politics is precisely the fact that it has no clear 
universal features.”113
De-alignment may in turn lead to re-alignment. The processes may be “concurrent and 
even complementary”.114 As the cleavages discussed by Lipset & Rokkan become less 
salient, a “silent revolution” enhanced the salience of post-materialist cleavages.115 
Surveys of green politics and protest or new populist voting lends some support this 
thesis, given the success of the German Greens, Swedish New Democracy and Italian
109 M. Maguire, “Is There Still Persistence? Electoral Change in Western Europe, 1948-1979”, in Daalder 
& Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems, p.92; Rose & Urwin, “Persistence and Change in 
Western Party Systems since 1945”; R. Rose & D. Urwin, “Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains 
in Regimes”, Comparative Political Studies, 2:1 (1969), 7-50.
110 R. J. Dalton, P. A. Beck & S. C. Flanagan, “Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies”, in 
Dalton, Flanagan & Beck (eds.), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, p. 8.
111 Franklin, Valen & Mackie (eds.), Electoral Change.
1,2 M. Pedersen, “The Changing Dynamics o f European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral 
Volatility”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 1 (1979), 1-26.
113 C. van der Eijk, M. Franklin, T. Mackie & H. Valen, “Cleavages, Conflict Resolution and 
Democracy”, in Franklin, Valen & Mackie (eds.), Electoral Change, p. 430. The authors conclude that “it 
may well turn out that in coming years the newly democratising countries o f central Europe will provide 
the best laboratories within which to further investigate the nature o f forces that govern electoral change,” 
p.431.
114 So concludes a major volume investigating the matter. R J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan & P. A. Beck, 
“Political Forces and Partisan Change”, in Dalton, Flanagan & Beck (eds.) Electoral Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, p.474.
115 R. Inglehart, “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies”, 
American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 991-1017; R. Inglehart The Silent Revolution: Changing 
Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977); R. 
Inglehart, “The Changing Structure o f Political Cleavages in Western Society”, in Dalton, Flanagan & 
Beck (eds.) Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', R. Inglehart, Culture Shifts, 
(Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press).
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Northern League.116 Kitschelt challenges and modifies the re-alignment thesis, arguing a 
“joint transformation of economic and non-economic political preferences and 
interests,” which is insufficient to predict the nature of party systems.117 Dunleavy & 
Husbands offer a related model, suggesting that voting is influenced by a series of 
factors that warrant new definition of class in terms of, e.g., consumption of public and 
private services.118 In neither case do these changes necessarily lead to party system 
instability, because parties may adapt to electoral change.
Focus o n  t h e  P a r t y :  S t r a t e g y  a n d  O r g a n is a t io n
The analyses of Kitschelt and Dunleavy & Husbands suggest that social change need 
not lead to party system change, leaving parties as the main instigators of system 
change. Party-driven change was suggested in early works on contagion from the left 
and right respectively, i.e., the suggestion that social democrat or American-style parties 
would prove organisationally superior.119 Kirchheimer’s catch-all party thus abandons 
ideology and sectional appeal in favour of a catch-all strategy. Once one party adopts 
this strategy its main rival is compelled to follow suit, leading to a party-driven shift 
away from cleavage-based political competition.120 Though this need not lead to party 
system change, but rather contributes to maintaining system through adaptation, it offers 
an account of the decreasing salience of cleavages in terms of party strategy rather than 
social structures. At one point, Lijphart found this in the breakdown of 
consociationalism in the Netherlands, as the Democrats4 66 challenged the consensus 
and PvdA (Labour) responded by moving left, the denominational parties merged and 
consociational practices declined. He has since argued that this analysis exaggerated
116 D. Richardson & C. Rootes (eds.), The Green Challenge: The Development o f  Green Parties in 
Europe, (London, Routledge, 1995); P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, West 
European Politics, 18:1 (1995), 34-51.
117 H. Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe”, J. Hayward & C. Page (eds.), Governing the New 
Europe, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), p. 129 and 133; H. Kitschelt, The Transformation o f  European 
Social Democracy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), chapter 4.
118 Dunleavy & Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads.
119 Duverger, Political Parties', Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies.
120 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”.
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party system change.121 Though the catch-all thesis has been disputed, it prompted 
increased focus on party strategy.122 More pessimistically, as far as parties are 
concerned, Panebianco’s analysis forecast the declining importance of parties, an 
argument since rebutted by Katz & Mair.123
E x p l a in in g  P a r t y  S y s t e m  S t a b il it y
Party-driven approaches to de-alignment offer an explanation of system freezing, 
something which Lipset & Rokkan did not offer but Sartori extracted from their 
account.124 If parties are rational actors, they should be expected to contrive to maintain 
a party system that they dominate. Therefore, due to parties’ adaptive ability, cleavage 
change need not lead to party system change.125 Parties set the political agenda, and “the 
definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.”126 Acting as a cartel, 
the main parties thus maintain the main lines of competition, contributing to party 
system stability. Mainstream parties adoption of environment agendas in West European 
politics lends support to this thesis, even if maverick issues such as regionalism or 
European integration may (temporarily?) upset the left-right dichotomy in Norway 
(1993) or Italy (1990s).
A sociological interpretation of the Lipset-Rokkan model suggests that no major 
changes can be expected unless a major ‘revolution’ occurs and new cleavages become 
relevant (the re-alignment thesis, above). However, the crucial factor in their account is 
the introduction of the full franchise, and closing down of electoral space following full
121 Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation; A. Lijphart, “From the Politics o f Accommodation to 
Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment”, West European Politics 12:1 (1989), 139-153.
122 S. B. Wolinetz, “The Transformation o f Western European Party Systems Revisited”, West European 
Politics, 2:1 (1979), 4-28; K. Dittrich, “Testing the Catch-All Thesis: Some Difficulties and Possibilities”, 
in Daalder & Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems.
123 R. Katz & P. Mair, “Party Organizations: Form Civil society to the State”, in R. Katz & P. Mair (eds.), 
How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 
(London, Sage Books, 1994); Panebianco, Modelli di Partito. A  similar decline-of-party thesis, 
complementing de-alignment, is suggested in Dalton et al., “Political Forces and Partisan Change.”
124 Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties”.
125 G. Smith, “A System Perspective on Party System Change”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 1:3 
(1989), 349-363; M. Maor & G. Smith, “On the Structuring o f Party Competition: The Impact o f  
Maverick Issues”, (manuscript, The European Institute, LSE, 1993).
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electoral mobilisation.127 This is accompanied by a process of institutional freezing, i.e., 
the influence of formative factors that shape a party system decreases as institutions 
come of age. Party systems freeze partly due to institutionalisation, and institutional 
change affects volatility, processes that do not depend on frozen sets of cleavages or 
political alternatives. Evidence for stability is found in the decline of electoral volatility 
since the inter-war period, in line with Lipset & Rokkan’s hypothesis. Bartolini & Mair 
find little evidence for the alleged increases in volatility since 1966, and though inter­
bloc (class) volatility has increased moderately, this is less than a third of total volatility. 
These data offer confirmation of the freezing hypothesis as far as class cleavage is 
concerned: voters change party allegiance, but not as far as class cleavage is 
concerned.128 Similar conclusions about the persistence of left -  right competition is 
found through analyses of party programmes.129
In short, party system stability is explained in terms of parties’ adaptation. Institutional 
stability and the parties’ interest in maintaining left -  right competition offer an 
explanation of party system stability, the evidence of social change notwithstanding.130 
Most new issues are aligned to the prevalent left -  right dimensions, which fits 
Kitschelt’s observations that change at the electoral level has not led to major changes 
within the main left and right camps, though some new parties have emerged.131 
Notably, Italian party system changes in the 1990s cannot be explained by demand side 
accounts (voters’ preferences) so much as by supply side (what parties offer).132
126 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View o f  Democracy in America, (New  
York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p.68.
127 This point is developed in Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability', and P. 
Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997).
128 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability’, Mair, Party System Change, 
chapter 4.
129 Budge et al, Ideology, Strategy and Party Change.
130 On electoral system change and stability, see A. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A 
Study o f  Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).
131 H. Kitschelt, “European Party Systems: Continuity and Change”, in M. Rhodes, P. Heywood & V. 
Wright (eds.), Developments in West European Politics, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997).
132 R. D ’Alimonte & S. Bartolini, “’Electoral Transition’ and Party System Change in Italy”, West 
European Politics, 20:1 (1997), 110-134.
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In t e r n a t io n a l  R e l a t io n s  a n d  P a r t y  Sy st e m  D e v e l o p m e n t
Several analyses of post-communist politics acknowledge the significance of the 
international dimension. Transition theorists have taken this factor on board, as one 
among many. A number of international relations analyses of inter-war Europe have 
pointed to the role of international relations in undermining the prospects for 
democracy.133 Hitler and Stalin, or fascism and Communism, are considered the twin- 
nemeses of East Central European democracy between the Wars. And Stalin and his 
successors continued to offer, or rather impose, an alternative to liberal democracy. 
Conversely, the collapse of these two models removed normative challenges to liberal 
democracy. The Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE and the OSCE have provided a climate in 
which border change is unacceptable in theory, thus defusing some ethnic tension. 
Practically all parties in East Central Europe adhere to these principles. In terms of 
structural elements, the international context is therefore far more conducive to 
consolidation of democracy in the 1990s than it was between the Wars, let alone after 
WWII.
The international relations literature is rich on the subject of institutionalism, i.e., how 
international institutions shape governments’ action. Future expectations of co-operation 
may prompt governments to take moderate stands, expecting their partners to 
reciprocate. Hence, for example, Germany and France’s support of the UK in the 
Falklands War.134 A study of British, France and American responses to economic crises 
in the 1970s and 1980s and domestic pressure for protectionism concluded that 
international institutions shaped their responses to the extent that they maintained free 
trade.135 While attempts to bind states together in the League of Nations failed, post-war 
efforts have yielded better results. For example, NATO’s key task was frequently
133 See, e.g., E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f  
International Relations, (London, Macmillan, 1939).
134 S. Stavridis & E. Regelsberger, “The Converging National Reactions (I): The Big States -  France and 
Germany”, in S. Stavridis & C. Hill (eds.), Domestic Sources o f Foreign Policy: West European 
Reactions to the Falklands Conflict, (Washington DC, Berg, 1996).
135 H. Milner, “Maintaining International Commitments in Trace Policy”, in Rockman & Weaver (eds.), 
Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, (Washington DC, The 
Brookings Institution, 1993).
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described, only half in jest, as ‘keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the 
Germans down.’ On the domestic scene, international institutions have been credited 
with contributing to stabilisation of democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece after the 
transition to democracy in the 1970s. In Southern Europe, “international conditions 
made it possible for civilian governments to direct the military away from domestic 
politics. NATO, for instance provided an opportunity to redirect military missions to 
external professional concerns.”136 Prospects of EC membership and economic growth 
depended on maintaining liberal democratic regimes, as prospective EU and NATO 
membership does for East Central Europe today. International institutions thus 
contribute to shaping domestic institutions, political as well as economic and military.
The impact of external factors on party system development has been covered in several 
country studies, but not on a comparative basis. The best documented West European 
case is immediate post-war Italy, where the DC and PCI found considerable direct 
support from Washington and Moscow respectively.137 More indirectly, US and British 
influence was undeniably found in the Norwegian Labour Party through the part of the 
leadership that spent the war abroad, which prevailed over more neutralist elements.138 
Tsebelis’ ‘nested games’ approach provides a framework for analysis of these factors 
inasmuch as he suggests that games take place at several different levels and that 
analysis of a single level only is unlikely to provide sufficient.139 The international 
system and foreign actors (parties) may influence domestic parties and party system 
development. At the party level, Gaffney’s edited volume examines the impact of EU 
politics on domestic political parties. The contributors find considerable evidence that 
domestic party competition has been shaped by EU politics and policy.140 The term 
‘policy syncretism’ has been coined to describe the mutual adjustments found in 
national and EU policies in more problematic areas of the Single Market (utilities, e.g., 
electricity, gas, telecommunications), involving a degree of adaptation where necessary
136 F. Aguero, “Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America”, in L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu & 
H. Tien (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, (Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins, 1997), p.198.
137 Mack Smith, Modern Italy, p. 460-461; G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe, p. 176-182.
138 H. Lie (Labour General Secretary), Skjebneaar: 1945-50, (Oslo, Tiden, 1985).
139 Tsebelis Nested Games.
140 Gaffney (ed.), Political Parties and the European Union.
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but maintaining differences when possible.141 A similar term could be applied to party 
system analysis, notwithstanding important differences, particularly in the liberal camp 
(which have become more important as the EP’s power has grown).142
E a st  C en t r a l  E u r o pe  in  C o m pa r a t iv e  P e r sp e c t iv e : T o w a r d s  a  
R a t io n a l  C h o ic e -B a sed  A pp r o a c h  t o  Pa r t y  Sy st e m s  T h e o r y .
Three main comparative West European politics approaches to East Central Europe 
warrant particular attention since they apply comparative West European politics to the 
region and investigate some of the problems associated with developing liberal 
democracy in the area and party competition in particular. G. Smith’s West European 
politics approach focuses on the constraints on party formation and party competition in 
East Central Europe, in particular the move to catch-all type parties without going 
through a mass party stage.143 Lijphart’s analysis of the development of political 
institutions in the four cases takes a similar approach, drawing on Rokkan’s work on 
democratisation in Western Europe.144 Mair’s ex-adverso extrapolation of basic 
characteristics of post-communist party systems based on the comparative party politics 
literature developed for West European politics draws attention to crucial differences in 
patterns of electorates, parties and party competition, as well as the process of 
democratisation.145 The present work is very much based on Lijphart’s premises of 
negotiated transition and the arguments of G. Smith and Mair that East Central 
European party systems should be analysed in terms of party systems theory, i.e. 
comparative West European politics. Party systems theory provides a theoretical 
framework, but the implicit and explicit assumptions in much of the West European 
politics literature must be reconsidered if it is to be applied to East Central Europe. One 
compelling example is Kitschelt’s analysis of actors’ and groups’ preferences in the 
light of the uncertainties that accompany political and economic transition. However, as
141 Eyre & Sitter, “From PTT to NRA”.
142 S. Hix & C. Lord, Political Parties in the European Union, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997); 
Interviews with ELDR and LI sources during 1998
143 G. Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”.
144 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”; Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties.
145 Mair, “What is Different about Post-Communist Party Systems?”.
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he later pointed out, this analysis did not factor in the role of nationalism in East Central 
Europe.146
The challenge to analysts of post-communist East Central European politics is to 
develop a framework for analysis that incorporates the relevant developments in 
transition theory and comparative West European politics and country-specific studies. 
The major features of the three sets of approaches are set out in table 2.1, where the 
columns divide the actor-oriented, institutional and structure-driven approaches, and the 
rows separate transition theory, East Central European exceptionalism, comparative 
West European politics and the IR literature.
All four broad approaches considered so far allow for political parties as the driving 
force, even if the extent to which parties are free rationally to pursue their interest is 
contentious. Given the extent of change in East Central Europe in 1989, summed up in 
Offe’s ‘triple revolution’, it is reasonable to suspect that the parties have been subject to 
fewer constraints than in almost any previous period in Twentieth Century Europe. 
Hence the focus on parties as rational actors, and as the key drivers of party system 
development and change. However, the literature on transition theory and East Central 
European exceptionalism draws attention to major structural and institutional factors 
that constrain any rational actor’s choice, and the IR literature suggests that these may 
be external as well as domestic. The implicit distinction between structure and 
institutions employed here differentiates between macro structures (e.g., class structure) 
and middle level institutions (rules of the game), and is hardly controversial.147 
Institutions are designed, whereas structures are larger-scale phenomena that may 
perhaps be shaped but can hardly be designed (though communist regimes did 
fundamentally change class structures, if not always as intended). The distinction 
matters in the East Central European context since there was considerable room for 
institutional choice and design in 1989-90 as far the rules of the political game are 
concerned. Institutions provide constraints, but institutional design reflects political
146 Kitschelt, “Formation o f Party Cleavage in Post-Communist Democracies”; Kitschelt, “Formation of 
Party Cleavage in Post-Communist Democracies”.
147 For a fuller discussion o f this definition see K. Thelen & S. Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics”, in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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forces’ preferences and success in negotiations. But they also reflect the wider ‘victory’ 
of liberal democracy as the normative model, and West European influence on 
economic and political institutional design.
R a t io n a l  Ch o ic e  u n d e r  C o n s t r a in t s
The focus on rational choice under constraints, a theme developed in the historical 
institutionalism literature, is of particular relevance to party system development 
because parties carry considerable historical and ideological baggage which is clearly 
evident in their ideological appeal, attachment to international party groups, and in the 
very names chosen by the new parties. Without going so far as to suggest that 
“institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history more 
generally, than suggested by a narrow rational choice model,”148 the constraints that 
institutions impose on rational action are recognised.
To be sure, the link between rational choice and new institutionalism is considerable. 
New institutionalists note that it “is implicit but crucial in this and most other 
conceptions of historical institutionalism that institutions constrain and refract politics 
but they are never the sole ‘cause’ of outcomes.”149 The key differences in the two 
approaches are the extent to which preferences are taken as fixed or shaped by 
institutions in a historical perspective and the extent to which actors satisfy rather than 
maximise preferences. However, some rational choice literature explicitly stresses the 
extent to which electoral preferences may be shaped by political parties, or by games 
played in related arenas.150 Similarly, particularly in terms of voting behaviour, where 
the costs and risks are too small to warrant costly cost-benefit analysis, satisfaction 
rather than maximisation may be the order of the day. Iterated choice limits the 
incentive to repeat full cost-benefit analysis in each instant, whether this is a short-cut to 
voting by way of party identification or a renewal of interest group membership.151 In
148 Thelen & Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, p.7.
149 Thelen & Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, p.3.
150 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice; Tsebelis Nested Games.
151 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections on party identification; Dunleavy, 
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Chapter Three on reconstructing the theory o f groups.
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other words, rational choice takes place under a series of constraints, several of which 
are set out in the historical institutionalist literature. However, the uniqueness of 
historical institutionalism can be exaggerated: its difference from aspects of rational 
choice theory is one of degree. Some of its exponents recognise this fact, or at least the 
two approaches’ common background as challenges to structuralist, functionalist and 
behaviouralist theories.152
Transition theory’s focus on actors’ strategies and the development and consolidation of 
new institutions is thus combined with the historical institutionalist’s focus on the 
medium and long term constraints that limit the parties’ freedom of action. Pierson 
combines March & Olsen’s analysis of the effect of institutions upon actors with change 
over time. Though institutions have been set up by rational actors, they may have 
unintended consequences, in Pierson’s case the member states’ limited control over the 
development of the EC. This approach “cuts across the usual sharp distinction between 
rational choice and nonrational choice work, drawing instead on research within both 
traditions that emphasizes the significance of the historical process.”153 In European 
integration theory, as in transition theory, the actors take centre stage. Nevertheless, 
their freedom of action is constrained not only by institutions, but also by structures that 
provide parameters within which they act.
Pure rational choice can, therefore, be considered an ideal-type approach, but in each 
case rational action is constrained by institutions, and/or structures. Empirical evidence 
can test when a specific rational choice thesis applies, i.e., when conditions hold and 
how accurate it is. This is a matter of testing applicability rather than the ‘truth’ of the 
theory. The aim is to offer realistic and coherent explanations of phenomena, not 100% 
predictability. Falsification may in fact show that, for some reason, a theory does not 
apply, possibly due to external constraints. The theory itself, however, is not necessarily 
falsified unless it is proved inconsistent.154 For example, rational choice theory’s
152 Thelen & Steinmo. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”.
153 P. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 29:2, (1996), 123-163, p. 131; J. G. March & J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: 
The Organizational Basis o f Politics, (New York, Free Press, 1989).
154 J. Friedman, “Economic Approaches to Politics”, in J. Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice 
Controversy, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996).
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suggestion that voters should not vote due to cost exceeding potential benefits is not 
proved ‘untrue’ by high voter turn-out, but it is clear that other factors influence the 
decision to vote. However, it may be proved to be less applicable than a similar theory 
that interprets voting as a case of low-cost insurance. Moreover, it forces focus on the 
question of why people vote, which is not solved by any rival theory.155
Four major points are worth noting before proceeding towards a framework for analysis 
of post-communist party systems. First, institutions such as electoral systems presented 
relatively limited constraints in the early period, as they were the product of negotiation 
between the main actors rather than imposed externally (in contrast to, e.g. in the BRD). 
Over time, however, institutions contribute to freezing of the political system to the 
extent that they are difficult to change. Second, historical institutionalism suggests that 
ideology and patterns of political competition are relevant. Though parties may enjoy 
considerable freedom in their choice of legacy on which to focus, these legacies may 
nevertheless be significant. Third, the East Central European regime changes featured a 
‘triple revolution’ in political, economic and national terms. All of these changes 
represent potential bases for political competition. Fourth, and finally, the EU, NATO, 
OSCE and the IMF have provided a set of ‘super-rules’, which is very difficult to 
change and has considerable influence on domestic policy. This has provided an explicit 
international institutional framework, and influenced domestic institutional norms. It 
therefore contributed to the parameters within which party systems develop. However, 
in East Central Europe, international institutions have all pulled in the same direction, 
towards consolidation of West European-type liberal democracy and acceptance of the 
‘free market’ as a normative model.
155 D. Chong, “Rational Choice Theory’s Mysterious Rivals”, in Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice 
Controversy.
Approaches to Post-Communist Politics in East Central Europe 77
To w a r d s  a  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A n a l y s is  o f  E a s t  Ce n t r a l  E u r o p e a n  P o st -  
C o m m u n is t  P a r t y  S y st e m s
Rational choice provides a link between competing explanations of party system 
development and change, but only if political parties are understood as independent 
actors and the constraints under which they operate are recognised and factored into the 
account. Sociological factors and institutional arrangements provide parameters and 
constraints, which can and do change. If party systems remain more or less frozen even 
as social structures change, a significant part of the explanation is sought in their 
continuous pursuit of power and organisational survival. However, the East Central 
European scene in 1989-90 featured not merely party system change, but also regime 
changes that have been described as revolutionary. In Lipset & Rokkan’s schema, 1989 
can be interpreted as a ‘revolutionary juncture’ with all the potential impact on politics 
that the national and industrial revolutions had.
Mair’s approach to party systems and party system change comes close to this type of 
actor-based analysis.156 Political parties are the main drivers of party system change, or 
rather, lack thereof. But ‘dysfunctional’ parties that do not pursue vote maximisation or 
office do occur, and are explained by Tsebelis in terms of, e.g., intra-party struggles that 
may lead parties to engage in apparently suicidal behaviour. Tsebelis’ analysis of the 
UK Labour party’s divisions in the early 1980s could hold for the current Conservative 
Party.157 The literature on West European party systems has been developed in a specific 
context, centred on the existence of mass parties of the left (in the early Twentieth 
Century) that were important players in the extension of democracy. Since the Lipset- 
Rokkan model lies at the base of much of the later work on party systems, and takes on 
board most of the assumptions made in West European party theories at the time (such 
as Duverger’s mass parties of the left), this model will be taken as a starting point. It is 
based on a series of functionalist assumptions and parameters which will be challenged, 
but also to a considerable extent on rational choice type bargaining between old and new 
regimes which is compatible with the actor-based bias in the current approach. The
156 Mair, Party System Change.
157 Tsebelis, Nested games.
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implicit and explicit underlying assumptions of Lipset & Rokkan’s schema require 
further analysis in the light of developments in the latter half of the Twentieth Century 
and the condition of post-communism. This is the subject of the next chapter. This in 
turn warrants development towards a more rational actor based model for party system 
formation, but one which takes account of institutional and social constraints. Though 
the current project is primarily concerned with East Central Europe in the 1990s, several 
of the points should be of considerable relevance to party system change in late 
Twentieth Century Western Europe.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
Pa r t y  Sy s t e m s : 
D e v e l o p m e n t , St a b il it y  a n d  C h a n g e
“The [West European] party systems o f  the 1960’s reflect, with few  but significant exceptions, the 
cleavage structures o f  the 1920’s. ”
- Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, 1967
Given the hypothesis that the East Central European party systems are comparable to 
their West European counterparts, Lipset & Rokkan’s analysis of development of party 
systems in Western Europe provides the starting point for the analysis of East Central 
European Party systems.1 However, two of the main pillars of their argument, the 
development of party systems and the freezing of party alternatives, warrant specific 
attention in the light of the East Central European conditions of post-communism. As 
the model is revisited with the benefit of hindsight, the role of cleavages (in the 
traditional sense of the term) is played down. Because many of Lipset & Rokkan’s 
assumptions were time and place specific, and do not hold for East Central Europe, the 
model must be expanded if it is to provide a framework for analysis of post-communist 
party systems.
First, Lipset & Rokkan’s ‘cleavage model’ is based on a number of explicit 
assumptions, of which their set of four lines of cleavage is the most significant. Rather 
than attempting a general definition of cleavages, Lipset & Rokkan derive the cleavages 
on which the model is based from Talcott Parsons’ fourfold classification of the 
functions of social systems. However, this gives rise to neglect one dimension, regime 
change, which is of particular importance in East Central Europe. A revision of the 
concept of ‘cleavage’ is therefore warranted. Moreover, the model is based on a number
1S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: and 
Introduction”, in S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, (London, The Free Press, 1967), p.50.
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of explicit assumptions concerning the nature of and salience of political issues, which 
are specific to a given time and space. For example, the worker -  owner cleavage takes 
on tremendous importance to the extent that it provides similarities across all (or most) 
West European systems. This is related directly to the way in which thresholds to 
democratisation were lowered in Western Europe.
Second, the analysis is based on several implicit assumptions, most of which do not 
apply to East Central Europe in the inter-war period, let alone to the condition of post­
communism. It relies heavily on the emergence of mass parties of the left, and the 
response by the old non-socialist parties to this challenge. As Lipset & Rokkan 
emphasise in their analysis of reduction of thresholds to participation, this response took 
the form of lowering barriers to political competition. But it also had consequences for 
the development of political parties as organisations. Parties are, at least partly, 
organisations that aggregate interests and build alliances between different interests. A 
number of alternative strategies were available to party leaders, both in terms of 
mobilisation of support and offers of political alliances, and their choices shaped the 
party system. The model assumes specific forms of political competition, or patterns of 
party competition. This raises a number of questions concerning the conditions of post­
communism, particularly in terms of party organisation, aggregation of interests, 
alliance-building and party strategy.
However, it is the freezing hypothesis rather than the cleavage model that has been the 
subject of most academic debate. And though this project concerns the development of 
party systems in East Central Europe, the ‘freezing’ debate is relevant in more than one 
way. In its own right the freezing hypothesis is relevant inasmuch as the development of 
party systems takes on far greater significance if the party systems can be expected to 
undergo some degree of freezing. However, the freezing debate is also significant 
inasmuch as it points to the factors which affect the development (or lack thereof) of 
party systems and shape their trajectories, as well as indicating the potential for party 
system stability and change.
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A  M o d el  o f  P a r ty  Sy st e m s  D e v e l o pm e n t
The Lipset -Rokkan model of party system development suggests that the differences 
between West European party systems derive from a series of strategic decisions made 
by the non-socialist parties in the long-term or immediate run-up to the extension of the 
franchise (ca. 1918-20). These differences are explained in terms of the choices made 
by the “central core of cooperating ‘nation-builders’ controlling major elements of the 
machinery of the ‘state’”.2 Their commitments to the reformation or counter­
reformation (alliance with the national Church, with the Catholic Church, or opting for 
a secular state) and to urban or rural interests form the basis for Lipset & Rokkan’s 
eight-fold typology of political oppositions (and hence party systems). This typology 
assumes a few limits to the options open to the periphery/opposition: i) if the centre 
allies with a national church, the opposition will focus on religious dissent; ii) if this 
leaves a strong Catholic minority the opposition will be split into secular, Catholics 
and/or dissident parties; iii) the opposition cannot unite Catholicism and urban forces, 
or secularism and rural forces.
2 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.36.
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Table 3.1 Lipset & Rokkan’s eight-fold typology.3
Central core of nation- 
builders’ alliance on the 
religious front
Nat.-builder’s
economic
alliance
Examples of
nation-
builders
Periphery or
opposition’s
response
Examples of 
opposition
1
National church 
dominant (i.e. allied with 
the state)
Rural: landed 
interests
Britain:
Conservative
Dissident
religious,
urban
Britain:
Liberal
2
National church 
dominant
Urban:
commercial and 
industrial
Scandinavia:
Conservative
Dissident 
religious, rural
Scandinavia: 
Liberal or 
‘old’ left.
3
National church 
dominant,
Catholic strong minority
Rural
Prussia/Reich:
Conservative
Secular, urban 
vs.
Catholic
Prussia/Reich: 
Liberals vs. 
Centre (Cath.)
4
National church 
dominant,
Catholic strong minority
Urban
Netherlands:
Liberal
Dissident 
relig., rural vs. 
Catholic, rural
Netherlands: 
Three relig. 
parties
5
Secular state against 
Catholic Church Rural
Spain:
Liberal
Urban
vs.
Catholic
Spain: 
Catalans 
vs. Carlists
6
Secular state against 
Catholic Church Urban
France, Italy:
Radicals,
Liberals
Catholic, rural
France, Italy: 
Conservative 
Catholics
7
State allied with Catholic 
Church Rural
Austria:
Catholics Secular, urban
Austria:
Liberals,
Pan-Germans
8
State allied with Catholic 
Church Urban
Belgium: 
Catholics vs. 
Liberals
Rural
Belgium:
Flemish
separatists
Lipset & Rokkan chose not to incorporate their fourth dimension, the owner -  worker 
cleavage, into this model on the grounds that the first three cleavages account for the 
variance among party systems, while the fourth cleavage made them increasingly 
similar. Mass parties of the left appeared (almost) everywhere across Western Europe, 
the key question would be their strength and cohesiveness, not their presence. Lipset & 
Rokkan suggest that working class movements were more united in the Protestant north 
(types 1 -  4), and in the Catholic cases where state and Church had been allies in the 
nation-building process (7 and 8), while they were more divided where the state and 
Church had been in conflict (5 and 6).4 Luebbert offers a variation on this theme, 
suggesting that the outcome in terms of inter-war regimes depended on whether the 
liberal left offered the emerging socialist left Tib-lab’ pacts, and the extent to which 
these were accepted. In table 3.2 below, Spain appears twice as a borderline case,
3 Modified from Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.37.
4 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.46-50.
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because it corresponds partly to both the Fascist and traditional dictatorship ideal types. 
Belgium and the Netherlands do not appear as they do not fit the ideal-types because the 
dominance of the confessional parties kept the socialist left out of office without 
recourse to fascism or liberalism (interestingly, this work contains no reference to 
Lijpharf s work on power-sharing/consociationalism).5
Table 3.2 Luebbert’s po itical alliances, party competition and inter-war regimes.^
The ‘old left’ up to 
WW I.
Relationship with new 
left before WW I
Post-WW I party 
competition
Outcome (ideal types, 
cases are close 
approximations)
Liberals strong, pre­
war hegemony. Rise o f  
socialism not feared.
Lib-Lab pact Pluralist trade union left 
vs. centre-right. 
Liberalism (if not liberal 
parties) hegemonic.
Liberal democracy: 
Britain, France, 
Switzerland
Liberals weak, divided 
over cleavages, feared 
rise o f socialists.
No co-operation, new 
and old left break with 
each other.
Left organises agrarian 
workers, vs. fascist 
response on the right.
Fascism:
Italy, Germany, Spain
Liberals weak, divided 
over cleavages, feared 
rise o f socialists.
No co-operation, new 
and old left break with 
each other.
Socialist left allies with 
farmers, vs. conservative 
urban right.
Social democracy:
Scandinavia,
Czechoslovakia
Liberals weak due to 
multiple cleavages and 
‘backwardness’ (i.e. 
industry).
Both liberal and 
socialist left weak.
Limited competition, not 
much based on ideology 
(other than nationalism).
Traditional
dictatorship:
Spain, East Central 
Europe.
It is tempting to extrapolate a similar typology of post-communist party systems, based 
on the ‘triple revolutions’ of 1989-90. In this case, the three critical junctures would be 
the political transition, the economic transition and the new government’s commitment 
to civic or ethnic nationalism. In table 3.3, the first column indicates whether the first 
post-communist government was formed by the former opposition or the former 
communists, and whether these ‘parties’ were oriented primarily towards a secular state 
in both religious and ethnic terms. The terms ‘civic nationalism’ and ‘secular state’ are 
used to indicate this stance, while ‘ethnic’ indicates a focus on the ethnic dimensions of 
nationhood, usually invoking pre-communist history (these points are developed further 
in Chapter Seven). The second column indicates these governments’ commitments to
 ^ A. Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, (Berkeley, 
University o f California Press, 2nd ed. 1975); A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative 
Exploration, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977).
6 Based on G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political 
Origins o f  Regimes in Interwar Europe, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
Party Systems: Development, Stability and Change 84
radical or moderate economic reform, and the third column cites a number of examples 
that approach these ideal types. Inevitably the examples are rough approximations, and 
some cases even appear as examples of two ideal types. The fourth column suggests the 
response of the main one or two opposition groups, first to the government and then to 
each other. In types 1 - 4 ,  the reform communists (RC) react as much to the opposition 
as to the government, though they have tended to be divided into two camps on 
economic reform. Again the examples are approximations, and do not correspond to the 
ideal types in all respects. Extremist nationalists have been left out of this model, as 
they have occurred more or less across the board, and national minorities have been 
included where relevant (i.e., where minorities exist and at least one significant party 
invokes ethnic nationalism). The empty ‘examples’ boxes in type 2 indicate the problem 
of combining liberalism and slow economic change.
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Table 3.3 A possible post-communist East Central European eight-fold typology7 (Reform communists 
are abbreviated to RC in the fourth column.)___________________________________________
First Governments in 
1989-91
Govnt’s
economic
strategy
Examples 
(approx.) o f first 
governments
Periphery or
opposition’s
response
Examples of 
opposition, 
later in gov’t
1
Former opposition, 
commitment to secular 
state (civic nationalism)
Fast pace 
of reform 
(shock 
therapy)
Poland:
Liberal (dominant) 
wing of Solidarity, 
later UD, KLD.
Nationalist, 
moderate 
vs. RC, fast 
vs. RC, slow
Poland: 
(KPN), AWS 
vs. SLD, PSL
2
Former opposition, 
commitment to secular 
state (civic nationalism)
Moderate 
pace of 
reform
Nationalist,
fast
vs. RC, fast 
vs. RC, slow
3
Former opposition 
nationalist posture 
(ethnic nationalism)
Fast
Czech lands: 
Klaus’ OF/ODS 
Czechoslovakia: 
OF (Klaus)
Civic, 
moderate 
vs. RC, slow 
vs. minority
Czech lands: 
OH vs. CSSD 
vs. KSCM 
Cz/Sl: Meciar
4
Former opposition 
nationalist posture 
(ethnic nationalism)
Moderate
Hungary, Slovakia: 
MDF, KDNP, FKgP 
Meciar’s HzDS 
Croatia: Tudjman
Civic, fast 
vs. RC, fast 
vs. RC, slow 
vs. minority
Hungary/Slov. 
Liberals vs. 
MSzP/SDL vs. 
ZRS
5
Former Communist 
commitment to secular 
state (civic nationalism)
Fast
Bulgaria: Bulgarian 
Socialist Party
Nationalist, 
moderate 
vs. minority
Bulgaria: 
Conservatives 
vs. Turkish 
minority
6
Former Communist 
commitment to secular 
state (civic nationalism)
Moderate
Gorbachev’s USSR: 
Reformists within 
the Yugoslav 
communist party
Civic, fast vs.
nationalist,
slow
USSR, Yugo.: 
Liberals, vs. 
nationalists vs. 
hard-line 
communists
7
Former Communist 
nationalist posture 
(ethnic nationalism)
Fast
Romania: National 
Salvation Front
Civic, slow 
vs.
minority
Romania: 
opposition vs. 
Hungarian 
minority
8
Former Communist 
nationalist posture 
(ethnic nationalism)
Moderate
Serbia:
Milosevic
Civic, fast 
vs. minority
Serbia,
Croatia:
opposition
Interesting as table 3.3 might be, it opens almost as many questions as it answers. The 
correlation between the examples and the ideal types is far less convincing than in 
Lipset & Rokkan’s case, in several cases because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
conglomerate parties that entered office with the transition from communism. In the 
Czech, Slovak and Polish cases only the dominant factions within the government fit 
the ideal types, and strains in the conglomerate parties soon led to formal divisions. 
Second, in types 5 -  8, the real-life continuity between communists and the reform 
communists is blurred (internal reformers took over the Party), and their economic
7 Inspired by Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.37.
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strategy is elusive at best. Even in the East Central European cases, several dissidents 
had a communist past. Third, party strategies were developed partly on an ad hoc basis, 
and the rapid pace of change makes the government -  opposition dichotomies less 
reliable. In cases 1 - 4 ,  this means that the reform communists developed both types of 
economic strategy, usually manifest in internal party divisions. Fourth, on more specific 
points, for example to account for the success of the non-communist CSSD in terms of 
Klaus’ (moderate) leaning toward ethnic nationalism seems controversial at best and 
ridiculous at worst, even if it suggests something about the CSSD’s development as an 
opposition party. Finally, the consistent anti-incumbency trend in post-communist 
elections meant that new parties have entered the government with almost every 
election, again inhibiting stable, dichotomous relationships. The ‘first governments’ 
category hardly invokes the stability and preponderance of Lipset & Rokkan’s ‘nation- 
building core’.
Though this eight-fold typology brings out some (logical) differences in the post­
communist party systems of Eastern Europe, it clearly leaves much to be desired as far 
as East Central Europe is concerned. It would even be possible to proceed along 
Luebbert’s lines to predict the prospects for stable liberal democracy, based, for 
example, on the extent to which national cleavages divide the non-socialist camp or 
whether the politics of economic transition is relevant to most voters. An analysis along 
these lines suggested better prospects for the East Central Europe cases than their 
eastern and south-eastern neighbours.8 However, a comparative analysis of the four East 
Central Europe cases warrant, closer analysis of the Lipset-Rokkan model, and re­
appraisal of its assumptions in the light of the conditions of post-communism. The 
starting point is the cleavages upon which the model is built, and the subsequent areas 
of investigation include its explicit and implicit assumptions.
8 G. Evans & S. Whitefleld, “Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe”, British 
Journal o f  Political Science, 23 (1993), 521-548.
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Cl e a  v a g e s a n d  F u n c t io n a l  A s s u m p t io n s  -  R e d e f in in g  t h e  C o n c e p t
Though the Lipset-Rokkan model of party system formation was developed with 
reference to Western Europe as a whole, is has an in-built bias towards the northern 
monarchies bordering on the Atlantic, Norway in particular. Application of the model to 
the Mediterranean states and peripheral states like Finland or Ireland is more 
problematic, particularly in the light of territorial change and civil war. Sinnott argues 
that the model can only be applied to Ireland if the state is considered part of a wider 
political system including the UK (taking 1918 as the starting point), and Mair 
emphasises the role of the parties in affecting change and stability in the Irish party 
system.9 Several analysts of the Irish party system have argued that the 1918 election 
and the quest for independence shaped the system irrevocably, or simply that the 
cleavage model does not apply to the Irish case.10 The relevance of the Russian 
revolution to the Finnish civil war and subsequent party system developments is less 
contentious, but equally cogent.11 Analyses of the new Greek, Portuguese and Spanish 
party systems that emerged in the 1970s, a decade after the Lipset-Rokkan model was 
published, invited questions about the extent to which the model applied in a late
9 R. Sinnott, “Interpretations o f the Irish Party System”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 12:3 
(1984), 289-307; P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organisation, Ideology and Electoral 
Competition, (London, Pinter, 1987); P. Mair, “Explaining the Absence o f Class Politics in Ireland”, in J. 
H. Goldthorpe & C. T. Whelan (eds.), The Development o f  Industrial Society in Ireland, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992); B. Kissane, “The Not-So Amazing Case o f Irish Democracy”, Irish Political 
Studies, 10 (1995), 43-68.
10 T. Garvin, “Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanization in Ireland: The Case o f the Periphery- 
Dominated Centre”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 2 (1974), 307-27; B. Farrell, “Labour and 
the Irish Party System: A Suggested Approach to Analysis”, Economic and Social Review, 1 (1970), 477- 
502; R. K. Carty, Parties and Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland, (Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1981).
11 E. Allardt & P. Pesonen, “Cleavages in Finnish Politics”, in Lipset & Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments; R. Alapuro, “Finland: An Interface Periphery”, in S. Rokkan & D. Urwin (eds.), 
The Politics o f  Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism, (London, Sage Publications, 1982), 
and J. Mylly, “The Emergence of the Finnish Multi-Party System: A Comparison with Developments in 
Scandinavia, 1870-1920”, in J. Mylly & R. M. Berry (eds.), Political Parties in Finland: Essays in 
History and Politics, (Turku, Grafia Oy, 1984); R. Sankiaho, “Cleavages and Party System Dimensions”, 
in S. Borg & R. Sankiaho (eds.), The Finnish Voter, (Tampere, Painomainos Oy, 1995).
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Twentieth Century context.12 So did the changing Italian party system in the 1990s.13 
Application of the model to East Central Europe merely multiplies these problems.
Though the Lipset-Rokkan model has been hailed as going beyond the ‘sociology of 
politics’ due to its focus on the question of how cleavages are translated into political 
competition, the model remains sociological in its reliance on cleavages.14 The question 
is whether these cleavages can be used to analyse developments outside the core states 
on which the Lipset-Rokkan analysis is based. For example, an application of the 
Lipset-Rokkan schema to the European Community political system would require 
focusing on a new centre -  periphery cleavage: integration vs. national sovereignty. 
Like Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavages, this is derived from a specific critical junction or 
revolutionary event: supranational integration.15 Similarly, application of the Lipset- 
Rokkan schema to post-communist East Central Europe would warrant focusing on new 
critical junctions: the political and economic transitions from communism. This raises 
questions concerning the nature of the cleavages on which the model is based.
Lipset and Rokkan focus on four critical lines of cleavage:16
Tw o o f  these cleavages are direct products o f  what w e m ight call the National Revolution: 
the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance o f  the 
ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and 
peripheries [...an d  secon d ...] the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and 
m obilizing Nation State and the historically established corporate privileges o f  the Church 
[...].
12 M. Caciagli, “Spain: Parties and Party System in the Transition”, and J. R. Lewis & A. M. Williams, 
“Social Cleavages and Electoral Performance: The Social Basis o f Portuguese Political Parties, 1976-83”, 
both in G. Pridham (ed.), The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and 
Portugal (London, Cass, 1984); C. Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of 
‘Bureaucratic Clientelism?”’, West European Politics, 7:2 (1984), 99-118; N. P. Diamandouros, 
“PASOK and State-Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988)”, in S. Vryonis Jr, 
Greece on the Road to Democracy: Form the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986, (New Rochelle, NY, Astride 
D. Caratzas, 1991); G. Pridham, “Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation 
in Southern Europe”, West European Politics, 13(1990), 103-117.
13 E.g., S. Parker, “Electoral Reform and Political Change in Italy, 1991-1994”, in S. Gundle & S. Parker 
(eds.), The New Italian Republic: From the Fall o f  the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi, (London, Routledge, 
1996).
14 G. Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties: A Critical Review”, in O. Stammer (ed.), Party Systems, Party 
Organisations, and the Politics o f  New Masses, (Berlin, Free University o f  Berlin, 1968).
15 S. Hix, “The Study o f the European Community: The Challenge to European Politics”, West European 
Politics, 17:1 (1994), 13-44.
16 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p. 15.
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Two of them are products of the Industrial Revolution: the conflict between the landed 
interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs [...and...] the conflict between 
owners and employers on the one side and tenants, laborers, and workers on the other [...].
By extension, it is tempting to suggest that the revolutions of 1989 produced two lines 
of cleavage: one centring on the question of political regime change, the other on the 
economic transition. Both pit defenders of the status quo or advocates of slow and 
limited reforms against advocates of rapid and extensive transition.
Though there is much to be said for this, it constitutes only half the story. A cursory 
examination of inter-war East Central Europe reveals that the Lipset-Rokkan schema 
cannot be applied so readily. In inter-war Slovakia, more than half the electorate voted 
for parties that were normally excluded from the governing ‘Petka’, i.e., for parties in 
opposition to the Czech-dominated government. The Pilsudski -  Dmowski dispute 
centred on the proper reach of the Polish ‘nation-state’. Aspects of Hungarian inter-war 
politics reflected pre-war divisions over acceptance of the Ausgleich (the Austro- 
Hungarian constitutional compromise of 1867 which created the dual monarchy) and 
the monarchy. Issues arising from nation-building and regime change featured 
prominently in the East Central European regimes. Hence the question of how 
‘cleavage’ can be defined, a question Lipset & Rokkan carefully avoided. This, in turn, 
begs a question concerning whether regime change itself should be considered on a par 
with Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavages, or even as more significant than these.
Lipset & Rokkan’s starting point is a review of a range of “logically possible strains and 
oppositions” based on Talcott Parsons’ functions of social systems.17 From this a two 
dimensional space is derived, within which cleavages are located: i) oppositions within 
the central elite, as opposed to ii) oppositions between the centre and the periphery; and 
iii) conflicts based on interest concerning the allocation of resources, as opposed to iv) 
religious or ideological oppositions. The first and second fall along a territorial 
dimension (vertical, y-axis), i.e., centre vs. periphery and within-centre conflicts. The 
third and fourth represent a functional dimension (horizontal, x-axis), i.e., ideological or
17 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.6. The approach is 
based on Parsons' pattern variables and general functional problems faced by any social system. See e.g. 
T. Parsons & N.J. Smelser, Economy & Society (London, Routledge, 1956).
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interest-specific conflict.18 Parsons’ dichotomies are thus transformed to a grid, within 
which conflicts or cleavages are located. From this it is but a short step to their four 
cleavages. Each revolution generated cleavages along both the territorial dimension and 
the functional dimension. The national revolution generated territorial cleavages 
between centre and periphery (2), and functional cleavages between state and church 
(1). Similarly, the industrial revolution led to territorial cleavages between landed and 
urban interests (3), as well as functional class cleavages between owners and employees
(4).
Figure 3.1 i) opposition within established elites
4. Worker-Owner 1. Church-State
iii) interest-specific iv) ideological
oppositions oppositions
3. Urban - Rural (Economy) 2. Centr e-Periphery
ii) local/regional oppositions
However, though it purports to be a general theory, the Parsons schema has been open 
to criticism, some of which is relevant to Lipset &Rokkan’s thesis. Questions have been 
raised concerning the exhaustive nature of Parsons’ categories, and whether they can be 
considered fundamental. One answer holds that the schema ignores strains or tensions 
deriving from changes in the rules of the game, or changes of players, which go beyond 
mere adaptive questions. Black therefore criticises Parsons’ schema as static, or 
equilibrium-based.19 It is not equipped to deal with major changes in the system as 
such, whether in the shape of internal or external shocks. By definition, these kinds of 
problems play a crucial role in transitions to democracy by way of revolution or regime 
collapse (as opposed to gradual change within stable borders). A similar critique could 
be derived from the international relations debate surrounding neo-functionalist theories 
of European integration. The key shortcoming of neo-functionalist analysis of the
18 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p. 10-11.
19 M. Black, “Some Questions about Parsons' Theories” in M. Black (ed.), The Social Theories ofTalcott 
Parsons, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1961).
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European Community lies in its blindness to actors, economic conditions, and external 
developments.20 Focusing on the dynamic of integration, the neo-functionalists failed to 
address potential economic and political shocks to the system, whether derived from 
domestic or international politics. These include, e.g., the Euro-sceptic strands in 
Scandinavian and British domestic politics, the various rounds of enlargement of the 
EC/EU and German unification. Though Lipset & Rokkan focus on the role of actors 
and the extent to which their strategic choices shape party systems, their model does not 
take account of political conflicts over the size and shape of the state and/or regime, 
some of which are driven by external shocks. As in the case of European integration, 
these shocks may take the form of political system change, economic system change, or 
changes in the shape and size of the system (i.e., the state). In other words, regime 
change need not be merely a political phenomenon, but may also entail economic 
changes and/or changes to the shape and scope of the state. Indeed, given the 
significance of stability in terms of borders, even expansion (acquisition) of territory 
can be considered a ‘state failure’ (and therefore state change).21
Lipset & Rokkan recognise that “[f]unctional oppositions can only develop after some 
initial consolidation of the national territory.”22 Hence the relevance of the process of 
state-building in terms of territorial secession or unification, a process which in East 
Central Europe differed considerably from the West European ‘norm’. As the Irish case 
illustrates, application of the Lipset-Rokkan model entails answering the question of 
what political unit it should be applied to. The division over acceptance of the 1921 
Treaty can be interpreted as a centre -  periphery cleavage within the UK (then including 
Ireland), which divided the two camps within Sinn Fein. In other words, regime change 
represented a separate line of ‘strain and opposition’. Analogously, the inter-war East 
Central European states emerged from collapsing empires, prompting the question of 
the relevance of regime change on top of the centralising and secularising national 
revolution. In fact, no European state other than Switzerland has escaped some kind of
20 S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985).
21 G. Schopflin, “Yugoslavia: State Construction and State Failure”, in S. Bianchini & G. Schopflin, 
State Building in the Balkans: the Dilemmas on the Eve o f the 21st Century, (Ravenna, Longo, 
forthcoming).
22 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p. 13.
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state failure in terms of loss or acquisition of territory, foreign conquest, loss of empire 
or complete disappearance.23 Regime change, therefore, represents a potential division 
along which political competition may be structured. Even British politics saw the Irish 
question shape Liberal -  Conservative competition around the turn of the century. 
Hence the question: can regime change be considered a cleavage?
R e g im e  C h a n g e  a s  a  Cl e a  va g e
At this point a more general definition of cleavages is called for, i.e., what exactly does 
the concept imply? Most definitions of cleavages are linked to one of the three 
categories discussed by Rae & Taylor: i) ascriptive or ‘trait’ cleavages, based on 
objective criteria; ii) attitudinal or ‘opinion’ cleavages, based on values or ideology; 
and iii) behavioural or ‘act’ cleavages based on action or membership of 
organisations.24 The question has been whether cleavages are derived primarily from 
social structures, as the first type of cleavage would suggest, or whether political 
organisation is more significant. Bartolini & Mair define cleavages as including three 
elements, each of which is related to one of Rae & Taylor’s categories of cleavages. By 
this definition cleavages feature: i) an empirical element, i.e., objective social structure; 
ii) a normative element, i.e., a more subjective dimension based on values and beliefs; 
and iii) an organisational or behavioural element, i.e., the expression of the cleavage in 
terms of action or organisation.25 In other words, cleavages are based on social 
structures, but these must be translated into political competition, or at least a degree of 
organisation, before the term cleavage can be applied to politics. Political and 
institutional aspects of social stratification are pertinent, not merely stratification per se. 
“In sum, a cleavage has to be considered primarily as a form o f closure o f  social 
relationships.”26
23 Schopflin, “Yugoslavia: State Construction and State Failure”.
24 D. W. Rae & M. Taylor, The Analysis o f  Political Cleavages, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1970), p .l.
25 S. Bartolini & P. Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: the Stabilization o f  European 
Electorates 1885-1985, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.213ff.
2  ^Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability, p.216.
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On the Bartolini & Mair definition regime change does not qualify as a cleavage 
inasmuch as it lacks the empirical element, or social stratification. This is not to say that 
regime change may not be linked to a specific cleavage. It usually is. Nevertheless, 
regime change per se might generate opposition or conflict. If this were the case, the 
conflict would feature two of the three elements associated with cleavages, i.e., a 
normative element and political organisation. This is precisely what happened in 
several European states towards the end of the Nineteenth Century and during the early 
Twentieth Century, whether the states gained independence from the UK and Sweden 
or from the Russian and Central European empires. The process of regime change 
carries the potential for divisions between advocates of compromise with the old regime 
and advocates of more radical change. The division between supporters of the 1867 
Ausgleich and revisionists (and nationalists calling for complete Hungarian 
independence) is perhaps the best case in point, though the Irish Civil War illustrates a 
similar division over the acceptability of compromise in the quest for independence.
There is no a priori reason why such a ‘quasi-cleavage’ should not have as strong an 
influence on party system formation as a ‘genuine’ cleavage, provided that the strength 
of values and organisation compensate for the lack of empirical basis. In fact, there are 
grounds for expecting regime change to be more salient than cleavages that are not 
directly related to it, at least temporarily. If the rules of the game remain open to debate, 
this debate could be expected to take on a high degree of salience given the long-term 
implications of institutional arrangements. Moreover, a number of authors have 
identified regime change as a cleavage, or at least as a central political dimension or line 
of division.27 In the Italian case, Sartori emphasises that “the cleavage between the four 
pro-system parties and the half-way parties; [and] the cleavage between the half-way 
parties and the anti-system parties” make up two of the four relevant cleavages.28 
Reviewing the Lipset-Rokkan model, he focuses on the question of how “conflicts and 
cleavages” are translated into party competition, and goes on to argue that an
27 H. Daalder, “Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe”, in J. LaPalombara & M. 
Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1966); A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns o f  Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984).
28 G. Sartori, “European Political Parties: The Case o f Polarized Pluralism”, in LaPalombara & Weiner 
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, p. 149.
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“advantage of this approach is that it gives equal attention to any kind of conflict or 
cleavage.”29 Finland provides further evidence that ‘non-structural’ cleavages, in this 
case over foreign policy, may shape party systems.30 Carty similarly argues that the 
Irish constitutional cleavage was elite-driven (though Sinnott disagrees).31 This has led 
analysts of party competition to play down the socio-economic element of cleavages, 
e.g., Dahl’s analysis of cleavages in US politics focuses on “political attitudes and 
actions”, and their link to political loyalties.32 Zuckerman’s analysis of the literature on 
cleavages supports the notion of non-structural cleavages, thus suggesting that the term 
should not be limited to divisions that feature a structural or objective element.33 In 
other words, the empirical element of a cleavage is not considered a necessary 
condition. If this possibility of playing down the importance of the empirical element is 
accepted, then regime change qualifies as a ‘cleavage’. The Irish, Finnish and Italian 
cases suggest that there is a strong case for doing this.
The point concerning the salience of divisions over regime change is readily reinforced 
with reference to rational choice analysis. In game theory terms, liberal democracies 
feature two levels of games: games about policy and games about institutions (i.e. the 
rules of the policy-games). Given the durability and significance of the rules of the 
game, or constitutional arrangements, these can be expected to take precedence over 
policy games.34 Until the rules of the game have been established, the struggle to lay 
down such rules dominates. In inter-war Hungary, Ireland and Finland this was resolved 
only through civil war. By extension, a regime can be considered as consolidated once 
the new rules of the game have been accepted by the major players.35 Hence the
29 Sartori, “The Sociology of Parties”, p. 18-19, emphasis in original.
30 Allardt & Pesonen, “Cleavages in Finnish Politics”.
31 Carty, Parties and Parish Pump', Sinnott, “Interpretations o f the Irish party System”.
32 R. Dahl, “The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial”, in R. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions 
in Western Democracies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), p.48ff.
33 A. Zuckerman, “Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis”, British Journal o f  
Political Science, 5:2 (1975), 321-248.
34 See e.g. G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, (Berkeley, CA, 
University o f California Press, 1990), Chapter Four on games about institutions and the significance o f  
uncertainty. Games about rules o f the game (i.e. institutions) will be referred to as 'macro-games'.
35 G. Di Palma, “Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization: A Minimalist View”, in U. Liebert & 
M. Cotta (eds.), Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, (Pinter Publishers, 
1990).
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significance of reforma pactada, or negotiated transition.36 The nature of transition can 
matter, to the extent that a negotiated settlement promotes rapid consolidation if all 
major political forces accept the new rules of the game. By and large this fits 
developments in Poland and Hungary 1989-90.37 Though the outgoing regime had less 
of a say in the Czecho-Slovak transition, the 1990-1992 constitution represented a 
negotiated settlement between Czechs and Slovaks. In contrast, the inter-war regimes 
hardly represented a similar reforma pactada.
The same point is reflected in coalition-building, where the West European experience 
suggests that regime change or a threat to the regime takes precedence over other issues. 
A study of coalition-building in twenty states indicates a hierarchy of party preferences: 
i) to conserve democracy if it is under threat; ii) to deal with policies related to socialist 
-  bourgeois differences if there is no regime threat; and iii) to pursue group-related 
preferences if neither of the above issues is salient.38 Extending the argument to party 
system formation, regime change can be expected to be more salient than ‘real’ 
cleavages, at least during the transitional phase. In the case of the Irish Free State and 
the Italian ‘First Republic’, this was projected into long-term party competition.
The idea of regime change as a cleavage can, therefore, be derived from the 
comparative politics literature, game theory and rational choice analysis, and an 
empirical survey of coalitions in Western Europe. Yet, in most West European states 
the process of democratisation, i.e., extension of the franchise, did not generate an 
independent cleavage. Not only were party systems firmly established at the eve of the 
introduction of universal suffrage, but the extension of the franchise was generally part 
of a package of constitutional reform including proportional representation. In the face 
of the rise of mass parties of the left and pressure for franchise reform, PR was a 
rational strategy for limiting the impact of new left-wing votes, particularly considering 
divisions within the non-socialist camp. New or modified rules of the game were thus
36 G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter & L. Whitehead, (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects 
fo r Democracy, (Baltimore, Johns Hopskins University Press, 1986).
37 A. Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 
1989-91”, Journal o f  Theoretical Politics, 42:2 (1992), 207 - 223.
38 I. Budge & H. Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in 
Twenty States, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p.34.
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established by explicit or tacit negotiation over a relatively brief period of time.39 Under 
these conditions issues generated by democratisation (regime change) did not have a 
major impact on party system formation for three reasons: i) there was no question of 
wholesale regime change; ii) the major players were already established along the four 
cleavage lines; and iii) questions relating to the new rules of the game were settled 
before they could influence the party system. In fact, the pressure for a change of rules 
was expressed by the existing parties, i.e., extension of the franchise followed pressure 
from the liberal and socialist left. The same can hardly be said for inter-war East Central 
Europe, or even West European cases such as Ireland.
In East Central Europe, as in some Western Europe cases, divisions that were caused or 
triggered by specific political events -  not ‘divisions along natural lines’ -  had a 
considerable formative impact on party systems. Rational choice analysis and 
comparative West European politics suggest that these should be treated as cleavages. 
They were generated by the same type of ‘revolutionary events’ or ‘critical junctures’ as 
Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavages, even if they are not necessarily based on ‘natural lines of 
division’. Though this violates the dictionary definition as ‘divisions based on natural 
lines’, it is in line with theory, comparative politics practice and empirical observation. 
This distinction between the classic (sociology-based) use of the concept and the wider 
usage in comparative politics is significant, because if cleavages are not necessarily 
based on ‘objective’ social divisions they may not provide for the kind of link between 
voters and parties that the worker -  owner division did. This definition of cleavage 
therefore warrants analysis of the implications of ‘non-social’ cleavages’ lack of basis 
in objective or natural divisions. Hereafter, the term cleavages will be used here in the 
new, wider sense, i.e., including major potentially party system shaping divisions that 
feature the ‘subjective’ and ‘organisational’ elements of Bartolini & Mair’s analysis, but 
not necessarily the ‘objective’ elements.
39 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”; S. Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: 
Approaches to the Comparative Study o f  the Process o f  Development, (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970).
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Th e  E x p l ic it  a n d  I m p l ic it  A s s u m p t io n s  o f  t h e  L ip s e t -R o k k a n
A p p r o a c h
The Lipset-Rokkan scheme is about more than cleavages. In the authors’ words, 
“cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course.”40 
Hence their focus on “conditions for the expression of protest and the representation of 
interest in each society.”41 The process of democratisation involves lowering several 
thresholds, the net result of which is to allow the opposition entry into the political 
game. And this process involves a number of strategic decisions on the part of the old 
regime and the emerging opposition during the process of democratisation. Hence the 
O’Donnell & Schmitter volume’s focus on the process of regime change rather than on 
cleavages.42 The Southern European and Latin American transitions took place under 
conditions which differed significantly from those of the Lipset-Rokkan processes of 
democratisation, and therefore the model has rarely been applied to them. A similar 
argument could be made for East Central Europe. Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
assumptions made by Lipset & Rokkan allows for sufficient re-working and expansion 
of the model to provide a framework for analysis of post-communist party systems in 
East Central Europe. Lipset & Rokkan’s approach is based on assumptions concerning 
the process of democratisation, which are related to the historical context in which the 
process took place, namely the emergence of socialist mass movements. These warrant 
closer examination.
Th r e s h o l d s  a n d  L e g it im a c y
Lipset & Rokkan focus on four thresholds, which when lowered lead to gradual 
incorporation of the opposition into the game of parliamentary politics. The first two 
thresholds, the legitimacy of protest and the protesters’ status as citizens with full 
political rights, were the main elements in the process of democratisation, i.e.
40 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.26.
41 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.26.
42 O'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.
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introduction of the full franchise. However, although the first tended to precede the 
second in Western Europe, as the authors assume, this has not always been the case 
elsewhere. De jure political citizenship does not necessarily imply de facto legitimacy 
of opposition, as the communist regimes made a point of illustrating. And they were by 
no means the only ones. Inter-War Hungary’s compromise allowing Socialists 
organisation and political activity in urban centres, but not in the countryside, is a case 
in point. De jure political citizenship went hand in hand with de facto limits to political 
activity through abolition of the secret ballot in rural constituencies.43
Second, the authors focus on two thresholds related to the electoral system, namely the 
ease with which new parties can gain representation and the existence of built-in checks 
on majority power. However, these are not necessarily independent variables, since the 
choice of electoral systems depends to no small extent on party strategies.44 Though this 
assertion generally holds for much of Western Europe, institutional choice in the 
context of regime change may be limited by externally imposed parameters. The Irish 
Free State’s STV electoral system is a case in point. Though first Cumann na nGaedheal 
and then Fianna Fail pushed towards a more majoritarian system, neither was in a 
position to abolish STV (which was part of the Treaty deal to protect the Protestant 
minority in 1921). In post-war Germany, the electoral systems were initially decided by 
the four occupying powers, though the Americans and the French left it up to the 
Lander. The West German system was a product of Lander negotiation and US, French 
and British influence, and has survived with minor changes.45 Similarly, neither of the 
Czech or Slovak Republics has abolished the PR systems introduced as part of the 
1990-92 power-sharing arrangement, though Meciar tried.
Though legal thresholds might be reduced rapidly, as was the case in post-communist 
East Central Europe, this does not necessarily imply that the main parties accept the 
legitimacy of their opponents (which is not the same as the legitimacy of the rules of the
43 Rothschild describes this as virtually amounting to bribery o f the left, which abstained from political 
activity in rural constituencies, where the secret ballot had been abolished in 1920, J. Rothschild, East 
Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (Seattle, University o f Washington Press, 1974), p. 160.
44 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.30.
45 G. K Roberts, “The Federal Republic o f Germany”, in S. E. Finer (ed.), Adversary Politics and 
Electoral Reform, (London, Anthony Wigram, 1975).
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game). Institutions may not always reflect the complete political reality, in terms of 
political competition, even if they are the product of negotiation. Hence the need to 
consider assumptions made about party strategy, the class basis of politics, voters and 
party identification and party organisation, and the extent to which these assumptions 
are problematic given the conditions of post-communism.
P a r t y  S t r a t e g y
The Lipset-Rokkan analysis includes three more or less explicit assumptions. First, it 
assumes a rational choice approach to party strategy on the part of the major parties. 
This assumption is made in the context of mini-max strategy, limitation of the possible 
maximum damage under conditions of uncertainty. In other words, parties pursue a 
strategy of survival in the face of an uncertain threat, each party focusing on gaining or 
maintaining a presence in the parliamentary arena. It is assumed that the old parties 
recognise the legitimacy of the new opposition, or at least its potential success, and 
react by letting the opposition enter the game of parliamentary politics.46 The model is 
based on developments in a number of logical steps, the first of which is the 
development of an entrenched conflict, normally the class conflict. This is followed by 
de facto  recognition of the conflict, and thence its legitimacy. Finally, political rights 
are extended to the opposition, a development that might include restructuring of 
institutions (e.g., the electoral system). In other words, all major forces accept 
parliament as the key arena for political competition. Democratisation is the result of 
pressure by entrenched political forces and the old regime’s response, a situation in 
which much will depend on party strategies towards offers and acceptance of alliances. 
Lipset & Rokkan focus on the central nation building elites’ commitments on the 
religious and economic fronts, i.e., respectively to a secular state or a church on the first 
front, and to urban or landed interests on the second. This by and large determines the 
peripheries’ choice of alliances 47 Alliances and coalition-building are the tools of the 
trade, leading to democratisation in the form of reforma pactada.
46 Rokkan elaborated on this theme in Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties.
47 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.36-37.
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B a r g a in in g : C l a s s -B a s e d  I n t e r e s t s
Second, the Lipset-Rokkan approach assumes that the process of democratisation is by 
and large a product of the pressure generated by the industrial revolution, or more 
precisely the rise of working class mass movements. Moreover, the assumption is that 
these movements pursue an evolutionary rather than revolutionary strategy. A similar 
point was made by Rustow: the “dynamic process of integration is set off by a 
prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. To give it these qualities, the protagonists 
must represent well entrenched forces (typically social classes)...”48 What Rustow 
makes explicit, national unity, remains implicit in the Lipset-Rokkan model as the 
authors avoid cases in which democratisation is closely associated with national 
independence, or regime change. “This excludes situations of latent secession, as in the 
late Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires...”49 By extension, democratisation by way of 
regime change in 1989-90 must also be ‘excluded’ from Rustow and Lipset & Rokkan’s 
models. Marxist theories of the state generally hold that class conflict is the most basic 
conflict, and that inter-ethnic or religious conflict deflects attention from this.50 
However, the overall European experience indicates that the opposite is the case. 
Conflict over bargainable issues within an established polity provides scope for 
bargaining over distribution within commonly accepted rules of the game, whereas 
conflict over identity or morality, let alone over national borders, is far less conducive 
to stability.51 The Lipset-Rokkan scheme assumes that the class conflict is the driving 
force behind democratisation, even if “[t]he decisive contrast among the party systems 
had emerged before the entry of the working class parties into the political arena.”52
48 D. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics, 3 (1970), 
337-63, p.352.
49 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”, p.351.
50 R. Kieve, “Pillars o f Sand: A Marxist Critique o f Consociational Democracy in the Netherlands”, 
Comparative Politics, 13:3 (1981), 313-337.
51 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies', G. Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1993); G. Schopflin, “From Communism to Democracy in Hungary”, in A. Boz6ki, 
A. Korosenyi, & G. Schopflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, 
(London, Pinter Publishers, 1992); A. Arato, “Civil Society in the Emerging Democracies: Poland and 
Hungary”, in M. L. Nugent, From Leninism to Freedom: The Challenges o f  Democratization, (Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1992).
52 Lipset & S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.35.
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This factor facilitated the step-by-step process of democratisation as set out by Rustow 
and Lipset & Rokkan. The established parties’ response to the socialist challenge 
became a key factor shaping party systems, or in Luebbert’s analysis, the very 
regimes.53 However, the East Central European regimes, inter-war as well as post­
communist, were hardly the result of a democratisation process ushered in by the liberal 
or socialist left, let alone organised interests. Hence the call for analysis of alternative 
strategies and alliances, partly due to the lack of an overwhelming class base for 
political competition.
P a r t ie s  a n d  Vo t e r s : P a r t y  I d e n t if ic a t io n
Third, the cleavages or divisions which provided the basis for democratisation affect the 
relationship between the electorate and the new elites, or parties. The left-wing parties 
which played an integral role in the ‘first wave’ democratisation process in Western 
Europe were not merely based on a social cleavage, but also aggregate organised 
interests. The labour and social democrat parties developed in close association with the 
trade union movement, if not as their political wings.54 In several states, especially the 
Netherlands and Belgium, their competitors relied on the second major extra- 
parliamentary reservoir of organised power, the Church. The parties of the left, and 
several of their right wing counterparts, thus relied on a strong and well-structured 
relationship between voters and party, fostered through trade unions and churches. 
Hence the description of Dutch society as ‘pillarised’.55 The inter-war West European 
party systems in Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases featured a high degree of party 
identification on the part of voters courtesy of the relationship between parties and
53 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy.
54 A comprehensive comparative account can be found in D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f  Socialism, 
(London, Tauris, 1996).
55 Hence the debate on consociationalism in the Netherlands, A. Lijphart, The Politics o f  
Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, (Berkeley, University o f California 
Press, 1968); H. Daalder, “The Consocational Democracy Theme”, World Politics, 26:4 (1974), 604-621; 
S. M. Halpem, “The Disorderly Universe o f Consociational Democracy”, West European Politics, 9:2 
(1986), 181-197; H. J. G. A. van Mierlo, “Depillarisation and the Decline o f Consocationalism in the 
Netherlands, West European Politics, 9:1 (1986), 97-119; A. Lijphart, “From the Politics of 
Accommodation to Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment, West European Politics, 
12:1 (1989), 139-153.
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extra-parliamentary organisations. But these links were not reproduced in East Central 
Europe in 1989. Though dissident organisations made for a degree of organised 
interests, these conglomerate organisations were directed against the regime. 
Campaigns were dominated by moral arguments about absolute right and wrong. 
Though an effective instrument against a totalitarian regime, this hardly constitutes an 
ideal basis for interests-based political competition.56
P a r t y  O r g a n  is  a t io n
Fourth, and finally, the model features assumptions concerning the type of parties that 
operated and developed during the process of democratisation. In Lipset & Rokkan’s 
own terms, the result of gradual reduction of thresholds is strong and durable parties 
“firmly entrenched in inherited social structures and [that] could not be dislodged 
through changes in the rules of the game.”57 Though a number of these parties were 
formed prior to the final extension of the franchise, they developed considerably during 
the mass politics era. Given the rise of well-organised mass parties on the left, the non­
socialist parties had little choice but to respond in kind. The result was a dynamic 
development, where cadre parties respond to the rise of the mass party by recruiting 
mass membership in an attempt to take advantage of the resources that this entails.58 
Hence the development of mass parties across the political spectrum, with strategies 
focusing on mobilisation of mass support and taking advantage of their supply of party 
workers. In this scenario, political parties represent a link between civil society and the 
state, at times to the extent that they seek “increasing influence over all spheres of the 
individual’s [or party member’s] daily life.”59 ‘Parties of integration’ therefore 
represent a class or pillar of society, based on one or more cleavages. However, post­
56 This point is developed in G. Schopflin, “Postcommunism: The Problems o f Democratic 
Construction”, Daedalus, 123:3 (1994), 127-141.
57 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.34.
58 M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, (London, 
Methuen & Co, 1954), Chapter Two.
59 S. Neumann, “The Party o f Democratic Integration”, in P. Mair (ed.), West European Politics, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p.47. Excerpted from “Towards a Comparative Study of  
Political Parties”, in S. Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, 
(Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1956).
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war West European politics has seen a shift to the more autonomous catch-all party, or 
even the professional cartel party which acts as a broker between the state (of which it 
forms part) and civil society.60 Once again Lipset & Rokkan’s assumption hardly holds 
for inter-war East Central Europe, let alone the condition of post-communism. The 
post-communist parties have far more in common with the West European catch-all 
party than with the mass parties associated with the process of democratisation.61 Katz 
& Mair’s cartel parties and Paul Taggart’s ‘new populist’ parties provide even closer 
parallels to some of the new post-communist parties.62
Given the prevalence of mass parties in West European politics between the turn of the 
century and the 1960s, and the links between these parties and organised interests 
reflecting ‘objective’ or structural cleavages, it is no surprise that the Lipset-Rokkan 
model should focus on cleavages in this sense. However, the mass party was specific to 
a given time and place, early Twentieth Century Western Europe, and was directly 
linked to the salience of the owner -  worker cleavage. This in turn is linked to 
legitimacy, party strategy, and the scope for interest-based bargaining. However, this 
need not suggest that the same should hold outside the core West European cases. The 
interest-based mass party is but one option. While the mass party invites attention to 
‘structural’ cleavages, the extent to which parties do not or cannot adopt the mass model 
warrants extending the focus to include ‘non-structural’ cleavages. This opens potential 
challenges to the other assumptions inherent in the Lipset-Rokkan model as well.
60 O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, in LaPalombara & Weiner 
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development; R. Katz & P. Mair, “Changing Models o f Party 
Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence o f the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, 1:1 (1995), 5-28.
61 G. Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, in S. Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional 
Architecture o f  Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993).
62 P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, West European Politics, 18:1 (1995), 34-51.
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Th e  P r o b l e m s  o f  P o st -C o m m u n is m
These more or less explicit assumptions of the Lipset-Rokkan approach have a few 
implications for post-communist party systems formation which suggest that party 
strategy, party organisation and the parties’ links with civil society warrant further 
examination. First, the question of the primacy of cleavages based on bargainable 
questions (distribution of resources) as opposed to value-based cleavages is particularly 
relevant to post-communism. The West European left-wing parties’ focus on 
redistribution of wealth stands in considerable contrast to the moral dimension of 
political competition sometimes seen under the condition of post-communism. Judy 
Batt refers to a
general mistrust and rejection not just o f  formal organization but o f  power itself, reflecting  
profound disillusion and scepticism  o f  politics as a m orally corrupt, dirty business to be 
shunned by respectable, decent people. This also affects attitudes to pluralism and 
opposition. People seem  to expect the national unity achieved at the clim ax o f  the struggle 
to end com m unist rule to continue in post-com m unist politics, and thus seem  neither to 
understand nor to approve the bi-party or multi-party com petition evolving from within the 
new  political leadership.63
The second point follows directly from this, namely the relevance of cleavages to 
political competition. Whereas early Twentieth Century mass parties in Western Europe 
(at least on the left) enjoyed a degree of external institutional support, the same cannot 
be said of most post-communist parties’ links with extra-parliamentary organisations. 
Across East Central Europe, the parties of the 1990s have generally been bom of 
schisms within the opposition movements or former communist parties since the 
collapse of communism. Therefore, the emerging parties represented movements rather 
than specific social interests or deep social cleavages. The emergence of agrarian parties 
notwithstanding, few post-communist parties represent specific interest groups or even 
an aggregation thereof.
63 J. Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation, (London, Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs, Pinter Publishers, 1991), p.47.
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Third, rational choice theory suggests that party strategies should be examined.64 Given 
the consensus on the need for some degree of market-oriented reform, do parties seek to 
influence policy or to achieve a dominant position in the political market? Walesa’s U- 
tums on the Polish economic transition indicate that the latter is not out of the question. 
The brief ‘rise’ and fall of Walesa’s BBWR is a case in point, a vehicle designed to 
enhance his support rather than influence policy.65 The closest post-communist parallel 
to the policy-oriented Scandinavian liberal and/or agrarian coalitions with labour parties 
has been the coalitions between reformed communists and agrarians (Poland) and the 
former liberal opposition (Hungary).
Fourth, Katz & Mair’s points on the development of political parties’ structure and 
relationship with the state are relevant to the post-communist scene. If the post­
communist parties fit this picture better than that of the mass party, it has implications 
for the development of party systems. Organisationally, cartel or ‘new populist’ parties 
entail more freedom for the party leadership than a catch-all party, let alone a mass 
party. A more professional party, less dependent on links with civil society and more a 
representative of the state, would provide more room for leadership manoeuvre, less 
constrained by cleavages. Where the mass party remains more captive to its members, 
catch-all, cartel and ‘new populist’ parties leave the party leadership less constrained, 
but also more vulnerable to leadership struggles.
Though the Lipset-Rokkan model provides a useful starting point, it can, therefore, by 
no means be applied wholesale to East Central Europe. But a review of the model’s 
assumptions highlights areas for further investigation in post-communist East Central 
Europe. The nature of the relevant cleavages is but one of these, as party system 
formation in East Central Europe has taken place under conditions that differ 
considerably from those of mainstream West European politics. Three factors stand out:
64 E.g., P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy & Public Choice, (Exeter, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
Dittrich comes to a similar conclusion by examining the notion of the catch-all party, K. Dittrich, 
“Testing the Catch-All Thesis: Some Difficulties and Possibilities”, in H. Daalder & P. Mair (eds.), 
Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, (London, Sage Publications, 1983).
65 L. Vinton, “Correcting Pilsudski: Walesa's Nonparty Bloc to Support Reform”, RFE/RL Research 
Report, 2:35 (3 September 1993)
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the relationship between party politics and civil society, party strategies, and the very 
nature of the political parties. All this points towards one conclusion: post-communist 
party systems have developed and are being shaped under conditions that place 
considerably fewer constraints on the party leadership, whether in the shape of 
cleavages or organisations. Hence the importance of party strategies, and parties’ 
responses to competing parties’ strategies.
But is this uniquely East Central European or post-communist? Not necessarily. The 
Lipset-Rokkan framework is based on assumptions concerning the nature of parties and 
their relationship with each other and civil society. Hence its relevance to the 
Scandinavian and Dutch cases, which featured mass parties, democratisation by way of 
negotiation, prominent left-wing mass parties and coalition governments. However, 
party system formation under different conditions, whether secession (Ireland) or 
regime change (Greece), renders the original model less useful. The advent of the Italian 
‘Second Republic’ is an example where the Lipset-Rokkan model is of little use as far 
as the post-1992 Italian party system is concerned. The implications of this re- 
evaluation of the principles and assumptions on which the Lipset-Rokkan model is 
based are, therefore, not limited to post-communist East Central Europe. Lipset & 
Rokkan’s model presents a framework for party system formation in several north-west 
European states in a given historical context. But this context no longer holds for East 
Central Europe, and never fully held outside a few central cases even in Western 
Europe.
Though the dynamics of party system development set out in the cleavage model (based 
on translation of cleavages into politics and on patterns of competition, alliance- 
building and opposition) are important, its assumptions about cleavages, parties and 
political competition must be revised. The functional approach to cleavages is rejected 
in favour a wider definition that allows inclusion of ‘non-structural cleavages.’ Using 
Bartolini and Mair’s terms, this entails the normative element and organisation. Though 
an empirical element may be found, it is not necessary since the two other aspects of a 
cleavage can exist without ‘objective’ divisions. The new cleavage model is therefore 
expanded to include analysis of politicisation of cleavages in the wider sense, and
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analysis of institutions, of the relationship between voters and parties, of party 
organisations, and of party strategy and patterns of political competition. Institutional 
constraints are considered below, in the last section of this chapter, and then through the 
remaining chapters where relevant. One chapter is dedicated to each of the other aspects 
of this model: voters and elections, party organisation, party alignments and party 
competition.
T h e  Fr e ez in g  H y po t h e sis  a n d  C o n t r o v e r sy
Lipset & Rokkan’s ‘freezing hypothesis’ (or rather observation) has generated a 
considerable amount of debate on the dynamics of party system development. 
Paradoxically, the freezing hypothesis was put forward at the dawn of an era of 
increasing electoral volatility and party system change. Over the next decade the Dutch 
and Belgian party systems went through important mergers and splits respectively, and 
Denmark and Norway experienced a burst of electoral volatility associated with the 
divisive issue of European integration. Hence the extensive debate on the merit of the 
freezing hypothesis. However, in the long run West European party systems have 
featured a considerable degree of stability, particularly in terms of blocs of parties rather 
than individual parties.66
The post-war West European experience suggests that once party systems have emerged 
and the process of franchise extension is complete, the further development of party 
systems is subject to significant constraints. Only in exceptional circumstances have 
party systems undergone substantial change over a short period of time, and even then 
the change has turned out less be less significant in the long term. The Danish and 
Dutch changes in the 1970s have since been recognised as less dramatic than was 
argued at the time 67 The Italian ‘Second Republic’ is perhaps the best, if not the only, 
case of major party system change in post-war Western Europe (excluding, of course,
66 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability.
67 On the Netherlands see Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation; on Denmark, see O. Borre, 
“Denmark”, in M. Franklin, T. Mackie, & H. Valen (eds.), Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving 
Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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the transitions to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece).68 Despite evidence of 
secularisation and de-alignment, party system change has been limited. If the freezing 
process is due to institutional factors and party strategies rather than the strength of 
certain historical cleavages, then the implications for the process of party system 
development and change in post-communist East Central Europe include a potential for 
freezing.
Lipset & Rokkan’s arguments focus on the prevailing strength of the parties that 
entrenched themselves before the final extension of the franchise, and the “narrowing of 
the ‘support market’ brought about through the growth of mass parties during this final 
thrust toward full-suffrage democracy [which] clearly left very few openings for new 
movements.”69 The parties that emerged during the process of democratisation and 
were fully functioning by the time of franchise extension ‘crowded out’ potential new 
parties, which was possible due to the strong ties between voters and the mass parties 
that had developed by the time of the post-WW I wave of democratisation. By the 
1920s ‘electoral space’ had thus narrowed considerably, i.e., floating voters were in 
short supply. In the Lipset-Rokkan schema cleavage structure is therefore a major factor 
in the freezing process, though political parties are recognised as the agents promoting 
the freezing. Yet this is only part of the equation which leads to freezing. Frozen party 
systems have occurred in cases where the party system did not reflect the strength of 
parties that were entrenched before the final extension of the franchise. For example, the 
Irish party system was formed around a specific issue, acceptance of the 1921 Treaty, 
but has survived in a more or less ‘frozen’ form.70 This case alone would suggest that 
the freezing process can be explained by other means. Two approaches, focusing on 
rational choice and institutional constraints respectively, constitute complementary 
rather than alternative explanations for the persistence of ‘freezing’.
68 Gundle & Parker (eds.), The New Italian Republic.
69 Lipset & Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, p.51.
70 See Mair, The Changing Irish Party System', Sinnott, “Interpretations o f  the Irish Party System”.
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R a  t io n a l  C h o ic e  a n d  P a r t y  S tra  t e g y
An actor-oriented approach to the development of party systems throws considerable 
light on the interests and strategies pursued by the main actors, the political parties. 
Sartori considers the freezing process a stage of ‘structural consolidation’, suggesting 
that “the 1920 freezing of party systems and alignments is intriguing only as long as we 
persist in understanding party systems as dependent variables. It is not intriguing, 
however, if we realise that a freezed party system is simply a party system that 
intervenes in the political process as an independent system o f  channelment, propelled 
and maintained by its own laws and inertia.”71 In other words the party system, once 
developed, contributes to its own perpetuation. It is not merely the result of other forces, 
but an independent factor contributing to its own stability. The party system is by and 
large the product of the interaction between parties.72 Hence the question of how parties 
can shape party systems, either individually by shaping voters’ preferences or 
collectively by reinforcing the salience of certain issues and attempting to keep 
‘maverick issues’ off the electoral agenda.73 The referendum has proved a particularly 
useful device for the latter, e.g., the left in Norway, Sweden and the UK has at different 
times used referendums on EC/EU membership to reduce the impact of internal schism. 
In Schattschneider’s words, “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument 
of power.”74
The freezing process can, therefore, be understood in terms of manipulation of political 
agendas and alternatives. Once the division between the main political camps has been 
consolidated in the shape of a ‘left -  right’ dimension, possibly incorporating a range of 
issues, new parties and movements are obliged to position themselves along this
71 Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties”, p. 21, emphasis in original.
72 G. Smith, “What is a Party System?”, Parliamentary Affairs, 19:3 (1966), 351-362; G. Smith, 
“Western European Party Systems: On the Trail o f a Typology”, West European Politics, 2:1 (1979), 
128-143.
73 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy & Public Choice; M. Maor & G. Smith, “On the Structuring of 
Party Competition: The Impact o f Maverick Issues”, (manuscript, The European Institute, LSE, 1993); 
M. Maor & G. Smith, “Govemment-Opposition Relationships as a Systemic Property: A Theoretical 
Framework”, ECPR Joint Session o f  Workshops, Leiden April 1993; S. Bartolini, “Electoral 
Competition: Analytical Dimensions and Empirical Problems”, EUI Working Paper, SPS No.95/6, 1995.
74 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View o f  Democracy in America, (New 
York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p.68.
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dimension. Even new parties that have focused on ‘maverick’ issues such as European 
integration or post-materialist values have accepted the need to adopt a position on the 
dominant left -  right dimension. It is in the main parties’ interest to maintain the party 
system more or less frozen in terms of alternatives, and they have the means to pursue 
this. Though cleavage structures may change, this change is gradual and parties can 
adapt to new pressures and issues by incorporating these into the main dimension of 
political competition. This, more than anything, explains the fate of green parties in 
Scandinavia, despite their success in Sweden in the late 1980s.75
F o r m a  t iv e  F a c t o r s : A n  In s t it u t io n a l is t  A p p r o a c h
Yet the rational actor approach does not tell the whole story. Institutions do matter. 
Political outcomes reflect more than the distribution of preferences and resources: 
institutions impose an element of order and continuity, even if they are subject to 
change. Moreover, they contribute to the shaping of preferences and resources of 
actors.76 In terms of party system development and change, the parties that prosper 
under certain institutional rules are unlikely to promote institutional change. Once a 
given set of institutions has been established, this contributes to system stability.
Analysing the freezing of party systems, Bartolini & Mair suggest that systemic factors 
become increasingly important in relative terms, as the impact of “factors associated 
with the process of the formation of party systems -  for example enfranchisement, 
electoral growth of new parties, institutional change, and so on -  will tend to wane 
away”.77 In other words, party systems become more stable when institutional change 
declines, or the rules of the game have been developed. Institutional flux is associated 
with the development of party systems, and institutional stability contributes to party
75 M. Bennulf, “Sweden: The Rise and Fall o f Miljopartiet De Grona”, in D. Richardson & C. Rootes 
(eds.), The Green Challenge: The Development o f  Green Parties in Europe, (London, Routledge, 1995); 
O. Knutsen, “The Materialist/Post-Materialist Value Dimension as a Party Cleavage in the Nordic 
Countries”, West European Politics, 13 (1990), 258-273.
76 J. G. March & J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis fo r  Politics, (New 
York, Free Press, 1989).
77 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability, p. 137, emphasis added.
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system stability and vice versa. Italian politics since 1989 is a perfect example. The 
collapse of the party system prompted changes in the rules of the game, which have in 
turn influenced the relationship between the parties. The result has been the most 
comprehensive party system change in post-war West European politics. By extension, 
both the new Italian and the post-communist party systems should feature a 
considerable degree of freezing once the initial period of institutional change is behind 
them. Di Palma’s minimalist definition of regime consolidation raises a similar point, 
inasmuch as consolidation is defined in terms of major actors accepting the new rules of 
the game, which in turn suggests a degree of stability.78
Therefore, ‘party system freezing’ depends on two factors. First, the strategies pursued 
by individual parties, in the context of the party system, shape the party system by 
determining the agenda and the dimensions of political competition. Second, the 
institutional framework (rules of the game) determined during the process of 
democratisation represents a constraint on party strategies. However, this constraint 
may include a degree of flexibility inasmuch as there is room for institutional 
manipulation. Though major institutional change, particularly electoral system change, 
has been rare since the final wave of democratisation, smaller changes have been seen 
across Western Europe.79 Similarly, all four East Central European states in question 
have modified their electoral systems since 1990.80
78 Di Palma, “Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization: A Minimalist View”; G. Di Palma, To 
Craft Democracies, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990).
79 For an overwiew o f electoral change in post-war Western Europe, see A. Lijphart, Electoral Systems 
and Party Systems: A Study o f  Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1994). A majority o f Western Europe's states have changed their electoral systems to a minor 
extent since 1945. Italy and France have gone through considerable changes, and the UK Labour 
government is considering electoral reform.
80 Poland adopted a 5%  barrier for the 1993 election (8% for alliances or joint lists) and Hungary 
changed from the threshold from 4% to 5% for the 1994 election. The Czech and Slovak republics have 
changed their electoral laws for their upper chambers since the dissolution o f the state.
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Th e  F r e e z in g  C o n t r o v e r s y : Pa r t y  S t r a t e g y  o r  S o c ia l  Ch a n g e ?
Despite the wave of literature on party system change in the two decades following the 
publication of Lipset & Rokkan’s ‘freezing hypothesis’, more long term evidence 
suggests that party strategy and institutional stability have prevailed over social change. 
While the salience of cleavages has declined, this has not generated the increased 
volatility expected by some authors.81 Bartolini & Mair present evidence indicating that 
over the last century total volatility “fails to display any clear secular trend over 
time”.82 Moreover, when within-bloc or cleavage volatility is considered with respect to 
the worker-owner cleavage in Western Europe, there is no upward trend in any of the 
states considered in the post-war period. This is arguably as “the most telling indication 
of the reality of the freezing process since it offers a direct index of cross-cleavage 
mobility.”83 Nevertheless, it is worth noting the attempts that have been made to 
overcome the ‘freezing’ of party systems.
B e y o n d  C l e a  v a g e s : t h e  Ca t c h -A l l  Pa r t y  a n d  D e -a l ig n m e n t
The West German Volkspartei is the classic case featuring party strategy based on 
electoral appeal above and beyond cleavages. Germany’s CDU is the best example, 
followed by the Italian DC, though Dutch ‘de-pillarisation’ illustrates the case as well. 
Based on the success of the CDU, and the SPD’s subsequent conversion to Volkspartei 
status, Kirchheimer argued the case for the superiority of the ‘catch-all’ party in terms 
of organisation and party strategy.84 The key point is that parties can, relatively 
successfully, seek to take politics beyond the cleavages upon which party systems are
81 R. J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan & P. A. Beck (eds.), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984); M. Maguire, 
“Is There Still Persistence? Electoral Change in Western Europe, 1948-1979”, in Daalder & Mair (eds.), 
Western European Party Systems', M. Pedersen, “The Changing Dynamics o f European Party Systems: 
Changing Patterns o f Electoral Volatility”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26; S. B. 
Wolinetz, “The Transformation o f Western European Party Systems Revisited”, West European Politics, 
2:1 (1979).
82 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability, p. 119-120.
83 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability, p. 120.
84 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”.
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based. Moreover, this may prove a superior strategy, inasmuch as the opposition may 
have to adopt a similar catch-all strategy if it is to have any hope of electoral success.85 
Though Kirchheimer’s and Epstein’s theses feature elements of social change such as 
the declining salience of cleavages, the main focus is on party organisation and 
strategies. The catch-all strategy is a deliberate choice on the part of the party, or more 
specifically the party leadership, designed to reach a wider electorate. It is no 
coincidence that this strategy was adopted by the right first, in competition with ‘wing- 
parties’ on the socialist left which relied on class-based mobilisation. In this context, the 
labour and social democrat parties’ shift towards catch-all strategies, from the SPD at 
Bad Godesberg in 1959 to Blair’s ‘New Labour’ in the 1990s, represents a response to 
their opponents’ strategies. Though Thatcher’s Conservative Party can hardly be 
described adequately in ‘catch-all’ terms due to its focus on ideology, it still illustrates 
the impact of party strategy appealing over and above cleavage structures.86
The fact that several other types of parties have survived does not in itself detract from 
the catch-all thesis, neither does electoral or party system stability.87 Kirchheimer 
stressed that the catch-all thesis applies mainly to major parties.88 The result of a catch­
all strategy could be to prevent an otherwise impending loss of votes, rather than 
spectacular electoral growth. Though some attempts have been made to test the catch­
all thesis in West European politics,89 Dittrich concludes that “the one definite point to
85 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, p. 188; see also Dittrich, 
“Testing the Catch-All Thesis”; D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (London, Pall 
Mall Press, 1967) similarly anticipated a shift toward US-style office-seeking parties appealing over and 
above cleavages.
86 It has been argued that the Conservative - Labour division warrants a redefinition o f class centring on, 
among other factors, the private - public divide in employment, home ownership, etc., P. Dunleavy & C. 
Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s, (London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1985); see Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice on 
preference shaping along these lines o f divisions. In any case, the importance o f party strategy is 
illustrated.
87 Ware cites non-class cleavages, new cleavages, continued reliance on ideology, and the persistence o f  
non-catch-all parties, A. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 226-29; A. Ware, “The Party Systems o f the Established Liberal Democracies in the 1990s: Is 
this a Decade o f Transformation?”, in Government and Opposition, 30:3 (1995), 312-326.
88 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems”, p.55.
89 R. Rose & D. Urwin, “Persistence and Change in Westen Party Systems since 1945”, Political Studies, 
18:3 (1970), 287-319; Wolinetz, “The Transformation o f Western European Party Systems Revisited”; 
and Maguire, “Is There Still Persistence?” found little evidence to indicate the success o f catch-all 
parties.
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emerge from this [debate on the catch-all party], is that we need to pay much more 
attention to the question of party strategy.”90 And this is the key point for East Central 
Europe. Parties not only translate cleavages into political competition, they can also 
attempt to transcend cleavage-based politics. Party strategy matters. However, the 
conglomerate movements (or proto-parties) that emerged in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
in 1989 shared only some attributes of the catch-all party. They were based on un­
structured or non-aligned electorates rather than the de-alignment associated with the 
West European catch-all party.91 Subsequent developments have depended to no small 
extent on party strategies, or rather, leadership strategies.
To w a r d  N e w  C l e a  v a g e s : R e -a l ig n m e n t
The second major challenge to the freezing hypothesis is based on re-alignment rather 
than de-alignment, i.e., the salience of new cleavages rather than the declining salience 
of old cleavages. Inglehart has been the most prominent advocate of the notion that 
value-change in post-materialist society has brought forward a new, post-materialist, 
agenda which has had a major impact on West European politics in the from of green 
parties.92 A ‘silent revolution’ has arguably generated a new set of cleavages, expressed 
in the rise of green parties and some left-wing parties’ adoption of elements of the 
‘green’ agenda in response to this threat. Given the central role of cleavages in the 
Lipset-Rokkan scheme this could imply party system change. Yet the freezing 
hypothesis, at least in the interpretation set out above, would suggest otherwise.
The effect on West European party systems has been mixed. Though green parties have 
experienced some success, particularly in Germany and in European elections, the 
overall effect on West European party systems has been more limited due to left wing
90 Dittrich, “Testing the Catch-All Thesis”, p.266.
91 Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, p.9-10.
92 R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, 
(Princeton University Press, 1977); R. Inglehart, “Value Change in Industrial Societies”, American 
Political Science Review, 81:4 (1987), 1289-1303; R. Inglehart, Modernisation and Postmodernisation: 
Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997), 
Chapter Eight.
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parties’ ability to absorb part of the green agenda.93 Nevertheless, green parties have 
seen some success. They should probably be treated as ‘issue-oriented parties’ rather 
than as parties focusing on a new cleavage. In line with the rational choice notion of 
voters’ signalling when voting for less viable parties, ‘green’ votes could be interpreted 
as a message to the major parties. In fact, the coalition behaviour of moderate greens 
(e.g., in Germany) indicates that greens have developed into interest-oriented parties, 
bargaining for influence over policy. Maor & Smith cite post-materialist issues among 
the new ‘maverick issues’ which do not fit easily into the dominant left -  right 
dimension.94 Nevertheless, green parties have tended to adopt positions along the left -  
right dimension. Kitschelt goes one step further, arguing that the ‘silent revolution in 
Europe’ has affected left -  right competition inasmuch as ‘post-materialist’ values are 
associated with a left-wing socio-economic orientation.95
Three points are significant for East Central European party system development. First, 
if there has in fact been a ‘silent revolution’, whether of Inglehart’s or Kitschelt’s kind, 
its effect on party systems in Western Europe has been limited. As an explicit challenge 
based on realignment according to new cleavages, the green parties have not altered 
party systems radically. However, as pressure groups, green parties and other ‘new 
social movements’ have influenced political competition. Green politics thus illustrate 
the potential power of interest-based parties rather than a case for re-alignment. Second, 
pace Kitschelt, the ‘silent revolution’ literature raises questions concerning non-material 
dimensions of politics other than religion and identity. Though non-material issues are 
significant in West European politics, they have been incorporated into left -  right 
competition, linked by attitudes to government intervention and redistribution of 
wealth. Hence the question of the nature of the relationship between economic and non­
93 E. Frankland, “Germany: The Rise, Fall and Recovery o f Die Grunen”; C. Rootes, “Greens in the June 
1994 Elections to the European Parliament”; both in Richardson & Rootes (eds.), The Green Challenge; 
W. Rudig, “Green Parties and the European Union”, in J. Gaffney (ed.), Political Parties and the 
European Union, (London, Routlege, 1996). Inglehart himself has noted post-materialist voters' 
tendencies to vote for left-wing parties which absorb the post-materialist agenda R. Inglehart, Culture 
Shifts, (Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Bennulf, “Sweden: The Rise and Fall 
o f Miljopartiet de Grona”.
94 Maor & Smith, “On the Structuring o f Party Competition”.
95 H. Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe”, J. Hayward & C. Page (eds.), Governing the New 
Europe, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).
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material issues under post-communism, which need not follow the West European 
pattern. Finally, the post-materialist challenge underscores the potential for ‘maverick 
issues’ to influence party systems in the short to medium term. Though party systems 
may adapt and accommodate such challenges, there is some scope for short-term 
shocks, in this case based on alternative cleavages.
A n t i-C l e a  v a g e  P o l it ic s : ‘N e w P o p u l is m ’
If post-materialist parties challenged Western Europe’s ‘frozen’ party systems from the 
left, they were by no means the only parties to do so. Though right-wing extremist 
parties were not new in West European politics in the 1970s, the anti-tax parties that 
developed in Scandinavia can be better described as neo-populist. Their anti­
immigration policies notwithstanding, the Norwegian and Danish anti-tax parties
focused more heavily on a ‘populist’ criticism of the welfare state and socialism. The
term neo-populist is used to reflect their attempted appeal over and above sectional 
interests, based on notions of ‘common sense’, the ‘common man’ and national 
interests. A parallel can be drawn with anti-EC parties on the left in both countries, 
stressing the ‘common man’ against corporate interests, not unlike US Populists in the 
1890s.96 Taggart’s term ‘New Populism’ captures the combination of the older populist 
appeal and the protest character of the 1970s and 1980s’ ‘new social movements’, and 
“fuses the Anti-politics stance of the New Politics with the broad-based protest of the 
populist party.”97 Though he does not include the anti-EC socialist left parties in 
Scandinavia, these are at least near cousins.98 Kitschelt reaches a similar conclusion via 
an alternative route, though he does not draw conclusions concerning types of parties. 
Whereas much of the post-materialist agenda has been linked to the left of the West 
European political spectrum (e.g., social and cultural minority rights, green issues), the 
more authoritarian elements of non-materialist issues have been addressed by a rising
96 M. Canovan, Populism , (London, Junction Books, 1981).
97 Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe, p.35.
98 J. E. Lane, & S. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, (London, Sage Publications, 1991), 
p. 106-107, note the difficulty in identifying the left socialist parties given their lack o f clear-cut 
ideological criteria and their tendency to have split off from socialist parties. Yet precisely this lack o f  
clear cleavage basis and the 'populist' appeal qualify them as New Populist.
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‘new authoritarian’ right." Both authors stress the neo-liberal economic appeal of the 
new populists or new authoritarian right, in contrast to fascist and neo-fascist parties.
New populism takes the notion of a party not based on interests or cleavages to its 
logical conclusion, by combining the catch-all strategy’s mass appeal above cleavages 
and the post-materialists’ focus on non-material issues. Though the Norwegian and 
Danish Progress Parties epitomise this approach, the phenomenon has become 
increasingly significant. Taggart includes, among others, Forza Italia and Sweden’s 
New Democracy.100 The debate as to which West European parties should be so 
classified is less important than the emergence of parties that deliberately aim to appeal 
over and above sectional interests, focusing heavily on non- or post-material values. 
The contrast to the catch-all strategy is clear, new populism emphasises that it is un­
aligned rather than de-aligned. This point has become increasingly important with the 
collapse of the Italian ‘First Republic’ and the electoral success of Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia and Fini’s Alleanza Nazionale in 1994. Both parties emphasised their ‘new’ status 
and accompanying lack of involvement in the bribery scandals that contributed to the 
fall of the Christian Democrats.101
Again the conclusion points to the importance of party strategy and organisation. 
Taggart stresses “strongly centralised structures with charismatic and personalised 
leadership” along with “anti-system ideology and speaking for the ‘mainstream’ of 
society” and wide constituency as central features of new populist parties.102 The Italian 
case suggests that the time of the mass party may be gone, given the success of the 
partito azienda (the professional, or literally the ‘company’, party). Or at least it
"  Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe”, p. 136-138.
100 Taggart's inclusion o f the Northern League was debatable given the party's strong regional identity, 
but the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nationale fits the bill closely. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western 
Europe”; I. Diamanti, “The Northern League: From Regional Party to Party of Government”, and C. 
Ruzza & O. Schmidtke, “Towards a Modem Right? Alleanza Nazionale and the ‘Italian Revolution’”, 
both in Gundle & Parker (eds.), The New Italian Republic.
101 M. Frei, Italy: The Unfinished Revolution, (London, Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996); Gundle & Parker 
(eds.), The New Italian Republic; S. Bartolini & R. D’Alimonte, “Plurality Competition and Party 
Realignment in Italy: The 1994 Parliamentary Elections”, EUI Working Paper, SPS No.95/7, 1995. Both 
parties enjoyed considerable support in the 1994 elections, but less in the 1995 local and 1996 national 
elections.
102 Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, p.43-44.
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suggests that there is considerable room for parties that can be classified neither as mass 
nor catch-all parties, nor even as Katz & Mair’s cartel parties, but rather as a new 
relative of the populist party. In Italy, the 1994 elections brought the right-wing new 
populist coalition to power. Yet two years later the formerly communist PDS led a 
victorious coalition in the 1996 elections, having recently adopted a catch-all type 
strategy. The parallels between Italy since 1992 and East Central Europe since 1989 
will be developed further in the chapters below. Suffice it to note that both 
developments present challenges for theories of party system change and stability in 
Western Europe.
B e y o n d  t h e  F r o z e n  P a r t y  S y s t e m ?
Judging from West European theory and practice, the brief answer to the question 
whether party systems development has gone beyond the limits of the freezing 
hypothesis must be negative. Apart from the Italian case, the post-war West European 
party systems have remained remarkably stable in the face of catch-all strategies, post­
materialist politics and new populist challenges. Once developed, party systems have 
tended to remain more or less frozen. If this can be put down to institutional constraints 
and party strategy, there is little reason to expect that the ‘freezing hypothesis’ cannot 
eventually be applied to Italy’s ‘Second Republic’ and the post-communist East Central 
European party systems. However, West European party systems have not remained 
completely frozen. Bartolini & Mair’s distinction between total volatility and bloc 
volatility is particularly pertinent. Even if overall volatility is subject to temporary 
change, bloc volatility has declined over the twentieth century.103 Yet there can be little 
doubt that several parties have changed considerably, both in terms of strategy and 
organisation.104
103 Bartolini & Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability.
104 R. Katz & P. Mair, “Party Organizations: Form Civil society to the State”, in R. Katz & P. Mair 
(eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 
(London, Sage Books, 1994); Katz & Mair “Changing Models o f Party Organisation and Party 
Democracy”.
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A  Fr e e z in g  H y po t h e sis  fo r  P o st -C o m m u n ist  E a st  C e n t r a l  
E u r o p e ? In st it u t io n a l  C o n st r a in t s  o n  P a r t y  Sy st e m
D e v e l o pm e n t
By the logic set out above, any freezing of East Central European party systems 
depends on consolidation of the rules of the game, or institutional stability, and on the 
strategies pursued by the political parties. With the change from the period of transition 
to consolidation, both factors become increasingly strong constraints on individual 
parties’ strategies over time. Rokkan’s hypothesis concerning negotiated 
democratisation and constitutional choice in early Twentieth Century Western Europe is 
particularly relevant here, inasmuch as the transitions in East Central Europe in 1989-90 
were negotiated processes.105
Th e  N e w  R u l e s  o f  t h e  Ga m e
Institution-building in post-communist East Central Europe had more in common with 
West European politics than inter-war East Central Europe. The difficulties faced by 
these new democracies in the inter-war period “resulted in theoretical orientations that 
look at new democracies in the twentieth century as saddled with original problems that 
are inherently difficult to remove.”106 However, the failed inter-war democracies were 
bom out of crisis and defeat of the old order in war, “without the support and consent of 
the losers.”107 This can be contrasted to democratisation in the Atlantic and 
Scandinavian states, where the lowering of thresholds of representation through 
franchise extension was accompanied by adoption of PR electoral systems, resulting 
from convergence of pressures from below and from above.108 The focus is thus on 
institutional arrangements or rules of the game that satisfied the demands of all major
105 Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties.
106 Di Palma, “Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization”, p.33.
107 Di Palma, “Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization”, p.33.
108 Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties, p. 157.
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political forces. Rokkan’s suggestion that the process of negotiated democratisation is 
crucial to the choice of new rules of the game has since been applied to the East Central 
European transitions.109 The crucial factor in these ‘macro-games’ is the perceived 
strength of the actors.110 Cautious assessment of their potential electoral support 
prompted both socialist and non-socialist negotiators in the ‘first wave’ of 
democratisation to opt for the compromise of PR electoral systems, thus minimising the 
danger of an opposition majority government.111
The negotiated transitions in Poland and Hungary featured several factors similar to 
those stressed by Rokkan in his account of the adoption of PR in Western Europe in 
response to the ‘first wave’ of democratisation. The compromises centred on adoption 
of PR as a means of preventing socialist majorities as far as the established parties were 
concerned. Similarly, for the rising working class parties, PR was a means of securing 
representation. Lijphart’s parallel is clear, “[f]or Rokkan’s ‘old-established parties’ read 
ruling Communist parties, and for his ‘rising working class’ read the new democratic 
forces.”112 In 1989, as in a number of the earlier cases, the rising new parties tended to 
underestimate their strength, therefore pressing for PR. The same could not initially be 
said for the ancien regime parties. Before the Polish elections in 1989 they 
overestimated their support, though the outcome of these elections led to drastic re- 
evaluation of the Communists’ prospects across the region. In addition, Lijphart focuses 
on two further elements of power-sharing: the use of bi-cameral legislatures featuring 
one chamber based on PR and a second chamber elected on a basis more favourable to 
the old parties, and semi-presidentialism as a means of separation of powers. Both 
institutions represent means of limiting the power of the party (or coalition) that 
controls the lower house, thus safeguarding the interests of both government and
109 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”.
110 The distinction between games about the rules of the game (macro-games) and the iterated games 
subsequently played is worth noting. Democratic consolidation is concerned with the macro-games, i.e. 
the rules within which subsequent political conflict is played out. See A. Przeworski, Democracy and the 
Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); Tsebelis, Nested Games.
111 Four European ‘waves’ o f democratisation are usually identified: a first wave culminating in the 
post-WW I adoption o f the full franchise in most European states; a second wave following WW II; a 
third Mediterranean wave in the 1970s; and the fourth, post-communist wave.
112 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”, p.209.
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opposition. In both cases the original 1989 round-table compromises foresaw (tacitly) a 
Communist president, Jaruzelski in Poland and Pozsgay in Hungary.113
Thus, “the Polish case does not merely fit the [Rokkan] hypothesis, but provides a well- 
nigh perfect illustration of it.”114 It must, however, be considered a multi-stage process, 
as the electoral rules of the game were reformed extensively before each of the two 
subsequent elections (1991 and 1993). In 1991, with the party system still emerging, 
only the Democratic Union was confident enough of its electoral strength to support a 
German-style 5% threshold.115 The result was a ‘hyper-proportional’ electoral law, 
passed in spite of two presidential vetoes.116 A 5% threshold was adopted before the 
1993 election, voted through with the support of all the big parties but predictably 
opposed by smaller ones. The shift from the Hare formula for seat allocation to the 
D’Hont formula favoured larger parties further.117
In Hungary, the electoral rules for parliament reflect a compromise that is not dissimilar 
to the Polish outcome. As in Poland the regime preferred competition for single 
constituencies, reflecting the low standing of the Party but high profile of a number of 
its candidates.118 By the same reasoning the MDF favoured a pure list PR system, and 
the SzDSz a mixed system. The resulting electoral system differs from the German one 
inasmuch as the overall system is not proportional, the ‘PR seats’ do not provide 
additional members with the aim of overall proportionality. Hence the parallel with the 
Polish bicameral system in terms of electoral compromise. The 4% threshold 
represented a compromise between the MSzMP’s preferred 5%, and the new parties’
113 Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation, p.30-36. Pozsgay never made it to the 
presidency due to changes in the rules for election o f the president after a referendum promoted by the 
SzDSz and Fidesz.
114 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice... ”, p.213.
115 V. Zubeck, “The Fragmentation o f Poland's Political Party System”, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 26:1 (1993), 14-71, see p.49-52.
116 D. McQuaid, “The ‘War’ over the Election Law”, Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, 2 
August 1991; L. Vinton, “Poland's New electoral Law: Fewer Parties, Same Impasse?”, Radio Free 
Europe, 2:28, July, 1993.
117 F. Millard, “The Polish Parliamentary Election o f September, 1993”, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 27:3 (1994), 295-313, p.302.
118 B. Lomax, “Hungary”, in Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional Architecture o f  Eastern Europe, 
p.83.
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choice of 3%.119 In contrast to Poland in 1989-91, the Hungarian opposition was clearly 
divided into parties by the time of the negotiations. The threshold was raised to 5% 
prior to the 1994 elections.120
The Czechoslovak transition cannot be compared with the Hungarian and Polish 
transitions in the sense of a negotiated settlement between regime and opposition. 
Coming after the Polish elections and the collapse of the Berlin wall, the ‘round-table’ 
element was absent.
[T]he communists in Czechoslovakia simply had no bargaining power at all. Negotiations 
in these conditions had a rather different role from those in Poland and Hungary: they were 
entered into in Czechoslovakia at the point at which the two sides were hardly 
‘interdependent’, but instead the opposition, previously small and disorganized, was 
buttressed by the mass support of the people, whereas the Communist Party had been 
weakened to the point of dependence on the opposition to avoid its complete 
obliteration...121
However, inter-ethnic bargaining provided the negotiated element in the Czechoslovak 
transition. The main political actors in the constitutional game were the (Czech) Civic 
Forum and (Slovak) Public Against Violence rather than the ancien regime -  opposition 
dichotomy predominant elsewhere. Both Rokkan and Lijphart have stressed the 
significance of ethnic or religious minorities in democratisation, and the adoption of PR 
to guarantee their political representation.122 Lijphart commented on the situation in 
1991:
Proportionality is one of the four basic principles of consociationalism, and Czecho­
slovakia is also thoroughly consociational in the other three respects: (a) it has a 
power-sharing cabinet including representatives of both the Czech majority and the 
Slovak minority, as well as a Czech president and a Slovak prime minister; (b) it is a 
two-unit federal system consisting of autonomous Czech and Slovak Republics with 
their own governments; and (c) it has a mutual veto in the form of a concurrent 
majority requirement stipulating that constitutional amendments and major legislation 
require not only approval by extraordinary legislative majorities but also by such 
majorities in the upper house among Czech and Slovak representatives voting 
separately.123
119 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”, p.215.
120 Associated Press, “Hungarian Election Facts and Figures”, 05 May 1994.
121 Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation, p.40.
122 Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties, p.157; Lijphart, The Politics o f  Accommodation, on the 
Netherlands 1917.
123 Lijphart, “Democratisation and Constitutional Choice...”, p.217.
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However, the 1990 electoral law was the product of negotiations under the pressure of 
the deadline of the first elections. “[T]he most obvious solution was to turn to the 
previous pre-communist systems for inspiration, with the understanding that this would 
be used for the first election, and that a full reconsideration of the electoral system 
would be made after the election”.124 By the 1992 election only one major aspect of the 
law was changed: the threshold for coalitions was raised to 7 and 10 percent for 
coalitions of two or three and four or more parties respectively.125
Though the Czecho-Slovak state collapsed at the end of 1992, both successor states 
have maintained the electoral system (including election of their presidents) adopted in 
1990 more or less unaltered. The consociational approach to power-sharing includes 
one element which makes it somewhat ill-suited to the conditions of post-communism, 
namely the veto. Given the central position of the transition to a free market economy 
and the substantial changes required, the mutual veto contained a considerable danger 
of immobilism. Yet the failure of consociationalism in keeping the state intact obscured 
its success in producing a set of rules of the game acceptable to all parties. The ‘velvet 
divorce’ notwithstanding, both successor states’ institutions and party systems remained 
largely unchanged, if not ‘frozen’.
Though the initial development of party systems in post-communist East Central 
Europe took place in an institutional vacuum, the new institutional designs have 
provided parameters within which fully-fledged party systems develop. Given that the 
role of institutional stability and party systems’ tendency to self-perpetuation in the 
freezing process is based on general theory rather than arguments specific to Western 
Europe in the early Twentieth Century, and given the institutional stability achieved in 
East Central Europe by way of negotiated transitions, the East Central European party 
systems are developing under institutional constraints that are very similar to those that 
contributed to freezing of the West European party systems.
124 J. Batt, “Czechoslovakia”, in Whitefield (eds.), The New Institutional Architecture o f  Eastern 
Europe, p.37.
125 D. Olson, “Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia”, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 26:3 (1993).
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Above all, this suggests that institutional change will continue to be incremental and 
limited to, e.g., changes in thresholds or constituency size. Meciar’s unsuccessful 
attempt to introduce a more majoritarian electoral system illustrates this. Any party’s 
attempt to achieve a dominant position is tempered by the PR electoral systems. The 
thresholds to parliamentary representation limit not only the prospect for new parties, 
but also the consequences of divisions within existing parties. In several cases divisions 
within a parliamentary caucus have resulted in one section failing to gain representation 
in subsequent elections for precisely this reason. In short, though parties change, the 
party systems cannot be expected to change radically beyond the point of institutional 
freezing. The new electoral law in Poland in 1993 was probably the last step in this 
development of new rules of the game, though Slovakia has seen attempts to change the 
electoral law.
P a r t y  S y s t e m  D e v e l o p m e n t : R a t io n a l  Ch o ic e  u n d e r  S y s t e m ic  C o n s t r a in t s
The Lipset-Rokkan model of party system development remains a powerful analytical 
tool for analysis of the development of party systems, or rather, a set of party systems, 
that emerged under specific conditions and in a given historical context. However, if the 
model is to be applied to cases other than its original core states these context-specific 
assumptions must be reconsidered, and rejected. Not only is Lipset & Rokkan’s 
approach based on a given set of cleavages, it also assumes highly structured links 
between social cleavages and politics, notably in terms of voting behaviour. However, 
the second, third and fourth waves of democratisation have differed considerably from 
the first wave discussed by Lipset & Rokkan in all these respects. Though party systems 
may appear to reflect similar cleavages, this does not necessarily imply the same 
relationship between cleavages and party systems that Lipset & Rokkan pointed to. The 
transition from communism generated its own new cleavages centring on regime 
change, and older pre-communist cleavages were revived. Moreover, even if these 
cleavages contributed to the development of post-communist party systems, this did not 
take place in the context of the strong extra-parliamentary organisations featured in 
Western Europe at the turn of the century. The link between organised interests and
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party politics is considerably weaker, not to say absent. The same goes for the structure 
of post-communist parties, and for a number of parties in inter-war Europe and post-war 
Western Europe as well. The days of the mass party are over, but there is a considerable 
gap between a mass party that shifts towards catch-all status, and a new party with 
limited basis in cleavages.
A number of questions emerge for the analysis of the East Central European party 
system. The post-communist Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian party systems share 
several attributes with their inter-war predecessors, and even their West European 
counterparts. There is little doubt that, at the elite level, old and new cleavages played a 
part in the development of these party systems. However, the leadership of the new 
parties have been working under considerably less constraint from external 
organisations than was the case during the first wave of democratisation. Or at least 
very different constraints. The requirements of economic transition constitute one of 
these new constraints, but this concerns policy rather than party system formation. A 
number of parties have attempted to outflank this constraint by focusing their appeal on 
non-economic issues, with varying degrees of success. The medium-term danger 
associated with this strategy is a backlash at the polls from voters casting their votes 
retrospectively based on the government’s performance.
A comparison of the role of cleavages, in particular the owner -  worker cleavages, in 
the first wave of democratisation and the less structured competition associated with the 
fall of communism suggests that the link between parties and voters should be 
considerably weaker in the post-communist cases. Again this suggests a wider scope for 
party leader freedom in the development of party strategies, and thus in party system 
formation. If party systems reflect cleavages, this should be due to elite divisions as 
much as, if not more than, social cleavages. However, the imperative of economic 
transition, and the recession this entailed in most cases, contributed to an anti­
incumbency bias in East Central Europe. To some extent, parties in office were, 
therefore, likely to suffer electoral loss, giving rise to high electoral volatility.
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The parties which have developed under the condition of post-communism have more 
in common with Western catch-all or cartel parties than the mass parties which were 
characteristic of the first wave. Gone are the links with extra-parliamentary 
organisations, save in the case of some Christian democrat parties. The left-wing 
parties’ links with trade unions are not comparable to their counterparts in early 
Twentieth Century Western Europe. Parties rely less on their extra-parliamentary 
membership. Again this suggests wider freedom of action for party elites, whether in 
terms of party strategy and political appeal or by way of the splits and mergers which 
have characterised all four East Central European party systems to a greater or lesser 
degree.
This re-working of the cleavage model thus suggests considerable differences between 
party system formation in early Twentieth Century Western Europe and post­
communist East Central Europe. Different cleavages are relevant, their degree of 
salience differs, as do parties and party strategies. There is more room for party 
strategy, as party leaders operate under fewer constraints. However, this approach also 
suggests a set of constraints under which this ‘rational choice’ takes place. If cleavages 
are less significant at the voter level, then there is more room for appeal based on issues, 
personality and populism. While the this may bring considerable success at the polls, it 
leaves parties potentially vulnerable in the case of economic difficulties. The lack of 
viable alternatives to the free market thus imposes a second, more medium-term, 
constraint on party strategy.
An application of the freezing hypothesis to post-communist East Central Europe 
suggests that institutions ‘froze’ relatively fast by way of negotiated revolutions and 
post-revolution institutional settlements. With the changes to Poland’s electoral law in 
1993 this process of laying down new rules of the game was more or less over. 
Subsequent changes have not exceeded those that are normal in West European liberal 
democracies. Moreover, there is little reason not to expect the East Central European 
party systems, and the big parties in particular, to perform according to rational choice 
theory (and western experience) and contribute to keeping the party systems frozen by 
way of agenda setting and keeping maverick issues out. Hence the most significant
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constrains under which party systems in East Central Europe are developing -  a rapid 
freezing process.
C o n c l u sio n
Though the post-communist party systems of East Central Europe have much in 
common with their Western counterparts, and the Lipset-Rokkan model is therefore a 
useful starting point in the analysis of the development of these party systems, 
considerable differences remain. The need for a wider model is due to the assumptions 
made by Lipset & Rokkan, as their model concerns a given set of states in a specific 
historical context. Any application of the model to a different set of states, or in a 
different historical context, therefore warrants re-evaluation of these assumptions. 
Though the fall of communism and the development of post-communist party systems 
have been the occasion for this review of the model, it highlights the problems of 
applying the model outside its core states and historical period. Hence references will be 
made to West European cases for which the Lipset-Rokkan approach is problematic, 
notably inter-war Ireland and the Italian ‘Second Republic’.
Despite its limitations, the Lispet-Rokkan model provides a useful ‘heuristic device’ 
which draws attention to significant features and trends in party system development 
and change. It presents a powerful explanation of the development of the core West 
European party systems. Lipset & Rokkan’s analysis focuses on the four cleavages the 
clearly were predominant in the core cases, however problematic or contentious the 
functionalist model that they are deduces from is. Yet both the critique of functionalism 
and the empirical evidence suggests that regime change should also be considered a 
cleavage, albeit a ‘non-structural’ cleavage. Moreover, analysis of the model raises 
questions about the assumptions made by Lipset & Rokkan, which do not necessarily 
hold for east Central Europe. Though the key aspect of the model, the translation of 
cleavages into party competition, remains essential, some of the assumptions built in to 
the model are revised. Hence the focus on cleavages and dimensions of party 
competition is supplemented by focus on elections, voters and the links between voters
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and parties, on party organisation, and on party strategy. This provides a re-working of 
the model for analysis of post-communist party systems in a comparative perspective, 
which also throws light back on West European party systems.
The succeeding chapters therefore focus on the main elements of this wider version of 
the Lipset-Rokkan model. A brief historical chapter (Four) is followed by analysis of 
voters and elections (Five), parties and party organisation (Six); and cleavages and 
dimensions of party competition (Seven). Chapter Eight focuses on party strategies and 
the developments of patterns of competition, toward more fully developed party 
systems. The focus, therefore, falls more heavily on Sartori’s appraisal of the Lipset- 
Rokkan model, i.e., the role of political parties in translating cleavages into politics, 
than on cleavages. The term ‘cleavage’ is widened to take account of the significance of 
‘non-structural’ cleavages. The functional approach to cleavages turns out to have been 
one of the weaker elements of the ‘cleavage model’, while the focus on parties and 
patterns of competition and coalition-building are the more endurable points. As Sartori 
argued in 1968, “[i]n the Lipset-Rokkan approach the question which is conducive to 
causal explanations and does grapple with the real problem is: how are conflicts and 
cleavages translated into a party system?”126
126 Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties”, p. 18, emphasis in original.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  
D e m o c r a c y  D o m in a n t  o r  D o m in a n t  
D e m o c r a c y ?
T h e  L e g a c y  o f  P o l it ic a l  C o m pe t it io n  in  In t e r -W a r  E a st  
C e n t r a l  E u r o pe  in  a  C o m pa r a t iv e  C o n t ex t
“A spectre is haunting Eastern Europe -  the spectre o f liberalism ”
- Jerzy Szacki, 1994
Though Havel saw 1989 as heralding the ‘return to Europe’, there can be little doubt 
that East Central European Twentieth Century political history has differed considerably 
from that of Western Europe. The inter-war democracies in East Central Europe are 
usually qualified by a limiting adjective, or accompanied by quotation marks. However, 
what Havel was suggesting was that the East Central Europe states are part and parcel 
of a wider European history -  that these states draw not only on their specific heritage, 
but on European cultural and political history. In other words, the post-communist 
political parties were free to focus on West European liberal democratic politics, 
drawing on a wider historical legacy. This may, therefore, have been more of an 
aspiration than a statement of fact. Nevertheless, though East Central Europe embarked 
on post-communist politics carrying a historical legacy that sets the area apart from 
mainstream post-war West European politics, this condition need not be peculiar to East 
Central Europe. Briefly, the post-communist parties in East Central Europe have 
inherited a historical institutionalist legacy, including ethno-national cleavages and 
patterns of party competition. Yet the extent to which the new parties invoke this legacy 
has varied considerably.
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T h e m e s  in  C o m pa r a t iv e  E u r o pe a n  P o l it ic a l  H ist o r y
Four main themes run through Twentieth Century East Central European political 
history. First, the domination of empires and the late development of states stands in 
contrast to the state system that developed in Western Europe. East Central Europe saw 
contemporaneous processes of state-building and democratisation, which shaped party 
competition. This generated a number of conflicts centred on competing approaches to 
nationalism, not only between but also within the ‘nations’ of Eastern and Central 
Europe. These attained a high degree of salience and relevance due to the number of 
border changes, population shifts and minorities in the region. Second, the domination 
of the centre, first imperial and subsequently national, entailed a high degree of 
centralisation of power. This centralisation of political, military and economic power in 
the hands of the administrative centre does not compare with the constitutional division 
of power developed in West European politics separating branches of government, and 
cities and industry against government, and reflecting the long-running struggle 
between state and Church. The enduring strength of the state can be accounted for in 
terms of institutionalism, inasmuch as no government has had an incentive to weaken 
the state’s control over non-state actors (civil society). Third, economic liberalism 
hardly developed in East Central Europe, either in the inter-war or post-war era, until it 
was introduced in the form of shock therapy in 1990. Finally, developments in East 
Central European politics have taken place within a pan-European setting, in the context 
of competition first between Prussian and Russian empires (with Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey on the sidelines), then between the USSR and Germany, and finally between the 
USSR and the West. In other words, East Central European politics has been subject to 
considerable external pressure, up to and including the influence of NATO, the EU and 
the IMF in the last decade of the Twentieth Century.
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S t a t e -B u il d in g, N a t io n a l is m  a n d  P o l it ic a l  C o m p e t it io n
Though West European party competition has predominantly reflected Lipset & 
Rokkan’s four cleavages, regime change has been recognised as relevant by several 
authors.1 In East Central Europe, regime change has perhaps been the most significant 
cleavage. In Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases the national revolution predated the 
industrial revolution, which meant that questions related to state-building had generally 
been resolved by the time full male franchise was introduced. At the very least, the 
introduction of the full franchise was part of a wider bargain settling questions related to 
state-building, e.g., in the Dutch 1917 Great Compromise. The same cannot be said for 
Germany and Italy until 1948, let alone for the inter-war East Central European 
regimes. However, the count of cases in which the questions raised by national 
revolutions remained unresolved by the time of the introduction of universal male 
suffrage also includes peripheral West European states, notably Finland, Ireland and 
Greece. In fact, Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases are reduced to Britain, France, 
Switzerland, the Low Countries and parts of Scandinavia. Elsewhere in Europe, 
unresolved national issues influenced the development of party competition to the 
extent that the party systems cannot be understood unless they are considered in the 
light of conflicts over state-building and regime change. In fact this holds for the first 
Italian and French Fourth Republic as well.
Lipset & Rokkan’s analysis suggests that the key to differences within West European 
party systems lies in developments before the emergence of mass parties of the left, an 
argument broadly supported by Luebbert’s work. In fact this argument can be taken 
one step further, suggesting that unresolved state-building or regime conflicts may 
inhibit the rise of mass parties on the left unless the conflict is cast in socialist -  non­
socialist terms. This was certainly the case in the Irish Free State, as Labour had stood 
aside the 1918 election.3 Where the left played a major role in regime conflicts, these 
conflicts centred around efforts to build socialist republics (Finland, Hungary). Hence
1 See Chapter Three, above.
2 G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
3 R. Sinnott, “Interpretations o f the Irish Party System”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 12:3 
(1984), 289-307, p.302.
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the significance of two factors: first, the pre-socialist divisions over state-building and 
the extent to which these remained unresolved after Versailles, and second, the extent to 
which socialist or communist parties shaped conflict over state-building.
The first question draws attention to the division between liberals and conservatives 
over constitutional questions, including attitudes to the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 
1867, Czech and Slovak nationalism, and the different strategies adopted by Poles in the 
three empires. Inter-war party competition on the right reflected the extent to which 
these questions were left unresolved, but also the effort made to exclude the left from 
political power (or even party competition altogether). For example, Gratz argues that 
the need to exclude the anti-Ausgleich side from government prevented the emergence 
of a competitive two-party system in Hungary, but that this exclusion was no longer 
necessary after 1919. Batkay disagrees, arguing that Gratz exaggerated the post-WW I 
consensus.4 Finally, though WW II and the Cold War settled border questions more or 
less permanently, nationalism remained a powerful tool for the communist regimes as 
well as the opposition. The communist period may have frozen the borders and set 
parameters of regime change, but it hardly removed, let alone resolved, most questions 
related to state-building and nationalism.
Szacki goes on step further, arguing that the state-building process weakened liberalism 
in East Central Europe because a strong state was seen as a bulwark against national 
catastrophe (and the USSR and the Third Reich), rather than as a threat to individuals’ 
rights.5 In other words, national independence takes precedence over the form of the 
independent regime -  collective national rights over individual rights. In the Polish 
case, the Catholic Church’s function as a national institution reinforced the collectivist 
challenges to liberalism, even if liberalism, Polish nationalism and the Catholic Church 
shared common enemies before independence. To this extent, the development of 
liberalism as an individual-oriented ideology was restricted or over-shadowed by the 
national question, not only in the East Central European cases, but also in West
4 G. Gratz, A forradalmak kora; Magyarorszag tortenete, 1818-1920, (Budapest, Magyar Szemle 
Tarsasag, 1935), discussed in W. M. Batkay, Authoritarian Politics in a Transitional State: Istvan Bethlen 
and the Unified Party in Hungary 1919 -  1926, (Boulder, East European Monographs, 1982), p.96-98.
5 J. Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995), p.53.
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European cases that involved efforts to extract a state from an empire, such as 
Nineteenth Century Finland, Ireland, Greece, and even Norway. The question is how 
this affects political competition once independence is achieved, whether peacefully or 
through civil war. Where state-building continued to dominate politics, particularly 
following civil war, the result was party systems that reflected regime change and 
efforts permanently to exclude one side from power. The relevant examples include 
Poland, Hungary and the Slovak lands, as well as Greece, Finland and Ireland. In 
contrast, state-building was resolved satisfactorily as far as the Czechs and Norwegians 
were concerned, leaving the party systems to develop around second-order divisions 
such as agrarian or workers’ interests (even if some of these overlap the regime 
cleavage).
F e d e r a l is m  vs. C e n t r a l is a t io n  -  P a r l ia m e n t a r y  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  D e m o c r a t ic  
Ce n t r a l is m
During the second half of the Nineteenth and the entire Twentieth Century East Central 
Europe featured a paradoxical combination of administrative and political centralisation 
combined with repeated waves of disintegration into supposedly national units. With 
independence, political control may have shifted from Vienna to Prague, but within the 
new state the centre retained control. The same, of course, held for Poland and Hungary. 
Infrastructure supported these political arrangements, as the cities of East Central 
Europe were either administrative centres of former empires and new states, or garrison 
towns, but hardly comparable to the more independent trade-based cities scattered 
across the landscape of Western and Northern Europe.6 In other words, the institutional 
legacy of empire did not include commercial cities as a political counter-balance to the 
administrative centre, or constitutional arrangements that limited centralisation.
During the century leading up to the communist take-overs, administrative 
centralisation was accompanied by centralisation in terms of political institutions. The 
balance of power found in several West European states either by way of institutional
6 This argument is developed in J. Szucs, “Three Historical Regions in Europe: An Outline”, in J. Keane 
(ed.), Civil society and the State: New European Perspectives, (London, Verso, 1988).
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arrangements or coalition politics was not a prominent feature on the East Central 
European scene. Though separation of power or consensual politics is by no means a 
prerequisite for liberal democracy, as the heavily centralised British case illustrates, 
there is ample evidence to suggest that such features make liberal democracy more 
viable in states with religious or ethnic divisions. In inter-war East Central Europe, as 
in several West European states, centralisation contributed to exclusion of minorities 
from the political system, whether these were the losers of civil wars or ethnic 
minorities. Even within the centralised system, power was concentrated in the hands of 
the executive branch, to the extent that East Central European inter-war elections 
“reflected overall priorities [of the political class], if not always its particular 
preferences.”8 The role of elections and parliaments was, therefore, more geared toward 
providing post-hoc legitimisation and support for a government than to actually 
choosing a government. In the three East Central European cases no government fell as 
the result of an election between 1918 and 1989, let alone before that period!
Despite the nominal federalisation of Czechoslovakia after 1968, the communist period 
did little to reverse the trend toward centralisation. The considerable differences in 
communist party tactics and strategy notwithstanding, the 1948-53 era saw a uniform 
drive towards monolithic communism. Even the differences that were to grow in the 
three decades following Khrushchev’s secret speech, in which he attacked Stalinism and 
condoned ‘different roads to socialism’, did not prevent increasing centralisation in each 
regime (with the noteworthy exception of Yugoslavia, and limited federalisation in 
Czechoslovakia). The communist system granting the party a ‘leading role’ and 
featuring ‘democratic centralism’ within the party took centralisation of power to the 
extreme.
7 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1977); A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns o f  Major itarian and Consensus Government in Twenty- 
One Countries, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984).
8 J. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (Seattle, University o f Washington 
Press, 1974), p. 19-20.
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Th e  P o p u l is t  R ig h t  a n d  t h e  We a k n e s s  o f  L ib e r a l is m
Despite the familiarity of the terms, conservatism and liberalism carried connotations in 
pre-and inter-war East Central Europe that differed considerably from their West 
European counterparts. Whereas the Christian democrat -  liberal divisions in, e.g., the 
Netherlands and Belgium concerned the relationship between church and state and the 
extent to which the state should be secularised, the East Central European divisions 
reflected questions of state-building and nationalism. Liberalism in West European 
politics, therefore, centred on opposition to conservatism and an emphasis on individual 
rights, the secular state and free trade. Though liberalism may have been equally cast in 
terms of individual rights in East Central Europe, it was combined with nationalism 
against (conservative) maintenance of empires in the second half of the Nineteenth 
Century.9 In other words, liberal ideology based on the individual was combined with a 
political agenda based on the collective rights of the nation. Neither the liberals nor 
conservatives developed free-market (or Keynsian, for that matter) economics as a part 
of their political ideology or platform, at least not until 1989.
As in Western Europe, the liberal -  conservative divisions of the mid- to late Nineteenth 
Century were not matters of mass politics, but rather reflected the limited franchise and 
competition within elites. The second key difference in East Central European (and 
peripheral West European) politics lies in the development of mass politics. If the rise 
of socialist parties mobilising industrial masses contributed to similarities across the 
West European party systems, the mobilisation of the agrarian masses by populist 
peasant or nationalist parties provide the common factor across East Central Europe and 
some West European peripheral cases. If the key demand in the industrial heartland of 
Europe was workers’ rights (social, economic and political), the key demand in the 
countryside was land reform (or, on the part of owners, protectionism).
The agricultural population thus held one of the keys to party system formation, 
inasmuch as the parties for whom they voted played a substantial if not dominant role in 
the inter-war party systems. Luebbert has linked the success of social democracy to the
9 Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, p.53-61.
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socialists’ failure to mobilise agrarian workers, because the class was too small 
(Norway), or already mobilised (the Czech lands, Sweden and Denmark).10 Here the 
social democrat -  agrarian alliances dominated politics, based on protectionism and 
high industrial wages. In Germany and Italy, the respective reformist and radical 
socialist parties took class politics to the countryside, resulting in a fascist backlash. In 
Hungary the agrarian Smallholders’ Party was incorporated into the government or 
governing parties. In Poland the Piast peasant party became the government party until 
1926. Both can safely be described as centre-right, relying on appeal to the nation and 
religion and governing in alliance with the Christian national right, and emphasising the 
community and national interest rather than agrarian interests such as land reform.11
Political competition in inter-war East Central Europe, translated loosely into party 
competition, therefore reflected four key dimensions, which correspond loosely to the
19four cleavages discussed by Lipset and Rokkan.
First, state-building provided questions that fed into the main dimension of competition,
which centred on questions concerning the state and religion. The Pilsudski -  Dmowski
division is a case in point, the latter taking the more Gemeinschqft-orienlQd approach
associated with the traditional right and ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’ nationalism. An
analogous Gesellschaft -  Gemeinschaft division has been identified in Hungarian early
1920s politics, though in this case the liberal Gesellschaft camp was fragmented,
heavily urban and elite-based, advocating free trade and looking to the West for 
1 ^examples. In 1920, the right took 164 seats to the liberal camp’s 13, and the latter was 
all but dead after 1926.14 Further divisions within the centre-right included the legitimist 
vs. free electors question, at least until the death of Charles IV in 1922. Bethlen’s failure 
to sustain a Unified Party in 1920-21, and his success a year later, has been attributed to 
the resolution of this question.15 Only within the Czech lands was this division less
10 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p.310.
11 D. W. Urwin, From Ploughshare to Ballot Box: the Politics o f  Agrarian Defence in Europe, (Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 1980), p. 202-205,248-249.
12 When a centre -  periphery cleavage is not cited here, it is because it is subsumed either in minority 
nationalism or in agrarian politics.
13 Z. Nagy, The Liberal Opposition in Hungary, 1919-1945, (Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1983); G. 
Schopflin uses the Gesellschaft -  Gemeinschaft distinction in Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).
14 Batkay, Authoritarian Politics..., p.13-16.
15 Batkay, Authoritarian politics..., p.31-33.
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prominent, partly because the dominant ethnic cleavage ran between the Czechs and the 
Slovak and German minorities. However, Gemeinschaft -  Gesellschaft differences over 
the appropriate relationship between the minorities and Prague divided both the German 
and Slovak party systems within Czechoslovakia. In the German lands the 
Kampfgemeinschaft opposed the Arbeitsgemeinschaft and Prague, in Slovakia Hlinka’s 
Slovak People’s Party, the Communists and Hungarian minorities did the same.16
Second, and reflecting this division, the conservative parties approached rights in 
collective rather than individual terms. In other words, rights were considered in the 
name of nation and religion, both of which were used to link people and government in 
collective rather than individualistic terms. Though this reflects the West European state 
-  church cleavage discussed by Lipset & Rokkan, the church -  state relationship was a 
minor question in East Central Europe due to the comparatively limited historical
1 7competition between the ‘nation-state-builders’ and the church. In fact, in Poland the 
Church was to no small extent a national institution, linking nationhood and 
Catholicism, against the ‘alien’ state or empire.18 The Gesellschaft -  Gemeinschaft 
division thus played a role analogous to the clerical -  secular cleavage in West 
European politics.
The third dimension, peasant populism directed against the cities (sometimes ‘foreign’ -  
read Jewish) and bourgeois commercial practices, is epitomised by movement outside 
the core East Central Europe cases: Stamboliski’s Bulgarian Agrarian National Union. 
Founded in 1889 in defence of peasants against taxes, and critical of partisan politics 
and the central government, it focused on functional organisation of peasants to 
supplant political parties.19 In Poland and Hungary, however, the peasant parties were 
integrated into the governing parties, representing the governing elite to the voters 
rather than representing agrarian demands to the government. Moreover, despite the 
difference between Polish political populism and the Hungarian populist writers, they
16 Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, p.96-99.
17 J. Szucs, “Three Historical Regions o f Europe”, in J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State, (London, 
Verso, 1988); Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe.
18 N. Davies, Polish National Mythologies, in G. Hosking & G. Schopflin (eds.), Myths and Nationhood, 
(London, Hurst & Company, 1997).
19 J. D. Bell, “Populism and Pragmatism: the BANU in Bulgarian Politics”, in J. Held (ed.), Populism in 
Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism and Society, (Boulder, East European Monographs, 1996).
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shared the ethnic nationalist, traditionalist outlook. Only the Czech agrarian party 
developed into a more classic political party along the lines of the Scandinavian 
agrarian parties, emphasising defence of farmers’ economic interests and focusing on
9 1agricultural policy rather than ideology.
The final dimension was socialism vs. non-socialism. Again Czechoslovakia stands out 
from the rest of East Central Europe, inasmuch as it saw a red-brown coalition similar to
99those found in inter-war Scandinavia. The Hungarian left, on the other hand, not only 
suffered from Kaorlyi’s and Kun’s failures, but also from the open vote which 
obstructed socialist activity outside the cities. Although it took part in the 1922-23 
coalition and supported Pilsudski’s 1926 coup, the Polish left’s opposition to the right 
remained overshadowed by Pilsudski in terms of both significance and impact on 
policy. Only in Czechoslovakia did the social democrat left play a significant role in 
government. Given the effect of the Russian revolution of 1917, the communist parties 
remained ‘outsider’ parties in all three states, though operating legally and polling as 
much as 13% of the vote in Czechoslovakia in i925. The Hungarian communists were 
banned after the failure of Kun 133-day government in 1919, the Finnish communists 
remained illegal until 1944, and the Polish party went illegal when it refused to register 
in 1921 (but competed in elections through ‘fronts’ polling up to 2.3% in 1930). Only 
the Czechoslovak Communist Party remained legal throughout the inter-war years.
Part of the legacy with which East Central Europe entered the post-war era therefore 
centred on these four dimensions of competition. The re-establishment of party systems 
in the brief post-war period did little to alter this. To be sure, the political landscape had 
been altered radically by the war, but this did not help the development of liberalism. It 
practically eliminated much of the right. Even where pre-war political forces had not 
been wiped out by WW II and Nazi and Soviet occupation, the war constituted a
9^
revolution that led to radicalisation of expectations. Moreover, the ‘final solution’,
20 M. Lacko, “Populism in Hungary: Yesterday and Today”; P. Hanak, “The Anti-Capitalist Ideology of  
the Populists”; M. K. Dziewanowksi, “Polish Populism”, all in Held (ed.), Populism in Eastern Europe.
21 Z. Pryor, “Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period”, p.204; V. L. Benes, 
“Czecholovak Democracy and its Problems, 1918-1920”, p.67-68, 89-92; both in V.S. Mamatey & R. 
Luza (eds.), A History o f  the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1973).
22 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p.292-294.
23 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p.68-74.
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Poland’s shift westwards, and the expulsion of German minorities ‘simplified’ the 
political scene further and eliminated some of the immediate nationalist questions. 
Nevertheless, the new party systems were dominated by the communists, the socialists 
and the populist (peasant) parties that joined them to make up the national coalition 
governments. All entertained radical programmes, and focused on collective rights. In 
the event, however, the development of non-communist ideology through party 
competition was prevented by the effective elimination of competitive elections.
Moreover, four decades of communism prevented further development of right wing 
thought based on individual rights or market-driven politics based on economic theory. 
To be sure, a ‘new right’ could be identified as part of the opposition to communism. 
Scruton argues that “thinkers living under ‘real socialism have become aware not only 
of the two currents of thinking on the right [‘free marketeers’ and ‘social 
conservatives’] but also of the tension between them.”24 However, his analysis reveals 
that the right in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia focused on concrete historically 
given law rather than liberalism’s abstract rights, on tradition and identity (Catholicism 
in Poland), and obligations under a moral order. The quest for ‘a-political man’ is
9 <therefore equated with classical British conservatism. The result is a “New Right” that 
is more ‘social conservative’ than ‘free marketeer’, which praises the market as “an 
exercise in responsible accounting rather than as an embodiment of individual choice”. 
However, this ‘New Right’ differs considerably from individualistic liberalism. The 
division of the Hungarian opposition into two camps, one liberal and one more 
‘Christian national’, was, therefore, somewhat less “peculiar” that Scruton suggests
97(particularly in the light of pre-war political divisions).
The populist -  liberal fault-line therefore continued to run within the East Central 
European opposition movements. It was particularly visible in Hungary’s division 
between the democratic and populist opposition, but less so in Czechoslovakia (partly 
due to the limited scope for opposition and partly due to the Czecho-Slovak question).
24 R. Scruton, “The New Right in Central Europe I: Czechoslovakia”, Political Studies, 36 (1988), 449- 
462, p.449; and R. Scruton, “The New Right in Central Europe II: Poland and Hungary”, Political 
Studies, 36 (1988), 638-652.
25 Scruton, “The New Right in Central Europe I”, p.461.
26 Scruton, “The New Right in Central Europe I”, p.459.
27 Scruton, “The New Right in Central Europe II”, p.650.
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Within the Polish opposition, where the KPN represented the traditionalist right, a form
of ‘proto-liberalism’ was developed as a practical and ideological challenge to the
regime. But this did not involve the development of modem West European right-
wing or liberal political thought.
The problem consists not so much in the fact that communism destroyed the influences
of liberalism as an ideology in Eastern Europe, for there was not much to destroy (one
can even say, paradoxically, that in spite of itself communism helped to popularize
liberalism as its complete negation); rather, the problem is that communism made
29barren the soil on which the ideology could grow.
Moreover, the Gesellschaft -  Gemeinschaft debate continued within the communist
parties, and Tamas (then leader of the SzDSz National Committee, who described
himself as ‘Neo-Whig’) argues that this provided one of the foundations of the post-
communist party systems.
The Party eventually silenced this debate, but the schism between the advocates of
“development” and the advocates of “community” remained. Here you have in a
nutshell the origins of the contemporary political party structure of post-communist
Eastern Europe. The dominant romantic-populist-collectivist forces are the heirs of the
“community” side in the alienation debate, while the pragmatic “liberals” of today trace
30their ancestry to the “development” camp.
In short, the communist era contributed to preservation of the inter-war political legacy 
inasmuch as development of non-communist politics was severely limited. Even within 
the communist parties, debate partly reflected questions of state-building. Come 1989, 
the opposition had four legacies on which to draw: the inter-war past, the anti­
communist struggle, divisions within the communist parties, and West European 
politics.
28 Szacki, Liberalism after Communism; M. H. Bernhard, The Origins o f  Democratisation in Poland: 
Workers, Intellectuals, and Opposition Politics, 1976-1980, (Columbia, Columbia University Press, 
1993).
29 Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, p.64-65.
30 G. M. Tamas, “Socialism, Capitalism and Modernity”, in L. Diamond & M. F. Platter (eds.) 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Revisited, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 
p.63.
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E x t e r n a l  F o r c e s , I n f l u e n c e s  a n d  D o m e s t ic  Ch o ic e  - E a s t  Ce n t r a l  E u r o p e  
b e t w e e n  Ge r m a n y , R u ssia  a n d  t h e  We s t:
Perhaps more than any other area of Europe, East Central Europe has been influenced 
by political developments outside the region. From 1848 to 1918, domestic politics in 
future Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia was defined in terms of the relationship 
with their respective imperial centres. The national and liberal wave of revolutions in 
1848-49 provided a catalyst for liberal -  conservative competition over the extent to 
which national independence should be pursued over the next seven decades. More 
directly, the Prusso-Austrian War did the same for the Ausgleich, leading to continuous 
competition between pro- and anti-Ausgleich forces. Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia emerged as new states, or at least in new forms, with the Versailles 
settlements as a direct consequence of the defeat of the Prussian, Russian and Austro- 
Hungarian empires in WW I. Their post-WW II political systems were constrained, if 
not imposed, by the USSR. The 1975 Helsinki Agreement and the CSCE/OSCE 
arrangements limit border change.
While it may be obvious that East Central European borders have been shaped by 
Germany and Russia, the point is almost equally valid in terms of ideological 
developments. The influence of Russian and German populism (and later fascism) on
' i  i
East Central European populism is not in dispute. The local fascists and the 
communists borrowed heavily from the prevailing ideologies in Germany and Russia, 
though the opposition to communism was somewhat more complicated and 
considerably more home grown. The quest for a third way featured heavily in the Czech 
1968 debate, even if Brezhnev’s recognition that this logically implied a challenge to
T9communism because no third way was possible may have been justified. In Poland, 
Solidarity represented (and to some extent still represents) a similar new or third way, as 
did (and does) Hungarian populism.
31 J. Held, “Antecedents”, in Held (ed.), Populism in Eastern Europe’, M. Canovan, Populism, (New York, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
32 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 155-156.
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Finally the post-communist states have been influenced, if not dominated, by West 
European models of political and economic liberalism since 1989. In short, East Central 
Europe features a range of historical, political and institutional legacies from which to 
chose, some of which have been borrowed from Russia, Germany or Western Europe. 
Yet by 1989 there were no ideological alternatives to liberal democracy and free 
markets. If Fukuyama may have been right in asserting that there were no alternative 
ideologies challenging liberal democracy, this certainly did not mean that the new 
political parties all looked to Western Europe for inspiration. The nature of the political 
system may reflect West European influence, but the nature of the party system need 
not follow the same path.
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P o l it ic a l  C o m pe t it io n : D o m in a n t  Pa r t y  Sy st e m s  
S t a t e - B u i l d i n g , R e g im e  C h a n g e  a n d  N a t io n a l i s m :  E x c lu d in g  t h e  L o s e r s
The four themes discussed above have combined to produce a legacy that can best be 
described as ‘dominant democracy’ -  a party or coalition achieving a dominant position 
that excludes the losers more or less permanently. Party system development in East 
Central Europe took place in a context where state-building overshadowed the industrial 
revolution in political importance. The governing parties had considerable centralised 
power at their disposal, and the regimes came under increasing pressure from their 
Bolshevik and Nazi neighbours. This adds up to threats to the regime or conflics over 
state- and nation-building, which also the West European evidence suggest take 
precedence over ‘bargainable’ conflicts about (re-)distribution of income. By 
definition, pro-regime parties cannot permit anti-regime parties to come to power 
without threatening the very regime about which they disagree. The (unsurprising) 
consequence is that conflicts over the nature of the regime are not only first-order 
divisions that take precedence over second-order issues such as economic policy, but 
also that they lead to exclusion of the losers for power, if not from politics altogether. 
The exclusion of losers from politics, common after civil wars, therefore characterised 
most of pre-and inter-war East Central Europe -  de facto if not de jure.
I n t e r -W a r  P a r t y  C o m p e t it io n
Compared to their West European counterparts, the inter-war East Central European 
parties possessed strong means to control the political agenda, manipulate election 
outcomes (directly or indirectly), change the rules of electoral competition or even ban 
their opponents. In Hungary and Poland, the governing parties fit Panebianco’s model 
of endogenous parties, which developed around one leader and consequently feature
33 I. Budge & H. Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in 
Twenty States, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990).
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weak institutionalisation.34 The Hungarian and Polish parties were not mass parties in 
the West European sense, whether in terms of ideology or mass membership. Rather 
than interest-aggregation, the functions of Pilsudski’s BBWR and the Unified Party 
were “simply to support the respective Polish and Hungarian regimes.” Arising out of 
disintegrating movements on the eve of independence, divided over strategy (e.g. 
acceptance of treaties or deals) and/or fighting communism, these parties resemble their 
Irish and Greek counterparts more than the mass parties of inter-war Scandinavia or the 
UK. Only the Czech party system institutionalised to a greater extent, and even though 
it was brought to an end by the Munich agreement rather than internal collapse its 
approach to the Slovak and German minorities hardly constitutes a model exercise in 
ethnic conflict resolution. However, if the Slovak and German elements are left aside, 
the Czech party system developed along lines similar to those of the Norwegian and 
Danish party systems. They were better organised and more ideological than their 
Polish and Hungarian counterparts, and featured ideological or interest-oriented parties 
including clerical, conservative, social democrat and agrarian parties, as well as the far 
left and right. Nevertheless, the political losers came to be excluded on a more or less 
permanent basis in all three East Central European states.
The left’s effective exclusion from Hungarian politics followed the defeat of Kun’s 
revolutionary regime in 1919. The development of Hungarian parties was limited, 
illustrated by the ‘coffee-house’ parties, predecessors of their 1990s ‘taxi party’ 
cousins, -  the entire membership fitting into the relevant establishment or vehicle. After 
the Unified Party was set up by a merger of the Smallholders coalition (free electors) 
and Christian National Union (legitimists) in 1920, no other party controlled the 
government until 1944. The change from Bethlen’s regime to that of Gombos was 
achieved through internal party politics, and whether Bethlen intended his resignation as
34 On Panbianco, see Chapter Six, below; A. Panbianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
35 Batkay, Authoritarian Politics, p.77.
36 J. McGarry & B. O’Leary, “Introduction: the Macro-Political Regulation o f Ethnic Conflict”, in J. 
McGarry & B. O’Leary (eds.), The Politics o f  Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies o f  Protracted  
Ethnic Conflicts, (London, Routledge, 1993).
37 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.95-98; Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy.
38 R. J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, (London, Routledge, 1994); and more 
humorously, J. Hasek, The Red Commissar, (London Abacus, 1981).
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'XQmore than a formality is debated. The 1931 election had provided Bethlen with a 
comfortable majority, and his subsequent resignation (accepted by Admiral Horthy, the 
Regent) reflected the economic crisis and divisions between the Bethlen and Horthy 
rather than parliamentary politics. However, the contest between right-radicals and 
Bethlenites continued within the government party. Bethlen’s plan for developing an 
articulated structure for the Unified Party in 1922 had not only failed, it was not even 
published. The party remained centralised, interpenetrated with the state, allied with 
local notables and allowing its “component groups to take from its vague programme 
whatever happened to suit their particular interests”.40 Hence the continuity despite 
internal changes. Despite the formal power of the Deputies (MPs) within the party, the 
real power lay with the leader. “The whole function performed by elections was, indeed, 
not to consult the electorate but to renew, refresh and revise -  possibly purge -  the 
Parliamentary membership of the Government Party itself.”41 Under Gombos the party 
made much of its re-naming and re-organisation in 1932,42 and the 1935 election 
replaced all but 25 of its 158 outgoing deputies.43 After his death in 1936 the party 
(though divided internally between its conservative and right-radical wings) remained 
‘in control’ of Hungarian politics until the German occupation in 1944. However, the 
Independent Smallholders Party had been reconstituted in 1930, and the parliamentary 
life of the opposition parties was “revitalised” during W W II.44
The Polish case of exclusion of the opposition is more blatant, given the lack of 
effective political competition in after the 1926 coup despite Pilsudski’s retention of the 
constitution until 1935. Yet the period up to 1926 saw alternation in power, with the 
centre-right (e.g., Witos, 1923), non-party experts (e.g., Grabski, 1923-25) and broad 
coalitions (e.g., Skrzynski, 1925-26) leading governments.45 Parliamentary majorities 
that included the minorities and the left precludes the ‘dominant democracy’ label.
39 C.A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History o f  Modern Hungary 1929 -  1945, (Edinburgh, at the 
University Press, 1956), p.94, argues that it was intended as a formality; I. Romsics, Istvan Bethlen: A 
Great Conservative Statesman o f  Hungary, 1874-1946, (Columbia University Press, 1995), disagrees, p. 
295-297.
40 Batkay, Authoritarian Politics..., p.24, chapter on “Organisation and Structure o f the Unified Party”.
41 Macartney, October Fifteenth, p.46.
42 [Party programme] 1932-35, Drei Jahre Regierung Gombos, (Budapest, J. Bathory-Huttner, 1935),
p.20.
43 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.174.
44 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p. 187.
45 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.50-52.
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However, Following the coup, parliament was marginalised, yielding a 
“semiparliamentary style of government [...which ...] was to prove a failure by 1930” 
because the parliamentary majority was powerless to replace the government.46 The 
creation of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR) as 
Pilsudski’s supporting bloc and incarceration of opposition leaders set the scene for 
complete exclusion of the right, the left and the minorities. Until 1939 the regime was 
run first by Pilsudski and after his death in 1935 by his (less than ideologically united) 
heirs, to the exclusion of other parties to the extent that they boycotted the elections in 
1935 and 1938.
Exclusion may have been more subtle in Czechoslovakia, but it was no less effective for 
that reason. Successive Czech governments ruled against the majority of Slovak and 
German voters’ preferences as expressed in at election time, save for the ‘bourgeois 
coalition’ from 1926 to 1929 (and limited continued German participation thereafter). 
Despite its otherwise liberal democratic credentials, the Czech Petka coalition thus 
rendered a majority of the Slovak and German semi-permanent excluded minorities. 
Given majority support for the Petka with Czechoslovakia, there was no need to exclude 
the minority from elections, merely from power. This exclusion of either the Slovak and 
German parties or the socialists means that the interpretation of the Petka as a 
consensual system must be challenged.47
This suggests that the development of centralised and majoritarian government might 
well have led to problems in terms of ethnic conflict management even without external 
pressure and competing anti-liberal ideologies. At least this would follow from the 
consociational democracy argument about the benefits of power-sharing, in the light of 
the Austrian case (inter-war problems, post-war power sharing). In other words, 
though the collapse of the East Central European inter-war regimes can be attributed to 
pressure from Germany and the USSR, the two expanding empires were pushing at 
open (or at least pretty rotten) doors inasmuch as they found willing collaborators on the
46 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.62.
47 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, interprets it as consensual, Rothschild, East 
Central Europe between the Two World Wars and Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe challenge this 
view, as, in fact, does Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.33n.
48 On the debate concerning consociational democracy in Austria see A. Lijphart, “Consociational 
Democracy”, World Politics, 31:2 (1969), 207-225; B. Barry, “Political Accommodation and 
Consociational Democracy”, British Journal o f Political Science, 5 (1975), 477-505.
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right and/or among minorities. Moreover, external pressure from Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet factor (anti-communism) also contributed to the crowding out of liberal or 
consensual politics by providing radical alternatives.
Th e  P o st -  Wa r  R e g im e s
Though ‘people’s democracies’ of Eastern and Central Europe epitomise exclusion of 
losers, and therefore require less attention here, the nature of party competition between 
1944 and 1948 is more contentious. Seton-Watson’s three-step model of communist 
take-overs which suggests a more or less uniform strategy for communist domination 
(genuine coalition -  fa9ade coalition -  monolithic bloc) has since been supplemented by 
focus on the weakness of non-communist parties, radicalisation of expectations and the 
communists use of anti-German nationalism (and in Czechoslovakia, anti-Hungarian 
nationalism).49 The immediate post-war period differed somewhat in the three cases, 
indicating that there may have been some scope for co-operative politics based on the 
anti-fascist fronts. At any rate, the ‘popular front’ strategy reflected a degree of 
consensus on radical land reform, expulsion of German minorities and centrally planned 
government-driven reconstruction.50 Yet there was little or no consensus on what kind 
of radicalism was sought.51 Moreover, even this consensus was based on exclusion 
(expulsion) of some 10m Germans from Eastern Europe and on banning parties tainted 
with collaboration.
Of the three cases, Poland was most clearly and directly influenced by Soviet policy 
inasmuch as the Communist party was run by ‘Moscow communists’ and the 
government made up of communists and the exile government from London. That this 
co-operation was as much a product of realpolitik (Soviet presence and the existence of 
an exile government) as party strategy became evident as tension between the two 
groups increased. The test of their relative support over a symbolic question about 
abolition of the Senate in 1946 produced controversial results (i.e. alleged fraud) in
49 H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 3rd Ed. (London, Methuen, 1956); Schopflin, Politics 
in Eastern Europe, p.66-74.
50 R. Bideleux & I. Jeffries, A History o f  Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, (London, Routledge, 1998), 
p.526.
51 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p.70.
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favour of the Communist-led bloc. Any further potential move toward cooperation 
between the two blocs was undermined by the 1947 elections, where failure to persuade 
the Peasant party to join the ‘Democratic Bloc’ precipitated the former’s loss due to 
election fraud. Socialist -  Communist party fusion followed in 1948. Moreover, the 
cooperation between the two blocs was based partly on removal of ethnic minorities (a 
westward shift away from the Ukrainians, the wartime ‘final solution’, and the 
expulsion of Germans), the perceived need for Soviet support for the new borders, and 
the anti-German role the Communists could take on.53
Czechoslovakia saw a more domestically driven effort to build consensual politics, 
based on a more institutionalised inter-war party system and a returning govemment-in- 
exile. However, though the coalition included Slovaks and communists, it was still 
based on exclusion of German (expelled) and the Hungarian minorities. Moreover, the 
Agrarian Party was banned for collaboration in WW II, thus removing “the natural 
rallying point for the democratic opposition to the Marxist left” and rendering the 1946 
election merely “fairly free” in Bideleux & Jeffries’ analysis.54 Nevertheless, 1946-47 
saw a broad coalition government outlast its counterparts in Italy and France. Yet the 
prospect of losing votes in the 1948 election (as polls indicated) prompted a change in 
communist strategy towards a ‘national list’ rather than competitive elections, and a 
purge of the police apparatus that prompted the resignation of non-communist ministers. 
In Schopflin’s analysis, “[a]t least a part of the explanation of the coup in February 1948 
lies in the unthinkability for the communists that they might cede power merely because 
the electorate had changed it mind.”55 This suggests that political cooperation was 
intended, at the very least, to produce a kind of ‘dominant democracy’.
Hungary between 1944 and 1947 presents a more classic case of ‘popular front’ politics. 
Despite the Smallholders’ absolute majority in the 1945 elections (57%), the four-party 
coalition with the Communists, Social Democrats and National Peasants that had been 
established the year before was maintained (as per pre-election agreement). In this
52 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p.220; J. Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A 
Political History o f  East Central Europe since World War I, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), 
p.82-84.
53 Rothschild, Return to Diversity, p.80-81.
54 Bideleux & Jeffries, A History o f Eastern Europe, p.525.
55 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p.73-74.
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former German ally, the radical right was not so much excluded as simply defeated in
war and eliminated. Within the coalition, however, the Communists’ post-election
reassessment of strategy provided the model for ‘salami tactics’ -  gradual elimination of
opponents -  starting by demanding, and getting, the interior ministry (followed by
internal security).56 Before the August 1947 election the Smallholders’ secretary general
Kovacs had been arrested by Soviet authorities and prime minister Nagy ‘removed’
• • •whilst abroad (through incrimination in a ‘foreign conspiracy’). Though the 1947 
elections even included parties running against the coalition, competitive politics was 
eliminated through progressive proscription of parties and the 1949 elections featured a 
single ‘government list’.
The post-war era was undeniably shaped by international developments to a 
considerable extent. However, despite the exclusion of the right and ethnic minorities, 
1944-47 can be interpreted as an effort to overcome ‘the politics of exclusion’ on the 
part of the ‘democratic’ parties (and possibly some communists) -  hence the broad 
alliances between the London Government and the communists in Poland, between the 
populist, centre-right parties, communists and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and the 
national front parties in Hungary. Whether this represented a potential basis for power- 
sharing and consensus politics became irrelevant in the light of developments in 1947- 
49, which resulted in communist take-overs and regimes that took Russian influence, 
centralisation, and exclusion of the opposition to new extremes, and attempted to marry 
communism and nationalism. However, in terms of potential long-term legacies of party 
competition, it is the inter-war tactics that warrant more attention.
D o m in a n t  D e m o c r a c y
Inasmuch as the inter-war party systems were based on the exclusion of losers they can 
be called ‘dominant’ party systems, i.e., one party or bloc establishes a long-term 
dominant position. While Sartori uses the term ‘hegemonic’ to describe non-competitive 
multi-party systems, such as communist Poland, the term dominant is employed here to
56 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p.222-223.
57 Rothschild, Return to Diversity, p. 100-101.
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emphasise the parties or coalitions’ explicit pursuit of a dominant position and the
c o
exclusion of genuine competitors. This does not mean that the system is not 
competitive, though it implies that one party or bloc is excluded from power by design, 
not merely by accident. This is qualitatively different from the dictionary definition of 
‘hegemony’, which suggests preponderance (i.e., generally out-weighing the opposition 
at the polls) rather than a position that excludes the opposition from power.59 Sartori 
called these ‘predominant party systems’, though the term ‘hegemonic’ is preferred here 
to describe systems where one party or bloc normally rules, but alternation in power is 
expected.
The exclusion of the losers of the civil war and the schisms in Polish, Hungarian, Greek, 
Irish and Finnish inter-war politics was not merely the product of the hegemonic 
position enjoyed by the governing parties or coalitions, but also a case of deliberate 
strategy. The same holds for the continuous rule of the Petka in Czechoslovakia, and 
Italian post-war partitocrazia. By contrast, while the Norwegian and Swedish social 
democrat parties enjoyed hegemonic positions within the party systems which allowed 
them to control their respective governments for most of the first four decades after 
WW II, the political process remained consensual.60 Moreover, alternation in power was 
expected, if infrequent. The dominant position, on the other hand, is based on 
continuous exclusion of the opposition, and secure tenure for the government. Of the 
civil war cases, only Ireland and Finland saw alternation in power before WW II. 
Finland saw the Social Democrats take office temporarily in 1926, but the main losers 
of the civil war, the Communists, were banned until 1944. In Ireland, first Cosgrave’s 
Cumann na nGaedhael and after 1932 De Valera’s Fianna Fail governments continued 
electoral strategies that provided something close to a dominant position. The same 
point holds for post-junta Greece, which saw a similar alternation in power in 1981. In 
all three cases, the long-term outcome was competition between two aspiring dominant 
parties, not dissimilar to post-communist party competition in East Central Europe, or 
even Berlusconi’s Forza Italia’s efforts.
58 G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1976).
59 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1913 Edition, defines hegemony as “leadership; 
preponderant influence or authority.”
60 Lijphart compared consensual with consociational democracy. Lijphart, Democracies; A. Lijphart, 
“From the Politics o f Accommodation to Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment”, West 
European Politics, 12:1 (1989), 139-153.
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But how is domination ensured? How are losers excluded from the political process? 
East and West European political history indicates a few possibilities, ranging from 
coalition politics and manipulation of the electoral system and electoral practices, to 
banning political opponents, and direct violence and intimidation.
The Italian first republic and the Czech Petka system represent the least illiberal means 
for exclusion of a minority. The exclusions of the PCI and Czecshoslovakia’s minorities 
were neither absolute (the PCI shared in the lottitazione system of sharing benefits, e.g., 
it had ‘its own’ TV channel, and the ‘other’ Czechoslovak parties sometimes 
participated in the Petka), nor was it achieved through restricting electoral competition. 
The Italian coalition and the Petka worked by expanding coalitions as and when 
necessary, but without ever letting the central parties (DC, the Agrarians) lose control. 
The Irish, Italian, and Czechoslovak systems all relied on their respective electoral 
systems. The Italian PR system facilitated the ‘delivery’ of votes for the DC 
(particularly in the Mezzogiorno -  the south),61 while progressive elimination of the 
larger constituencies under STV in Ireland worked against smaller parties, as did the 
practice of calling two successive elections within a year (when smaller parties had 
depleted their resources) in the Free State.63 In Czechoslovakia, the PR list system and 
parties’ power to expel MPs provided for highly proportional outcomes and 
considerable power vested in the central office.64
Hungary’s plurality electoral system was laid open to abuse by use of the open ballot 
outside larger cities, introduced by decree in 1922, and written into law in 1925. This 
provided “four types of pressure on the voters -  administrative, social, economic and 
physical.”65 Since four-fifths of the seats were subject to open voting, “it [would] 
depend only on the self-restraint of the administration in power how big a majority in
61 S. Waters, “’Tangentopoli’ and the Emergence o f a New Political Order in Italy”, West European 
Politics, 17:1 (1994), 169-182.
62 J. Coakley, “Constituency Boundary Revision and Seat Re-Distribution in the Irish Parliamentary 
Tradition”, Administration, 28:3 (1980), 219-328.
63 B. Kissane, “Majority Rule and the Stabilisation o f Democracy in the Irish Free State”, Irish Political 
Studies, 13 (1998), 1-24.
64 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.93-94, and election results.
65 Batkay, Authoritarian Politics, p.56.
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the House it secured for itself.”66 Even in the 1931 elections, held during deepening 
economic crisis, the Unified Party’s vote fell below the opposition only in
( \ 7constituencies with secret voting. Despite the Unified Party’s smallholder background, 
the peasantry was thus kept out of the main political system. Both government and the 
new post-1932 opposition compared the constitution to that of the UK (including the 
electoral system), stressing centralisation of power in the hands of the government and
/Q
regent. While the 1938 electoral law introduced a mixed list and plurality system and 
the secret ballot, other changes made for further exclusion. Eligibility to vote required 
six years’ residency in the same commune, and candidates lost their deposits if they 
polled less than 25% of the vote (or failed to get at least one list MP elected), all of 
which was hardly favourable to workers (casual labour is mobile) or to independent 
candidates.69
In contrast, Poland’s PR system and weak presidency led to a weak parliamentary 
system in 1919-26. This was hardly the model for dominant democracy, and, under the 
old electoral system, Pilsudski was unable to secure a majority for his BBWR in the 
1928 elections, two years after his coup. He succeeded in this only in 1930, using
• • t *70incarceration of opposition leaders and police intervention in the elections. The 1935 
constitution and the electoral ordinances that followed Pilsudski’s death the same year 
took Poland the full step away from parliamentary politics, leading to an opposition 
boycott of the 1935 elections and resulting in a non-party Sejm after the dissolution of 
the BBWR in October 1935.71
The less constitutional, if still legal, options included banning specific political parties 
or arresting their leaders. The Communist parties were banned in Hungary and Poland, 
and perhaps more significantly given their size and following, in Finland. Less subtly, 
direct action was taken against political opponents: the ‘White Terror’ in Hungary at the
66 T. Eckhart, “The Constitutional Evolution of Hungary Since the War”, The Hungarian Quarterly, 3:3, 
(1937), p.392. In 1937, Eckhart was Leader of the Opposition, and Bethlen’s former press chief. Also 
cited in Batkay, Authoritarian Politics.
67 Romsics, Istvan Bethlen.
68 Eckhart, “The Constitutional Evolution o f Hungary...”, and A. Tasnadi-Nagy (then Minister of 
Justice), “A Thousand Years o f the Hungarian Constitution”, The Hungarian Quarterly, 5:1, (1939).
69 Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 191.
70 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.64.
71 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p.67-68.
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time of 1920 elections “made nonsense of the theoretically broad suffrage.”72 Arrests of 
opposition leaders preceded the 1930 elections in Poland. More clandestinely, 
allegations surfaced linking senior Italian military and government figures to efforts to 
prevent a PCI government in Italy in the 1970s by any means necessary. The P2 
masonic lodge was linked to right wing terrorism in 1980, and questions raised over 
terrorist use of resources from the secret Gladio defence organisation a decade later.73
Finally, administrative centralisation goes hand in hand with dominant democracy. 
Federalism is, in this sense, a system of power sharing and balance of power. It is not to 
be found in the cases considered here (with the partial exception of Italy). Suffice it to 
note that in countries that feature sizeable geographically concentrated ethnic 
minorities, centralisation of power removes one potential means of power-sharing (local 
autonomy).
Across inter-war East Central Europe the results were similar. Though the methods 
differed, The Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish regimes were based on excluding the 
losers from power. The manifest effort on the part of one party to become the dominant 
force, not recognising the legitimacy of the opposition, is hardly unique to inter-war 
East Central European politics. Nevertheless, the period left a legacy that can hardly be 
described as liberal democratic or conducive to power-sharing. To the extent that the 
parties and ideology of this period have been invoked since 1989, this has entailed 
competition for dominance. By contrast, the post-war parties in Austria and Germany 
explicitly rejected the old form of competition, as did the Italians after 1992 (but not the 
Greeks after 1974). However, any East Central European effort to do the same after 
WW II was drowned by the communist take-overs. In 1989 the communist system of 
competition, or lack thereof, was rejected, but several parties looked back to the inter­
war party systems for guidance.
72 Rothschild, East Central Europe..., p. 153; Batkay concurrs, Authoritarian Politics..., p.17.
73 M. Frei, Italy: The Unfinished Revolution, (London, Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), p. 148-151; F. Cossiga, 
interviewed in B. Vespa, La Corsa: Dopo D ’Alema a palazzo Chigi chi salira al Quirinale, (Milan, 
Mondatori, 1998), p.7-11.
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C o n c l u sio n  -  Pa r ties  a n d  Id e o l o g y : F r e e  to  Ch o o se
Historical institutionalism is of particular relevance to party systems, to the extent that 
they carry a considerable amount of ideological baggage, either imported from the west, 
or inherited from opposition to communism or the inter-war era. Just as the communist 
regimes were legitimised partly by their anti-fascist credentials, so several parties on the 
post-communist right are seeking legitimacy as the enemies of the communist regimes. 
However, the impact of West European parties and ideologies on the formation of post­
communist parties is considerable. Several parties have invoked this directly, as in the 
‘west of centre’ label ROAD adopted or Klaus and Orban’s association with Thatcherite 
economic policy. Institutionalism presents a powerful tool for explaining inertia, while 
historical and new institutionalism explains elements of the trajectories of change. 
Therefore, though historical factors may help account for some of the parties and party 
strategies that have emerged on the post-communist political scene, the overall picture 
is not one of a return to the past. Five major themes have been picked up by different 
‘families’ of parties.
The weakness of liberalism in historical terms is counterbalanced by the powerful 
development of economic liberalism in West European politics, particularly since the 
early 1980s. The election of Thatcher in the UK, Die Wende in Germany in 1982 and 
French socialist government’s change of economic policy a year later set the scene for 
the Single European Act, ‘1992’ and an era of monetarism. When East Central 
European post-communist liberals focused on the heritage from the West and links with 
West European political parties, they showed that some political parties may choose to 
overcome the constraints of historical institutionalism. This is not to say that the west- 
of-centre liberal parties were guaranteed success. The problems of economic transition 
practically ensured that they were not. Nevertheless, the liberal parties by and large 
circumvented the historical institutional legacy by focusing on West European parties 
and ideology as a model. Klaus repeatedly stressed the need to move the Civic Forum 
towards a modem party “similar to West European parties” with a right-of-centre
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agenda, particularly when the ODS was set up in 1991.74 The ODA chose to focus on 
West European liberalism, inviting Western liberals like Genscher to their founding
nc
congress to emphasis the point. Even in the Autumn of 1989, Havel and Civic Forum 
spoke of a ‘return to Europe’, rejecting the notion of a ‘third road.’ The difference 
between the Western-oriented SzDSz and Fidesz on the one hand, and the populist and 
historical parties in Hungary on the other was well documented at an early stage.77 In 
1988, Fidesz explicitly rejected the region’s historical constraints, borrowing from
7 o
Western legal and political traditions and invoking Thomas Jefferson. Within the 
MDF, the debate whether it should be a broad European-style catch-all party continued
70until the expulsion of Csurka in 1993.
The problems the reformed communist left faced in terms of the legacy of communism 
and discrediting of the left have been partly overcome by the close relationship between 
social democrat governments in Poland and Hungary and western institutions like the 
IMF, the EU and NATO. The historical legacy is far more problematic for the radical 
(or ‘eastern’) left, which is not associated with free market policies and individual 
rights. Like their liberal counterparts, the social democrat parties developed an 
ideological (or rather, non-ideological, catch-all) appeal based directly on the reputation 
of Social Democrats in Western Europe, from the SPD and PvdA to New Labour. The 
fact that this may have been a tactical as well as strategic imperative given the extent to 
which the left had been discredited in East Central Europe since 1968 does not detract 
from the parties’ ability to choose the historical legacy and traditions on which to base 
their post-communist identity. Even the Czech communists debated whether to adopt a
O A
stance more similar to the PCF or PCI, as Weiss’ SDL had done in Slovakia.
74 J.Pehe, "The Civic Forum Splits into Two Groups", RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, 
p.13.
75 J. Pehe, "The Realignment of Political Forces", RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 24 may, 1991.
76 A. Stefansen, Folkevar i Ost, (Oslo, Cappelen, 1990), p.221 and 167.
77 A. Bozoki, “Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary”, in ”, A. Bozoki, A. 
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In sharp contrast, historical institutionalism accounts for a significant part of the 
weakness of the right in East Central Europe inasmuch as the right’s ideology and 
appeal remains based on religion and the traditional community, cast in terms of 
collective rather than individual rights -  often focusing on the nation. This is not 
necessarily a peculiarly East Central European characteristic. Any conservative party 
that does not rely on free market economics and individualism is by and large left to 
appeal to religion or nation or both (the Norwegian Christian People’s Party is the 
classic West European case). Even Western European catch-all conservative parties, 
which have more or less abandoned the link with religion, face questions concerning the 
role of the nation and the compatibility of collective rights and free-market economics. 
Part of the answer in Christian Democratic Europe has been a focus on European 
integration, following a long-term trend of scepticism towards the state as a political 
institution. By contrast, the East Central European right suffered from limited scope to 
develop ideology, strategy or tactics during the communist period. By definition, the 
conservative right could hardly draw on the legacy of the West European right 
inasmuch as conservatism is based on long-term continuity (the four decades of 
‘people’s democracy’ notwithstanding), whether in government or in opposition to the 
regime. Even post-war Italian conservatism developed only partly based on US tutelage 
and as much based on the Popolari and the Catholic Church. In other words, it is 
considerably more difficult to base conservatism on external traditions than it is to 
establish liberal and social democratic parties based on more or less coherent sets of 
ideology and practice developed over a century of West European politics. Yet the 
Czech KDU-CLS proves that it can be done, as it “builds on pre-war traditions and 
experience and on the experience of the Christian parties of the democratic world”, 
invoking Western Christianity and European integration, and explicitly rejecting 
nationalism.81 The West European Christian democrats’ focus on European integration 
and scepticism toward the state provided an opportunity to combine conservatism with 
free-market economic policy (if not precisely laissez-faire, at least not until the early 
1980s). In East Central Europe, the etatist element inherited from the inter-war years 
made this considerably more problematic, even if economic and security questions 
made EU and NATO membership an imperative.
81 KDU-CSL, “The Principles of the Policy o f the Christian and Democratic Union -  Czechoslovak 
People’s Party”, undated, supplied by KDU-CSL International Office in 1997.
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If conservative parties may at least look to the EU as a possible way out of the dilemma 
between traditional appeal and the necessary acceptance of free market policies, the 
historic parties are by definition more driven by historical institutionalism. Usually 
conservative or agrarian, the parties that earned the ‘historic’ label were constituted in 
1989-91 as revivals of inter- and post-war parties. Indeed, the ‘historic’ label is derived 
precisely from the extent to which the parties choose to focus on continuity, or historical 
institutionalism. Their problem lies in four decades of communist ‘modernisation’. Even 
if the direction or quality of modernisation may be controversial, its magnitude is 
beyond debate as far as industry and agriculture is concerned. Given this context, it can 
hardly be surprising that the historical parties that have seen any degree of success have 
been based on issues that were not resolved under communism. Where they survived, 
nationalism, urban -  rural cleavages and religion have been politicised by the historic 
parties, with mixed success. National questions were frozen or recast, agriculture 
collectivised, and religion driven under-ground in Czechoslovakia and Hungary if not in 
Poland. In other words, several of the central divisions of the inter-war party systems 
survived to form the basis for parties that explicitly played on an historical 
institutionalist legacy. However, the limited electoral success of the historical parties 
testifies to the extent of communist modernisation. For example, there has been no 
successful agrarian party in former Czechoslovakia (though the KSCM performs well in 
agricultural regions).
West European post-war political history suggests a possible fifth category of party, into 
which several East Central Europe parties that may otherwise be described as 
conservative populist may fall. A number of new parties have emerged in Western 
Europe since the mid-sixties, combining populist appeal with rejection of traditional 
politics -  the so-called protest parties. These new populist parties may inherit a 
historical legacy, but there is also a direct link to ‘new politics’ based on rejection of 
class politics. Though there may be links to inter-war populist parties, parties such as 
Meciar’s HzDS owe less to historical legacy than to the specific nature of post­
communist competition. In other words, new populism or protest parties are more 
defined by what they oppose or reject, than by their historical legacy. This holds even 
for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Bossi’s Lega Nord, both of which rejected the 
partitocracy of the First Republic and the new social democracy found in PDS, and in 
the Lega’s case also rejected Rome rule. Poland in the late 1970s and 1980s was home
Democracy Dominant or Dominant Democracy? 158
to the development of an entirely sui generis movement in Solidarity, combining 
intellectual and legalistic opposition and trade union rights. Though the liberal wing 
provided a ‘proto-liberal’ legacy, new populist parties emerged from its populist wing 
(PC, BBWR, AWS). Parties such as KPN, founded in Poland in 1979 and invoking 
Pilsudski’s heritage, straddle two groups by combining new populist elements and
SOhistorical appeal.
In short, only part of the inter-war and communist legacy is significant as far as parties 
and ideology are concerned. In fact, the historical development of inter-party 
competition in West European politics is as relevant to the post-communist historical 
institutionalist inheritance as is East Central European political history. The same could, 
of course, be said for the relevance of Russian political history or historical 
institutionalism to the post-war East Central European regimes. The foreign heritage 
may have been imposed after WW II as opposed to borrowed in the post-communist 
era, but in either case Russian and West European institutionalism and ideology 
respectively influenced (if not shaped) political competition. The institutional and 
historical legacy in East Central European politics is, in fact, highly selective. Come 
1989-90, the emerging parties in East Central Europe were remarkably free to choose 
their historical legacy, perhaps a paradox given their limited choice in economic policy.
Nevertheless, three main elements of historical institutionalism are of particular 
relevance to the development of post-communist party systems. Despite the differences 
within and between families of new parties, three issues could hardly be ignored. First, 
issues derived from the multi-ethnic nature of most East Central European states have 
proved persistent in East Central European politics, surviving communism as well as the 
transition to free market liberal democracy. Second, both the inter-war and communist 
legacy reinforced tendencies towards etatism, or the centralised state. In Commisso’s 
assessment the most significant factor is the institutional legacy of communism, which 
leaves the need for the state to withdraw from civil society. This is a difficult
82 L. Vinton, “‘Outsider’ Parties and the Political Process in Poland”, RFE/RL Research Report, 3:3, 21 
January, 1994, p. 18.
83 E. Commisso, “Legacies o f the Past or new Institutions? The Struggle over Restitution in Hungary”, 
Comparative Political studies, 28:2 (1995), 200-238.
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proposition at the best of times, let alone during a period of transition in which the 
incumbent government is particularly vulnerable to criticism. Third, liberal democracy 
is a mechanism for resolving conflicts, and to no small extent this means conflicts 
concerning the distribution of resources. Economic policy is therefore a major element 
of party competition, a dimension that is present if not dominant in every West 
European party system. Yet the complete failure of the communist economic system 
meant that West European models were imported wholesale, leaving relatively little 
scope for ideological economic debate even if the pace of economic transition has been 
hotly contested. The legacy of domination-oriented strategies for party competition was, 
therefore, not necessarily mitigated by the need for bargaining over economic policy or 
to reach a consensus on economic reform.
If nationalism provided an integral element in the platform of the inter-war ‘right’ 
across East Central Europe, the communist period hardly eradicated nationalism or 
resolved inter-ethnic questions. The fact that communism and nationalism remain 
incompatible in theory because they are based on ultimate loyalty to class and nation 
respectively did not prevent a number of marriages of convenience between the two. 
However, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, actual and threatened Soviet 
intervention in 1956, 1968 and 1980-81 made it difficult for the regimes to invoke 
nationalism in defence of themselves. Short of arguing that a domestic communist 
regime was preferable to Soviet intervention (national interest rather than nationalism), 
there was therefore little scope after 1968 for any of these regimes invoking anything 
like Ceaucescu’s nationalist stance in Romania.
In the last two decades of communism, therefore, credible political appeal based on 
nationalism remained the privilege of the opposition in Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
lands. Only Slovak communists could claim to defend the national interest, leaving it 
vaguely defined, but pointing to the federalisation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The result 
was the emergence of national ‘conservative’ opposition movements invoking the inter­
war past, notably the MDF in Hungary and the KPN in Poland. Though border changes 
and population movements during and after WW II simplified the East Central 
European ethnic map and the Helsinki agreement ruled out border changes, the political 
implications of national identity remained potential sources of political competition.
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However, to the extent that the inter-war legacy persists, it hardly serves as the model 
for peaceful management of inter-ethnic relations.
Commisso has suggested that despite the agreement on pluralist rules of the game and 
limited government after 1989, the real Leninist legacy was “the extensive and highly 
centralised state”.84 However, this legacy is more extensive and can be traced further 
back than she suggests. The formal constitutions notwithstanding, inter-war East Central 
European government was based to a considerable extent on exclusive or dominant 
democracy, i.e., permanent exclusion of losers from the political process, be they 
national minorities or the left. Political competition under communism and the inter-war 
regimes was thus geared towards exclusive power rather than negotiation and coalition- 
building after elections. To be sure, the communist regimes’ totalitarian aspirations (at 
least in the Stalinist years) differed qualitatively and quantitatively from the inter-war 
governments’ centralised control. The point is not the similarity between the regimes, 
but rather that a focus on the inter-war legacy does not provide a countermeasure to the 
centralised state that was the legacy of Leninism.
The problems of government control over the media illustrate the point. Given the 
problems inherent in presiding over economic transition and recession, the temptation to 
exercise control over the media proved stronger than the constraints provided by the 
new legal regime, at least in Hungary and Slovakia. In 1992 the Slovak government 
halted the privatisation of the Danubaprint company, citing the need to regulate it, and 
in the same year friction between Meciar and the head of Slovak television caused the
• • • QC ,latter’s resignation and dismissal of the independent board supervising television. This 
was followed by the establishment of the Meciar-sponsored Club of Journalists for a 
True Picture of Slovakia. Similar controversy surrounded Antall’s attempts to dismiss 
the heads of Hungarian Radio and Television during the 1992-93 “Media War.”86 In 
Poland, the Sejm-appointed National Broadcasting Council has come under fire for 
censorship, particularly in the light of laws that stipulate good taste and morality in 
programming. Even the Czech government has suffered criticism over its handling of
84 Commisso, “Legacies o f the Past or new Institutions?”, p.235. See also Chapter Two, above.
85 J. Obrman, “The Slovak Government versus the Media”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:6, 5 February 
1993.
86 J. Pataki, “Power Struggle over Broadcasting in Hungary”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2; 11, 12 March 
1993.
Democracy Dominant or Dominant Democracy? 161
on
the media, though this was mainly linked to privatisation. This is not so much a matter 
of the weakness of civil society as an illustration of the tools available to a centralised 
government.
Finally, the communist period inevitably left a heritage of disaggregated economic 
interests. Given the illegitimacy of economic conflict, and the use of trade unions as 
‘transmission belts’, trade unions and economic pressure groups have emerged
on
gradually from an organisation vacuum following the collapse of communism. Short 
of the ‘new anti-politics’ in Poland in the 1980s, which based opposition to communism 
on economic grounds, there was little development of alternative economic theories to
OQ
communism. Similarly, inter-war political competition provided little or no basis for 
economic criticism of communism. Come 1989, therefore, governments and parties 
faced with the economic transition looked to West European models, debating the pace 
of transition and the scope of welfare safety-nets rather than the goal of West European 
market economies and membership of the European Community. In this respect the 
Leninist and inter-war legacy was paradoxically an economic policy vacuum that left no 
viable theoretical alternatives to IMF-approved economic transition.
The combined legacy of inter-war politics and communism in East Central Europe 
therefore left the new post-communist parties with a wider range of historical 
institutional legacies from which to choose. The new liberal parties, reform communists, 
conservative, historic and new populist parties have drawn on a range of models of 
party organisation, appeal and ideology, emphasising the pre-communist past as well as 
West European politics. However, this choice is constrained by three key legacies -  
institutional centralisation that limits federalism, the economic orthodoxies of post­
communist economic transition, and divisions over approaches to nationalism. 
Moreover, the legacy of inter-war party competition centres on efforts to achieve 
dominant party status. One way or another, every post-communist parliamentary party 
that has experienced government power (and by 1998, most had) faced not only 
questions derived from nationalist issues and economic transition, but also decisions as
87 “The Media in Eastern Europe”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:19, 17 May 1993.
88 M. Waller, “Groups, Interests and Political Aggregation in East Central Europe”, Journal o f  Communist 
Studies, 8:1 (1992), 128-147.
89 Szacki points to Dzielski as the leader and main exponent o f this strand, Szacki, Liberalism after 
Communism.
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to what strategies to adopt in terms of party competition and the exercise of central 
government power. The combination of radical privatisation programmes and 
substantial state power left considerably more discretionary power in the hands of the 
East Central European governments than is common in West European liberal 
democracy, even during Thatcher’s privatisation programme in the UK. Party choice 
therefore matters. It determines the extent to which different legacies are important. 
Political parties in East Central Europe have therefore been, to a large extent, free to 
choose.
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C h a p t e r  F iv e  
V o t e r s  a n d  E l e c t io n s : 
Th e  A n t i-In c u m b e n c y  B ia s  in  E a st  
C e n t r a l  E u r o pe
“I t ’s the economy, stupid! ”
-  James Carville, Clinton’s Presidential Campaign, USA 1992.
The message that summed up Clinton’s 1992 campaign rings true for most post­
communist elections in East Central Europe too. If there is one over-riding factor that 
may be invoked to explain voting behaviour in post-communist states it is the economy, 
or rather the economic transition. Even in 1990 it was clear that traversing the ‘vale of 
tears’ through which the economic reform process was to progress would inevitably 
take longer than the lifetime of one parliament.1 “Given the large number of economic 
and social problems each rebuilding democracy usually faces, and given the propensity 
of the winning party to place all of the problems on their initial agenda, it is unlikely 
that any governing party could achieve complete success before the second election.”2 
This comment on West European post-authoritarian elections applies equally well, if 
not better, to transitions from communism. Given the tremendous tasks involved in 
developing a market economy in formerly communist states, it should not be surprising 
to find that East Central European electorates have a propensity to throw out their 
governments at election time. To the extent that this is in fact the case, it opens three 
questions that are relevant to the development of post-communist party systems. First, if 
voters reject the incumbent parties on the grounds of economic performance, this 
implies that electorates are not tied strongly to parties by way of social structures. The 
‘electoral market’ is open, and a considerable number of voters are prepared to change
1 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1990), p.78.
2 A. W. Turner, “Postauthoritarian Elections: Testing Expectations about ‘First’ Elections”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 26:3 (1993), 330-349, p. 345.
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their votes.3 If this is the case, does it mean that party systems reflect party competition 
rather than social differences? Second, to the extent that issue voting dominates post­
communist elections (and party identification is weak), is this a temporary or permanent 
feature of post-communist democracy? Finally, what constraints does such anti­
incumbency voting impose on the parties and the development of party systems?
E l e c t o r a l  Sp a c e : I ssue  V o tin g  a n d  P a r t y  Id e n t ific a t io n
The principal difference between non-structural cleavages and Lipset & Rokkan’s four 
cleavages derives from the latters’ link to social structures. The Lipset-Rokkan model 
has cleavages translated into political competition, and however much translation is 
carried out the basis in social structures remains. Only re- or de-alignment could change 
this. However, if the requirement of a structural element is relaxed, cleavages no longer 
necessarily feature the same kind of links between social structures and party 
competition. Though parties may represent segments of society, they do not necessarily 
do so if the divisive issues on which they centre are not rooted in social divisions. This 
difference prompts questions about links between parties and voters, particularly the 
scope of ‘party identification’. If the party system does not necessarily reflect social 
divisions, can voters be expected to be loyal to a particular party?
A second difference follows from this, inasmuch as non-structural cleavages are likely 
to feature weaker organisational elements than Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavages. If party 
systems are based on long-standing socially salient divisions or cleavages (at the time of 
mass enfranchisement), there is a considerable chance that non-party organisations will 
be available to lend support to ‘their’ political parties. To the extent that cleavages are 
not based on social structure, this organisational element is likely to be weaker. This is 
not to suggest that such divisions do not reflect individuals’ interests, but merely that 
these interests may well be disaggregated or unorganised. Even where social divisions 
lie at the heart of conflict the degree of organisation may vary. For example, divisions
3 The term is from P. Mair, “Electoral Markets and Stable States”, in M. Moran & M. Wright (eds.), The 
Market and the State: Studies in Interdependence, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991).
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based on religion tend to feature stronger organisational support than divisions based on 
ethnicity, partly because most religions feature an organised hierarchy of authority and 
a well-developed world view.4 However, in East Central Europe, the very existence of 
pluralism or ‘civil society’ as a basis for political competition has been contentious.5
Does this mean that electoral markets in East Central Europe are considerably wider 
and more open that those of Western Europe? And if they are, what are the implications 
for post-communist political competition and the development of competitive party 
systems in East Central Europe? Some analysts are uncertain “whether propositions 
derived from studies of the more established Western Democracies can be exported to 
the CEE democracies [Central and Eastern Europe],” and to the extent that they can, 
they “suggest the possibility of considerable electoral turbulence.”6 The cleavage 
model would suggest that electoral markets should be more open if the sociological 
dimensions of cleavages are weak. A similar answer could be derived from meso- 
structure analysis focusing on the ‘weakness of civil society’.7 However, the absence of 
meso-structures that channel social divisions into party competition does not mean that 
politics cannot be based on individuals’ economic interest. Kitschelt suggests a 
relationship between economic interests, social positions and voting behaviour in post- 
communist East Central Europe: bipolar competition centred on voters that stood to 
benefit from economic change and social mobility versus those that did not. In these 
terms, voters’ interests were based on the skills, resources and social position they
4 B. Barry, “Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy”, British Journal o f  Political 
Science, 5 (1975), 477-505, p.502.
5 J. Curry, “Pluralism in East Central Europe: Not Will it Last, but What is it?”, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 26:4 (1993), 446-461; R. J. Hill, “Democracy in Eastern Europe”, in I. Budge & D. 
McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in Honour o f  Jean Blondel, (London, 
Sage, 1994); M. H. Bernhard, “Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas o f Post-Communist 
Democratisation in Poland and Beyond”, Communist and Post Communist Studies, 29:2 (1996), 147-166.
6 I. Crewe, “Voters, Parties and Leaders Thirty Years On: Western Electoral Studies and the New  
Democracies o f Eastern Europe”, in Budge & McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy, p. 75-76.
7 M. Waller, “Groups, Interests and Political Aggregation in East Central Europe”, Journal o f  Communist 
Studies, 8:1 (1992), 128-147; E. Gellner, “Nationalism in the Vacuum”, in A. Motyl (ed.), Thinking 
Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study o f  the USSR, (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1992); G. Evans & S. Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f Party 
Competition in Eastern Europe”, British Journal o f  Political Science, 23 (1993), 521-548.
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inherited from the communist regime.8 Analysing the social bases of party competition
in Eastern Europe Whitefield & Evans conclude that
[w]here there is a socio-econom ic basis to party com petition it w ill be m ost strongly  
influenced by left -  right issues. Where there is an ethnic basis to party com petition it 
w ill be m ost strongly influenced by liberal-authoritarian and national-cosm opolitan  
issues. Finally, in the absence o f  socio-econom ic or ethnic bases o f  com petition, the 
principal issues around which parties w ill com pete w ill be consensual; what w ill concern  
voters w ill be the ability o f  parties to achieve agreed-upon goals.9
In this analysis, competition in Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic should focus on 
redistributive issues, in contrast to Slovakia’s focus on valence issues because of its 
“inevitable economic problems” and limited prospects for raising incomes and living 
standards.10
Even in the absence of strong extra-parliamentary organisations or social bases for 
political competition, parties remain vehicles of aggregation of interest, i.e., the voter 
votes for the party that presents the package of politics that best corresponds with his 
interests. In fact, to the extent that deep social cleavages do not naturally separate voters 
into segments and this function is not performed by non-party organisations, the parties 
become increasingly important as aggregators of interest. To be sure, the extent to 
which voters can be treated as rational consumers is contentious. The Downsian notion 
of a rational voter focusing on costs and benefits has been challenged on the grounds 
that the cost of voting exceeds the expected benefits due to the low probability that a 
voter’s choice will affect the outcome of the election.11 Efforts to deal with this 
problem have included attaching utility to the act of voting or contributing to 
maintaining democracy in action, thus departing somewhat from the interest-based 
decision.12 If this were the case, voting would presumably be more significant than for 
whom the vote was cast. Moreover, invoking ‘psychic’ factors to explain turnout makes
8 H. Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society, 20:1 
(1992), 7-50; Bernhard, “Civil Society after the First Transition”.
9 Evans & Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f Party Competition in Eastern Europe”, p.540.
10 Evans & Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f Party Competition in Eastern Europe”, p.545.
11 A. Downs, An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, (New York, Harper & Row, 1957); D. Green & I. 
Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory: A Critique o f  Applications in Political Science, (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1994), Chapter Four.
12 W. Riker & P. Ordershook, “A Theory of the Calculus o f Voting”, American Political Science Review, 
62 (1968), 25-42; D. Mueller, Public Choice, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chapter 
Eighteen.
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it difficult to exclude such factors when explaining how voters choose for whom to cast 
their ballot.13 However, given the low cost of voting and the high probability that each 
vote will not be pivotal, rational voters could be minimising their potential regret rather 
than maximising their possible utility.14 In other words, voting may be interpreted as a 
form of low-cost insurance, a guarantee that the voter’s party will not fail by a small 
margin due to his failure to turn out in election day. In this sense the voter can, 
therefore, be treated as a consumer, seeking to cast his vote for the party that best 
represents his interest. Moreover, Dunleavy challenges the Olsonian assumption that 
links increased size of the electorate (or group membership) to disincentives for voter 
turnout. The effect of increased size on the party’s (or group’s) viability outweighs the 
reduced probability that the individual’s decision will make a difference. The vote is 
interpreted as a resource that will be wasted if it is not used, and the opportunity to use 
this resource is limited.15
The role of parties as aggregators of interests invites focus on five questions relating to 
voter choice, party identification and post-communist voting patterns. If the voter is 
treated as a consumer and his main cost is information gathering, questions arise 
concerning sources of information and parties’ potential for influencing voters’ 
preferences.
1. To what extent do parties enjoy support from extra-parliamentary organisations? 
Downs suggests that voters seek short-cuts to information about parties. In West 
European politics these have been provided by supporting organisations, such as 
trade unions, which contribute to voters’ identification with a particular party.
2. To what extent can voters be expected to develop party identification in the absence 
of membership of organisations or cleavage-based competition? As a short-cut to 
information voters may consider their previous choices, thus developing party 
identification over time.Does the structure of alternatives matter? Given the
13 P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political 
Science, (London, Harvester, 1991), p.82.
14 J. A. Ferejohn & M. P. Fiorina, “The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis”, 
American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 525-536.
15 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Chapters Three and Four.
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nebulous nature of the ‘left -  right’ line of party competition, unclear alliances and a 
multitude of parties means that a considerable number of voters vote for parties that 
fail to get representation in parliament, or are marginalised.
3. How significant is the economic transition? US case studies have indicated the 
primacy of retrospective voting based on economic performance, which, given the 
depth and duration of the recessions in East Central Europe, suggests that no 
government should be re-elected.16
4. Finally, if parties aggregate issues into packages which are presented to the voter at 
election time, is there greater scope for ‘preference shaping’ than when voters 
identify closely with parties? Post-communist governments have had considerable 
resources at their hands, which provide means by which they may attempt to 
mitigate the anti-incumbency effect.
The tentative answers to these questions suggest that voters are less subject to pressure 
from non-party organisations and that party identification may take some time to 
develop, particularly as ‘left -  right’ alignment is problematic, which in turn means 
open electoral markets and considerable scope for preference shaping. The depth of the 
economic problems suggests that anti-incumbency voting should dominate post­
communist elections.
N o n -P a r t y  O r g a n  is  a t io n s a s  L in k s  B e t w e e n  P a r t ie s  a n d  Vo t e r s
The extra-parliamentary support bases for West European parties have primarily 
consisted of trade unions and Churches, which have served a multitude of functions 
including mobilising voters for their associate parties and candidates. Though the extent 
of external support for mass parties has varied considerably across parties and countries, 
most West European socialist and social democratic parties have enjoyed considerable
16 M. P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1981); D. R. Kiewiet, “Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues”, American 
Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 448-459.
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support from trade unions.17 Post-war Italy and the Netherlands illustrate the point, with 
separate religious organisations and/or trade unions linked to each of the main 
denominational and left-wing parties.18 In rational choice terms, such organisations can 
be construed as means to overcome collective action problems in voting by means of 
persuasion, peer-pressure and eliminating the cost of information gathering. If voting is 
seen as low-cost insurance, this can be extended to include inducement of fear, e.g., of 
the ‘Stalin can’t see you in the voting booth but God can’ variety used by the Church in 
immediate post-war Italy, or trade unions invoking the need to protect the welfare 
state.19 This means that rational choice theory does not necessarily reject party 
identification as irrational. If a party purports to represent a segment of society, any 
rational member of this segment could reasonably be expected to cast his vote for ‘his’ 
party (subject to a sufficiently high salience and the party’s credibility). Hence the 
success of the mass ‘wing’ parties of the left in early Twentieth Century West European 
politics.
Though ‘social democrat’ and ‘reform communist’ families of parties are often 
identified in post-communist politics, the parties which make up this group remain a far 
cry from their West European counterparts in the aftermath of the First World War.20 
This is partly due to their limited links with supporting organisations. The main role of 
trade unions under post-communism has been bargaining over pay and working 
conditions rather than acting as sponsors of political parties.21 If anything, parties have 
attempted to capture trade unions rather than vice versa, thereby reversing or distorting 
the classical pluralist pressure group -  government relationship. The National 
Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions’ (MSZOSZ) failure to oppose the MSzP-led
17 A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988); D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f  Socialism, (London, Tauris, 1996).
18 H. Daalder, “The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society”; and S. H. Barnes, “Italy: 
Opposition on Left, Right and Center”, in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western 
Democracies, (New have, Yale University Press, 1966).
19 D. Sassoon, Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy & Society Since 1945, (London, Longman, 1986), 
p. 142-147; G. Esping-Andersen, “Single-Party Dominance in Sweden: The Saga o f Social Democracy”, 
in T. J. Tempel (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes, (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1990).
20 K. von Beyme, Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, (Frankfurt-am-Main, Suhrkamp, 1994).
21 C. Schnabel, “Die Arbeitsbeziehungen im Osteuropaischen Transformationsprozess”, in O. Vogel 
(ed.), Osteuropa auf dem Weg in die Marktwirtschaft, (K6ln, Deutscher Instituts-Verlag GmbH, 1993).
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government’s tight economic programme in 1994/95 would be a case in point.22 
Though six of eight Hungarian unions have been described in terms of socialist, 
Christian, liberal or populist “ideological outlook”, the links with government and 
parties are “very weak”.23 In Poland Solidarity's demand for social protection illustrated 
the problematic relationship between the trade union and political parties that emerged 
from the same opposition movement24 The unions failed to impede economic shock 
therapy, partly due to fragmentation.25 In the Czech and Slovak Republics, trade union 
activity has likewise been limited mainly to pressure politics.26 In short, they have 
proved a poor basis for post-communist mass parties in East Central Europe.
The Catholic Church provided the second major external basis for West European mass 
parties, notably in inter-war Belgium and the Netherlands. In Italy Azione Cattolica 
played a considerable part in the development of the DC into a mass party during the 
last year of WW II.27 However, the post-war success of Christian Democrat parties in 
Germany, Italy and Austria was based on the Church acting as “a loose framework of 
commitment” leaving the politicians to “make the running.”28 This was not to be the 
case in East Central Europe. The moderate success of Christian democrat parties under 
post-communism has been attributed partly to crowding out by conglomerate and 
‘Christian national’ parties.29 Moreover, explicit Church involvement in politics 
appears to have backfired. The clearest case of direct Church involvement was the 
Polish election of 1991, whereas by the 1993 election the Church was already beginning 
to exercise more self-restraint.30 Polls in 1991 indicated that the Church’s stance on 
religious education and abortion in particular and its public role in general were
22 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 9:10 (12 May 1995).
23 T. Cox & L. Vass, “Civil Society and Interest Representation in Hungarian Political Development”, in 
T. Cox & L. Vass (eds.), Hungary: The Politics o f  Transition, (London, Frank Cass, 1995), p.l65ff.
24M. Orenstein, “Who’s Right, Who’s Left”, Transition, 1:14 (11/08/95).
25 M. Kramer, “Polish Workers and the Post-Communist transition”, in Communist and Post Communist 
Studies, 28:1 (1995), 74-114.
26 S. L. Wolchik, “Democratisation and Political Participation in Slovakia”; and D. M. Olson, “The 
Experience o f the Czech Republic”, both in K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds.), The Consolidation o f  
Democracy in East-Central Europe, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
27 P. Ginsborg, A History o f  Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, (London, Penguin, 1990), p.50.
28 G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe, (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1990, 5th ed.), p.54.
29 See, e.g., von Beyme, Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, p.309.
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counterproductive, affecting its popular standing “adversely” as RFE understatements 
put it.31 A 1994 poll indicated that 60% of Poles believed the Church had too much 
influence in politics, while 53% and 49% respectively said the Church should permit 
divorce and abortion.32
However, the limited relationship between extra-parliamentary organisations and 
political parties does not preclude party identification on the part of voters. To the 
extent that East Central Europe features disaggregated interest rather than the absence 
of pluralism, political competition based on (economic) interests remains an option. 
However, alignments based on interests in rapid economic transition do not correspond 
to owner vs. worker class politics inasmuch as interests depend on each industry’s 
prospects in a market economy rather than class divisions. Political parties are not
dependent on external support from interest groups, nor do most of them represent
organised interests or a well-defined segment of society. Party identification is,
therefore, not being developed through or enhanced by extra-parliamentary
organisations. It therefore becomes a more long-term prospect, to be established over a 
number of elections.
P a r t y  Id e n t if ic a t io n  t h r o u g h  I s s u e  Vo t in g
Though organisations and identity might promote the development of links between 
voters and parties, they are far from the only road to party identification. It can also be 
based on iteration, i.e., if the voter judges party ‘X’ to be most competent or closest to 
his interests in several successive elections he may use his previous judgements to guide 
his future voting. Based on Downs’ rational voter, Fiorina developed a model of 
retrospective voting in which party identification features heavily. Whereas Downs’ 
rational voter uses past performance as a means for estimating possible future
30 A. Sabbat-Swidlicka, “The Polish Elections: The Church, the Right, and the Left”, RFE/RL Research 
Report, 2:40 (8 October 1993).
31 J. B. de Weydenthal, “Catholic Bishops Call for Cooperation between Church and State”, RFE Report 
on Eastern Europe, 17 May 1991; J. L. Curry, “Are the Church and Public Opinion at Variance?”, RFE 
Report on Eastern Europe, 12 July 1991.
32 L. Vinton “Opinion Poll: Poles are Selective Catholics”, OMR1 Daily Digest, 8 August 1994.
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performance, Fiorina’s rational voter develops party identification over time through an 
iteration of this process: “current party ID combines additively with future expectations. 
But party ID at any given time is a function of party performance prior to that time.”33 
In other words, if imperfect information makes it rational for a voter to base his choice 
in part or mostly on past performance, then this will over time contribute to the 
development of party identification.
However, one defining feature of new democracies is the lack o f  time over which party 
identification can develop. In the short term, any party identification must, therefore, be 
based on identity or organised interest. Voting on the basis of expected performance or 
individual economic interest constitutes issue voting, though it might eventually lead to 
party identification. Organised interests have proven too disaggregated to contribute 
meaningfully to the development of widespread party identification, but some evidence 
of the stability of ethnically based voting can be found among the Hungarian minority 
in Slovakia (stable at 9% +/- 1.5%). The logic of party identification and the main 
parties’ broad appeal therefore suggest that the floating voter will figure prominently 
under the conditions of post-communism. Only over time, after a handful of elections, 
can a degree of party identification be expected. If the voter repeatedly assesses one 
party as his preferred choice, or as ‘his’ party, the extent to which he invokes his 
previous assessments at each new election determines the extent to which party 
identification develops. This is not only rational in terms of cutting the cost of 
information, but also in terms of invoking the long-term view as opposed to myopic 
voting. Party identification therefore becomes at best a medium-term prospect in East 
Central Europe, and given the limited role non-party organisations play in this process 
the electoral markets can be expected to remain very open.
33 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, p.76.
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Th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e s : C o m p e t it io n  f o r  ‘l e f t ’ a n d  ‘R i g h t ’, a n d
‘WASTED VOTES’.
The openness of electoral markets in East Central Europe is reinforced by the structure 
of political competition, at least as far as the first few elections are concerned. Post­
communist politics has featured competing visions of left -  right competition, and to 
some extent it still does. This represents a ‘conflict of conflicts’, a competition to 
determine the main dimension in the party system.34 The social democratic and reform 
communist parties invoked the social democratic legacy (local and European), hoping to 
pit social democracy against a liberal and conservative right. Meanwhile the parties 
loosely referred to as the ‘Christian national’ right invoked inter-war conservative -  
liberal competition, grouping the liberals on the left with the reform communists and 
new social democratic parties. Finally, the ‘liberal parties’, generally favouring rapid 
economic reform, emphasised the division between ‘shock therapists’ and ‘timid’ 
economic reformers (whether Christian national or reform communist). This tripartite 
alignment produced party competition in East Central Europe that was far from uni­
dimensional. While the social democratic and reform communist parties monopolised 
the mainstream ‘left’, the liberal and Christian national camps competed to dominate 
the ‘right’. If the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are to be used, they require, at the very least, 
modifiers to distinguish the free-market ‘liberal’ right and the more Gemeinschaft- 
oriented (conservative) ‘Christian national’ right. The over-all problem is complicated 
by the similarity in the policy positions adopted by the ‘far right’ and the ‘hard left’, as 
openly nationalist and unreformed communist parties all argued against the free market.
This ‘trichotomy’ was not conducive to the stabilisation of electoral markets. Each 
major party or ‘camp’ had at least two rivals, each on a separate dimension. Rejection 
of the government did not produce a shift to the opposition, but to one of two alternative 
oppositions. In the Polish case, the aggregate shift at electoral level was from the liberal
34 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View o f  Democracy in America (New 
York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); M. Maor & G. Smith, “On the Structuring o f Party Competition: 
The Impact o f Maverick Issues”, (manuscript, The European Institute, LSE, 1993); P. Mair, “E. E. 
Schattschneider’s The Semi-Sovereign People”, Political Studies, 14 (1997), 947-954.
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camp to the Christian national camp in 1991, and then to the social democrat camp in 
1993. Moreover, the plenitude of parties meant that a considerable number of voters 
cast their votes for parties that did not gain representation in parliament (see table 5.1 
below), or became marginalised from mainstream politics. To the extent that these 
voters opt for viable parties in the next elections they (by definition) contribute to 
electoral volatility. Moreover, inasmuch as the electoral systems punish factionalised 
camps (all four featured 4% or 5% thresholds by 1993) and the winning camp was less 
factionalised than the opposition. This volatility was set to produce an anti-incumbency 
effect. Between 1993/94 and 1997/98 the SLD gained 6.7% and the MSzP lost only 
0.1%, but both lost seats to united liberal and Christian national camps. The structure of 
alternatives and the plenitude of parties therefore contributed to an over-all anti­
incumbency effect, by increasing volatility and (to the extent that voters had learned to 
vote for viable parties by the time of the 1997 -  98 elections) dispersing the vote in the 
1991 -  94 rounds of elections. As table 5.1 illustrates, this effect has been clearest in 
Poland and Slovakia though parties that fail to make it to parliament continue to poll 
some 12% of the vote in three of the four cases.
Table 5.1 Votes for parties that failed to gain representation in parliament
Period: 1 9 9 0 - 1992 1 9 9 3 - 1996 1 9 9 7 -1 9 9 8
Czech Republic 1992 14.0% 1996 19.3% 1998 11.4%
Hungary 1990 15.8% 1994 12.4% 1998 12.3%
Poland 1991 No barrier 1993 34.4% 1997 12.8%
Slovakia 1992 17.7% 1994 13.0% 1998 5.8%
Th e  E c o n o m ic  t r a n s it io n -  “I t 's  t h e  E c o n o m y , S t u p id ”
Rational choice accounts of voting behaviour have long stressed the role of 
retrospective voting, i.e., the casting of a vote based on the incumbent’s record, as part 
of rational voting behaviour under conditions of uncertainty. Downs’ rational voter uses 
past performance as a guide to future performance, a short-cut in the world of imperfect 
information.35 Given the cost of estimating the performance of a future government, the
35 Downs, An Economic Theory o f Democracy.
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comparatively low-cost activity of observing the performance of the incumbent should 
contribute considerably to the voter’s choice. This is particularly relevant in the context 
of catch-all parties, where competition centres on competence and priorities rather than 
fundamentally different (ideological) political programmes. Given the degree of 
consensus on the need for economic reform in East Central Europe performance-based 
retrospective voting should be particularly important. Moreover, the depth and duration 
of the recession, and the level of unemployment in particular, suggests an anti­
incumbency effect.
To be sure, the theory of retrospective voting based on economic performance is hardly 
uncontroversial. Several studies point to its explanatory power in the US and the UK, 
particularly with respect to unemployment, disposable income, inflation and the general 
state of the economy (GDP growth).36 Interestingly, this tends to reflect voters’ 
perceptions of overall economic problems, which in turn “closely reflect actual 
conditions in the nation’s economy”, and even voters’ appraisals of their own financial 
situation reflect unemployment and inflation.37 Voters are therefore better described as 
sociotropic (concern for overall economic performance) rather than egocentric (focus on 
personal financial situation). However, alternative models based on future expectations 
have claimed better empirical results, criticising the “past-oriented” approach used in 
retrospective models.38 A study of one decade of British politics concluded that, as far 
as the party leaders are concerned, comparative and prospective evaluations matter 
more than individual and retrospective evaluations. In other words, voters compare 
leaders and consider their prospective performance rather than evaluate the Prime
36 D. R. Kinder & D. R. Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role o f Personal 
Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting”, American Journal o f  
Political Science, 23 (1979), 495-517; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections', M. 
Paldam, “A Preliminary Survey o f the Theories and Findings on Vote and Popularity Functions”, 
European Journal o f  Political Research, 9 (1981), 181-200; F. Schneider, “Public Attitudes towards 
Economic Conditions and their Impact on Government Behaviour”, Political Behaviour, 6 (1984), 211- 
227; M. Harrop & W. L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, (London, 
Macmillan, 1987), Chapter Eight; D. Sanders, “Economic Influence on the Vote: Modelling Electoral 
Decisions”, in Budge & McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy.
37 Kiewiet, “Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues”, p.454.
38 J. H. Kuklinski & D. M. West, “Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in the United States 
House and Senate Elections”, American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 436-447.
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Minister on his or her past performance.39 Sanders’ evidence for the same period 
suggests a combination of sociotropic retrospective voting (reflecting GPD growth) and 
egocentric (personal) expectations of the immediate future.40 In the US, “[t]he 
electorate “responds with the sophistication of the banker [foresight, as opposed to the 
simple peasant’s focus on experience], evaluating the president on the basis of an 
informed view of the nation’s economic prospects rather than its current standard of 
living.”41
Nevertheless, there is a theoretical and practical case for returning to the four basic 
economic indicators: economic growth (GDP), unemployment, inflation and, 
particularly for East Central Europe, real wage growth (measured in US $). First, the 
questions used in surveys to determine future expectations about candidates’ or parties’ 
ability to solve a particular problem are closely linked to the question of who/what is 
the voter’s preferred candidate/party. A close correlation between this and the actual 
vote is, therefore, hardly surprising. Testing this argument for the US 1992 election, 
Miller & Shanks found that prospective evaluations of overall performance of parties 
and candidates is significant, but the explanatory power vanishes for parties (not 
presidential candidates) when they control for “other significant prospective 
evaluations” (i.e., issues other than the economy).42 Second, focusing on hard economic 
data permits separate focus on the question of preference shaping (see below). The 
effect of parties’ efforts to engage in preference shaping would be included in 
prospective data, but not in hard data on economic performance. Finally, as polls prior 
to the 1992 election in Britain illustrated, survey evidence may be of questionable 
reliability 43 Such problems have been exacerbated in East Central Europe, for example 
yielding surveys that indicate higher turnout in past elections than was actually the case.
39 R. Nadeau, R. G. Niemi & T. Amato, “Prospective and Comparative or Retrospective and Individual? 
Party Leaders and Party Support in Great Britain”, British Journal o f Political Science, 26 (1996), 245- 
258.
40 Sanders, “Economic Influence on the Vote”.
41 M. B. MacKuen, R. S. Erikson & J. A. Stimson, “Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and 
the U.S. Economy”, American Political Science Review, 86:3 (1992), 597-611, p.606.
42 W. E. Miller & J. M. Shanks, The New American Voter, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1996), Chapter Fourteen.
43 D. Sanders, “Voting and the Electorate” in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holiday & G. Peele (eds.), 
Developments in British Politics 5, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997), p.58-62.
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One possible explanation of survey unreliability is mistrust in pollsters or reluctance to 
provide information. This potential problem is elegantly circumvented by use of hard 
economic data and electoral results rather than ‘soft’ survey data.
Given the tremendous tasks involved in the economic transitions, the anti-incumbency 
approach suggests that most post-communist governments would face the wrath of 
voters as expectations of a rapid economic transition go unfulfilled. In this light it is the 
survival of Klaus’ government, rather than other post-communist governments’ defeat 
at the polls, which requires explanation. Alternation in government, sometimes 
considered a sign of a consolidated democracy, thus becomes the norm while stability 
would indicate either economic success or domination by a single party facing a 
fragmented opposition. A brief examination of economic indicators suggests that the 
Czechs have fared somewhat better than their neighbours, particularly with regard to 
unemployment.
Figure 5.1 GDP growth in % 1990 -  1997
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Source: Business Central Europe, BCE Online statistical database, http://www.bcemag.com.
Figure 5.2 Inflation in % 1990 -  1997 
Polish inflation in 1990 was 585% (off the scale)
—#— Czech Republic 
—h— Slovakia 
—A— Hungary 
—*— Poland
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
5.0
0.0
1994 1995 1996 19971991-5.0
- 10.0
Source: Business Central Europe, BCE Online statistical database, http://www.bcemag.com.
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Figure 5.3 Unemployment in % 1990 -  1998
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Source: Business Central Europe, BCE Online statistical database, http://www.bcemag.com.
Figure 5.4 Average monthly wages in US $ 1990 -  1998
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P r e f e r e n c e  S h a p in g  a s  P a r  t y  S tra  t e g  y
Though the four factors discussed so far point in the direction of large-scale anti­
incumbency voting under the conditions of post-communism, the governments of East 
Central Europe have considerable means at their disposal by which they may attempt to 
shape voters’ preferences. The notion that liberal democracy may be stacked against the 
incumbent is hardly new to East Central Europe, and as Dunleavy points out, a 
“rationally-led opposition should simply track all the government’s policies which 
attract majority support, incorporating them into its own programme.”44 However, he 
goes on to argue that this effect has been offset by governments’ abilities to use the
44 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy & Public Choice, p.l 14.
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resources that office provides to shape voters’ preferences. In Britain, this has included 
partisan social engineering (increasing the number of potential supporters), adjusting 
social relativities (making potential supporters more satisfied), context management and 
institutional manipulation. Examples include, respectively, Conservative efforts to 
reduce the size of the public sector and increase the number of home-owners by selling 
council houses (fewer potential Labour voters, more potential conservative voters); 
making home-owners better off relative to tenants by changing rent-control laws; 
generating booms shortly before elections by relaxing monetary policy to improve the 
context; and changing local government structures (abolishing the seven metropolitan 
councils).45 Elections provide more than a prize for the winner -  the winner is in control 
over substantial resources that may affect the outcome of the next contest.
Analogous efforts have been made in post-communist East Central Europe, though with 
mixed success. Examples of institutional manipulation include introduction of the 5% 
threshold in Poland in 1993 and Meciar’s efforts to change the Slovak electoral system 
to a more majoritarian type in 1998. Slovakia’s electoral reform of May 1998, which 
applies the 5% threshold to parties within coalitions, was criticised as gerrymandering 
targeted at the Hungarian coalition 46 In 1997 Meciar used the interior ministry’s power 
to remove the question of the direct election of the president from the referendum 
ballot.47 Hungary and Slovakia have seen considerable controversy over media laws 
and government efforts to control the press, either directly or by influencing 
appointments in the broadcast media. Examples include the establishment of the Club of 
Journalists for a True picture of Slovakia (non-members were refused access to the 
government), political interference in the privatisation of the Danubaprint company 
(which harmed the Slovak opposition press), and broadcast media resignations over 
political interference in Hungary and Slovakia.48 More subtly and successfully (at least 
in the short term) the Klaus government’s efforts to keep unemployment low modified
45 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy & Public Choice, p. 119-125.
46 RFE/RL Newsline, (2:98) 25 May 1998.
47 The constitutional court subsequently ruled against the government, RFE/RL Newsline, (2:28) 11 
February 1998; RFE/RL Newsline, (2:36) 23 February 1998.
48 J. Obrman, “The Slovak Government versus the Media”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:6, 5 February 
1993; J. Pataki, “Power Struggle over Broadcasting in Hungary”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2; 11, 12 
March 1993; “The Media in Eastern Europe”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:19, 17 May 1993.
Voters and Elections 180
the real pace of economic reform, e.g., by reluctance to enforce bankruptcy laws, Klaus’ 
free-market rhetoric notwithstanding.49 Moreover, survey evidence suggests that voters 
participating in voucher privatisation or exposed to privatisation via their work place 
were more likely to support the government in the elections, lending some credence to 
the link between preference shaping and the ODS’ success. Some 80% of the electorate 
had been exposed to privatisation by 1996 (i.e., worked in a privatised company or 
owned shares through the voucher scheme).50 A final point, not limited to government 
parties, concerns party elites’ efforts to set the agenda for the electoral campaign, to 
focus on issues on which they are stronger or more cohesive than their competitors, to 
capitalise on social tension or to build up long-term constituencies.51 In East Central 
Europe, divisions over the implications of multi-ethnic states or potential irredentism at 
home or abroad have provided ample material for mobilisation, battles over the agenda 
and capitalising on (if not inciting) social tensions.
In the wake of the collapse of communism the major parties were not divided over the 
need to achieve a transition to a free-market economy, but rather over the pace at which 
this goal should be pursued. Given that success in this field contributes significantly to 
a government’s ability to pay off discontented voters and to the scope for preference 
shaping, macro-economic success should be expected to affect voters’ evaluation of 
government performance. The overall implications of the autonomy of parties from 
non-party organisations, the slow dynamic of the development of party identification, 
the nebulous structure of left-right competition and the difficulties involved in 
economic transition suggest that East Central European post-communist elections 
should feature a clear and present anti-incumbency trend. However, parties’ efforts to 
engage in preference shaping constitute the countervailing force. The extent to which 
the evidence supports this analysis is the subject of the second part of this chapter.
49 For example, few large industrial firms went bankrupt under the Klaus government. B. Slay “The 
Czech Economic Transition: A Moment of Truth?”, OMR1 Analytical Briefs, 1:143, 3 June 1996.
50 J. S. Earle, S. Gehlbach, Z. Sakova, J. Vecemik, “Mass Privatisation and Voter Response in the Czech 
Republic: Will the Klaus Strategy Work?”, OMR1 Analytical Briefs, 1:137, 30 May 1996.
51 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy & Public Choice, p. 125-128; T. Iversen, “The Logics of 
Electoral Politics: Spatial, Directional and Mobilizational Effects”, Comparative Political Studies, 27:2 
(1994), 155-189; A. Przeworski & J. Sprague, Paper Stones: A History o f  Electoral Socialism, (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 1986).
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E a st  C e n tr a l  E u r o pe  1989 -  98: E l ec t o r a l  V o l a t il it y  a n d  A n t i-
In c u m b e n c y  V otin g
The rational choice case for an anti-incumbency bias in post-communist East Central 
Europe is derived primarily from the problems of economic transition and the limited 
degree of party identification that can be expected under the condition of post­
communism. Both of these factors are analysed below. First the evidence for anti­
incumbency voting is considered, and tested against aggregate economic indicators. 
Second, the extent of electoral volatility is analysed, with a view to confirming the 
arguments concerning weak party identification. Though the limited number of 
elections have not generated sufficient data for a thorough test, an analysis of the data 
available lends support to the theories put forward above, suggesting that they are valid, 
but not providing conclusive proof. The key point, however, is that governments in East 
Central Europe do not tend to win elections.
Th e  A n t i-In c u m b e n c y  B ia s
So, “are winners losers?” Rose & Mackie’s reply to this question was that the anti­
incumbency bias in post-war West European politics has been limited. Moreover, even 
when some coalition partners lost votes, this does not automatically lead to loss of 
control of government.52 The same question has been raised concerning post­
authoritarian elections in Western Europe and Japan. Turner, surprisingly, found that: 
“[e]very single postauthoritarian election winner won the next parliamentary election. 
Five of eleven postauthoritarian election winners gained votes in the next election.”53 
The same cannot be said for post-communist East Central Europe, with the exception of 
the Czech Republic. As table 5.2 indicates, anti-incumbency voting has dominated not 
just East Central Europe but most of post-communist Eastern Europe. Out of 33 
elections across Eastern Europe 1989-1998 (excluding Yugoslavia), the incumbent was
52 R. Rose, & T. Mackie, “Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability?”, in H. Daalder & P. Mair 
(eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, (London, Sage Publications, 1983).
53 Turner, “Postauthoritarian Elections”, p.346.
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either voted completely out of office or lost overall control of the government in all but 
six cases. A further five cases, classified as mixed outcomes, indicate less clear-cut 
results, either by way of the replacement of the government by a coalition or 
technocratic government, with substantial losses for the incumbent on election day; or a 
previous government’s return after a brief period of opposition. However, in all five 
cases the incumbents were technically defeated at the polls.
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Table 5.2
Elections in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (excluding Yugoslavia) 1989-98
State Date Incumbent voted out? Comments
Poland June 1989 YES In the contested seats. 1st election, anti­
communist.
Hungary March/April 1990 YES 1st election, anti-communist.
Lithuania Feb 1990 YES Soviet election, anti-Soviet vote.
Estonia March 1990 YES Soviet election, anti-Soviet vote.
Latvia March 1990 YES Soviet election, anti-Soviet vote.
Romania May 1990 NO 1st election, ex-communists win after coup.
Czechoslovakia June 1990 YES 1st election, anti-communist.
Bulgaria June 1990 NO 1st election, constitutional assembly, Ex- 
communist win.
Albania March/April 1991 NO Communists win.
Bulgaria October 1991 YES Opposition wins, close anti-communist 
outcome.
Poland October 1991 YES Anti-government vote.
(But 'liberals' back in May 1992)
Albania March 1992 YES Anti-communist election.
Czech lands June 1992 NO Post-conglomerate party, continuity.
Slovak lands June 1992 YES Meciar returns (ousted in April 1991).
Romania September 1992 MIX Change, but still ex-communists-supported 
government.
Estonia Sept 1992 YES Government fell Jan 1992, centre-right 
coalition after the election.
Lithuania Oct/Nov 1992 YES Ex-Communists win.
Latvia June 1993 MIX Conglomerate party collapsed.
Poland Sept 1993 YES Reform-communist win.
Hungary May 1994 YES Reform-communist win.
Slovakia Sept 1994 MIX Meciar returns again (ousted March 1994).
Bulgaria Dec 1994 YES Ex-communist win, after government 
collapse Oct 1994.
Estonia March 1995 YES Laar government fell Oct 1995. Centre-left 
government after the election.
Latvia Sept/Oct 1995 MIX no majority, technocratic government.
Czech Republic July 1996 NO, but Coalition survived, minority government.
Albania May 1996 NO, but Widespread allegations o f fraud.
Romania Nov 1996 YES Ex-communist government out, opposition 
in.
Lithuania Nov 1996 YES Ex-communist government out, the right 
wins.
Bulgaria April 1997 YES Ex-communists out Feb. 1997, lose election.
Poland Sept 1997 YES Reform-communist government out.
Hungary May 1998 YES Reform-communist government out.
Czech Republic June 1998 MIX Government fell Nov 1997, divided former 
coalition retains majority, minority CSSD 
government.
Slovakia September 1998 YES Opposition wins, Meciar out
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Returning to East Central Europe, the first wave of elections requires little elaboration, 
they are ideal-type illustrations of anti-incumbency voting. The communist political and 
economic system was rejected en masse by voters, who voted for new parties about 
which relatively little was known. It would make little sense to speak of party systems, 
let alone party identification, as conglomerate movements swept the board. Solidarity 
took all but one of the contested seats in 1989, while the communist party fared 
somewhat better with 13.7% and 13.6% in the Czech and Slovak lands, and the reform- 
communist MSzP polledlO.9% of the first round votes in Hungary. Though it could 
reasonably be objected that the ‘founding elections’ were part of the process of regime 
change rather than the first step in the process of party system formation, they 
nevertheless constituted part of the formative experience of the new democracies.
The Polish and Hungarian cases broadly support the anti-incumbency thesis. In the 
1991 and 1993 elections, Polish voters declined to support governments which had 
implemented the most radical scheme of economic reforms in post-communist Europe. 
If the 1989 election was interpreted as a mandate for shock therapy, the same cannot be 
said of any of the subsequent elections. However, it should be noted that the 1993 
election generated a majority of seats for two parties which combined took only 35.9% 
of the vote, as the 5% barrier (8% for coalitions) eliminated 34.6% of the votes for the 
lower house. Both liberal and Christian national parties suffered significantly from this 
electoral system change because of their disunity. The swing was nevertheless 
considerable. The SLD and PSL increased their respective share of the vote in 1993 to 
20.4% and 15.4% from 12.0% and 8.7% in 1991. Though the extent to which this can 
be put down to economic insecurity is debatable, the SLD’s appeal undeniably focused 
on economic concerns.54 Four years later the situation was reversed, with the 
unification of the Christian national right under the AWS banner. The coalition was 
voted out of office, even though the SLD actually increased its share of the vote by 
6.7% to 27.1%.
The Hungarian case is even clearer. The 1990 election represented a founding election 
inasmuch as it ousted the old regime, but it also ushered in the new party system. The
54 H. Tworzecki, “The Polish Parliamentary Elections of 1993”, Electoral Studies, 13:2 (1994), 180-185.
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Christian national right’s advantage over the liberal opposition was to no small extent 
due to its association with nationalist appeal rather than an economic programme.55 
However, this approach led to problems in the formulation of economic policy. Come 
the 1994 elections, the governing coalition was open to challenge from an MSzP which 
focused on an Austrian-type social market economy, stressing not so much an 
alternative programme as more competent management of the economy.56 Four years 
later a revamped Fidesz turned the very same arguments against the MSzP -  SzDSz 
coalition, offering tax cuts and increased spending and sending the financial market into 
a dive with the prospect of a Fidesz victory and fears that it would not prioritise fiscal 
rectitude.57 The SzDSz, which was widely seen as responsible for the 1995 austerity 
package, dived from 19.5% to 7.9%, while its senior coalition partner lost only 0.4% of 
its 1994 vote.
The two constituent republics of the old Czechoslovakia present less clear-cut cases. 
The 1992 elections produced two more or less incompatible party systems, with no 
party gaining representation in both regions (except various communist successor 
parties). Whilst the Czech lands returned a predominantly liberal government, the 
Slovak election favoured parties appealing for national sovereignty and slower 
economic reform. The latter is perhaps the best illustration of the potential significance 
of non-economic cleavages. Meciar’s re-election in 1992 and 1994 cannot be explained 
without reference to his role as a founder of independent Slovakia. Though the HzDS’ 
victories technically qualify as anti-incumbency voting because both elections followed 
a period of non-Meciar government, his domination of Slovak governments makes such 
an assertion dubious. Nevertheless, the 1992 election was partly as a reaction against 
Czech pressure for rapid economic transition. Only the former communists and Meciar's 
party polled double figures.58 The parallel to inter-war Slovak voters’ rejection of the
55 K. Okolicsanyi “The Economic Programs of the Major Hungarian Parties”, RFE Report on Eastern 
Europe, 13 April 1990; J. Pataki “New Government Prefers Cautious change”, RFE Report on Eastern 
Europe, 13 July 1990; A. Reisch “The Democratic Forum at the Finishing Line”, RFE Report on Eastern 
Europe, 6 April 1990.
56 J. Fitzmaurice, “The Hungarian Elections of May 1994”, Electoral Studies, 14:1 (1995), 77-80.
57 “The Price o f Austerity”, Business Central Europe, 6:52, June 1998.
58 G. Wightman, “The Czechoslovak Parliamentary Elections o f 1992”, Electoral Studies 12:1 (1993), 
83-86.
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Petka parties (the governing coalition at ‘federal’ level) is clear. Come 1994, “Slovakia 
saw the same backlash against the economic reform process as elsewhere in the region,” 
but to the benefit of the HzDS rather than the old left which had “become part of the 
modernisers coalition.”59 In addition, the SNS and the HzDS could exploit the ruling 
coalition’s links with the Hungarian minority and the SDL’s communist past. Meciar’s 
success thus depended on a combination of ethnic nationalism and anti-communism, 
while riding on the backlash against economic reform.
The Czech Republic remains the ‘odd man out’ in terms of ‘throwing out the rascals’. In 
1996 the ODS managed to recapture most of the votes it won in 1992, but its campaign 
was “not good enough to increase [its] electoral support above the 30 percent Klaus 
hoped to receive.”60 The big winner was the CSSD, campaigning on a platform 
appealing to “those who have not benefited from Klaus’s reforms.”61 The 1996 
elections, therefore, demonstrated an anti-incumbency factor in action, again related to 
the problems associated with the economic transition. But why was it not strong enough 
to oust Klaus’ government? One answer may lie in the government’s use of nationalist 
appeal and invoking ‘national myths’, though Williams argues that this failed to 
produce results in 1996.62 Moreover, the ODS-led coalition has not been above 
criticism for its approach the Roma.63 More significantly, deliberate preference shaping 
played a part. Klaus’ government proved less free market-oriented than some of its 
rhetoric might suggest, as the low unemployment figures in figure 5.3 suggest, and the 
ODS campaigned explicitly on its economic record.64
59 J. Fitzmaurice, “The Slovak Election o f September 1994”, Electoral Studies, 14:2 (1994), 203-206,
p.206.
60 J.Pehe, “Elections Result in Surprise Stalemate”, Transition, 2:13, 28 June 1996.
61 J.Pehe, “Elections Result in Surprise Stalemate”.
62 K. Williams, “National Myths in the New Czech Liberalism”, in G. Hosking & G. Schopflin (eds.), 
Myths and Nationhood, (London, Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 140.
63 T. Gross “A blot on the conscience - Czech attitudes on citizenship for gypsies come under fire” 
Financial Times, 19 December 1994. The 1992 Czech citizenship law has been subject to criticism from 
the US Congress and the Council o f Europe (CTK, in English, 1314 gmt 22 February 1996 (SWB 
24/02/96)). The law was amended in April 1996, easing the alleged restrictions on the Roma (CTK, in 
English 1000 gmt 26 April 1996 (SWB 27/04/06)).
64 J. Pehe, “Czech Elections Result In Stalemate”, OMR1 Analytical Briefs, 1:141, 3 June 1996; S. Kettle, 
“Czech Election Campaign Officially Starts”, OMRI Analytical Briefs, 1:112, 1 May 1996.
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Figures 5.5 and 5.7 below plot the fortune of the seven coalitions discussed above for 
which meaningful calculations of losses and gains at the polls are possible (Poland 1993 
and 1997, Slovakia 1994, Hungary 1994 and 1998, and the Czech Republic 1996 and 
1998), against aggregate indexes of economic performance. In both cases the horizontal 
axis represents the coalitions’ gains or losses in the election. Each of the vertical axes 
represent an aggregate index of GDP growth, inflation, unemployment and increases in 
real wages, averaged out over the coalitions’ time in office. Both indexes are linked to 
year-on-year growth in GDP and real wages (in US $). The first index combines this 
with changes in inflation and unemployment, measures in percentage points (GDP and 
wage growth increase the index value, inflation and unemployment growth reduce the 
index). The second index uses overall levels of inflation and unemployment rather than 
increases or decreases.
Though there are too few cases (and the scattering is too great) to draw statistically 
significant conclusions, the scatter-plot suggests a positive relationship between 
economic performance and governing coalitions’ performance at the polls. The obvious 
outliers are Hungary 1994 (in the upper left comer in both scatter-plots) and the Czech 
Republic 1998 (lower right in the ‘first index’ scatter-plot). In the Hungarian case the 
strength of the indicators reflects high wage growth in 1991 and 1992, which was offset 
by a dramatic increase to 13.3% unemployment in 1993 from 3.2% the previous year. 
The Czech case is complicated by the fact that the former coalition had divided six 
months before the election, and voters could therefore punish the government without 
voting for the opposition parties (by casting their vote for the US, the ODS anti-Klaus 
splinter). Though this evidence is merely indicative, it lends support to the rational 
choice-based argument that the anti-incumbency trend so clearly evident in East Central 
Europe is grounded, to a significant extent, in the problems of economic transition.
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Figure 5.5 Coalition performance (votes gained/lost in percent) against economic 
performance in seven East Central European elections (the index is relative, the 
absolute values are not significant).
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Figure 5.6 Coalition performance (votes gained/lost in percent) against economic 
performance in seven East Central European elections (the index is relative, the 
absolute values are not significant).
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T o w a r d s  P a r t y  I d e n t if ic a t io n ? E l e c t o r a l  Vo l a t il it y  i n  E a s t  C e n t r a l  
E u r o p e .
The second part of the argument advanced in this chapter concerns the relative 
weakness of party identification in post-communist East Central Europe compared with 
early Twentieth Century Western Europe. However, in this case the argument is based 
as much on special conditions in early Twentieth Century Western Europe as on the 
conditions of post communism. While the magnitude of the tasks involved in economic 
transition render East Central Europe somewhat different from late Twentieth Century 
West European politics, the same is not the case in terms of party identification. The 
links between the new parties and voters should be as weak in the Italian ‘Second 
Republic’ as in East Central Europe. In both cases the former communists (reformed or 
otherwise) enjoy some loyalty inherited from the past, but most new parties started from 
scratch in terms of voter loyalty. A reliable aggregate guide to volatility has been 
developed by Bartolini & Mair, and tested on West European data. In table 5.3, below, 
the relevant aggregate Bartolini & Mair data is compared with volatility in East Central 
Europe elections. The method of calculation is set out in the appendix, suffice it to note 
that the index is based on the sum of all absolute gains and losses for all parties, which 
is then divided by two to yield a 0 -100 scale of volatility. In the case of ambiguities, 
the calculations have been designed to minimise the figures for East Central Europe and 
Italy.
Table 5.3 Electoral Volatility
Czech Republic 1992 -  1996 (1996 -  1998)
Slovakia 1992 -  1994 (1994 -  1998)
Hungary 1990- 1994 (1994-1998)
Poland 1991 -  1993 (1993- 1997)
Italy__________ 1992- 1994 (1994-1996)____________ 408_______ (17.8)
Western Europe equivalent average 1885 -  1985:
Second elections after first male enfranchising election 11.55 
Same, but including female enfranchisement 11.43
Source: Post-communist and Italian figures calculated by author, see Appendix. West European figures 
from S. Bartolini, & P. Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: the Stabilization o f  
European Electorates 1885-1985, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 149.
Volatility
17.5 (6.21)
19.9 (19.3)
21.2 (22 .12)
26.9 (23.61)
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In the absence of strong links between external organisations and most parties in 1990s 
East Central Europe and Italy the results cited in table 5.3 are hardly surprising. The 
relatively high Polish 1993 figure stands out from the rest partly due to the introduction 
of a 5% barrier between the 1991 and 1993 elections. Counting only parties with more 
than 5% of the vote as ‘in parliament’ in 1991 would yield the lower figure of 21.2 for 
Poland 1991 -  1993. In effect, therefore, both Hungary and Poland saw a marginal 
increase in volatility in 1997/98, while Slovak volatility only decreased marginally. 
Only Italian and Czech voters appear to have moved in the direction of party 
identification. However, again a cautionary note is necessary. The suggestion that a 
limited degree of party identification may be developing is based on rational choice 
analysis that is only partly supported by a limited data set. Surveys conducted in East 
Central Europe offer some support for the arguments about limited party identification 
set out above, though they offer a wide range of estimates of party identification.
Table 5.4 Party identification in percent.
Source (date) Hungary Poland Czech Rep.* Slovakia* Austria BRD
Bruszt/
Simon (1990-91) 51% 17% 53%* 53%* na. na.
Plasser/ 
Ulram (1991) 25% 15% 29%* 29%* 58% 70%
Rose (1993-94) 21% 15% 40% 30% na. na.
* Czechoslovakia treated as one entity by Bruszt & Simon and Plasser & Ulram.
Sources:
L. Bruszt & J. Simon, Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientations in Central and Eastern 
Europe During the Transition to Democracy: The Codebook o f  the International Survey o f  10 
Countries, (Budapest, Institute of Political Science o f the Hungarian Academy o f sciences, 1992). 
Data from 1990 -  91, reproduced in J. J. Linz & A. Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.283.
F. Plasser & P. Ulram, “Perspektiven der Demokratisierung in Ost-Mitteleuropa: Vorlaufige 
Anmerkungen”, in P. Gerlich, F. Plasser & P. Ulram (eds.), Regimewechsel: Demokratisierung 
undpolitische Kultur in Ost-Mitteleuropa, (Wien, Bohlau, 1992), p.339. Data based on “Projekt: 
Demokratie- und Parlamentsvertandnis in Ost-Mitteleuropa”, (1991). Austrian data from 1992, 
FESSEL+GfK.
R. Rose, “Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies”, Party Politics, 1:4 (1996), 
p.522. Data based on Paul Lazarfeld Society, New Democracies Barometer III, data collected 
1993-94.
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T h e  im pl ic a t io n s  fo r  Pa r t y  Sy st e m  d e v e l o p m e n t : t h e  O n e -T e r m
R ule  a n d  Its E x c ept io n s
The above analysis and data point to two tentative conclusions about the parameters of 
party system development in East Central Europe. First, cleavages (in the traditional 
sense) do not form the basis of electoral politics, as a considerable number of voters are 
on the electoral market and tend to reject their incumbent governments at election time. 
Sociological constraints on political parties are, therefore, limited. Second, however, the 
anti-incumbency bias imposes a very different form of constraint on political parties. 
Party strategy and efforts to defeat the anti-incumbency trend take on great importance, 
but it becomes near-impossible to attain ‘dominant party’ status. Parties have not been 
able to hold on to power long enough. These two factors have combined to generate 
pressure for parties to compete along two-bloc, government -  opposition lines.
The electoral volatility data indicates that post-communist electorates feature a high 
number of floating voters and open electoral markets. Whilst this is not to say that 
sociological models of voting are irrelevant, they are overshadowed by the importance 
of floating voters in the first few post-communist elections. Moreover, the problems 
associated with the transition from command economies limited any government's 
prospects for re-election considerably. In the absence of strong links between external 
organisations and most post-communist parties the low salience of cleavages at the 
electoral level is hardly surprising, but Fiorina’s approach suggests that party 
identification should currently be developing. In short, the post-communist context 
provides a poorer basis for cleavage-based party competition than did its earlier West 
European counterpart. There is considerably more room for party strategy and the party 
leadership to exert autonomous influence than was the case in West European politics in 
the aftermath of WW I. The point is not that the rational choice approach explains all 
post-communist voting patterns, but merely that due to the scope of the electoral space 
retrospective voting is comparatively significant. While democratisation in Western 
Europe tended to close or narrow down electoral space, the 1989 wave opened it up. 
Furthermore, the task of economic transition implied that the governments could not be 
expected to benefit from a ‘feel-good factor’.
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Cleavages provide even less of a constraint than was the case in Western Europe, but 
the post-communist parties face other constraints, of which the anti-incumbency bias is 
the most significant. Leadership, party strategy and government performance play a 
considerable role in the development of party systems in the region and the individual 
parties’ prospects, but the other side of the coin is the limits the very same openness of 
electoral markets impose on parties. The anti-incumbency tendency makes for one-term 
governments, and alternation in power is the norm in post-communist East Central 
Europe (as it may well be in post-1992 Italy). Yet one factor strengthens governments 
against the opposition. Large-scale economic and political reform has provided 
opportunities for preference shaping, whether in the form of exposing most voters to the 
benefits of privatisation (in the Czech Republic) or manipulating the rules of the game 
(Slovakia).
Finally, the anti-incumbency trend has promoted a type of two-bloc adversary politics 
in East Central Europe, despite the multi-party systems. The governments’ economic 
problems and the prospect of incumbents losing elections rewards bloc-formation along 
government -  opposition lines. The result has been efforts to create and hold together 
alliances that offer an alternative to the government, as evident in the emergence of the 
AWS in Poland, the SDK in Slovakia, and pre-election coalition negations in Hungary 
in the run-up to the 1998 elections. However, given the multi-party nature of each bloc, 
the result has not been simply centripetal. Each bloc, united in opposition to the former 
incumbent, has experienced considerable disunity in government.
Party systems formation in East Central Europe has taken place under limited 
constraints. Sociological constraints on party system development have been limited, as 
cleavages do not tie voters to parties, and party identification is weak compared with 
West European politics. Though rational choice analysis suggests that party 
identification will strengthen, the lack of external organisational support indicates that 
this will be a medium term prospect at best and that party identification is unlikely to 
reach 1960s West European levels. Parties are, therefore, the main actors on the scene. 
However, the pattern of alternation in power has constrained their abilities to establish
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‘dominant democracy’, Meciar’s and Klaus’ efforts notwithstanding. Preference 
shaping has included not only economic policy, but also institutional manipulation and 
capitalising on ethnic tension. The prize which alternation provides for successful bloc- 
building in opposition has placed party strategy in a central position in party system 
development and ‘brought the party back in’ as the central actor. This is the subject of 
the next chapter.
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A ppe n d ix
A  N o t e  o n  C a l c u l a t io n s  a n d  E l e c t o r a l  V o l a t il it y
Figures have been calculated as per the index used by Bartolini & Mair, i.e., the sum of 
all individual party volatilities divided by two.
All parties which gained representation in parliament in either of the two relevant 
elections have been counted separately, while all parties which did not gain 
representation in parliament in either of the elections have been counted as one single 
‘others’ party.
The effect of this approach is a reduction in the index of volatility. As the point here is 
to illustrate the high level of volatility in post-communist East Central Europe 
compared with Bartolini & Mair’s West European data, the method which produces the 
lower estimate for East Central Europe has been used. Hence there should be no danger 
of exaggerating the differences between the two levels. As the point is to illustrate the 
greater volatility under post-communism, this approach has been chosen so as to err on 
the side of caution. However, the effect is rather limited. For example, in the Slovak 
case, counting all the parties on the ballot rather than using the above approach would 
yield an increase in the index of 0.83 points, form 19.87 to 20.70.
Where a party has split or two parties have merged they are counted as one single party, 
pace Bartolini & Mair. For example, the MDF vote in 1990 is compared to the 
combined MDF and MIEP vote in 1994. Again the effect is to reduce the indicated 
overall level of volatility.
The divisions and mergers counted for the purpose of the calculations used in table 5.3 
are as follows.
Poland:
1993: PC (Centre Alliance) + Coalition for the Republic = PC in 1991 
1993: UP (Union of Labour) = Labour Solidarity in 1991 
1993: KLD = KLD + PPPP 
1997: UW = KLD + UD
1997: AWS = Solidarity + PC + ZChN + BBWR + KPN 
Hungary
1994: MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) + MIEP (Csurka's Hungarian Life and 
Justice Party) = MDF in 1990 
1994: FKgP (Independent Smallhoders Party) + United Smallholders Party =
FKgP in 1990
1998: Fidesz + KDNP = Fidesz + KDNP (counted as a single bloc, liberal wing of 
KDNP joined Fidesz).
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Czech Republic:
1996: KSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) + LB (Left Block) + SDL = 
LB in 1992
1996: SD-LSNS = OH + LSU (Liberal and Social Union) in 1992 
1996: HSMSMNSJ + MNS-HSMF = MSD-SMS in 1992
1998: US + ODS = ODS + ODA in 1996 (US broke away from ODS, ODA told voters 
to vote for ODS)
Slovakia:
1994: SV = SDL in 1992
1994 MK (Hungarian Coalition) = Egyutteles in 1992 
1998 SDK = KDH + DU in 1994
A similar set of calculations by Rose is set out below for comparison.65 The figures are 
considerably higher, as Rose employs neither of the two rules set out above to avoid 
exaggerated levels of volatility. Rose's figures are the sum of all volatilities for parties 
securing more than one percent, not divided by two. The index thus runs from 0 - 200, 
rather than the 0-100  index used above.
Post-communist systems Rose's 0 - 200 index. Divided by 2 (1 - 100 index).
Czech Lands 1990-92 178 89
Slovakia 1990-92 160 80
Slovakia 1992-94 59 29.5
Poland 1991-93 63 31.5
Hungary 1990-94 59 29.5
Post-war West European politics
Greece 1977-7 59 29.5
FRG 1949-53 52 26
Italy 1946-48 46 23
Portugal 1975-76 25 12.5
Spain 1977-79 25 12.5
Austria 1945-49 24 12
Though the index is some 25-30% higher due to the method of calculation and rules 
applied, the conclusions are more or less the same. Post-communist elections 
demonstrate considerably higher volatility than their West European counterparts.
65 R. Rose, “Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies”, Party Politics, 1:4 (1996), 
549-563, p.556.
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C h a p t e r  Six  
D o e s  Pa r t y  O r g a n isa t io n  M a t t e r ?
“Le Parti C 'est Moil ”
-  Robert Michels, Political Parties, 1915
Party organisation remains an under-researched topic in East Central European politics, 
at least at a comparative level, even if some country studies have been carried out.1 
Though some theories have been put forward concerning the relationship between party 
organisation and political competition in West European politics, the field remains 
relatively unexplored.2 The catch-all thesis dominated the West European politics 
writing on the subject until it was supplemented by Katz & Mair’s cartel party thesis, 
which rejuvenated the debate on the development and decline of parties.3 While the 
mass party represented a link between voters and government, the implication of the 
shift towards catch-all parties is a change in this relationship towards parties that 
represent the state to civil society and act as a cartel. The developments and changes in 
party organisation are seen as dynamic, as a party may respond to electoral defeat by 
changing not only its ideology, programme, strategy, tactics or leaders, but also its 
organisation. With the transition to democracy in East Central Europe, the emergence of 
parties with weak organisational structures raises new questions about the relationship
1 P. Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East Central Europe”, Party Politics, 1:4 (1995), 515- 
534; R. Gilespie, M. Waller & L. L. Nieto (eds.), Factional Politics and Democratisation, (London, 
Frank Cass, 1995); P. G. Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organisation in East Central Europe, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1996).
2 The two prominent exceptions are A. Panebianco, Modelli di partito: Organizzazione e potere nei 
partiti politici, (Bologna, II Mulino, 1982), translated as A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation 
and Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); and R. S. Katz & P. Mair (eds.), How 
Parties Organise: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, (London, 
Sage, 1994). The topic is also dealt with in three classics: O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West 
European Party Systems”, in J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political 
Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966); M. Duverger, Political Parties, (London, 
Methuen, 1954); L.D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (London, Pall Mall, 1967).
3 R. Katz & P. Mair “Changing Models o f Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence o f  
the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, 1:1 (1995), 5-28. Panebianco saw the electoral-professional (catch-all) 
party heralding a decline o f parties in favour of, e.g., interest groups, Political Parties: Organisation and 
Power.
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between party organisation and party systems. The same holds for the Italian ‘Second 
Republic’. The new parties in Italy and East Central Europe indicate that parties can opt 
for either a potentially rewarding but vulnerable ‘weak’ structure or attempt to rely on a 
more traditional mass base. Of course there are limits to the extent that either option is 
open to post-communist parties. Party organisation is the product of exogenous factors 
as well as strategic choice. It represents a strategic choice, made under constraints 
imposed by the limits to party -  voter links discussed in the preceding chapter.
The political parties of post-communist East Central Europe are bound to have more in
common with new parties in Western Europe, be they post-authoritarian parties in
Greece, Spain or Portugal or new parties in established West European states, than with
early Twentieth Century parties. The ‘normal’ path from mass party to catch-all party
was by and large closed to the parties East Central European parties.
[One possible lead from Western Europe] is the em ergence o f  so-called ‘catch-all’ 
parties, ones which in being ideologically  bland are able to w in support from all sections 
[of] the electorate; these ‘people’s parties’, pragmatic and moderate, can achieve a 
dominant position, and they are kept on a moderate course through the com prom ises they  
have to make to keep the party and its support intact. This possibility for Eastern Europe 
is attractive, since -  it may be assumed -  the ‘unstructured’ electorate w ill have no fixed  
political com m itm ents, and there is no real basis for, say, strong class-based cleavages. 
The problem in applying this m odel is that it requires making an ‘evolutionary leap’, 
leaving out the fact that the catch-all parties developed from the pre-existing parties and 
still em bodied their traditions.^
Though the post-communist parties may share some attributes with the catch-all or 
cartel parties of West European politics, they start from a different, unstructured, basis. 
Only former communist or satellite parties had a mass-membership from which to ‘de- 
align’. As for the rest, one analyst suggests that “parties in east central European 
countries are likely to develop as formations with loose electoral constituencies, in 
which a relatively unimportant role is played by the party membership, and the 
dominant role by the party leaders.”5 This suggestion is grounded in supply- as well as 
demand-side politics. Popular aversion to joining parties (a hang-over from 
communism) and the diffuse links between parties and collective interests means that
4 G. Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, in S. Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional Architecture 
o f Eastern Europe, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993), p.9.
5 Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East Central Europe”, p.517, emphasis in original.
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there is limited demand for membership of political parties. Conversely, parties do not 
require mass membership for financial viability, and a large active membership 
represents a potential danger in terms of intra-party conflicts or challenges. Of course, 
based on this analysis, much the same could be said about the parties of the Italian 
‘Second Republic’ and post-authoritarian Spain and Greece.
Even if it were a feasible option, the mass party would not necessarily be a desirable 
strategy. For most parties in post-communist East Central Europe it was neither. The 
limited link between organised interests, voters and parties means that the mass party 
model might well not be a feasible option and that similarities with catch-all parties may 
be deceptive. However, mass membership may also be counter-productive, because 
party activists limit the leadership’s flexibility.6 The advantages of the mass party 
emphasised by Duverger turned out to be temporary, linked to a historical period in 
which large electorates, labour intensive campaigns and supportive mass organisations 
made the mass party a superior machine for mobilising voters. These factors were 
“destined by definition not to last”.7 Moves towards increased public financing of 
parties and the use of mass media-based campaign techniques rendered the mass party 
less appropriate to West European politics.8 This was not limited to the parties that 
developed from mass towards the catch-all or cartel type, if anything it applies even 
more to new parties, e.g., in democratic Spain.9 This prompted Montero Gibert to 
suggest that the parties might “transform into institutions of the state rather than 
society.”10 The Greek post-junta experience also illustrates the difficulty of establishing
6 Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East Central Europe”, p.519-520. See also S. Bartolini, 
“The Membership o f Mass Parties: The Social Democratic Experience, 1889-1978”, in H. Daalder & P. 
Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 206-211; G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative 
Politics, (Berkeley, California University Press, 1990).
7 A. Pizzomo, “The Individualistic Mobilization o f Europe”, in S. R. Graubard (ed.), A New Europe: A 
Timely Appraisal, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964), cited in Bartolini, “The Membership o f Mass Parties”, 
p.213.
8 Bartolini, “The Membership o f Mass Parties”, p. 209-210.
9 M. Caciagli, “Spain: Parties and the Party System in Transition”, in G. Pridham (ed.), The New  
Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, (London, Frank Cass, 
1984), p.88-91.
10 J. R. Montero Gibert, “Partidos y participacion politica: algunas notas sobre la afiliacion politica en la 
etapa inicial de la transicion espanola”, Revista de Estudios Politicos, 23 (1981), 33-72, p.72 (my 
translation).
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new mass parties, as New Democracy and PASOK tried to develop mass parties rather 
than focus on clientelism and charisma, but had very limited success.11
Both exogenous and endogenous factors have therefore contributed to the emergence of 
party systems that are very much dominated by the parties, or rather by the party 
leadership. Though party organisation may be approached from a rational choice 
perspective, focusing on maximising votes, influence on policy or survival of the party, 
organisational choice is still constrained by the conditions facing the party. Unless the 
party has a clearly defined constituency or a set or ‘core voters’, focus on mass 
membership may not be an option. The professional party with limited membership 
therefore represents a rational strategy for party organisation. Like the cartel parties, 
new parties tend to feature a greater degree of leadership domination within the party, 
and more focus on the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public office’ (as 
opposed to the ‘party on the ground’) than was the case with the mass parties.
Pa r t y  O r g a n isa t io n  a n d  Ch a n g e  in  W e st  E u r o pe a n  P o l it ic s:
A  C o m pa r a t iv e  P o l it ic s  P e r spe c t iv e
Despite the limited relevance of the mass party model, there is a case for considering the 
nature of party organisation and party system change in the light of West European 
experience and theory. On West European party organisation, Mair concludes that, 
“[l]ike previous party types, the cartel party implies a particular conception of 
democracy; moreover, also like previous party types, it stimulates further reactions and 
sows the seeds for yet further evolution.”12 The same is no doubt true as far as the new 
East Central European parties are concerned, there is little or no reason to suspect that 
the development of these parties will be any less dynamic than that of their Western 
brethren. Patterns of party organisation change and adaptation in West European politics 
should thus prove relevant to East Central Europe, and developments in post-communist
11 C. Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case o f ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism?”, West 
European Politics, 7:2 (1984), 99-118.
12 P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), p.74.
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politics may throw some light back on contemporary West European parties.
Before considering the development of West European party organisation, it is worth 
noting that the catch-all and cartel theses do not apply to all parties across the board. As 
Katz & Mair point out, new West European parties do not conform to their model. The 
anti-system (or rather anti-cartel) parties that have appeared since the mid-sixties do not 
share the mass party’s concern with membership, but tend to feature smaller 
membership and more professional activists. Despite their lack of participation in the 
cartels (i.e., government/office), these parties have a lot in common with the cartel party 
ideal-type in terms of organisation. The Scandinavian protest parties, the Progress 
Parties in Norway (FrP) and Denmark (Z) and New Democracy in Sweden (NyD), 
provide the clearest examples. These parties combine anti-system politics and neo­
liberal economics to form ‘new populist’ parties, which “may well represent an 
emergent new party family”.13 The Italian ‘Second Republic’ and post-junta Greece 
provide more complicated examples, which are approaching the cartel-type from a 
different route than the catch-all parties. Forza Italia’s local organisation was modelled 
on AC Milan’s (football) supporters’ clubs and the party is run largely by professional 
staff drafted from industry (including Berlusconi’s marketing agency, Pubitalia).u 
Despite efforts to create mass bases, New Democracy and Pasok have been dominated 
by the central leadership and charismatic leaders, a far cry from Duverger’s mass 
party.15 These parties are top-heavy with very limited party organisation ‘on the 
ground’, and FI only transformed itself into a party officially at the 1998 conference.
A second set of parties refused to follow the catch-all path altogether, focusing on a 
limited section of the electorate and defence of its specific and readily identifiable 
interest. Not all parties emphasise strategic gaols over value goals. “[A] party may be 
reluctant to increase its support through a loosely tied and possibly quite uncommitted
13 P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, West European Politics, 18:1 (1995), 34-51, 
p.47.
14 M. Donovan, “The 1994 Election in Italy: Normalisation or Continuing Exceptionalism?”, West 
European Politics, 17:4(1994), 193-201.
15 M. Spourdalakis, “Securing Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Greece: The Role o f Political Parties”, in
G. Pridham & P.G. Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in 
Southern and Eastern Europe, (London, Routledge, 1996).
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electoral base, and so may prefer the relative security involved in sticking to its 
traditional, albeit more numerically restricted, partisan base.”16 Agrarian and Lutheran 
parties like the Norwegian Sp and KrF or Sweden’s Centre party (C) and KDS more or 
less rejected the catch-all approach, or at least maintained their secure base, capitalising 
on tension related to questions such as EC membership. Although they may nevertheless 
take part in the ‘cartel’, this is done largely as representatives of specific minority 
interests. At least this held until 1997, when the Norwegian KrF (and FrP) challenged 
the Conservatives’ (H) status as the country’s second largest party. The same holds for a 
number of parties representing ethnic minorities. The Swedish People’s Party and the 
(German) Suedtirol Union have limited appeal to most of their respective Finnish and 
Italian electorates.
Th e  F o u r  S t a g e  M o d e l : C o n t in u it y  a n d  Ch a n g e  i n  P a r t y  O r g a n is a  t io n
A four-stage model of party organisation can be extrapolated from the comparative 
West European politics literature, beginning with the emergence of mass parties backed 
by non-parliamentary organisations. The first three stages of this model have dominated 
much of the literature on party systems, and the fourth stage has been proposed by Katz 
& Mair.17 Towards the end of the nineteenth century the emerging mass parties of the 
left challenged the dominant elite-based parties, setting out to provide an explicit link 
between their supporters and the state.18 These ‘wing parties’ of the left, backed by 
organised trade union support, set the scene for inter-war party competition. Though the 
original structures of party organisation may have been driven by circumstances, e.g., 
gradual franchise extension in England after 1832, strategic decisions like the 
Independent Labour Party’s break with the Liberals in 1892 shaped the development of 
the party system.19 Further developments in party organisation after the full extension of
16 K. Dittrich, “Testing the Catch-All Thesis: Some Difficulties and Possibilities”, in Daalder & Mair 
(eds.), Western European Party Systems, p.266.
17 Katz & Mair “Changing Models o f Party Organisation...”.
18 Parties’ changing role as links between state and society is emphasised particularly in Katz & Mair, 
“Changing Models o f Party Organisation...”; and T. Mackie, “Parties and Elections”, in J. Hayward & E. 
C. Page (eds.), Governing the New Europe, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).
19 M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization o f  Political Parties, Vol. I, (New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1902).
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the franchise were more internal to the party system. First the ideological mass party 
and later the de-ideologised catch-all party were hailed as the organisationally superior 
form, giving a party a considerable advantage over its opponents.20 Kirchheimer argues 
that once one major party has adopted the catch-all strategy, there is little its major 
opponent can do but choose a similar approach.21 Panebianco disagrees, relating party 
change primarily to organisational structure and power rather than goal-oriented parties, 
though he concedes that ‘environmental’ factors, such as electoral defeat, can prompt 
organisational change.22 In either case, parties’ organisational adaptation and change 
represent a rational strategy. The goal need not be office-seeking or vote maximisation, 
it can include organisational survival by way of keeping challengers out of the party 
system. Panebianco presents this as an organisational dilemma: pursuit of a single 
rational (policy) goal or responding and adapting to outside pressure.23 Przeworski & 
Sprague’s dilemma for socialist parties is similar: short-term vote maximisation versus 
long term efforts to shape the preferences of the electorate.24
The first stage is the period running up to and including the emergence of mass parties, 
during the period leading up to the adoption of universal male franchise. The established 
elite parties were challenged by emerging mass parties of the left, backed by extra- 
parliamentary labour organisations. The shift from cadre parties to mass parties entailed 
a shift from political competition characterised by theoretical pursuit of the common 
interest to politics based on the collective interest of different social groups.25 This 
required consciousness of collective interest, and its organisation into trade unions, but 
also that the unions be prepared to support socialist political parties.26 The 
organisational development of the old right from loosely organised ‘parties of notables’ 
to mass/catch-all parties only came with franchise extension and the challenge from
20 On the ‘wing-parties’: Duverger, Political Parties, and Epstein, Political Parties in Western 
Democracies', on the catch-all party: Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party 
Systems”.
21 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems”.
22 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.207-214.
23 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.6-9.
24 A. Przeworski & D. Sprague, Paper Stones: A History o f Electoral Socialism, (Chicago, University o f  
Chicago Press, 1986).
25 Mair, Party System Change, p.98.
26 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Chapter Six.
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wing parties of the left (including, in Britain, the Liberal left).27 “The advent of 
externally created mass parties tends toward a radicalization and intensification of the 
competitive process,” and political survival dictated a “snowballing effect in party
* * 9 Qorganisation.
Panebianco rejects the goal-oriented basis of this approach, focusing instead on internal 
developments and the genesis of parties. Party organisation depends on genetic aspects, 
i.e., how the parties originally developed. First, ‘territorial penetration’/4diffusion’ 
relates to whether the party is the product of an alliance of regional groups or a 
centralised organisation penetrating the periphery. Second, the presence or absence of an 
extra-parliamentary sponsoring organisation affects the future development of a party. 
So does the third factor, the role of charismatic leaders. Combined these factors affect 
the extent to which parties develop into strong or weak institutions (institutional 
aspect). In this context strongly institutionalised parties control their external 
environment, while weakly institutional parties are not in a position to do this. 
Institutionalisation is measured in terms of the party’s “autonomy vis-a-vis its 
environment” and “its degree of systemness” ?9 Other aspects of institutionalisation 
include a developed central extra-parliamentary organisation (the central office), 
homogeneity of organisational structures, plurality of sources of finance and 
correspondence between actual and statutory power structures within the party. The 
degree of institutionalisation is linked to the first two genetic aspects, yielding four 
types of parties:
Table 6.1
Type 
Examples 
Genetic factors 
Institutionalisation
Type 1
Communist parties: PCF, PCI 
Penetration + external legitimation 
Strong
Type 2
UK Labour, SFIO, PSI 
Diffusion + external legitimation 
Weak
Type 
Examples 
Genetic factors 
Institutionalisation
Type 3
Centralised: UK Conservatives 
Penetration + internal legitimation 
Strong
Type 4
Federations: CDU
Diffusion + internal legitimation
Weak, with a dominant coalition
27 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization o f Political Parties', Epstein, Political Parties in 
Western Democracies, Chapter Five; R. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (Yale, 
Yale University Press, 1966).
28 J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner, “The Origin and Development o f  Political Parties”, in LaPalombara & 
Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, p.27.
29 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.55.
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The role of charisma is more problematic, leading to a possible fifth type of party. Here 
institutionalisation is associated with a shift of loyalty from the leader to the party, or 
‘objectivisation of charisma’ as in the case of the Gaullist right in France. Though 
charisma inhibits institutionalisation through focus on personality, it is also associated 
with highly centralised parties. This produces a hybrid case, of low ‘systemness’ but 
high autonomy and central control. The point is not that parties do not respond to 
changes in the environment (they do), but rather that their degree of institutionalisation 
affects their responsiveness to exogenous stimuli. This approach has three advantages 
for analysis of East Central Europe. First, it provides a framework for categorising 
parties, and one that can (ostensibly) be linked to their flexibility and responsiveness to 
change. Second, it raises the question of the role of charismatic leaders. Third, it draws 
attention to the organisational difference between new European parties (West and East 
Central) and the old established West European parties.
The second stage followed the adoption of full franchise, and featured the development 
of mass parties of the right during the inter-war and immediate post-war period. This 
stage was dominated by the older parties’ need to respond to the growth of the mass 
parties of the left. The response came by way of efforts to transcend ideological and 
class bases of parties, i.e., a strategy based on developing a cleavage-based party into a 
less ideological mass organisation. Hence the catch-all party, which came in the form of 
conservative and Christian democrat parties. Though it still plays the role of a link 
between voters and the state, the catch-all party is an independent link rather than a 
representative of its electorate to the state. Though it may adopt many of the trappings 
of the mass party, its parliamentary party is considerably more independent. The mass 
base (party on the ground) becomes mainly an organisation supporting the 
parliamentary party (party in public office).
In the same vein, the third stage, catch-all contagion, saw mass parties’ attempts to cope 
with the competition provided by their catch-all opponents. “Conversion to catch-all 
parties constitutes a competitive phenomenon. A party is apt to accommodate to its 
competitor’s successful style because of hope of benefits or fear of losses on election
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day.”30 Again the pace was set by the Germans, as the SPD adopted the Bad Godesberg 
programme abandoning Marxism in 1959, while the British and Dutch Labour parties 
shifted to the left before adopting a more catch-all oriented strategy.31 Other possible 
factors contributing to this development include the fact that the ‘big battles’ of welfare 
state and class were resolved, electoral de-alignment, new issues, and technological 
change driving new campaign styles.32 For Panebianco the shift from ‘bureaucratic-mass 
party’ to ‘electoral-professional’ parties is a matter of de-institutionalisation, which 
threatens the role of political parties in West European politics -  ‘the crisis of parties’.33
Katz & Mair provide the fourth stage, which offers an alternative to the ‘crisis of party’ 
thesis. As membership is stabilised and electoral campaigns have come to rely 
increasingly on the media rather than mass membership, the main parties in West 
European politics have developed into more professional organisations. The process 
started by, and identified with, the catch-all parties thus continues. The parties become 
dependent on the state rather than their membership for resources, including finance and 
access to media. The links between voters and parties are loosened, the parties 
developing into representatives of the state rather than independent links between 
society and the state.34 Like the other stages, however, this is not necessarily a stable 
stage, and Katz & Mair point to challenges from new parties.35 The cartel party is the 
product of a dynamic development, the search for more efficient organisations in the 
battle for votes. Like Kirchheimer’s catch-all party the cartel party is a party which has 
opted for a strategy that plays down the significance of ideology and cleavages.
30 Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, p. 188.
31 PvdA moved leftwards after the 1967 election (but returned in the 1970s), Labour after its 1979 defeat. 
By the 1990s both can be described as catch-all or cartel parties, having adopted some of the most free 
market agendas o f West European social democrat parties. On Dutch data: K. Dittrich, “The Netherlands 
1946-1981”, in I. Budge, D. Robertson & D. Hearl (eds.), Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial 
Analyses o f  Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987).
32 Respectively: Mair, Party System Change, Chapters Two and Five; R. Rose & D. Urwin, “Persistence 
and Change in Westen Party Systems since 1945”, Political Studies, 18:3 (1970), 287-319; R. Inglehart, 
The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, (Princeton 
University Press, 1977); and Panebianco, Political Parties.
33 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.269.
34 Katz & Mair “Changing Models o f Party Organisation...”.
35 Katz & Mair, “Changing Models o f Party Organisation...”.
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However, the challenge which faced politicians in East Central Europe, the new 
Mediterranean democracies in the 1970s and Italy in the early 1990s was how to build a 
new party, not how to change a party in response to electoral success or failure. This is 
not a matter of responding to or anticipating cleavages’ declining salience, but rather a 
matter of attempting to build new parties without the benefit of cleavages or a previous 
mass base. Most South and East Central European parties therefore circumvented this 
multi-step development, reaching straight for the ‘un-aligned’ stage. Their ‘catch-all’ 
type status (in organisational terms) is the product of ‘new populism’ rather than de­
alignment. While the West European catch-all parties were associated with de­
alignment, the conglomerate parties of East Central Europe in 1989-90 drew on un­
aligned electorates. Likewise, the new Mediterranean parties in the 1970s were not the 
products of a gradual process of de-alignment, but rather of the extent to which old 
alignments could be invoked. The question was whether this was possible, and the 
degree of stability that could be expected.36 The parties that emerged from the 
conglomerate movements by and large followed the same pattern, developing around 
the leadership and central office rather than external mass organisations or social 
cleavages.
F o u r  I d e a l  T y p e s  o f  P a r t y  O r g a n is a  t io n
The West European politics four-stage model and its exceptions suggest a possible four­
fold typology of East Central European, and new West European, parties. Parties that 
have arrived on the scene since the 1960’s have by and large fallen into Panebianco’s 
third category (territorial penetration and internal legitimation) or been ‘charismatic 
parties’. Bearing in mind that some interest-based parties that have preserved a regional 
or sectional basis, four ‘ideal-type’ parties are suggested for East Central European 
politics and late Twentieth Century West European politics. Given the importance of 
party strategy as the driver of party change in Western Europe, this schema is based 
only partly on origin and background and partly on the aims and aspiration of the new 
parties.
36 A point made by G. Smith as early as 1991. “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, was delivered as a 
lecture at the School o f Slavonic and East European Studies, University o f London, spring 1991. Similar
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• Former mass party (reform-communist). Some parties feature a mass-base dating 
from the previous regime, even if this may be reduced by defections. This provides a 
basis for transformation to catch-all and/or cartel status, at least over time. Though 
the party could have roots of any of the four types in table 6.1, type 1 featuring 
external legitimation (USSR, military) and penetration has been most common. 
Charisma is another possible basis for such parties.
• Interest based and historical parties. Parties based on minority interests have been 
common to East Central European politics, mainly in the form of agrarian parties and 
ethnic minorities. Both include considerable potential for populist appeal, but target a 
specific section of the electorate. Inasmuch as historical parties attempt to recapture 
their old bases these should probably be included here.
• New cartel parties (bom in government). Several of the new East Central European 
parties were formed as successors to a governing conglomerate party (Solidarity, OF, 
VPN). Smith’s ‘evolutionary leap’ appears to have been facilitated by their role as 
governing parties, and was not so much straight to catch-all as straight to cartel. The 
big question is, of course, the extent to which they actually form a cartel. Though 
they may be organised like ‘cartel parties’, party competition has been less cartel-like 
(this is the subject of Chapter Eight).
• New populist parties (protest). This term is borrowed from Taggart, who uses it to 
distinguish between neo-fascist parties and new populist parties that rely on anti­
system appeals.37 These are “characterised by strongly centralised stmctures with 
charismatic and personalised leadership”. If the West European protest parties rally 
against the post-war welfare state consensus, their East Central European 
counterparts have inherited opposition to the ‘Western’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ (‘un- 
Ruritanian’) free market from their inter-war ‘old populist’ predecessors. However, 
the term covers a wider set of parties, including HzDS and Forza Italia, parties that
questions were asked in the context o f the Spanish transition, Caciagli, “Spain: Parties and the Party 
System in Transition”.
37 Taggart lists 12 new populist parties, with a mean best result o f  7.4%, and 12 neo-fascist parties (mean 
2.2%), “New Populist Parties in Westen Europe”, p.45.
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combine populism and protests (against the Czech-dominated government and the 
old corrupt regime respectively) with spells in office.
It is tempting to add a fifth group, or type, particularly in the light of the ‘electoral 
parties’ in Poland.38 However, the SLD and WAK are/were dominated by the SdRP and 
the ZChN respectively, and though the BBWR was a special case it hardly merits a new 
category. Better to recognise that not all parties fall neatly into the ‘ideal types’. The 
BBWR featured a ‘charismatic’ element inasmuch as it was set up to support Walesa, 
and included a ‘new populist’ appeal against the UW liberal right (i.e., ‘protest’) despite 
being set up to support the incumbent. It therefore mixes elements of at least two ‘ideal 
types’, and whether it originally leant towards ‘new populism’ or aspired to 
‘government party’ status, it is indisputably leadership dominated. Something similar 
holds for the AWS, the broad electoral alliance designed to oust the SLD -  PSL 
government, though without the same charismatic element.
P o st -C o m m u n ist  Pa r t y  O r g a n isa t io n  a n d  St r u c t u r e :
F o u r  Id e a l  T y pe s
The problem facing the new parties in the Mediterranean and East Central European 
states was that there is precious little material from which to build the new party 
organisations. Only the former communist parties (or their satellites) could opt for 
something like a multi-step catch-all approach, and given the negative connotations of 
‘socialism’ and the ‘left’ these parties were severely handicapped in 1989-90. Other 
parties had three options: i) attempt to build a mass base, ii) opt for the ‘catch-all’ or 
‘cartel’ strategy without the benefit of a former mass base, iii) or pursue the ‘new 
populist’ strategy of the West European ‘new parties’. All strategies were attempted, 
some with more success than others.
38 S. Gebethner, “Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland”, in Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and 
Organisation in East Central Europe.
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Prima facie , an application of Panebianco’s schema would suggest strong 
institutionalisation in East Central Europe, because most parties feature territorial 
penetration and very limited support from external organisations. Only charismatic 
leadership could limit this, and Panebianco argues that it can be associated with strong 
as well as weak institutionalisation. It is tempting, therefore, to suggest that the post­
communist parties’ institutional weakness can be explained by the role of charismatic 
leaders and/or the strength of external supporting organisations. The weak 
institutionalisation of the post-Solidarity parties can thus be explained by “the historical 
legacy of Solidarity and the unique role it played as an established social movement.”39 
The problem is that Solidarity was anything but a trade union in the classic sense, but 
rather an opposition movement playing a role comparable to that of Civic Forum/VPN 
in Czechoslovakia. The fact that the Solidarity Trade Union organised separately and 
contested 1991 and 1993 elections merely reinforces the point: the Solidarity ‘old 
opposition’ disintegrated, it did not represent an external force directing the post- 
Solidarity parties or the Mazowiecki government. An amorphous movement throughout 
the 1980s, Solidarity fragmented into more than thirty parties. The reliance on social 
unity as part of its political strategy against communism gave it an ‘anti-party legacy’ 
that made it a poor basis for party organisation (though it was but useful vehicle for 
endorsing candidates in local elections).40 Though the PC made an effort to use its 
electoral machinery (the Civic Committees) in the 1991 election, it split and 
disintegrated after Olszewski left to form the RdR the next year.41 Even the trade 
union’s parliamentary deputies disavowed politics in favour of focusing on workers 
rights, and the local Solidarity networks’ disparate reactions to its no confidence motion 
against Suchocka illustrated the extent to which the social movement had fragmented.42
Panebianco’s schema is primarily a comparison of West European mass parties, and it is 
far more difficult to apply to East Central or new West European parties. Even as far as
39 P. G. Lewis, “Democratization and Party Development in Eastern Europe”, Party Politics, 1:3 (1994), 
391-405, p.401.
40 P. G. Lewis, “Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-Communist Poland”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 46:5 (1994), 779-799; M. Marody, “Three Stages o f Party System Emergence in 
Poland”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28:2, 263-270.
41 K. Jasiewicz, “Polish Politics on the eve o f the 1993 Elections: Toward Fragmentation or Pluralism?”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 26:4 (1993), 387-411.
42 L. Vinton, “Walesa Applies Political Shock Therapy”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:24 (11 June 1993).
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the West European mass parties are concerned the suggestion that de-institutionalisation 
heralded a ‘crisis of parties’ is dubious. With hindsight, the transition from mass to 
catch-all or cartel parties has hardly led to a decline of parties in general, or even to ‘de- 
institutionalisation’.43 The notion of institutionalisation should be de-coupled from the 
mass party since there is no clear link between mass-membership and 
institutionalisation. Parties that are ‘weak’ in terms of the development of a mass base 
or the ‘party on the ground’ may still be strong in terms of centralisation and control 
over the environment. Nevertheless, Panebianco’s argument suggests that more than one 
path is open to post-communist parties, and draws attention to the potential role of 
charismatic leaders and the importance of strategic decisions about party organisation. 
Four strategies correspond to the four ideal-types above.
First, the reform communist strategy appears to have paid off inasmuch as the reformed 
socialist parties came to power in Poland and Hungary in 1993 and 1994, and in Italy in 
1996. Though the previous chapter concluded that this should be interpreted in terms of 
anti-incumbency voting rather than a resurgence of the left, the ex-regime parties 
enjoyed some advantages despite their association with the former regimes. They 
inherited property, resources and mass membership (even if it contracted severely), as 
well as experience and established party structures. There are clear parallels between the 
resilience of the parties of the left in East Central Europe and the success of their Italian 
counterpart (PDS) in the 1995 regional and the 1996 national elections. At the time, the 
Italian press put this down to the PDS’ advantage in retaining strong regional 
organisations.
A second strategy involves attempting to build a mass base by way of setting up parties 
based on historical cleavages. While West European Christian Democratic parties 
mobilised around a religious catch-all strategy, several of their East Central European 
counterparts tried to do very much the same, substituting (ethnic) nationalism for 
religion. A variation on this theme can be found in the peasant parties, combining a 
cleavage base with populist appeal (this includes the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia, as Czech agriculture was ‘industrialised’ under communism). West European
43 Katz & Mair, “Changing Models o f Party Organisation...”.
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agrarian parties’ experience indicates that this secure basis can be defended. However, 
the Greek parties illustrate the possible problems of creating new mass parties.
Third, the conglomerate parties’ successors in Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted 
Smith’s evolutionary leap, opting for catch-all status without previous alignment (other 
than broad opposition to communism). The ‘liberal’ parties rejected appeal based on 
cleavages, choosing to focus on the ‘return to Europe’ and introduction of a free market 
economy. To the extent that these parties rejected organisation and mobilisation based 
on social cleavages they resemble West European cartel parties more than anything else. 
It is perhaps no accident that these parties developed as the government parties, and that 
their fortunes were inextricably linked to their governments’ performance.44 The 
similarity to the new Spanish parties’ strategy suggests that this is a category of ‘new 
parties’ which should be added to West European party organisations. They may reach 
‘cartel’ status, but by a new route.
A final option follows the path marked out by West European ‘new populist’ parties, 
organised around the twin principles of populism and ‘new politics’.45 This combines a 
broad anti-elite appeal to the people (or rather the nation) and rejection of mainstream 
left -  right competition. Though the ‘third way’ between socialism and capitalism might 
be lost (or revealed as a fraud), ‘new populism’ suggests a ‘superior way’ based on 
national consensus.46 The potential danger of the ‘new populist’ strategy lies in the 
burden of government. It is considerably easier to criticise a government than to run 
one, and until 1994 no West European ‘new populist’ party had been involved in 
running a government.47 Berlusconi’s eight months in power illustrated the point, the 
coalition disintegrated and lost the subsequent elections (regional in 1995 and national 
in 1996).
44 This explains the difficulties faced by the liberal parties in Poland compared with the Czech Republic. 
See previous chapter.
45 Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”.
46 Not to be confused with Blair’s ‘Third Way’ that combines pragmatic elements o f centre-left and 
centre-right ideology for Britain’s New Labour.
47 Fianna Fail could arguably be counted as a ‘new populist’, or at least a populist, party. If so, it is the 
only one in Western Europe to consolidate its governing position. Given its nationalist approach to state- 
building, this may hold a valuable lesson for Meciar.
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COMPARA TIVE PARTY ORGAN IS A T10N IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
Despite the different strategies open to the emerging political parties in terms of party 
organisation and mobilisation of voters, parties across the political spectrum share much 
in terms of party organisation. In fact, most of the new post-communist parties have 
adopted internal structures that resemble those of the communist and satellite parties: a 
party congress meeting on a regular basis that elects or appoints an executive council or 
central committee, which in turn appoints or elects a presidium or executive office.48 
The former is either elected by the congress or made up of representatives of central, 
parliamentary, local or regional party branches; the latter frequently includes 
professional party ‘technocrats’ as well.
Figure 6.1
Executive Council 
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or National 
Committee
Elects/appoints
Executive Office/ 
Committee or 
Presidium
Elects
Elects/
Approves
National/Party Congress
MPs
or Elect
Day-to-day
Co-ordination
Parliamentary 
Party 
+ its
leadership
Local or regional party bodies, often featuring a similar internal structure
Three points should be noted about figure 6.1. First, not all parties’ congresses elect the 
‘national committee’ or its equivalent. Particularly in Hungary, it tends to consist of 
representatives of local branches, the executive committee and the parliamentary party 
(MDF, MSzP, FKgP, Fidesz). In SzDSz’s case it includes members elected by the 
congress as well.49 In Poland it includes the party’s MPs (deputies and senators).50
48 Lomax makes this point explicitly for Hungary, but it also applies elsewhere. B. Lomax, “The Structure 
and Organisation o f Hungary’s Political Parties”, in Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organisation in 
East Central Europe.
49 Lomax, “The Structure and Organisation o f Hungary’s Political Parties”.
50 Gebethner, “Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland”, p. 131.
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Second, most parties feature formal or informal presidia or inner groups within the 
‘executive committee’. Finally, with the exception of the former communist and satellite 
parties, the parties tend to be weak at the local level.51 Though Solidarity support for 
local candidates proved successful in local elections, this was at the expense of the 
political parties.52
Remaining at the general level, a series of features make the East Central European 
parties increasingly resemble the cartel parties of the West, despite Lewis’ suggestion 
that “it is difficult, for example, to see parties in East-Central Europe forming anything 
like the kind of cartel envisaged by Katz and Mair.”53 Due to the persistence of anti­
incumbency voting, most of the parliamentary parties in the four cases had enjoyed a 
spell in office by late 1994, with the notable exceptions of the CSSD and Fidesz, which 
were in office by 1998.
• In terms of finance, the parties rely on state funding to a considerable degree. As a 
share of total funding state subsidies usually account for more than half, much like 
the current state of affairs in West European politics.54
• In all the parties concerned the executive party office plays the main day to day role, 
again conforming to West European norms. The same, to a considerable extent, 
holds true for electoral campaigns.
• In most, but not all cases, parliamentary candidates are chosen by regional or local 
branches, sometimes subject to approval from central office. The most notable
51 A. Kroupa & T. Kostelecky, “Party Organization and Structure at National and Local level in the Czech 
Republic Since 1989”, in Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organisation in East Central Europe, p. 102- 
104.
52 Lewis, “Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-Communist Poland”.
53 P.G. Lewis, “Introduction and Theoretical Overview”, in Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organisation 
in East Central Europe, p. 13-14.
54 A. Korosenyi, “Das Parteiensystem Ungams”, S. Szomoolanyi & G. Meseznikov, “Das Parteiensystem 
der Slowakei”, and K. Vodicka, “Das Parteiensystem Tschechiens”, all in D. Segert, R. Stoss & O. 
Niedemayer (eds.), Parteiensysteme in Postkommunistischen Gesellschaften Europas, (Opladen, 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997); P. Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State”, in Katz & 
Mair (eds.), How Parties Organise, p.9-10.
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exceptions to this model are the Polish ‘electoral parties’, i.e., shells formed around a 
series of parties to contest elections (WAK) or to support a specific goal (BBWR).
• Mass membership is most conspicuous by its absence. As table 6.2 illustrates, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic are near average Western levels for the 1980s, 
while Poland and Hungary have little mass membership to speak of. Compared with 
1960s levels, even the Czech Republic’s score is low. The relatively high Czech 
score can be explained by the KSCM’s 222,000-strong membership, an adjusted 
Czech score would be at 5.0%.
Table 6.2 Total party membership as % of electorate, 1960s figures in parentheses.
State % State % State %
Poland 1.4 Slovakia 4.7 Italy 9.7 (12.7)
Hungary 2.7 Ireland 5.3 (n.a.) Finland 12.9 (18.9)
Netherlands 2.9 (9.4) Denmark 6.5 (21.1) Norway 13.5 (15.5)
UK 3.3 (9.4) Czech Republic 7.4 Sweden 21.2 (22.0)
Germany 4.2 (2.7) Belgium 9.2 (7.8) Austria 21.8 (26.2)
Source: West European data (late 1980s) from P. Mair & R.S. Katz (eds.) Party Organizations: A Data 
Handbook on Party Organisation in Western Democracies (London, Sage, 1992), cited in P. Mair, 
“Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State”, in R. S. Katz & P. Mair (eds.), How 
Parties Organise: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 
(London, Sage, 1994), p.5.
1995-96 East Central European data calculated by the author, based on D. Segert & R. Stoss, 
“Entstehung, Struktur und Entwicklung von Parteiensystemen in Osteuropa nach 1989 - Enie 
Bilanz”, in D. Segert, R. Stoss, O. Niedemayer (eds.), Parteiensysteme in Postkommunistischen 
Gesellschaften Europas, (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997) and population data from 
UNECE, http://www.unece.org/stats/trend, and WHO, World Health Statistics 1995, (Geneva, 
WHO, 1996).
Within this comparative framework the key questions relate to the degree of 
independence enjoyed by the central executive office, the relationship between the 
parliamentary party and the party organisation and the extent to which top posts are held 
by one or more persons. Despite the similarities in organisation and structure, there is 
considerable room for variation here.
• The degree of independence of the party leadership depends on several factors, 
including personality and charisma as well as formal party rules concerning election 
of leaders and their formal powers.
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• The independence of the parliamentary party tends to be considerable, largely due to 
so many parties being bom in parliament or at the negotiating table during the fall of 
communism. Division between party and parliamentary leadership haunted the FKgP 
and KDNP to the point of extinction.
• Concentration of leadership power depends on ‘separation of power’ within and 
between national and executive committees, the number of leadership posts and 
whether they are held by a single individual. This varies considerably, from parties 
normally identified with one individual (Meciar’s HzDS) to those that will not even 
name their PM designate during an electoral campaign (MSzP).
The case studies below are arranged according to the four ideal-types suggested above. 
This by no means represents an attempt to cover all parties of the region, but rather an 
effort to test the hypothesis that post-communist parties are leadership dominated and 
tend not to focus on a mass base. Former communist parties should show a greater 
propensity for mass membership than their opponents, and new cartel and new populist 
parties the least. Electoral alliances without much basis in party organisation (BBWR, 
Ojczyzna, WAK) are not considered here. They are not just leadership dominated -  they 
are the leadership. Likewise, the AWS is not a political party in terms of organisation, 
but an electoral alliance made up of several parties. Its deputies do not sit as a united 
bloc in the Sejm, let alone present united bloc support for the AWS -  UW government.
Ca s e  1. R e f o r m  C o m m u n is t  Ca  tch -A l l : SLD a n d  M SzP
The SLD and the MSzP represent the closest post-communist East Central Europe 
comes to catch-all parties in West European politics. Like the Italian PDS, the two 
inherited an organisational basis when the old communist party split and the reform 
communists took over the party structure and resources. Though membership was 
reduced in the two East Central European cases, it remained far higher than that of their 
competitors. Like the PDS, both parties were able to exploit their organisational
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advantage against the ‘first’ governments, in the context of these governments’ 
perceived failures. All three have transformed successfully to catch-all, if not cartel, 
status. With 60,000 and 40,000 members respectively the SdRP (the main component of 
the SLD) and the MSzP are large by East Central European standards, second only to 
the peasant parties. In terms of party finance, they are less dependent on state subsidies 
than their competitors. For example, by 1992 figures the MSzP was the only Hungarian 
parliamentary party to receive less than 50% of its funding from the state (33.6%).55
Both parties fit the model set out in figure 6.1, with a party congress electing the two 
superior organs, a National Committee and a National Executive in the Hungarian case 
and a Supreme Council’s Presidium and a Central Executive Committee in the SdRP’s 
case. Though the SLD is a coalition of 28 groups the SdRP’s role is so dominant as to 
make the leadership virtually identical: the chairman of the SLD parliamentary club is 
the leader of the SdRP.56 In both the Polish and Hungarian cases the parliamentary party 
and the central office are integrated. MPs are represented in both the parties’ higher 
organs, and the overlap in leadership between the SdRP and SLD provides a similar 
link. The leadership’s de facto power is considerable in both cases, as illustrated by their 
running tight economic programmes despite scepticism within the party, leading to 
some internal conflicts (see Chapter Eight). Though the MSzP is comparatively well 
structured by East Central European standards, one member of its Executive Committee 
said it was unprepared for government in 1994 because “the party’s internal integration 
was not satisfactory.”57 However, within a year of his inauguration, prime minister Horn 
was being criticised by his own party executive for acting too much without 
consultation, particularly over his dismissal of trade and industry minister Pal in June 
1995.58 Nevertheless, neither party relies on a single charismatic leader. The MSzP took 
this approach to the extreme, refusing to name its candidate for prime minister in the 
1994 electoral campaign, and the uncertainty concerning both prime ministerial and 
presidential candidates within the SLD during the 1993-97 Sejm indicates a similar 
reluctance to focus on one leader. The contrast to Klaus’ role in the ODS or Antall’s in
55 Korosenyi, “Das Parteiensystem Ungams”.
56 Gebethner, “Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland”, p. 131.
57 J. Geczi, interviewed in Magyar Nemzet, in Hungarian, 5 October 1994 (SWB, 07/10/94).
58 MSzP National Council Vice President Csintalan, cited in The Hungary Report, No. 1.14, July 3 1995.
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the MDF is telling. The MSzP leaves selection of parliamentary candidates up to the 
local party branches, though the national list is drawn up by the party central offices 
(and approved by congress). Finally, the two parties have proved resistant to trade union 
demands. In both cases efforts have been made to influence economic policy in a less 
radical free market direction, but with limited success. Though the parties may be linked 
to their respective trade unions, their freedom of action is hardly limited by this 
association.
The CSSD provides a contrast to the Polish and Hungarian parties, a social democrat 
party without mass membership (ca. 12,000) but with considerable electoral success. 
The CSSD, like the Hungarian and Polish left, benefited from the anti-incumbency 
factor, but the ODS-led coalition proved a far stronger adversary than the Polish and 
Hungarian coalitions. Moreover, “the remarkable increase in popularity of the CzSDP 
[CSSD], and its subsequent stabilization, was probably brought about by the change in 
leadership to Milos Zeman, a charismatic leader who inspired greater confidence than 
his predecessor.”59 However, by 1997 a conflict between Zeman and his First Deputy 
Chairman, Machovec, had developed, centred on the party’s electoral strategy but 
including Machovec criticising Zeman’s “authoritarian” leadership.60 In the Czech 
Republic the mass CP membership remained with the KSCM (222,000, down from over 
lm  in 1989).
Compared with most other post-communist parties the reform communist parties appear 
the least leader-oriented. Yet the leadership (if not the leader) remains dominant vis-a- 
vis the rest of the party, as evident in struggles over economic policy. The Bekesi- 
Bokross continuity in Hungarian economic policy illustrates the point, and Medgessy 
continued their programme, albeit in a somewhat more relaxed way. This moderate 
leadership domination and the ffee-market approach to economics bears close 
resemblance to the character of D’Alema’s PDS in Italy, not to mention Blair’s New 
Labour. The MSzP and SLD indicate the catch-all strategy’s potential for success
59 Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East Central Europe”, p.522; see also Vodicka, “Das 
Parteiensystem Tschechiens”, p. 119.
60 This is CTK’s indirect quote, CTK, 11 March 1997.
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inasmuch as they benefited from broad anti-government voting and did not enjoy 
support from an electorate that can be pinned down geographically or sectorally.61 The 
key obstacle was putting sufficient distance between the party and its communist 
predecessor, an obstacle both parties overcame during the first parliaments. The parties 
are close to the West European cartel model, having reached this stage by rejecting old 
ideology and by ‘modernising’, even if the changes within the PSL, MSzP and PDS 
were so radical as to represent a new path to cartel status (perhaps a ‘reform communist’ 
path).
Ca s e  2 . P e a s a n t  a n d  H is t o r ic a l  P a r t i e s : FKgP a n d  PSL -  f r o m  I n t e r e s t  P a r t y  
t o  Ca t c h -A l l ?
The PSL and the FKgP are the largest parties in their respective states according to 
membership figures, with estimates up to 250,000 and 60,000 members respectively. 
Both feature clear regional patterns of voting, as did the 30,000-strong KNDP which 
was stronger where the FKgP was weaker. They provide the second possible ‘real’ 
catch-all development inasmuch as they develop from (supposedly) interest-based 
parties towards catch-all parties. In the PSL’s case, the background includes satellite 
status under communism, which helps account for its large membership. All three 
(KDNP included) attempt to employ populist appeal to mobilise a broader electorate, 
with some degree of success (not in the KDNP’s case in 1998). In the peasant parties’ 
case, this involves a marriage of agrarian interests (modem agrarian politics) and 
populist appeal (traditional East European populism). The Norwegian Sp did something 
similar with considerable short-term success in the 1993 election, where it capitalised on 
anti-EU sentiment to become the second largest party in parliament. Its support has 
since declined back to close to normal levels.
The peasant parties of post-communist East Central Europe fall somewhere between 
Urwin’s two ideal-type peasant parties. Whereas Westem-type agrarian parties “were 
concerned more with defending agrarian economic interests within a market economy,” 
the peasant populist parties of inter-war Eastern Europe were “more prone to espouse at
61 Ziemer, “Das Partiensystem Polens”, in Segert, Stoss, Niedemayer (eds.), Parteiensysteme in
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least superficially peasantist doctrines, and appeared more concerned with preventing 
the contamination of rural areas by the market economy.”62 To be sure, most peasant 
parties straddle the two ideal types. The Norwegian Sp remains primarily a party 
defending agrarian economic interests, but it ventured into populist mobilisation centred 
on opposition to European integration in the 1993 election, thus indicating the attraction 
of using populist appeal to go beyond interest-based appeal as long as this does not 
compromise the original ideology. In this sense the peasantist parties may have an 
advantage in the quest for a greater share of the electorate, inasmuch as they can develop 
beyond their sectoral interest. Like their West European cousins, the peasant parties 
have seen reasonable success rate in terms of regional and/or sectoral mobilisation. The 
FKgP and KDNP found considerable support in rural Hungary, and both are to some 
extent regionally based parties. Their fortunes in 1990 reflected the regional distribution 
of their predecessors’ votes in 1947.63
The peasant parties differ somewhat from the organisational norm in East Central 
Europe, because they are more centralised. The PSL’s National Council is elected by the 
Congress, and, like other Polish parties, MPs participate on the Council. The FKgP 
features a more complex organisation, with the Grand Committee replacing the 
Congress as the main elector of higher offices. As figure 6.2 illustrates, considerable 
power flows from the President and the National Executive, represented in full on the 
National Leadership and the Grand Committee. No power flows from the Congress, 
though some flows from local and regional organisations as they elect a minority on 
each of the leadership bodies. Lomax contrasts the FKgP and the KDNP, the least and 
most democratic of the Hungarian right wing parties.64 The KDNP followed the standard 
model, the Congress electing the National Committee, which in turn elected the 
executive. The KDNP’s abnormality lay in its Executive Committee, a body composed 
of the Executive and representatives of MPs and local party organisations which
Postkommunistischen Gesellschaften Europas, p.62.
62 D. W. Urwin, “From Ploughshare to the Ballot Box: The Politics o f Agrarian Defence in Europe”, 
(Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1980), p. 206.
63 Korosenyi, “Revival o f the Past or a New Beginning? The Nature o f Post-communist Politics”, in A. 
Boz6ki, A. Korosenyi, & G. Schopflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in 
Hungary, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1992).
64 Lomax, “The Structure and Organisation o f Hungary’s Political Parties”, p.35.
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oversaw the Executive’s work, thus limiting the centralising tendency. However, this 
did not save the party from an extinction-level split.
Figure 6.2 The FKgP. Arrows represent election or representation.
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Though all three parties are thus firmly leadership directed, two of them have seen 
serious conflicts between top leaders. The FKgP split over Torgyan’s withdrawal of 
support for the Antall government in October 1991, whereupon he concentrated power 
in his own hands by strengthening the party presidency only six months after he had 
been elected to the position (June 1991).65 In the KPND’s case, the internal crisis came 
in 1997, following parliamentary group leader Isepy’s successful legal challenge to the 
December 1996 leadership election.66 After winning the leadership election, Giczy 
attempted dissolution of the parliamentary faction over its refusal to follow central party 
office instructions, thereby precipitating the split in the party and its demise in the 1998 
election. Isepy took half the parliamentary group into Fidesz and Surjan (leader of the 
breakaway Christian Democratic Alliance) ran on a Fidesz ticket.67
65 B. Lomax, “Factions and Factionalism in Hungary’s New Party System”, in Gilespie, Waller & Nieto 
(eds.), Factional Politics and Democratisation.
66 Hungarian Radio, in Hungarian 1300 gmt 28 April 1997 (SWB 30/04/97).
67 Hungarian TV2 satellite service, in Hungarian, 1730 gmt 18 April 1998 (SWB 20/04/98).
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The peasant parties share some of the features of their Western cousins, including a 
sectoral and regional base. Like their West European counterparts, their fortunes are tied 
to alliances, and in the Hungarian and Polish cases the result has been tension within the 
alliances over economic and agrarian policy as well as national and religious questions. 
Like Sp and KrF in Norway, the PSL, FKgP and KNDP have a solid regional and 
occupational base, from which attempts to achieve a populist or moderate catch-all type 
appeal can be launched. But this leaves the parties in a difficult situation, demanding 
concessions of their coalition partners on ‘their’ issues. The strategic choices lie with the 
party leaders, all of whom have been challenged over these decisions. In the KDNP’s 
case, the split proved fatal.
C a s e  3. ‘E v o l u t i o n a r y  L e a p s ’ a n d  ‘N e w  C a r t e l ’ P a r t i e s :  ODS, F i d e s z  a n d  UW .
In contrast to the peasant and former communist parties, the liberal parties’ evolutionary 
leap towards the cartel-type was a ‘forced move’, i.e., the only move that made sense in 
the circumstances. The ideological outlook and strategy is similar to, e.g., the Dutch 
VVD in terms of secular appeal focused on economic questions. The ODS, KLD and 
DU were bom in government, and were thus granted immediate cartel status. Apart from 
their background, there is little to distinguish these parties from West European cartel 
parties. This strategy relies on the parties’ governing role, and links their appeal to 
success in government. The ODS’ success has been linked to successful ‘preference 
shaping’ and economic management, in contrast to the UW parties’ falling support in 
the run-up to the 1993 election (see Chapter Five, above). Membership figures support 
this interpretation of the liberal parties as ‘new cartel’ parties. With 25,000 members 
the ODS was the largest of the three before its 1998 split, followed by the UW’s 18,000 
and Fidesz’ 12,000. Territorial analysis of the 1992 and 1996 elections shows that the 
ODS’ strongholds are in Prague and Central Bohemia, with a solid vote in the rest of the 
republic except South Moravia.68 In both elections its coalition partners compensated for
68 See T. Kostelecky, “Changing Party Allegiances in an Changing Party System: the 1990 and 1992 
Parliamentary Elections in the Czech Republic”, in G. Wightman (ed.), Party Formation in East Central 
Europe, (Aldershot, Hants, Edward Elgar, 1995); and final official results provided by the Election 
Commission, results by district for 1996 (http://www.ios.com:80/~jirim/special/docresut.html).
Does Party Organisation Matter? 222
the low ODS vote in South Moravia, leaving Northern Bohemia as the coalitions’ 
weakest region.69 Fidesz on the other hand, had “the most evenly spread constituency in 
regional terms” in the Hungarian 1990 elections.70
All three parties are dominated by the leadership, though this is a stronger feature in the 
Czech and Hungarian cases where Klaus and Orban run their respective parties than in 
the UW (the product of a merger between the UD and KLD). The ODS is very much a 
one-man party, dominated by Klaus and described by Kopecky as the ‘most 
outstanding’ case in this context.71 Internal criticism of Klaus’ centralisation grew after 
the 1996 elections, and was reflected in the differences between Klaus and deputy 
chairman Zieleniec (though their policy differences went back to the 1994 conference).72 
In contrast to other Czech parties, the ODS Main Office (the executive) consists of party 
employees and is not elected by the Congress.73 Fidesz is similarly dominated by its 
president, Viktor Orban. Its development from a small party featuring collective 
leadership to a centralised organisation led by its president and the National Executive 
has been analysed by Balazs & Enyedi, who suggest that the “recent [1994] electoral 
defeat could be interpreted as the result of too rapid rate of organizational reform”, 
including changes in ideology, which alienated activists.74 In other words, given its 
particular youth basis, Fidesz might have moved towards a catch-all stage too fast, and 
in contrast to the UW parties and the ODS, it lacked the resources that come with 
government power. The result has been a party dominated by Orban, particularly since 
Fodor left in 1993. The party is run by a National Executive, elected by the party 
congress, and a National Committee representing regional committees and other party 
organisations, making it similar to the standard post-communist party organisation. The 
UW remains the least centralised of the three parties considered here. The party leader is 
elected by Congress, as is the Political Council. The fact that the party is the product of
69 In N. Bohemia the coalition polled a low 35.8% in 1996, compared with a 44.1% national vote and 
near or above 40% elsewhere (second lowest was N. Moravia, 39.2%).
70 Korosenyi, “Revival o f the Past or a New Beginning?”, p. 125.
71 Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East Central Europe”, p.528-529.
72 CTK, 11 September 1996.
73 Kroupa & Kostelecky, “Party Organization and Structure at National and Local Level in the Czech 
Republic Since 1989”.
74 M. Balasz & Z. Enyedi, “Hungarian Case Studies: the Alliance o f Free Democrats and the Alliance of 
Young Democrats”, in Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organisation in East Central Europe, p.65.
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a KLD -  UW merger contributed to limited centralism, and with 27 representatives on 
the 100-strong council the KLD was somewhat over-represented after the merger.
In short, the liberal parties have adopted a straight-to-cartel strategy, which given their 
conditions appears to be a ‘forced move’. These parties feature limited membership, 
relatively concentrated leadership, and rely on access to the state and state funding. The 
leadership enjoys considerable freedom. Of the three, the ODS clearly took greatest 
advantage of its government position, while the choice of shock therapy and the 
presence of a strong president removed this option for the UD and KLD. Fidesz had no 
such option at all, but represented the most credible and popular alternative in 1993, 
only to face disappointment in the 1994 elections and a reversal to success four years 
later. The transition to cartel party by way of Smith’s evolutionary leap appears not only 
to have been possible, but also to have been profitable in the medium-to-long term.
Ca s e  4. N e w  P o p u l is m : M DF a n d  HZDS
In contrast to the peasant parties’ ‘old populism’, the MDF and the HzDS have adopted 
what can be described as a modem ‘New Populist’ approach to politics. They fit 
Taggart’s characteristics to a large extent, claiming to speak for all of society or to 
represent the entire nation, and using anti-system appeal. The parties’ appeal and 
organisation are neither local nor based on one of Lispet & Rokkan’s four cleavages, but 
rather centred on questions of state-building (and by extension, nationalism). However, 
the anti-system element HzDS’ appeal included opposition to Czech-driven rapid 
economic reform. The ‘new populists’ of East Central Europe tend to oppose neo-liberal 
economics, a fact Schopflin explains through their ‘under-developed conservatism’.75 
The result differs little from Taggart’s West European new populist parties, which are 
“very centralised and [set] great store in the leadership which is both personalised and 
charismatic.”76
75 G. Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), p.292-299.
76 Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, p.40.
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While the HzDS corresponds closely to the new populist ideal type, the MDF is more of 
a hybrid party. Nevertheless, both parties share elements of new populism. Moreover, 
like Forza Italia, they have both earned spells in government, a development that is 
bound to affect the party. Both are limited in terms of membership, at 34,000 and 
40,000 respectively, though this is above their countries’ averages. They score near the 
average in terms of party finance, relying on state subsidies for 65% and 60% 
respectively in 1992/93.77 During the run-up to the ‘velvet divorce’, the HzDS 
emphasised Slovak sovereignty and economic transition subject to Slovak national 
interest, and confirmed its new populist stance by stressing its organisational nature as a 
‘movement’ and Meciar’s role as a charismatic leader.78 Until his death in December 
1993 Antall played a similar role in the MDF, the party focusing on medium-pace 
economic transition and Hungarian national identity. Yet the two parties have little in 
common in terms of genesis, where the HzDS’s mixture of reform communists and 
nationally oriented “parteilosen” (‘the ones without party’) differs from the MDF’s 
‘anachronistic conservatism’ (family, nation, religion).79 Their similarity lies in 
organisation, political appeal and reliance on charismatic leadership, which adds up to 
weakly institutionalised parties in Panebianco’s terms.
Like other Slovak parties, the HzDS features a Congress and its council, which selects 
the Executive Council. However, formal party organisation is secondary to personal 
loyalty expressed through clientelistic networks within the party, leading to a highly 
centralised party where regional and local organisations take instructions from the
centre, e.g., on candidate selection.80 Internal party tension has been manifest in factions,
and these usually lead to expulsion or defection of the dissidents. R. Kovac and 
Moravcik left in early 1993, soon to be followed by another ten MPs who refused to 
sign a declaration of loyalty. Further loss of MPs precipitated the collapse of Meciar’s 
government in March 1994. Gaulieder’s defection in November 1996 led to his
77 Korosenyi, “Das parteiensystem Ungams”, and Szomolanyi & Meseznikov, “Das Parteiensystem der 
Slovakei”, p. 169 and 155, 1993 and 1992 figures, respectively.
78 M. A. Hatschikan, “Von der ‘sanften Revolution’ zur ‘sanften Scheidung’: Politik, Parteien und die 
Wahlen in der CSFR 1989 -  1992”, in M. A. Hatschikan & P. R. Weilermann (eds.), Parteienlanschaften 
in Osteuropa: Politik, Parteien and Transformation in Ungarn, Polen, der Tschecho-Slowakei und 
Bulgarien 1 9 8 9 -  1992, (Paderbom, Schoningh, 1994).
79 Szomolanyi & Meseznikov, “Das Parteiensystem der Slowakei”.
80 Szomolanyi & Meseznikov, “Das Parteiensystem der Slowakei”, p. 150.
Does Party Organisation Matter? 225
expulsion from Parliament. The expulsion was later declared unconstitutional, but to no 
effect.81 This suggests that within the ‘new populist’ parties, ‘exit’ is a more feasible 
option than ‘voice’. The MDF has earned a characterisation as the most hierarchical of 
the three main Hungarian parties.82 Centralisation is manifest in the party’s executive 
committee (National Executive), whose members are also members of the National 
Committee. This body, in turn, has no independent chairman, in contrast to, e.g., the 
SzDSz’ two executive bodies which have no overlapping membership.83 Nevertheless, 
the MDF contained three broad currents, usually identified as populist, conservative and 
Christian national.84 Though Antall steered the party towards the conservative strand, 
intra-party debates over the future of the party continued, based as much on personality 
and ‘milieu’ as on policy. Like the HzDS, its factions have exercised the ‘exit’ option, 
first with the departure of Csurka’s section in 1993, and three years later with the 
formation of the MNDP. In the latter case, new MDF Chairman Lezsak emphasised 
personal conflicts with Szabo as well as political differences.85
New Populism, therefore, constitutes a high-risk strategy, with potentially high rewards 
but leaving the party vulnerable if it governs ‘poorly’. Both parties have lost influential 
MPs to the opposition or in divisions of the party. The parallels between Forza Italia 
and HzDS are far from coincidental. Berlusconi’s support for Meciar in the run-up to the 
1994 election included help with the campaign.86 The HzDS slogan “Slovakia -  go for it 
-  and trust yourself!” is a direct take-off of Berlusconi’s (the football-chant "forza 
Italia ' translates as ‘Italy -  go for it!’).87 Like the FI, both the MDF and HzDS remain 
weakly institutionalised and dominated by the leadership. All three have proved 
vulnerable to challenges from other parties in the same camp or to defections. Though 
the language of catch-all parties is sometimes used, these parties have more in common
81 OMR1 Daily Digest II, No. 215, 6 November 96; RFE/RL Newsline, No. 129, Part II, 1 October 1997.
82 B. Lomax, “The Structure and Organisation o f Hungary’s Political Parties”, in Lewis (ed.), Party 
Structure and Organisation in East Central Europe.
83 Lomax, “The Structure and Organisation o f Hungary’s Political Parties”, p.29.
84 Lomax, “Factions and Factionalism in Hungary’s New Party System”, p. 127-129.
85 Lezsak, Hungarian Radio, Budapest, in Hungarian 1700 gmt 4 March 1996 (SWB 06/03/96).
86 “Campaigning Meciar stars in MFDS pop video”, CTK, in English 1917 gmt 4 Sepember 1994 (SWB 
07/09/94); the report cites Czech tabloid paper Blesk, 02/07/94; G. Schopflin recounted this story, in 
conversation, 1994.
87 HzDS homepage (in English), http://www.hzds.sk/indexE.html, 19/01/98.
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with new populist parties in Western Europe than with the de-aligned (and strongly 
institutionalised) catch-all parties.
H y b r id s
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), established on 8 June 1996, in anticipation of the 
1997 parliamentary elections, is a noteworthy hybrid case. Though it qualifies as a 
particular form of a ‘historical party’ (Solidarity Trade Union has 50% + 1 vote), the 
AWS also has much in common with the new populists. It represents one of the few 
successful attempts to sustain electoral support based on opposition to the communist 
regime, at least in the short term. Invoking the legacy of Solidarity in the 1980s, the 
AWS combines ‘new populism’ with its own brand of historical appeal, namely 
opposition to communism. The development of post-Solidarity parties has been very 
different in the ‘liberal’ and ‘Christian national’ camps. While the former has 
institutionalised to a considerable extent in the form of the UW, the later has remained 
fluid, from the original PC, to the failure of the BBWR in the 1993 elections and the 
success of the AWS four years later. The AWS’ announced intention is to turn into 
political party a la US Republicans or German CDU (which illustrates how little is 
known of Western parties -  ideologically and organisationally).88 Krzaklewski, leader of 
the Solidarity Trade Union, became chairman of the AWS, and is Kwasniewski’s 
prospective challenger for the presidency. On 13 November 1997, AWS filed its 
application to become a political party. However, its parliamentary groups (the plural is 
used advisedly) are less than cohesive, particularly over fiscal policy.
88 “Solidarity Election Action - AWS”, http://www.solidamosc.org/.
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P a r t y  O r g a n is a t io n  a n d  S t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  I t a l ia n  S e c o n d  R e p u b l ic, t h e  I r is h  
F r e e  S ta t e  a n d  P o st -J un ta  Gr e e c e
Three very different West European cases all share the common factor that their parties 
have little or nothing in common with the traditional West European mass parties. The 
party system of the Irish Free State was, at least partly, bom of the Civil War; in post­
junta Greece the new parties drew on their predecessors’ clientelistic practices and 
ideology; and after the collapse of the ‘First Republic’, which under the DC had become 
a ‘dominant democracy’ (or partitocracy), a new ‘Second Republic’ party system 
emerged. In the Irish case, neither Fianna Fail nor Cumann na nGaedheal (after the 1933 
merger with the Centre Party: Fine Gael) adopted the classic West European mass party 
organisation, though a degree of organisational convergence has occurred since, as Fine 
Gael sought mass membership and both parties rely increasingly on professional staff 
and media-oriented campaigns.89 The new Italian and Greek parties, and FF and FG (at 
least until the 1970s), differ considerably from West European mass or catch-all model, 
and are more akin to the new populist party. The Irish system suggests that this may not 
be so ‘new’ after all.
On the left, the PDS (now DS) is a post-communist party. Like its East Central 
European reform communist counterparts, it is less leadership dominated than its rivals 
and much less so than its former self, which makes it one of the few West European 
parties for which the move to catch-all and then cartel type entailed less leadership 
control. The PDS has enjoyed some advantage from its structure as it inherited 
organisational strength (the party on the ground).90 In a deliberate move away from its 
mass and class background the new structure was modelled partly on the German SPD.91 
By contrast, PASOK, despite being “at first the only party apart from the Communists 
to create a well-structured grass-roots organisation,” soon adopted a more populist,
89 D. M. Farrell, “Ireland: Centralization, Professionalization and Competitive Pressures”, in Katz & Mair 
(eds.), How Parties Organise.
90 L. Bardi & L. Morlino, “Italy: Tracing the Roots o f the Great Transformation”, in Katz & Mair (eds.), 
How Parties Organise.
91 G. Pasquino, “Programmatic Renewal and Much More: from the PCI to the PDS”, West European 
Politics, 16:1 (1993), 156-173.
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leadership oriented strategy.92 It therefore represented a hybrid between the mass-party 
and the new populist party, as “[it] aimed to appeal to its followers not as a class but as 
the people or ‘the nation.’”93 On the right, FI and ND come close to the new populist 
ideal type. Both feature a limited party organisation, and focus on populism and national 
identity. In the ND’s case attempts were made to develop a well-organised mass party, 
but Karamanlis decided to rely on personal influence and keep the party a party of 
notables rather than transform it into a catch-all or mass party.94 The same holds for FI, 
which explicitly subordinates the role of the party (and parliament!) to the direct link 
between leader and the electors.95 Its rapidly built-up mass membership has been 
compared to AC Milan’s (football) supporters’ club rather than an activist mass party.96 
An alternative interpretation sees the FI as unique to Italian conditions, a “media- 
mediated personality party” based on post-materialism, de-alignment, political change, 
monopoly media capitalism and “an electoral system which strengthens the 
personalisation tendencies in politics.”97 However, this focus on ‘technical populism’ 
(Berlusconi’s media empire) obscures the similarities between FI and other ‘new 
populist’ parties, whether in Western or East Central Europe. The Greek parties, despite 
initial efforts to adopt mass-structures, fell back on populism and personality-driven 
parties, prompting one observer to comment that “change resides in the translation into 
new forms of some traditional dysfunctional aspects of Greek politics.”98
Despite the debate as to whether Irish politics is exceptional, where Sinnott, Mair, and 
Laver reject the ‘peculiarity’ arguments, there is a considerable degree of consensus on 
the organisational structure of Irish parties.99 Fianna Fail was, at least in the Free State,
92 Y. Papadoupoulos, “Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change”, West 
European Politics, 12:2 (1989), 55-71, p.65.
93 Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece”, p. 111.
94 Lyrintzis, “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece”, p. 106-108.
95 It invokes a model o f democracy “which tends to let democracy come straight in with the election of  
the leader. This does not take away the party's role, but it is subordinate to the requests o f the elector. The 
relationship between the leader and the people modifies the role o f parliament...”, www.Forza-Italia.it.
96 Donovan, “The 1994 Election in Italy”, 193-201.
97 J. Seisselberg, “Conditions of Success and Political Problems o f a ‘Media-Mediated Personality-Party’: 
The Case o f Forza Italia”, in West European Politics, 19:4 (1996), 715-743, p.729.
98 Y. Papadoupoulos, “Parties, the State and society in Greece: Continuity within Change”, West 
European Politics, 12:2 (1989), 55-71, p.68 (emphasis in original).
99 R. Sinnott, “Interpretations of the Irish Party System”, European Journal o f  Political Research, 12:3 
(1984); P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organisation, Ideology and Electoral Competition, 
(London, Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987); M. Laver, “Are Irish Parties Peculiar?”, in J. H. Goldthorpe &
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more akin to a movement than a party. Despite its mass basis and appeal to society’s 
‘have-nots’, “Fianna Fail never sought to emulate the organisational style of social 
democracy.”100 Yet its local base provided for organisational superiority well past the 
life-time of the Free State.101 Despite both parties’ difference from their mainstream 
West European counterparts, FF has been described as a mass party compared to 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s ‘party of notables’.102 Nevertheless, despite decentralising 
forces due to local clientelism and the STV electoral system, both FF and Fine Gael are 
centralised and dominated by parliamentary wings.103 Taggart identifies no new populist 
party in Ireland, but if the British Isles is considered as a whole, FF (and Sinn Fein 
before the split) would qualify under the Free State, being “on the right, anti-system in 
orientation [Anti-UK] and claim to be speaking for the ‘mainstream’ of society”, 
“characterised by strong centralised structures” and dominated by the leadership.104 
‘New populism’ may be less ‘new’ than initially assumed, to the extent that FF and 
FG/CG came close to this ideal type. However, if both started their life closer to the 
‘new populist’ ideal type, their developments in the last two decades suggests that even 
these parties may develop towards the cartel model.
C. T. Whelan (eds.), The Development o f Industrial Society in Ireland, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1992).
100 Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, p. 114.
101 Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, p. 134-137; T. Garvin, “Political Cleavages, Party Politics and
Urbanization in Ireland: The Case of the Periphery-Dominated Centre”, European Journal o f  Political 
Research, 2 (1974), 307-27; R. K. Carty, Parties and Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland, 
(Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981).
102 Garvin, “Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanization in Ireland”, p. 318.
103 M. J. Carey, “Ireland”, in P. H. Merkl (ed.), West European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects, 
(London, Collier Macmillan, 1990); Farrell, “Ireland: Centralization, Professionalization and Competitive 
Pressures”.
104 Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, p. 43-44. It also fits Taggart’s electoral profile,
though this is less relevant given the different contexts.
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C o n c l u sio n
Party organisation does matter. However, it matters most in comparison to established 
West European parties -  the catch-all parties. The development of parties since 1989 
differs considerably from pre-1970 West European politics, but less from late Twentieth 
Century developments. New parties in West and East Central Europe stand in contrast to 
the mass- and catch-all parties with which most of the literature on party organisation 
has been concerned, and they can best be understood in terms of the contrast with these 
parties. While most West European parties developed in the context of ideological left -  
right competition and many were linked to organised interests, many new parties 
challenge this left -  right dimension and do not enjoy interest group support. Lomax’s 
conclusion about Hungary, “I do not think the finding that modem political parties are 
dominated by the professional political elites, and that rank-and-file membership is 
effectively excluded from the decision-making process, can be seriously challenged,” 
can safely be extended to the rest of East Central Europe.105 But it also holds for West 
European politics.
Party organisation cannot be considered a completely exogenous factor in the 
development of party systems. Though analysts of early Twentieth Century West 
European party systems might be forgiven for excluding this factor (or considering it 
exogenous), this omission cannot be justified in post-communist politics. Each party has 
made a strategic choice as far as party organisation is concerned, sometimes quite 
openly at the floor of party conferences. To be sure, this choice has been restricted by 
circumstances, notably the lack of large extra-parliamentary organisations that aggregate 
economic interests. But most parties have chosen something close to one of the four 
ideal-type strategies and organisational models discussed above. In general, the post­
communist parties share many of the features of new West European parties inasmuch 
as i) they accord tremendous power/influence to the leadership (party in 
office/parliamentary party); ii) they are dominated by professional politics (party in
105 Lomax, “The Structure and Organization of Hungary’s Political Parties”, p.41.
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central office); iii) membership (the party on the ground) is of limited importance; iv) 
the parties are state-sponsored; and v) they have weak links with interest groups. These 
are characteristics that set them aside from the old West European parties, but render 
them comparable to new West European parties and cartel parties. The result is parties 
that are dominated by the leadership, but this need not mean weak or unstable parties.
Parties’ choice as far as party organisation is concerned has proved a central factor in 
political competition. In Italy as well as in Hungary and Poland, and to a lesser extent 
Slovakia, the post-communist left has enjoyed some advantage from maintaining their 
organisation on the ground. First in regional elections, and later in national elections, the 
parties’ organisational strength proved advantageous. A similar option was open to the 
agrarian parties, for whom a relatively clearly defined electorate (and, in the Polish case, 
membership) provided a choice between mass basis and broad appeal. The neo-populist 
option, on the other had, has proved a riskier strategy (which is ironic given that these 
parties have proved risk-averse in economic policy). While this strategy propelled 
Antall, Meciar and Berlusconi to power, the new parties proved vulnerable in terms of 
unity and economic policy. Yet they may have had relatively little choice, an existing 
mass membership was not there for the asking. Similarly, the post-conglomerate parties, 
unsurprisingly, focused on the parliamentary party and the party in central office rather 
than the (weak) party on the ground. It is no surprise that parties tend to be centralised 
and elite-dominated. Despite their differences, the most significant attribute of post­
communist political parties is the lack of constraints under which they operate. Two 
elements are particularly significant. The parties remain relatively unrestrained by extra- 
parliamentary organisations, and the party leaderships tend to enjoy considerable 
freedom within the party. The party leadership, therefore, provides the key to 
understanding the development of post-communist party politics, and leadership choice 
and strategies become more significant. Here Panebianco’s focus on strong and weak 
institutionalisation indicates one possible paradox in East Central European politics. The 
‘right’ in the Hungarian party system (i.e., MDF, KDNP, FKgP and even Fidesz) has 
been dominated by parties prone to weak institutionalisation, with a heavy focus on the 
leader. This has left ample room for potential leadership contests, and, therefore, party 
system instability. This helps explain why the oldest East Central European party
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system, and that which has been most stable in terms of the number and names of 
parties, may not have been the most stable one in terms of party competition.
“Like previous party types, the cartel party implies a particular conception of 
democracy; moreover, also like previous party types, it stimulates further reactions and 
sows the seeds for yet further evolution.”106 This can be extended to the new East 
Central European parties. If the West European experience is anything to go by, further 
evolution and change in party organisation can be expected. The question is the extent 
to which this will affect the party system, and the answer suggested by the West 
European experience is ‘not very much’. Party organisation provides the context in 
which party systems develop and consolidate, but in stable, developed party systems, 
changes in party organisation are as much a form of adaptation as a driver of party 
system change. Though the institutional heritage from communism helped shape the 
structure of the reform-communist parties, even these parties conform to the general 
pattern of leadership-dominated parties. Party organisation, therefore, matters, though it 
primarily serves to explain differences between the East Central and the mainstream 
West European party systems. In East Central Europe, leadership dominance has left the 
parties as the main drivers in party system development, not unlike Irish politics or the 
Italian ‘Second Republic’. The dimensions of political competition that the parties 
choose to focus on therefore became the key factor in party system development, a 
process that has been far less constrained by extra-parliamentary supporting 
organisations or the mass membership than was the case in early Twentieth Century 
Western Europe. These dimensions of competition are the subject of the next chapter. 
West European politics also suggests that parties develop and change their strategy and 
organisation in response to their competitors, in a dynamic process as government -  
opposition relationships are developed and broken. This, the development of party 
systems, in turn forms the subject of the last chapter, Chapter Eight.
106 Mair, Party System Change, p.94.
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C h a p t e r  Se v e n  
C l e a v a g e s  a n d  P o st -C o m m u n ist  Pa r t y  
A l ig n m e n t s
“I ’m no 'closet social democrat’ -  that’s the Financial Times ’ characterisation! ”
- Vaclav Klaus, May 1995
C l e a v a g e s  and  Pa r t y  A l ig n m e n t s  in  a  C o m pa r a t iv e  P e r spe c t iv e
The two previous chapters have painted a picture of East Central European politics 
dominated by the political parties in general and the party leadership in particular. The 
political parties operate with a considerable degree of freedom, within parameters set 
by, e.g., the anti-incumbency effect. This, in turn, suggests that cleavages may be less 
important to political competition than was the case in early Twentieth Century Western 
Europe (or at least Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases). The re-working of the Lipset-Rokkan 
model suggests a broader definition of cleavages that permits adding divisions over 
regime change to Lipset & Rokkan’s four cleavages. Hence the attempt to drop some of 
the sociological baggage attached to cleavage theory without reducing cleavages to 
mere ‘divisions’. In West European politics a left -  right dimension has developed over 
time, based primarily on the owner -  worker cleavage, the fourth of Lipset & Rokkan’s 
cleavages. The fact that it is more difficult to ascertain a similar division in East Central 
Europe has not prevented the use of ‘left’ and ‘right’ to describe the parties, though 
these terms must be qualified. Though the development of a ‘left’ and ‘right’ based on 
one predominant dimension of politics is problematic, the terms can still be useful in 
East Central European politics.
L e f t - R ig h t  C o m p e t it io n  i n  We s t  E u r o p e a n  P o l it ic s
Though European party systems reflect a range of cleavages, the socio-economic 
dimension has dominated practically every post-war West European party system and 
formed the main basis for left -  right competition in West European politics. Lijphart 
has summed up the four main questions central to left and right positions on socio-
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economic policy: i) government vs. private ownership of the means of production; ii) 
the role of the government in economic planning; iii) the extent of redistribution of 
wealth; and iv) the scope of government welfare programmes.1 The socio-economic 
issue dimension, therefore, ranges from a free-market, laissez-faire right to a left-wing 
position focusing on political redistribution of resources. This dimension has been 
present, if not dominant, in every post-war democratic party system in Europe (Ireland
'y
included). Even if the shift to catch-all parties has rendered these four questions 
somewhat less salient, particularly with growing consensus on free-market politics since 
the early 1980s, the socio-economic dimension retains considerable relevance. 
Competition need not reflect great differences in party positions on this dimension, 
because different priorities provide a sufficient basis for competition.
A second dimension, based on non-economic issues, is far more diffuse than the socio­
economic dimension, but nevertheless present in every post-war European democracy. 
This has been described alternatively as post-materialist, non-materialist and libertarian 
vs. conservative.4 Though this dimension can be reduced to one central question in most 
party systems at any given time, a broad dimension ranging from a conservative or 
‘particularist’ pole to a libertarian pole allows for cross-country comparisons. These two 
poles reflect, to a considerable extent, collective and individualist approaches to society, 
i.e. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Central questions in European politics have 
included i) defence of the role of the Church in politics vs. secularism; ii) extension of 
political rights to the entire population; iii) breakdown of social hierarchies; iv) social 
liberal questions including divorce and abortion; and more recently v) post-materialist 
and feminist issues that do not fit the Gemeinschaft -  Gesellschaft distinction. The 
diffuse nature of this broad dimension is off-set by the advantages in comparative 
analysis across states and time, as it allows for comparison between a range of different
1 A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns o f Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), p. 129.
2 I. Budge, D. Robinson & D. Hearl (eds.), Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses o f  
Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).
3 P. Dunleavy & C. Husbands, British Democracy at the Cross-Roads, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 
1985).
4 R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977); H. Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe”, J. Hayward
& C. Page (eds.), Governing the New Europe, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995); I. Crewe, “Voting and the 
Electorate”, in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday & G. Peele (eds.), Developments in British Politics 4, 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993).
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but related non-material issues or cleavages.5 In this context the ‘silent revolution’ 
placed new issues on the ‘non-material’ dimension, rather than introducing an entirely 
new issue dimension consisting of post-materialist politics. Kitschelt, therefore, argues 
that Inglehart’s case for post-materialist cleavages is exaggerated, inasmuch as these 
represent one of many manifestations of non-material politics.6 The issues that formed 
the bases for both socio-economic and non-material competition in Western Europe in 
the 1990s have developed and changed considerably since the immediate post-war era, 
hence the two broad dimensions which provide a more long-term perspective.
Un c e r t a in t y  a s  th e  L in k  b e t w e e n  th e  T w o  A x e s
Institutionalised uncertainty represents one of the fundamental bases for liberal 
democracy, and provides a link between the material and non-material dimensions of 
competition. Uncertainty lies at the heart of Przeworski’s and Di Palma’s analyses of 
democratisation, inasmuch as democracy can be considered consolidated when all major
n
players accept the ‘rules of the game’ and its in-built uncertainties of outcome. The 
players’ acceptance of the game is based on built-in uncertainty, in democracies,
o  #
“distributional conflicts must be institutionalized”. This uncertainty is derived 
primarily from ‘decentralisation’ of decision making, as decisions are made by a 
number of actors, and not one single actor (the dictator). Outcomes depend on the 
strategies of several players, not one single agent, and can, therefore, not be anticipated 
with certainty. Though the rules and procedures are known, the outcomes of the 
political game are not known ex ante by any of the participants. However, while 
uncertainty of outcome may be built into the democratic process, there is room for 
debate on the extent to which it is desirable. The rules of the game determine the extent 
to which outcomes are uncertain, for example through providing ‘safety nets’ for losers 
in the economic game. A political party’s approach to economic policy is, therefore, 
based to a large extent on its degree of acceptance of market-based (and uncertain) 
distribution of resources. This, in turn is linked to democratisation and the economic
5 H. Kitschelt, The Transformation o f  European Social Democracy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994).
6 Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe.”
7 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.26-27; G. Di Palma, To Craft 
Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley, University o f California Press, 1990).
8 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 12, 180.
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status quo at the time. Late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century political ideologies 
are depicted in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Gesellschaft
LIBERALISM
SOCIALISM
Political allocation Free-market allocation
o f  resources o f  resources
CONSERVATISM
AUTHORITARIANISM
(Stalinism Fascism)
Gemeinschaft
The broad political movements at the turn of the century are easily located in this grid. 
The conservative status quo, based on free-market allocation of resources modified by 
protectionism, was challenged on two fronts, first by secular, free-market liberalism and 
later by socialism. These challenges to the status quo focused on two forms of 
uncertainty, the socialists pressing for breaking down social hierarchies (uncertainty) 
but instituting a system of political distribution of resources (certainty), and the liberals 
focusing primarily on the benefits of increased uncertainty inherent in economic 
distributions of resources. The socialist and liberal positions are based on advocating 
change on both dimensions, increasing social mobility (both) and economic uncertainty 
(liberals advocating moving to a more free-market regime) or change of the economic 
system (towards a different system of economic certainty). Over time, as the right 
occupied more free market-oriented positions, the main line of political competition in 
West European politics came to run from the upper left corner in figure 7.1 to the lower 
right, ‘libertarian-oriented’ social democracy against free-market social conservatism.9 
The old right’s options in response to challenges from socialism and liberalism lay in a 
move to the right in figure 7.1, towards modem free-market conservatism, or down and 
to the left, towards right-wing authoritarianism and autarky (social and economic 
‘certainty’). With the failure of fascism, West European politics has been dominated by
9 This argument is based on Kitschelt, The Transformation o f  European Social Democracy, Chapters One 
and Two. A debate on Thatcher’s policy was cast in similar terms: B. Jessop et Al„ “Authoritarian 
Populism, Two Nations and Thatcherism”, New Left Review , 147 (1984), 32-60; S. Hall, “Authoritarian 
Populism: A Reply”, New Left Review , 151 (1985) 115-124; B. Jessop et Al., “Thatcherism and the 
Politics o f  Hegemony: A Reply to Hall”, New Left Review, 153 (1985), 87-101.
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left -  right competition by way of modem free-market conservatism vs. social 
democracy or free-market liberalism vs. social democracy.
Extending this grid to post-communist East Central European politics presents relatively 
few problems. The horizontal axis representing the mainstream socio-economic ‘left- 
right’ dimension in Twentieth Century West European politics as defined by Lijphart is 
closely related to the set of economic issues which dominate the East Central European 
economic system changes. The privatisation process reflects the question of ownership 
of the means of production and the government’s role in the economy, while questions 
concerning the scope of welfare programmes and social protection correspond to 
Lijphart’s issues of redistribution of wealth. The non-material dimension is somewhat 
more nebulous. Though political system change from communism to pluralism was 
accomplished rapidly, a range of non-material issues have been salient in post­
communist politics, e.g., the Catholic Church’s role in Polish politics.
Figure 7.2 Gesellschaft
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The grid in figure 7.2 looks deceptively similar to that in figure 7.1. However, the 
starting point (status quo) was different in the post-communist case, as the ancien 
regime (communism) was associated with political allocation of resources. The 
conservative option thus lay in the lower left quadrant, and liberalism, not social 
democracy, represented the most radical challenge. Therefore, the logic of uncertainty, 
which links the two axes, did not operate in the same way as in Twentieth Century West 
European politics.
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L e f t - R ig h t  C o m p e t it io n  u n d e r  t h e  C o n d it io n s  o f  P o s t -C o m m u n is m
The triple nature of the ‘revolutions’ in East Central Europe in 1989/90 has already been 
established (see Chapter Two, above). System change meant both economic and 
political change, with questions related to nationalism and national identity ever-present 
in the background. However, divisions over economic and political system change 
reflected the optimal pace of transition rather than the final goal. In contrast to the inter­
war period’s readily available alternative systems, communism in the USSR and 
Fascism in Italy and Germany, the 1990s are dominated by one model: liberal 
democracy.10 Cleavages based on political system change centred on two main issues, 
the acceptability of individuals associated with the ancien regime and the extent to 
which they should be ‘cleansed’ from the political and/or economic system -  
‘lustration’. More significantly, there was an underlying difference between those who 
stood to benefit from opening up the political and social system, and those individuals 
and groups for whom privileged positions depended on their status under the former 
regime.11 This is the basis for individual or group interests against rapid social system 
change, i.e., increased social mobility and break-down of the ancien regime hierarchical 
order. Much the same holds for economic system change. The key issues centred on 
shock therapy, price liberalisation, provisions of welfare ‘safety-nets’ and the type and 
speed of privatisation. In Kitschelt’s terms, groups of individuals with common 
economic interests are readily identifiable, based the difference between individuals 
who possess skills and resources that are transferable to a market economy, and those 
who rely on non-transferable skills or political connections. Extreme examples would 
include professionals (e.g., the transferable skills of a doctor) and ‘apparatchiks’ 
(bureaucratic skills linked to the Communist Party) respectively.
L e f t -  R i g h t  C o m p e t it io n : L i n k i n g  P o l it ic a l  a n d  E c o n o m i c  S y s t e m  C h a n g e
The principle of uncertainty offers a link between the two dimensions in East Central 
Europe politics, on a basis that is comparable with West European politics. Though a
10 F. Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
11 H. Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society, 20:1 
(1992), 7-50.
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left -  right dimension for post-communist politics could be extrapolated from economic 
cleavages, the West European experience suggests that there is more to left -  right 
competition than economic policy. Though Lijphart’s four-factor economic dimension 
dominates left -  right competition, figure 7.1 indicates that it does so in conjunction 
with non-economic dimensions. Risk aversion and the prospect of uncertainty provided 
the link between the two axes in figure 7.1. In figure 7.2, risk and uncertainty are 
implicit in the reduction of government support for ‘losers’ as welfare state ‘safety nets’ 
are dismantled. The certainties which characterise the outcomes of political distribution 
of resources are abandoned in favour of the uncertain outcomes of the free market. 
Similarly, a shift up the vertical axis involves a reduction of the certainties associated 
with social hierarchies, in favour of a more mobile and less structured social order. 
Established, risk-averse elites are set to oppose both changes, while an emerging 
political elite could be expected to press for precisely such changes. Predictably, 
therefore, both the 1980s communist elites and Nineteenth Century conservatism are 
located somewhere in the lower quadrants, varying along the horizontal axis depending 
on the economic system of the day. The key difference is that in East Central Europe, 
the strongest opposition came from the upper right quadrant, in the form of free-market, 
individualist, liberalism (rather than social democracy).
A guide to group interests can be derived from the resources with which actors in the
1 9political game entered the post-communist era. While a series of resources and skills 
were transferable to a free market economy, a number of groups relied on resources or 
skills that were not transferable. Moreover, some resources are derived from the 
individual’s position in the social hierarchy, while others are independent of the social 
order. The combination of transferable skills and resources that are independent of the 
social order should place an individual or interest group in the top right quadrant, i.e., 
willing to face the risks and uncertainties associated with both social/political and 
economic change. By extension, groups or individuals that rely on resources derived 
from their social or political position under the communist system should find 
themselves opposed to libertarian policies and rapid transition to the free market, i.e., in 
the lower left quadrant. The point is that the social and economic dimensions are linked, 
not merely through risk aversion, but also due to the links between social/political
12 H. Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe”.
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position and ‘non-transferable resources.’ Hence Kitschelt’s argument that parties
located in the upper left and lower right quadrants should face poor electoral fortunes,
as they would find limited support among voters (in figure 7.3 the expected location of
1 ^
most voters would be the upper right and lower left quadrants). The failure of this 
prediction was explained in Chapter Five in terms of anti-incumbency voting and 
economic performance, rather than in terms of the existence of an ‘under-represented 
social democrat constituency’ in the upper left quadrant.14
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Borrowing terms from West European politics, a rough guide to party alignments in 
post-communist East Central Europe is set out in figure 7.4. Though this simplification 
ignores a number of idiosyncrasies, it highlights the changing alignments of parties over 
the period of the first parliaments. First, the reform communist parties moved 
considerably to the right in economic terms during the first five years after the fall of 
communism, to the extent that the SLD, the MSzP and SV advocated and implemented 
more free-market-oriented policies than Olszewski’s conservative right in Poland, the 
MDF in Hungray and the HzDS in Slovakia respectively. Second, divisions in the 
Christian national camp prompted the development of a Christian democrat right, more 
akin to its West European counterpart. Though the party alignments set out in figure 7.4 
represent a simplification of four complex party systems, they indicate something akin 
to the left -  right dimension in West European politics, i.e., a combination of the two 
axes into one single dimension. However, while the main line in West European politics
13 H. Kitschelt, “The Formation o f Party Systems in East Central Europe.” Kitschelt has since modified 
his model, H. Kitschelt, “Formation o f Party Cleavage in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical 
Propositions”, Party Politics, 1:4 (1995), 447-472.
14 I. Selenyi & S. Selenyi, “The Vacuum in Hungarian Politics: Class and Parties”, New Left Review, 187, 
121-137.
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runs from the upper left to lower right, the main concentration of East Central European 
parties runs along a line running from the lower left to upper right. “[WJhereas in 
advanced capitalist societies libertarian views go with a moderate left anti-capitalist 
economic reformism, in post-communist countries libertarians are the most ardent 
supported of rightist, pro-capitalist change of the economy.”15
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The two-dimensional grid could be simplified into one single dimension based on party 
alignments running from the lower left to upper right. One end of this single-dimension 
spectrum features parties oriented towards a closed and homogeneous society, 
combined with a slow pace of economic transition. Risk aversion provides the link 
between the two. Parties and interest groups associated with this end of the political 
spectrum represent scepticism towards the risks and uncertainties entailed by radical 
social and economic transformation, combined with defence of the interests of 
individuals or groups which stood to lose financially or socially from the system 
changes. The opposite end of this single dimension would feature parties accepting 
uncertainty and risk, advocating ‘open’ social structures, combined with market-based 
allocation of resources. This is associated with individuals or groups that stood to 
benefit from the economic transition, e.g., by way of being in possession of skills that 
are transferable to the market economy. The result is a single dimension, running from a 
‘closed society’ end to an ‘open society’ end. This is as close as post-communist politics 
comes to a single ‘left -  right’ dimension, i.e., a one-dimensional interpretation of 
political competition.
15 Kitschelt, “A Silent Revolution in Europe”, p. 146.
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Figure 7.5
Communist left Peasant parties Christian nationals Social/Chr. democrats Liberal right
risk aversion/'closed ’ society uncertainty/ ‘open ' society
While the two-dimensional grid used above might prove useful for analysis of the 
immediate post-communist period, it is not necessary to separate the two dimensions 
after about 1991, when the reform communist parties had begun to adopt free-market 
strategies. While keeping the two dimensions separate allows finer distinctions within 
each of the four East Central European party systems, there are considerable advantages 
to be had by amalgamating the two axes as per figure 7.5. As the broad groups of parties 
lie more or less in one line, relatively little is lost by combining the two axes. The 
advantage of this amalgamation lies in its permitting the introduction of a dimension 
which has proved particularly prominent and problematic in East Central European 
politics, if not across European politics, over the last century: nationalism.16
N a  t io n a l is m  a n d  L e f t -  R ig h t  C o m p e t it io n
Questions concerning nationalism have been central to East Central European politics 
for the last century and a half, if not longer. The challenge for the political scientist lies 
in analysing East Central European politics with due reference to nationalism, without 
losing sight of political competition on socio-economic issues or the libertarian vs. 
authoritarian dimension discussed above. Nationalism has been defined as a political 
doctrine that holds that the world is divided into nations and that the boundaries of
1 7nations and states should be congruent. In East Central Europe this condition is clearly 
far from being met, by virtually any definition of ‘nation’. Nevertheless, nationhood 
provides a key link between the state as an institution and its population, if not the key 
link. It has continuously played the role of a legitimising principle, even during the 
communist period. Yet one key concern of nationalists, border change, was all but
16 G. Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West”, in C. Kupchan (ed.) Nationalism 
and Nationalities in the New Europe, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995).
17 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983).
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eliminated by the Helsinki agreement in 1975 and the CSCE/OSCE arrangements. The 
key focus of current nationalists is therefore not border change, but the implications of 
the lack of congruence between nations and states. Minority rights, language laws, 
definition of citizenship and protection of ‘diaspora minorities’ in neighbouring states 
have become the major ‘nationalist’ issues.
N a t io n a l is m  a n d  P o lit ic a l  C o m p e t it io n : C iv ic  a n d  E t h n ic  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  
N a t io n h o o d
Several theories of nationalism distinguish between two types of nationalism in Europe:
1 ftcivic and ethnic; territorial or cultural; western and eastern; or political and cultural. 
Whether developed as a normative or descriptive distinction, the division centres on the 
process of state-building. Civic nationalism is usually taken to indicate nationhood 
being conferred upon the population of an existing state, e.g., by way of turning 
‘peasants into Frenchmen’.19 Membership of the nation is obtained through citizenship. 
Ethnic nationalism reverses this approach, inasmuch as states are (supposedly) built on 
the basis of existing nations or ethnic groups. The state-building (or rather ‘empire- 
disintegrating’) process leading to Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian statehood in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and to the Polish and Czechoslovak (two ‘existing 
nations’) states in the aftermath of WW I, furnished prominent examples. Greek and 
Serb nationalism can be added to this list. By extension, civic nationalism has been 
considered democratic and liberal, due to its focus on citizenship, whilst ethnic
onnationalism has been associated with ‘nasty’ nationalism. In a region featuring blurred 
ethnic boundaries and pockets of minorities, this poses a number of problems for liberal 
democracy, not least in terms of political equality.
Yet the bi-polarity of this approach is misleading. Nationhood cannot be divorced 
entirely from either its political or its cultural bases. It is conditional not merely upon
18 Respectively: A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986); H. Kohn, 
The Idea o f  Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (New York, Macmillan, 1944, 1958); J. 
Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism”, in E. Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution o f  
an Idea, (London, Edward Arnold, 1976); J. Hutchinson, The Dynamics o f  Cultural Nationalism, 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1987). See also R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992).
19 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernisation o f  Rural France, 1870-1914, (Stanford, Calif., 
Stanford University Press, 1976).
20 Plamenatz, “Two Types o f Nationalism”.
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the notion of the state, but also upon the notion of a state that rules in the name of the
0 1 O'ypeople. It also includes a more tangible basis, namely the ‘ethnie’. Though myths 
can be invented, or communities imagined, there are few, if any, cases of successful 
national identity being completely invented. Nationhood thus combines both political 
and cultural elements, and “should be conceptualised as simultaneously having a 
political (civic) and a cultural (ethnic) dimension.”24 In political terms, “nationhood 
became the tissue that was to connect the entire population of the state with its political 
institutions and claim to exercise power or control over it in the name of popular 
sovereignty. This process is the civic core of nationhood, its channel into politics.” 
Nationhood is therefore linked directly to citizenship and democratisation, as the state 
exercises national self-determination on behalf of the people. And for the people read 
the nation?6 Even if nationalism has little to say about domestic political arrangements, 
it holds that government should be on behalf of, if not by, the people/nation. In cultural 
terms, nationalism is based on a number of elements summed in Smith’s concept of the
on‘ethnie’. The ethnic origins of nations include a mixture of religion, language, and 
endogamous communities, but also common myths of ancestry or foundation myths. 
The ethnic group is sustained by “a series of rituals and by establishing various markers
IQ
that differentiate it from other groups.” Even if there is no ‘ethnie’, which is arguably 
the case in the USA, a range of myths are drafted or invented to form a cultural base for 
nationhood.
‘Ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism can therefore be understood as ‘ideal types’, two ends 
of a continuous dimension rather than as two separate and alternative (let alone 
mutually exclusive) approaches to understanding and delineating nationhood. Political 
parties can be associated with either end of this dimension, or any point along it, but no
21 G. Schopflin, “Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: Analyses and Solutions”, (manuscript, 
1996); E. Kedourie, Nationalism, (London, Hutchinson, 1960).
22 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations. Smith’s term is used here to emphasise the ethnic bases 
for nationhood, as opposed to its political elements.
23 B. R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism, 
(London, Verso, 1983). The German Democratic Republic may have attempted this, but even in this case 
the nation appropriated figures from imperial Germany, down to and including Bismarck! G. Schopflin, 
Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), p.222; M. Fulbrook, “Myth-Making 
and National Identity: The Case of the GDR”, in G. Hosking & G. Schopflin (eds.), Myths and 
Nationhood, (London, Hurst & Company, 1997).
24 Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West”.
25 Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West”.
26 M. Billig, Banal Nationalism, (London, Sage, 1995).
27 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations.
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political movement or organisation in the state can be non-aligned. Socialist and liberal 
movements may have some ideological difficulties in dealing with the political 
implications of multi-ethnic states, but a strategy which ignores the ethnic dimensions 
of nationhood is by default a ‘civic’ approach. The political question becomes which of 
the two aspects of nationhood is to be dominant. In post-communist Eastern Europe this 
is illustrated nowhere better than by the debates over citizenship laws in Estonia and 
Latvia, which have featured proposals for language tests, proof of lineage from pre- 
Soviet residents, and transitional periods of residence without citizenship for (ethnic
90Russian) residents who fail to meet the criteria. However, in the four East Central 
European states approaches to nationhood have been less directly linked to questions 
concerning concrete day-to-day matters. The absence of large ethnic minorities within 
their borders, with the exception of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, has removed most of 
the pressing questions concerning the relationship between ethnic identity and politics. 
Yet nationalism remains politically salient. Even if parties can agree more or less on de 
facto treatment of minorities, they remain divided in terms of their overall approach to 
citizenship and nationhood.
N a t io n a l is m , Id e o l o g y  a n d  L e f t -  R i g h t  C o m p e t it i o n
Despite the different ethnic make-up of the four East Central Europe states, all have 
featured divisions between parties that take predominantly ethnic or civic approaches to 
nationalism. Three different scenarios all permit political competition along the ethnic -  
civic dimension. First, the classic minorities problem in East Central Europe is the 
ethnic minority within the state, and this is often a minority which is the titular nation of 
a neighbouring ‘mother state’. Slovakia’s 600,000-strong Hungarian minority provides 
the best case in point, where the salient questions have concerned language, education, 
local autonomy, organisation of local government and power-sharing. Second, the 
converse is the ‘nation state’ with co-nationals residing in neighbouring states as
28 Schopflin, “Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: Analyses and Solutions”.
29 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel criticised Latvia’s naturalisation 
law in April 1997, RFE/RL Newsline, No. 6, Part II, 8 April 1997. See also A. Lieven, The Baltic 
Revolution: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Path to Independence, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1993).
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(potentially irredentist) minorities. Poland and Hungary both lost substantial territories 
less than two or three generations ago, leaving diaspora minorities in the former Soviet 
Union and Romania, Slovakia and former Yugoslavia respectively. Focus on the ethnic 
dimension of nationhood implicitly calls into question the legitimacy of boundaries, 
however much commitment is expressed to peaceful and agreed change and respect for 
current borders. Third, the dual nature of nationhood means that tension between parties 
focusing on its ethnic and civic dimensions cannot be ruled out even in homogeneous 
states without substantial diaspora populations. Nationhood can still play a substantial 
symbolic role in party politics, as Klaus’ use of Czech national imagery illustrates. 
The CSSD reacted by rejecting this mixing of civic and ethnic elements of nationhood, 
focusing instead on its civic dimensions. Though few issues reflect this division, it 
remains part of the language that the parties use for self-identification.
In ideological terms, liberalism and socialism are not particularly well equipped to deal 
with the political implications of ethnic diversity. Both are universalistic doctrines, and 
therefore stand in stark contrast to the particularistic approaches to politics inherent in 
nationalism. The two focus on the individual and class respectively, not on community. 
Individual or class identity provides the basis for politics, and, therefore, for party 
competition. Society is a Gesellschaft rather than a Gemeinschaft. In contrast, 
conservatism and populism focus on the community, in the form of Burke’s continuity 
between past, present and future generations or populist focus on the narod or 
traditional (rural) community. The latter is usually contrasted to the modem or 
cosmopolitan urban elite, in both the East European and Russian variants. Both 
conservatism and populism’s notions of the community are readily equated with the 
nation, made up of the community (past, present and future) in conservative thought or 
represented by the peasants in peasant populism. This distinction between liberalism 
and conservatism was evident in the differences between the ‘democratic opposition’ 
and the ‘national opposition’ to communism. While civil society was understood in
30 R. Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing Sates and External Homelands in the New Europe”, 
in Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
31 K. Williams, “National Myths in the New Czech Liberalism”, in Hosking & Schopflin (eds.), Myths 
and Nationhood.
32 Zeman went so far as to comprated the ODS to the Republicans after ODS Senator Klausner hinted that 
Romas should be moved outside Prague (Klausner also atracted criticism from the ODS), CTK, 3 July, 
1997.
33 M. Canovan, Populism, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
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terms of the individual as far as the liberal opposition was concerned, a second, more 
conservative, approach to ‘civil society’ centred on the nation and the Church. For 
example, opposition could be expressed in terms of liberal rights such as freedom of 
religion, based on either individual or collective rights.34 Though this division was 
sometimes obfuscated by expedience, it was expressed organisationally in the 
Hungarian opposition (separating the populist or national camp from the democratic 
opposition formed around the journal Bezelo).
By the same logic that linked the material and non-material axes in figures 7.1 -  7.4 
above, risk aversion and acceptance of uncertainty ought to provide a link between the 
‘open -  closed’ dimension and the ‘civic -  ethinic’ dimension. Commitment to diversity 
or ‘open society’ could be linked to ‘civic’ nationalism by much the same logic that 
linked liberal non-material policy and the free market. Civic nationalism (i.e., a civic 
approach to nationhood) suggests a degree of diversity by way of allowing for 
ethnically mixed states. In the context of economic and political transition, it is difficult 
to combine a focus on the civic elements of nationhood and the ensuing (uncertain) 
diversity with non-liberal economic and social policy designed to limit diversity. 
Attempts to combine civic nationalism with limited economic transition and illiberal 
policies should thus come under considerable strain. But the reverse does not hold. 
Acceptance of uncertainty and risk-taking need not imply a commitment to civic 
nationalism. If West European liberalism has tended to associate the two with each 
other, this is partly due to liberalism’s focus on rationality, which suggests emphasis on 
the political rather than the ethnic aspects of citizenship, i.e., civic nationalism. Yet 
economic risk-taking does not necessarily imply civic nationalism, even when it is 
associated with other non-economic liberal values. Individualistic liberalism can exist 
within clearly defined ethnic boundaries, even if this poses awkward questions about 
non-citizens. Apartheid South Africa, or at least its National Party, represented an 
extreme example. The logical link between liberalism and civic nationalism is thus 
somewhat weaker than that between free market orientation and liberal non-economic 
policy. More to the point, however, some states lack the immediate domestic problems 
associated with a large ethnic minority. While the need to deal with such issues may
34 J. Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1994), p.84, 95- 
96.
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expose the logical problem of combining liberalism and ethnic nationalism, this 
combination is far less problematic in practice in states with minor minority problems. 
By way of example, the Czech government’s approach to its small Roma minority has 
raised some awkward questions, but it has hardly undermined the ODS.
At the other end of the spectrum the logic holds to a greater degree, as defence of social 
hierarchies and commitments to political redistribution of wealth are associated with 
ethnic nationalism as a means by which uncertainty is kept at bay. Ethnic nationalism 
can be deployed rationally as a tool in defence of the interests of a community against a 
‘cosmopolitan’ threat from free-market policies or breakdown of old social hierarchies. 
This applies regardless of the existence of substantial ethnic minorities within a state’s 
borders, the mere invoking of ‘foreign conspiracies’ is sufficient. Conversely, the 
community focus associated with ethnic nationalism may make individualistic 
liberalism difficult, though elements of ethnic nationalism can be combined with a 
relatively liberal approach to minorities if these are sufficiently small (and can be 
overlooked). In the case of substantial domestic minorities, however, tension between 
liberal individual rights and an ethnic approach to nationhood must be expected.
The link between approaches to nationalism and the main ‘left -  right’ (or rather ‘open 
-  closed’) dimension of political competition is therefore weaker than that between 
economic and non-economic issues. If a grid is drawn up representing the ‘civic -  
ethnic’ and ‘open -  closed’ dimensions, several parties fall into the lower right 
quadrant. East Central European parties do not always conform to the ‘families’ set out 
in figure 7.1. The purpose of the grid is to suggest the spread of party ‘families’ across 
the grid. The nationalist and peasant parties by and large conform to expectations, as do 
most of the Christian national parties. However, the liberal, social democrat/democratic 
left and Christian democrat parties are less predictable, as the next section will 
demonstrate when the actual alignment of parties in post-communist East Central 
Europe is analysed in more detail.
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Figure 7.6 Civic approaches to nationalism
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Party alignments in East Central Europe have been obfuscated by a remarkable degree 
of consensus on the goals of the economic and political transition. After 1989, there 
were literally no normative alternatives to liberal democracy and the free market. The 
main divisions between parties were over how to achieve these goals, and the pace of 
economic reform. This generated great similarities in party programmes in Hungary, 
Poland and the Czechoslovak successor states, most of which called for free market- 
oriented reforms and integration into West European economic and security structures 
(the ‘return to Europe’). Programmes, therefore, tend to be of limited value in assessing 
party alignments, compared with speeches, interviews or statements by party elites as 
reported in the media. Though programmes may prove useful on specific issues, 
particularly when parties go against the free-market consensus, they cannot always be 
accepted uncritically. The party alignments and families spirituelles discussed below 
have, therefore, been based only partly on programmes, and primarily on evidence 
drawn from the contemporary media, reflecting speeches, statements, interviews and 
occasional analyses by journalists, concerning party policy and party alignments. This 
has been supplemented by reference to parties’ activities in parliament, e.g., support for 
legislation on abortion.
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Th e  L ib e r a l  a n d  B u r g e r l ic h P a r t ie s
The liberal parties of East Central Europe form a relatively cohesive group. All fall into 
one of the two right-hand quadrants in figure 7.6, largely due to their economic policy 
and libertarian policies on ‘non-material’ questions. However, there is less consistency 
on the nationalist dimension. While the SzDSz, UD and KLD have maintained the 
classical liberal position, more or less ignoring the national question, Fidesz and the 
ODS have chosen to adopt more ‘ethnic’ approaches to nationhood. This combination 
of liberalism and conservatism is captured in the German term burgerlich, which has 
clear right-wing connotations and is used to denote the Norwegian non-socialist parties. 
This is more appropriate than the neutral ‘civic’ often used in English translations, 
because it reflects an urban, bourgeois, middle class and cosmopolitan outlook, which is 
not necessarily liberal in all non-economic matters, nationalism in particular.
In Poland the UW (the UD and KLD before they merged in 1994) has taken the 
‘classical’ liberal approach to politics, focusing primarily on the economic transition. 
The Balcerowicz plan represented the most radical shock therapy in the region, and the 
two parties refused to modify their stance after defeat in the polls, maintaining 
opposition to Olszewski during the 1991/92 winter. The KLD was the more ardent 
advocate of free market liberalism, as evident in its demands for a ‘liberal minimum’ to 
be guaranteed in the merger, and in some UD members’ fear this might herald a shift to 
the right. In terms of non-economic policy, the key question dominating Polish post­
communist politics has been the role of the Church, particularly on abortion laws. Again 
the KLD proved the more explicitly liberal party, while the UD left the issue up to its 
members according to their convictions. Both parties’ policy on the religious 
neutrality of the state was brought into the new party. The two parties confirm the 
general observation that liberals and socialists share “difficulty in the understanding of 
nationalism, because they both derive their first principles from economic rationality.”
35 PAP in Polish, 1822 gmt 3 March 1994 (SWB 05/03/94); Zofia Kuratowska, leader of the DU Socio- 
Liberal Faction, PAP in Polish, 1630 gmt 26 February 1994 (SWB 02/03/94).
36 T. Mazowiecki (UD leader), Polish Radio, 1300 gmt 29 November 1992 (SWB 01/12/92).
37 Mazowiecki on the UD policy, PAP in English 1858 gmt 4 April 1993 (SWB 06/04/93); Kuratowska 
on the merger, PAP in Polish 1630 gmt 26 February 1994 (SWB 02/03/94). This was part o f  KLD’s 
above-cited ‘liberal minimum’, PAP in Polish, 1822 gmt 3 March 1994 (SWB 05/03/94).
38 Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West”, p.43.
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Key statements usually included reference to the free market economy, privatisation, 
freedom of the individual, religious neutrality of the state, minority rights, and local
-IQ
government, but made few references to nationalism.
The Polish Beer Lovers’ Party (PPPP) was East Central Europe’s purest free-market 
business-oriented party. Despite its less than serious origins and its preoccupation with 
promotion of beer, most PPPP candidates returned to the Sejm in the October 1991 were 
independent businessmen.40 Within a month the parliamentary PPPP had split into two 
camps. The Polish Economic Programme (PPG), consisting of 12 of the PPPP’s 16 
deputies led by Tomasz Bankowski, took up a free market position closely aligned with 
the KLD and the LID.41 Better known as Big Beer, it remained part of the liberal camp 
until the merger with the KLD one year later, supporting the UD and the KLD against 
Olszewski's government, e.g., in rejecting the government's economic programme.42 
The remainder of the party all but disintegrated, one deputy joining the SLD.43 The 
PPPP’s liberal stand on non-economic matters was illustrated by the annual congress’ 
resolution in favour of a referendum on abortion 44 Like the KLD and the UD, the PPPP 
appeared to be not so much a ‘civic nationalist’ party as a party ignoring nationalist 
questions.
The OH and ODA in the Czech Republic and the SzDSz in Hungary are close relatives 
of the UD and KLD in both economic and nationalist terms. Like the Polish liberal 
parties, the ODA, OH and SzDSz all emphasised their commitment to rapid economic 
transition. The ODA even proved critical of Klaus over slow economic reform in 1996- 
97, and its 1996 party conference emphasised privatisation and accelerated macro­
39 B. Gemerek, PAP in English 1915 gmt 2 October 1993 (SWB 05/10/93); PAP in polish 1824 gmt 4 
November 1993 (SWB 06/11/93); Kuratowska, PAP 26 February 1994 (SWB 02/03/94); D. Tusk (KLD 
leader) PAP in Polish 1755 gmt 9 February 1994 (SWB 11/02/94); KLD’s ‘liberal minimum’, PAP in 
Polish, 1822 gmt 3 March 1994 (SWB 05/03/94).
40 It has been described as a “cabaret routine” turned serious (L. Vinton “’Outsider’ Parties and the 
Political Process in Poland”, RFE/RL Research Report 3:31, (21 January 1994) and “harmless political 
cranks [...] hijacked by entrepreneurial elements”, V. Zubeck, “The Fragmentation o f Poland's Political 
Party System”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 26:1 (1993), 14-71, p.59.The campaign for 
promotion o f Prezydent beer eventually led to embezzlement allegations against PPPP's president J. 
Rewinski. PAP in English 1602 gmt March 1993 (SWB 03/03/93).
41 PAP in English 1420 gmt 11 November, 1730 gmt 14 November and 0200 gmt 21 November 1991 
(SWB 13/11/91, 20/11/92 and 22/11/92).
42PAP in English 2314 gmt 28 February 1992 (SWB 03/03/92).
43PAP in English 1354 gmt 5 May 1993 (SWB 10/05/93).
44PAP in English 1839 gmt 22 November 1992 (SWB 25/1/92).
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economic reform, coupled with de-centralisation and tax cuts.45 When they split in 
1991, one commentator described the ODA and ODS platforms as “in many respects, 
identical”.46 Neither the SzDSz nor the ODA have attempted to use nationalism for 
political mobilisation. Taking this approach one step further, the OH relied on its 
credibility as a party of the former dissidents to take the high ground on liberal issues, 
while maintaining an overall free market oriented approach to the economy. The main 
difference between the ODA and SzDSz and their Polish counterparts has been their 
openness to coalitions with the left. Even though it is generally considered further to the 
right than the ODS, the ODA considered co-operation with the CSSD 47 After the 1996 
election, both the ODA and the KDU-CSL favoured a written agreement with the CSSD 
or a grand coalition.48 Though the SzDSz joined the MSzP in government 1994-98, it 
remains open to alliances with other ‘non-extreme’ parties, i.e., Fidesz, and has 
advocated more radical and stricter economic measures than both the MDF-led 
government and the MSzP.49
By contrast, Fidesz and the ODS have combined radical free market rhetoric with 
elements of ethnic nationalism. The ODS tempered its free market rhetoric with 
considerable welfare provisions, through focus on target-oriented welfare policy.50 
Nevertheless, it presided over remarkable economic progress, or at least that appeared to 
be the case until 1997, and attacked the CSSD’s alleged “idea of a very expensive 
welfare state,” hailing America’s combination of individualism and the market over that 
of unnamed “semi-socialist” West European countries.51 Though less critical of the
• • • C*)West European experience, Fidesz adopted a similar, mixed, economic policy. For the
45CTK in English 1338 gmt 23 March 1996 and Czech Radio Radiozumal in Czech 1715 gmt 7 March 
1996 (SWB 26/03/96 and 10/03/95).
46J. Pehe, “The Realignment o f Political forces”, RFE Report on Eastern Europe, 24 May 1991, p.3.
47 CTK in English 1337 gmt 4 June 1996 (SWB 06/06/96). The ODA demanded CSSD’s commitment 
before joining a minority coalition. Eventually this came in the form o f a ‘deal’, not a written political 
agreement. CTK in English 1108 gmt 7 June 1996 (SWB 10/06/96); CTK in English 1912 gmt 27 June 
1996 (SWB 29/06/96).
48 J. Kalvoda (ODA Chair) CTK in English 1338 gmt 23 March 1996 (SWB 26/03/96).
49 I. Peto, SzDSz President, interviewed by Liberal Voice (SzDSz Newsletter), 6:1-2, at 
http://www.szdsz.hu/libvoice/index.html.
50 CTK in English 1520 gmt 1 January 1995 (SWB 03/01/95); Klaus’ statement was welcomed by unions, 
CTK in English 1651 gmt 2 January 1995 (SWB 04/01/95).
51 Klaus, cited by CTK, in English 1651 gmt 2 January 1995 (SWB 04/01/95) and 1242 gmt 7 December 
1996; Czech Radio-Radiozumal, in Czech 1200 gmt 11 May 1996 (SWB 09/12/96 and 13/05/96). He 
made a similar point at the Prognos forum in October 1995, CTK in English 1457 gmt 13 October 1995 
(SWB 16/10/95).
52 K. Okolicsanyi “The Economic Programs of the Major Hungarian Parties”, RFE Report on Eastern 
Europe, 13 April 1990.
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1998 election campaign, the party adopted an economic programme that failed to 
impress financial markets due to its commitments to cutting tax and increasing 
spending. On nationalist questions both Fidesz and the ODS have found it expedient 
to emphasise a more ethnic approach to nationhood. In the run-up to the 1994 election, 
in the face of declining popularity, Fidesz decided to emphasise nationalist issues more 
strongly.54 One year later it joined the KNDP and MDF in criticism of the government’s 
handling of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty, on the grounds that the draft treaty did not 
confer constitutional status on Hungarian minorities abroad (which the three considered 
part of the Hungarian nation ‘in a cultural sense’).55 In 1995, Fidesz’s shift ‘rightwards’ 
included a name-change to Fidesz-MPP.56 The ODS’ problem with the 1993 citizenship 
law (which attracted Western criticism for obstructing Roma citizenship in the Czech 
Republic) led to the law’s amendment in April 1996. Given the predominantly 
negative attitude to the Roma in the Czech Republic, the Financial Times suggested that
CQ
the ODS played on this issue for electoral advantage. Criticism from the Council of 
Europe and the US Congress followed.59 Though the ODS shares a pro-EU stance with 
its main competitors, it stresses defence of national interest and is more sceptical than 
the ODA and CSSD as far as the European Union’s supranational power is concerned.60 
An analysis of Klaus’ approach to national identity revealed extensive use of myths, 
invoking an approach to national identity that is more ethnic than civic.61 Its programme
fsJinvokes national history more than those of its rivals.
Slovakia’s DS (initially represented in parliament only by its chairman, Langos, who 
was elected as a KDH deputy) is the country’s most liberal party in the classical sense. 
In 1996 it became the first party to call for open co-operation with the ethnic Hungarian 
parties, a move that was hailed by Egyutteles’ (ethnic Hungarian party) Duray as “an
53 “The Price o f Austerity”, Business Central Europe, June 1998.
54 Jozsef Szajer, head of Fidesz national committee, Magyar Hirlap, 30 April 1994, p.l 1 (SWB 05 May 
1994).
55 Hungarian Radio, in Hungarian 1700 gmt 18 March 1996 (SWB 20/03/96).
56 The MPP is translated as Hungarian Civic Party, thoughpolgari translates into German as burgerlich. 
T. Vitos, “FIDESZ-MPP for the New Bourgeoisie”, The Hungary Report, No. 1:6, 7 May 1995.
57 On Helsinki Committee criticism, see CTK, in English, 0837 gmt 1 February 1995 (SWB 01/02/95); on 
amendment, CTK, in English, 1000 gmt 26 April 1996 (SWB 27/04/96).
58 T. Gross “A blot on the conscience - Czech attitudes on citizenship for gypsies come under fire” 
Financial Times, 19/12/94.
59CTK, in English, 1314 gmt 22 February 1996 (SWB 24/02/96).
60 J. Pehe “Czech Parties Views on EU and NATO”, OMRI Analytical Brief, 1:121, 20/05/96.
61 Williams, “National Myths in the New Czech Liberalism”.
62 “The ODS Political Programme”, 6th Congress, October 1995.
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entirely new situation in Slovak politics.” CTK described the DS as known 
“principally for [its] defence of civil rights”.64 Its programme describes it as a 
“conservative, secular party,” citing the free individual as its cornerstone, praising free- 
market principles and invoking “traditional European values.”65 Langos and ODA 
chairman Zantovsky both agreed that the DS is the closest Slovak counterpart to the 
ODA.66 The DU is included among the liberal or burgerlich parties because of its 
aspiration to belong to this ‘family’ of parties, in spite of the less than liberal 
background of some of its key members. It was set up when Moravcik’s DEUS 
(formerly the Alternative for Political Realism, formed by Moravcik and Roman Kovac 
upon their expulsion from HzDS) merged with Cemak’s NDS-NA. The three, who had 
left the Meciar cabinet shortly before, toned down their ethnic nationalist rhetoric
sn
considerably and adopted a more free market-oriented strategy. However, this has 
more to do with personality conflicts than ideological divisions, with the DU taking 
president Michal Kovac’s side against Meciar. DU deputy leader Budaj eventually 
accused the HzDS of “political terrorism.”69 On economic policy, the party has proved 
critical of the Meciar governments’ slow pace of economic reform and their intervention 
in the economy.70
Th e  D e n o m in a t io n a l  a n d  C o n f e s s io n a l  P a r t ie s
The confessional parties make up the most diffuse ‘family’ of parties on the post­
communist scene, despite the limited number of parties. The KDNP epitomised the 
ideal type position, modesty on economic reform and reluctant to pursue shock therapy, 
and oriented towards ethnic nationalism. The term ‘Christian national’ has therefore 
been used frequently to describe the KDNP, and its Polish counterpart, the ZChN. By
63 CTK, in English 1341 gmt 19 March 1996 (SWB 21/03/96).
64 CTK, in English 1251 gmt 23 August 1994 (SWB 25/08/94).
65 “Political Programme o f the Democratic Party”, 18/11/95, http://www.demstrana.sk/.
66 CTK news agency, Prague, in English 1208 gmt 9 May 1997 (SWB 11 May 1997).
67 TASR news agency, Bratislava, in English 1905 gmt 25 March 1995 (SWB 27/03/95).
68 Moravcik suggested the DU would contemplate co-operation with the HzDS, but only after Meciar 
retired from politics. TASR in English 1857 gmt 9 September 1994 (SWB 13/09/1994). In 1996, Huska 
stated that the HZDS’s coalition government was open to any party but the DU. CTK in English 1805 
gmt 13 January 1996 (SWB 15/01/96).
Budaj, cited by CTK, in English 1545 gmt 6 May 1996 (08/05/96), citing the police investigation o f the 
DU’s list o f signatures for the 1994 election and opposition parties’ exclusion from monitoring o f security 
services.
70 Budaj, TASR news agency, Bratislava, in English 1616 gmt 15 November 1996 (SWB 19/11/96).
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contrast, the Czech and Slovak Christian democrat parties emulated their West 
European counterparts’ economic policies, and have taken a stand on national questions 
that is more ‘civic’ than ‘ethnic’. In the KDH’s case this was driven by its support for
71maintaining the Czechoslovak state.
The ZChN and the KDNP have both combined their ethnic approach to nationalism and 
their scepticism to free market politics, e.g., in the KDNP’s opposition to privatisation 
of the food industry based partly on fear of foreign ownership. Its economic platform 
emphasised the “social market economy”, whilst criticising the MSzP-SzDSz
70
government’s privatisation programme. Both parties have taken a less than liberal 
stance on Church -  state relations and the role of religion in politics. However, the 
ZChN’s impact has been more limited than might be expected given Poland’s 
overwhelmingly Catholic population, partly because religion had not translated into 
popular demand for restriction on divorce or abortion.74 In Hungary, the 1996 KNDP 
programme was clear on this point: ‘W e support the family model with several children.
nc
[...] Our aim is the abortion free Hungary...” Commenting on the question of 
Hungarians beyond the border, KDNP-leader Bela Csepe agreed with Csurka's ‘ethnic 
nationalists’ demands (see MIEP, below), but in a “Christian democratic, real
nr
Hungarian way”. The party was critical of the MSzP-SzDSz government’s alleged 
subordination of protection of the interests of Hungarians abroad to European 
integration.77 Shortly before the break-up of the party, the KDNP was expelled from
70
European Union of Christian Democrats over unacceptable links with MIEP. 
Meanwhile, having failed to pass the 8% threshold for coalitions as part of the 
Fatherland Coalition in 1993, the ZChN threw in its lot with the AWS in 1997.
71 KDU-CSL, “The Principles o f the Policy of the Christian and Democratic Union -  Czechoslovak 
People’s Party”, undated, supplied by KDU-CSL International Office in 1997.
72 Hungarian Radio, 1600 gmt 31 March 1993 (SWB 05/04/93); DU economic spokesman Vaskovic, 
CTK, in English 1211 gmt 20 July 1995 and CTK, in English 1536 gmt 13 July 1995 (SWB 22/07/95 and 
20/07/95).
73 M. Jarosi, G. Szakolczay, A. Szanto, Declaration o f  Platform, September 1996. KDNP homepage, 
http://www.kdnp.hu.anagprog.htm.
74 Louisa Vinton “Opinion Poll: Poles are Selective Catholics”, OMRI Daily Digest, 08/08/94.
75 M. Jarosi et al., Declaration o f Platform, September 1996. Emphasis in the original.
76Hungarian Radio, 0500 gmt 24 April 1993 (SWB 28/04/93).
77 M. Jarosi et Al., Declaration o f  Platform, September 1996. The programme also cites opposition to 
foreign participation in privatisation of utilities, banks and land, a position that would pose problems for 
EU membership.
78 RFE/RL Newsline, No. 73, Part II, 15 July 1997.
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The KDH, the KDU-CSL and the smaller KDS all come closer to West European 
Christian Democrat parties. On economic matters the KDU-CSL supported the Klaus 
governments’ reform effort, albeit as the most vociferous advocate of welfare measures
70within the coalition. Like some of its West European counterparts the KDU-CSL
on
emphasises religious issues more than its allies. The KDS leadership under Pilip was 
more closely aligned with the ODS, on which ticket it ran in 1992. By September 1995 
its deputies divided between the ODS and KDU-CSL-oriented camps and a formal 
decision for a merger was taken in November. Five out of ten MPs joined KDU-CSL, 
while the rest merged with the ODS in March 1996.81 The KDH is the most liberal of 
the Christian democrat parties, to no small extent owing to its eschewing Meciar’s 
nationalist approach in favour of a pro-federalist position on the Czechoslovak question. 
The party has become the main advocate of rapid economic reform in Slovakia, critical 
of Meciar’s backtracking on privatisation, which it has combined with criticism of 
Meciar’s attacks on the president and the DU. On nationalist issues, the party 
generally pursued an anti-Meciar policy, which involved opposing or abstaining on 
language legislation and general criticism of Meciar’s minority policies. Meciar 
responded by ruling out any co-operation with the KDH (or the Hungarian parties).84
Th e  N e w  P o p u l is t  R ig h t
The new populist right is firmly lodged in the lower left quadrant of figure 7.6, due to 
its combination of scepticism towards rapid economic transition and its ‘ethnic’ 
approach to nationalist questions. The BBWR, HzDS and the MDF constitute near ideal 
type examples. The MDF maintained a balance between its liberal and nationalist 
factions until Antall’s expulsion of Csurka over anti-Semitism in 1993, which he
79 CTK in English 1242 gmt 7 December 1996 (SWB 09/12/96).
80 This led to some internal coalition tension in 1994, Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:6 (16/03/94).
81 S. Kettle, “Czech Deputies Change Parties”, OMRI Daily Digest (13/09/95); S. Kettle, “Czech 
Coalition Parties Vote to Merge” OMRI Daily Digest (20/11/95).
82 M. Dzurinda, KDH deputy chairman, on HZDS’ abandoning of coupon privatisation, ‘Steps’ party 
leader discussion programme, Slovak TV1, Bratislava, in Slovak 1129 gmt 25 June 1995 (SWB 
28/06/95).
83 CTK in English, 1724 gmt 19 November 1995 (SWB 21 November 1995); Eastern Europe 
Newsletter,8:3 (01/01/94).
84 CTK in English, 1407 gmt 28 April 1993 (SWB 30/04/93).
Cleavages and Post-Communist Party Alignments 257
attempted to counterbalance with the expulsion of two liberal MDF MPs as well.85 All 
three parties adopted or advocated economic policies that rejected shock therapy in
o /
favour of a more gradualist approach to economic reform. When the AWS coalition 
succeeded in uniting the Christian national and populist forces where the BBWR had
on
failed four years earlier, its policy remained more or less intact. Like the old PC -  
ROAD division, the dividing line within the AWS -  UW coalition reflects the 
institutional legacy of the 1980s struggle against communism. Whereas the UW 
contains most of the intellectuals of the old Solidarity, the AWS represents the trade
no
union section of the old movement.
In terms of economic transition, the MDF can at best be described as cautious. Its initial 
medium-pace approach to economic transition was met by scepticism from the IMF,
OQ
and earned its intermittent criticism. Its approach to the acceleration of economic 
transition under the MSzP-SzDSz government is summed up in the party programme, 
which condemns the combination of “former existing socialism and a 19th-century wild 
capitalism.” “The Government’s utterly dilettantish economic policies [...] are alien to 
Hungarian circumstances.”90 The HzDS’ economic reform effort was equally 
moderate.91 It has been critical of the privatisation carried out by non-HZDS
09governments, some of which it subsequently annulled. Economic policy has been 
linked to the party’s (ethnic) nationalist populist outlook, summed up in deputy 
chairman Huska’s call for ‘economic sovereignty’. Similarly, from the PC’s criticism
85 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 7:13, (22/06/93).
86 G. Blazyca & R. Rapacki, “Continuity and Change in Polish Economic Policy: The Impact o f  the 1993 
Election”, Europe-Asia Studies, 48:1 (1996), 85-100; M. Butora, Z. Butororova & T. Rosova, “The Hard 
Birth o f Democracy in Slovakia: The Eighteen Months following the ‘Tender’ Revolution”, The Journal 
o f Communist Studies, 7:4 (1991), 435-459; S. Fisher, “Tottering in the Aftermath o f the Elections”, 
Transition, 29 March 1995; K. Okolicsanyi, “The Debate over Economic ‘Shock Therapy’”, RFE/RL 
Report on Eastern Europe, 11 January 1991; A. Reisch, “Prime Minister Replaces Key Ministers”, 
RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 8 February 1991.
87 Walesa, cited by Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, in Polish 1500 gmt 30 August 1997 (01/09/97).
88 A. Prazmowska, ‘work in progress’ paper on Solidarity presented at the LSE, Spring 1998.
89 D. L. Bartlett, “Democracy, Institutional Change and Stabilisation in Hungary”, Europe-Asia Studies, 
48:1 (1996), 47-83.
90 “Hungary -  its Present and Future: The Basic Principles o f the Policies o f the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum”, February 1997, http://www.mdf.hu/indexuk.htm.
91 Eastern Europe Newsletter 9:9 (28/04/95).
92 Specifically direct privatisation after 6/9/94. Eastern Europe Newsletter 8:23 (16/11/94) and 9:1 
(04/01/95).
93 “We really want Slovakia to be economically sovereign. To put it another way, we want to be protected 
in order to prevent a situation in which foreign interests prevail and destroy our possible steps aimed at 
the best economic development in our country.” A. M. Huska, ‘Steps’ party leader discussion programme, 
Slovak TV1, Bratislava, in Slovak 1129 gmt 25 June 1995 (SWB 28/06/95).
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of the original Balcerowicz plan to the AWS -  UW tension over economic policy, the 
Polish populist right has proven sceptical towards shock therapy. The AWS describes 
itself as centre-right, and presented an electoral programme focusing heavily on “the 
family”.94 If abortion is a useful guide to parties’ social liberalism in Poland, it falls 
firmly in the ‘old right’ camp.95 Economically, its programme calls for “modem 
legislation concerning collective bargaining and social dialogue”. The breadth of the 
AWS membership is illustrated by the (initially ambivalent) inclusion of the KPN, and 
the fact that PC leader Kaczynski stood on the ROP list in the 1997 elections, though his 
party belongs to the AWS.96 Within the MDF, the faction that seceded to form the 
MDNP in 1996 represented the more Westem-oriented, liberal faction.97 This was 
reflected in the parties’ first choice of alliance partners, Fidesz and the KDNP 
respectively.98 Lezsak’s election as chair of the MDF, the immediate cause of the split, 
was welcomed by the FKgP as a step towards co-operation within the ‘national camp’.99 
The main evidence of the HzDS’s ethnic nationalist approach to minorities lies in its 
approach to the Hungarian minority, e.g., on language laws regulating the use of 
Hungarian and in efforts to change regional boundaries (north-south boundaries would 
diminish the Hungarian minority’s influence, as it is located along the southern border 
with Hungary).100
Two other parties, the PC and the MNDP, were located on the blurred boundary 
between the populist/Christian national and the burgerlich camps. The divisions 
between the PC and ROAD in 1990 reflected divisions over the government’s economic 
shock therapy, though the Mazowiecki -  Walesa division was primarily a matter of
94 AWS, “Democracy in Poland” and “Plan for Poland o f the 21st Century”, http://www.solidamosc.org/.
95 M. Krzaklewski (party leader), PAP in English 1805 gmt 25 October 1996 (28/10/96).Q (L
On KPN, Polish Radio 3, Warsaw, in Polish 1900 gmt 4 July 1997; Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, in Polish 
0600 gmt 6 July 1997 (SWB 07/07/07); on Kaczynski, Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, in Polish 1300 gmt 9 
July 1997 (SWB 14/07/07).
97 T. Vidos (GJW Government Relations), “The fog lifts on opposition politics”, The Hungary Report 
1:41, 11/03/96. Also in the Budapest Business Journal. MDNP, “Self-Portrait o f the People’s Party” at 
http://www.net.hu/English/mdnp/selfport.htm.
98 I. Csuhaj, “Similarities and differences in the policy o f the MDF and the MDNP” Magyar Hirlap 1 
March 1996 (SWB 09/03/96). MDNP, “Self-Portrait o f the People’s Party” at 
http://www.net.hu/English/mdnp/selfport.htm.
99 Z. Lanyi (FKgP spokesman) in Hungarian Radio, in Hungarian, 2100 gmt 4 March 1996 (SWB 
06/03/96).
100 TASR in English 1545 gmt 9 February 1996 (SWB 12/02/96); CTK in English 1252 gmt 20 June 1995 
(SWB 22/06/95); CTK in English 1805 gmt 13 January 1996 (SWB 15/01/96).
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personality.101 Despite its avowed market orientation, ambivalence towards economic 
reform was evident in the PC in the 1991 election, and in its subsequent voting
1 O')record. Though favouring ‘radical privatisation’ its second congress emphasised 
combating unemployment as a main objective. On non-economic matters, the PC 
differed from ROAD in terms of “attitudes to history and tradition”, and mutual 
allegations that the PC was anti-Semitic and the ROAD Jewish.104 The MDNP split off 
from the MDF following a growing division between the party leadership and its more 
populist element, the MDNP representing the faction that was more liberal on both 
economic and cultural/national issues.105 This difference is clearly reflected in the 
MDNP’s ruling out any co-operation with Csurka’s MIEP, a move the MDF was not 
prepared to make.106 On minority questions, the MDNP looked primarily to European 
international organisations to guarantee the right of Hungarian minorities abroad, in 
some contrast to the MDF’s focus on bilateral relations and close direct relations with
1 07Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. The PC and the MNDP thus joined 
the Slovak DU in attempting to make the transition from the Christian national camp to 
more West European type Christian democrat parties, or in Szabo’s words, “a moderate, 
civic opposition force”.108
101 ROAD Supreme Council statement, cited by Warsaw Home Service (radio) 1900 gmt 4 February 1991 
(SWB 07/02/91); L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism and Transformation, (Budapest, Central 
European University Press, 1995), p.298.
102L. Vinton '"Outsider1 Parties and the Political Process in Poland" in RFE/RL Research Report 3:31, 21 
January 1994, p. 14.
103 Polish Radio, Warsaw 2100 gmt 25 April 1993 (SWB 28/04/93).
104 The ROAD was charged with downplaying these aspects, e.g., by J. Mikke (Citizens’ Committee 
Attached to Walesa), as per PAP in English 2001 gmt 29 July 1990. Other delegates criticised ROAD’s 
less than nationalistic stance. On the alleged Jewish nature o f ROAD, Walesa commented that “persons o f  
Jewish origin should not conceal this (their origin)”. The statement “I am proud o f the fact that I am 
Polish and, similarly, I would have been proud of my origin if I had been Jewish” illustrated the 
combination o f rejection of anti-Semitism with a suggestion that Jewish is not Polish. Walesa cited by 
PAP in English 1822 gme 29 July 1990 (SWB 01/08/90).
105 Former PM P. Boross attributed the party’s loss of popularity to its liberal line, suggesting that only
Lezak could bring it back on the Christian, popular national-liberal line. Magyar Nemzet, cited in The
Hungary Report, 1:34, 22/01/96. MDNP, “Self-Portrait o f the People’s Party” at
http://www.net.hu/English/mdnp/selfport.htm.
106 I. Csuhaj, “Similarities and differences in the policy o f the MDF and the MDNP”, Magyar Hirlap, 1 
March 1996 (SWB 09/03/96). S. Fisher, “New caucus in Hungarian parliament”, OMRI Daily Digest, 
12/03/1996.
107 I. Csuhaj, “Similarities and differences in the policy of the MDF and the MDNP”; S. Fisher, “New  
caucus in Hungarian parliament”.
108 Hungarian Radio, in Hungarian, 17000 gmt 4 March 1996 (SWB 06/03/96).
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Th e  P e a s a n t  P a r t ie s
Only two peasant parties have seen much success in East Central Europe, and both have 
adopted policies that reflect general scepticism towards rapid economic transition, 
grounded in protection of the agricultural sector, as well as a populist orientation 
towards ‘ethnic nationalism.’ The PSL party programme emphasises the party’s 
opposition to “‘absolutisation’ of political and economic liberalism.”109 This scepticism 
was evident in the Pawlak government’s ambivalent attitude towards privatisation, and 
in the continuing tension between the PSL and SLD, 1993-97.110 Likewise, the FKgP 
has been sceptical to privatisation, except full agrarian re-privatisation (which caused its 
departure from the governing coalition in 1991).111 The Polish party has been the more 
openly conservative of the two in terms of the role of the Church, a point that is 
specifically recognised in the party programme, as is the peasants’ role as perpetuators 
of the Polish nation. Both parties have invoked the inter-war East Central European 
‘peasantist’ tradition, combining scepticism towards the market with populism and 
ethnic nationalism, the FKgP emphasising its ‘national’ character, e.g., in deputy chair
i n
Agnes Maczo Nagy’s call for a “really independent Hungary”. Party leader Torgyan 
argued it would be an “unforgivable crime” to sign the treaty with Romania.113 
Unrestrained by participation in government, Pawlak’s resignation speech took a similar 
nationalist stance warning against foreign investment dominating the country.114
The Liberal and Social Union, formed in 1991 of a merger between the Czechoslovak 
Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Agrarian Party, offered a short-lived 
alternative, focusing on local self-administration and emphasising liberal principles, a 
mixed economy and environment protection. “The LSU perceives the social principle as
109 “Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: Ideological Declaration o f the Polish People’s Party” adopted at the 
Extraordinary Congress o f Polish People’s Party Warsaw, 29 June 1991 (amended at III and IV PSL 
Congresses), http://www.psl.org.pl/anglia/psl-ide.html.
110 L. Vinton “Pawlak Questions Mass Privatisation” OMRI Daily Digest 05 August 1994; B. Slay 
“Gdansk Shipyard Causes Political Tensions to Flare Anew in Poland”, OMRI Analytical Briefs, 1:207, 
01/07/96.
111 FKgP general secretary G. Gyimoti said the party would end “predatory privatisation” 
(rabolprivatizalas). Hungarian Radio, in Hungarian, 1500 gmt February 1994 (SWB 01/03/94); Magyar 
Nemzet 18 January 1994, p.4 (SWB 26/01/94).
112 Interview in Magyar Nemzet 18 January 1994, p.4 (SWB 26/01/94).
113 Hungarian Radio in Hungarian 1240 gmt 3 September 1996 (SWB 05/09/96).
114 This included reference to Poland as a potential “white-half-colony”, Eastern Europe Newsletter 9:5 
(02/03/95).
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an organic part of the market economy”.115 The author of its economic strategy was 
Milos Zeman, subsequent leader of the CSSD. However, the LSU’s liberal principles 
were counterbalanced by fear of German influence through privatisation, particularly by 
Sudeten Germans purchasing or potentially reclaiming land.116 The party developed a 
focus on protection of farmers’ interests, eventually merging with the Farmers’ Party, 
though this failed to prevent it being wiped out in the 1996 election, polling less than
117half a percent.
Th e  S o c ia l  D e m o c r a  t  a n d  D e m o c r a  t ic  (R e f o r m  C o m m u n ist )  L e f t
The social democrat/democratic left ‘family’ of parties is characterised by the duality 
that its name suggests: the difference between social democrat parties and the formerly 
communist democratic left. In terms of policy, all the parties have taken a liberal stand 
on non-economic issues, while the democratic left has adopted more radical economic 
programmes but also a more ‘ethnic’ approach to nationalism. The Czech CSSD 
represents the ‘ideal type’ social democrat party in the region, and Poland’s UP came 
close to this model too. Founded in 1878 and merged with the Communist Party (KSC) 
in 1948, the CSSD was re-established in November 1989. Its economic policy has been 
shaped by its opposition to Klaus’ governments, and has, therefore, focused on 
increased welfare spending, though party leader Zeman expressed qualified support for 
the right’s economic programmes and lent some measured support to Klaus’ minority 
government.118 Zeman rejected Klaus’ allegations that the CSSD would reverse 
developments since 1989 as “silly”, and replied by favourably contrasting his critical 
stance in early 1989 to Klaus’ work at the (old regime’s) Economic Forecasting 
Institute.119 Even KDU-CSL chairman Lux argued that the ODS created an “artificial
170clash” between itself and the CSSD during the 1996 Senate elections. Zeman has
115 LSU election broadcast, Czech Radio, Prague 0830 gmt 26 May 1992 (SWB 01/06/92).
116 LSU press conference, Czech Radio, Prague 2030 gmt 3 April 1992 (SWB 09/04/92); Slovak Radio, 
Bratislava 1730 gmt 20 February 1992 (SWB 24/02/92).
117 CTK news agency, Prague, in English 1738 gmt 3 December 1994, (SWB 05/12/94), CTK news 
agency, Prague, in English 2130 gmt 3 February 1996 (SWB 06/02/96).
118 1996 electoral programme, cited by CTK in English 1915 gmt 23 April 1995 (SWB 25/04/95); M.
Zeman, as per CTK in English 1641 gmt 3 June 1996 (SWB 05/06/96).
1,9 Klaus and Zeman on Czech TV1, in Czech 2009 gmt 1 June 1996 (SWB 03/06/96); CTK in English
0926 gmt 20 November 1995 (SWB 21/11/95).
120 Lux on Czech TVlin Czech 1100 gmt 24 November 1996 (SWB 26/11/96). Klaus disagreed.
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been at pains to point out that the CSSD is a normal West European Social Democratic
191party, rejecting Klaus’ assertion that ideology separates the two parties. The key
199difference is prioritising social or economic values. Yet the CSSD remains the party
199most voters perceive as competent on welfare issues. Finally, Zeman has been critical 
of Klaus’ “sceptical” and potentially “isolationist” tendencies on European
124integration.
If the CSSD is a more modernised form of social democracy, the post-Solidarity UP 
(Union of Labour, formerly Labour Solidarity) represented the traditional Twentieth 
Century social democrat orientation towards protection of workers, advocating
19c m # #
progressive taxation and liberal social policy. Its scepticism towards rapid economic 
reform was evident in its reluctant support for the Pawlak government and its criticism 
of the Oleksy government’s economic policy for heavy taxation of low and medium
19/»income workers. The UP dropped out of coalition talks after the October 1993 
election primarily over the SLD’s intention to continue the previous government’s 
privatisation policy, and it had opposed Suchocka’s government programme in 1992 on
197the same grounds (though it lent support to the government as such). On non­
economic matters the party has proved more libertarian, opposing legislation banning 
abortion and leading the campaign for a referendum on the issue, and emphasising the
190
secular nature of Polish politics. Its party congress instructed its MPs to reject the
1 9 0Concordat with the Vatican. Like several of the liberal parties, it said little about 
ethnicity.
121 Zeman on Czech TV1, in Czech 2009 gmt 1 June 1996 (SWB 03/06/96).
122 Zeman on Czech TV1, in Czech 1100 gmt 24 November 1996 (SWB 26/11/96).
123 In a 1996 poll, 32% named the CSSD, 17% named the ODS. CTK in English 0651 gmt 10 June 1996 
(SWB 11/06/96).
124 Zeman, as per CTK in English 1546 gmt 30 August 1996 (SWB 02/10/96).
125 In 1993, R. Bugaj (party leader) was reportedly aiming to build a party along the lines o f the UK 
Labour Party. Eastern Europe Newsletter, 7:21 (19/10/93).
126 Opposition to Pawlak was made clear at an extraordinary conference, as reported by PAP in English 
1821 gmt 26 March 1994 (SWB 30/03/94). The UP proceeded to join the BBWR and KPN in a vote 
against the government’s wage control law, PAP in English, 1524 gmt 23 April 1994 (SWB 25/04/94). 
On Oleksy: PAP in Polish, 1734 gmt 18 March 1995 (SWB 20/03/95).
127 Bugaj as per PAP in English 1526 gmt 13 October 1993 (SWB 15/10/93); Bugaj, as per PAP in 
English 2024 gmt 11 July 1992 (SWB 13/07/92).
128 PAP in English 1736 gmt 13 November 1992 (SWB 17/11/92); R. Bugaj (UP party leader) as per 
PAP in English 1159 gmt 26 July 1993 (SWB 29/07/93).
129 PAP in English 1821 gmt 26 March 1994 (SWB 30/03/94).
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The democratic left (reform communist) parties have proved more aggressively free 
market oriented that the CSSD and the UP, partly because they shed their left-wing 
factions to the ‘rump-communist’ parties. Once in office they maintained (SLD) or 
even accelerated (MSzP) the previous governments’ economic reform programmes. The 
MSzP’s economic programme, as set out by Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi after the 
1994 elections, was reported as a “belt-tightening plan” due to its “generally restrictive 
policy” including reduction of government spending, its wage policy and attack on
■I -1A
“over-regulation”. Though Bekesi resigned in January 1995, citing disagreement with 
Horn over privatisation and economic reform, the SzDSz-MSzP coalition continued to
n i
pursue a strategy of rapid economic reform under Bokros and Medgyessy. Even 
though its rhetoric in 1994 stressed the problems of uncontrolled privatisation and
1 'JOunemployment, the MSzP was responsible for acceleration of economic reform. In 
Poland, the SLD set out to pursue a tight monetary policy and close links with the IMF, 
despite its links with OPZZ.133 After the 1993 election, negotiations between the SLD, 
the UP and the PSL revealed considerable differences over economic policy, largely due 
to the SLD’s commitment to its predecessors’ economic programmes (which it had 
occasionally supported).134 Come the 1997 election its position on privatisation was 
close to that of the UW, save for its reluctance to break up utilities monopolies (gas,
1 -J £
electricity and telecommunications). Though neither party can be accused of 
conservative or illiberal tendencies as far as social policy is concerned, both parties have
130 MTI in English 1025 gmt 11 July 1994 (SWB 21/07/94).
131 E. Oltay “Hungarian Finance Minister Resigns”, OMRI Daily Digest 30/01/95; Eastern Europe 
Newsletter 9:4 (16/02/95). Separation o f the finance and privatisation portfolios sparked the crisis; Z. 
Szilagyi “Implications for the Coalition” OMRI Analytical Brief 1:6, 20/02/96. Finance Minister Bokros 
continued the economic programme, but ceded control o f privatisation to the newly appointed 
privatisation minister, Suchmann. Eastern Europe Newsletter 9:9 (28/04/95). Economic austerity 
measures were announced on March 12th, 1995, and pushed through a surprised cabinet by Bokros with 
support from G.Suranyi (the new Central Bank Governor), causing the resignation o f two ministers (P. 
Kovacs, welfare, and B. Katona, without portfolio, in charge o f the secret services), Eastern Europe 
Newsletter 9:6 (15/03/95). On Bokros: Z. Szilagyi “Hungary's Finance Minister Steps Down” OMRI 
Analytical Brief 1:6, 20/02/96; Z. Szilagyi “Hungary's Finance Minister Steps Down” OMRI Analytical 
Brief 1:6, 20/02/96. On Medgyessy: Z. Szilagyi, “The First Hundred Days of Hungary's New Finance 
Minister”, OMRI Analytical Brief 1:180, 18/06/96; Z. Szilagyi, “Hungarian Finance Minister Outlines 
Reform Programme”, OMRI Daily Digest, (29/02/96).
132 Horn, Hungarian TV1 in Hungarian 1800 gmt 20 August 1994 (SWB 23/08/94).
133 The ex-communist OPZZ trade union supported 60 out o f 171 SLD MPs. Eastern Europe Newsletter, 
21:7(19/10/93).
134 PAP, in English 2253 gmt 6 October 1993 (SWB 08/10/93); PAP in English 1807 gmt 1 May 93 
(SWB 04/05/97); Oleksy, Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, in Polish 1249 gmt 4 March 95 (SWB 06/03/95).
135 5 5 PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1425 gmt 18 September 1997 (SWB 20/09/97).
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adopted a more or less ‘ethnic’ approach to nationhood and issues related to 
nationalism. Within the MSzP, a more populist ‘national democrat’ faction has been 
associated with F. Kosa.136 It thus joined Fidesz in combining a generally liberal 
outlook with an emphasis on the ethnic dimension of nationhood. Following the 
election, however, the new government shifted its foreign policy in the region to a more 
conciliatory approach.137 A similar approach on the part of the SLD was reflected in 
Oleksy’s inauguration speech, citing minority rights.138
The SDSS and the SDL, the principal partners in the Common Choice (SV) coalition in
the Slovak elections in 1994, both pursue predominantly ‘civic’ strategies when it
comes to social policy and policy towards the Hungarian minority (though both have
seen internal dissent on this matter), but their economic policies have differed
somewhat. The SDL has at times contemplated supporting an HzDS minority
government, though this has been conditional on the HzDS severing its ties with the
1ZRS and the SNS and Weiss has proved more open to co-operation with the KDH. 
However, the SDL’s criticism of Meciar focused on his failure to halt privatisation, 
whereas the SDSS has proved more supportive of radical privatisation, shifting its 
position closer to the more liberal parties, at the cost of the departure of some of its left- 
wing members. Like their Czech sister party (CSSD), both parties have been critical of 
the two governments’ limited efforts at improving relations between the Czech and 
Slovak republics.140 The SDL confirmed its civic orientation on national questions with 
chairman Peter Weiss’ re-election in February 1995, when he defeated a candidate more 
open to co-operation with the HzDS.141 Within the SDSS a faction advocating a shift 
towards more focus on “Slovakia’s national interests” was formed in June 1995.142 
However, the party has since entered formal co-operation with the KDH -  DH -  DS 
coalition, to the point where they formed a joint coalition for the 1998 elections.
136 After the 1994 elections this faction’s strength was an estimated 50-55 o f the party ‘s 209 MPs. 
Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:24 (01/12/95).
137 This entailed advocating regional rather than individual entry to NATO and focus on bi-lateral treaties 
with Slovakia and Romania. Eastern Europe Newsletter, 9:3 (01/02/95).
138 Oleksy, Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, in Polish 1249 gmt 4 March 95 (SWB 06/03/95).
139 Meciar in Pravda (Bratislava) in Slovak 4 July 1996, p. 1,4 (SWB 08/07/96); CTK in English 0627 
gmt 8 August 1996 (SWB 09/08/96). The SDL accepts the KDH as clearly separated from the Church.
140 Joint CSSD-SDL communique, as per TASR, in English 1403 gmt 9 January 96 (SWB 11/01/96).
14IThough Lubomir Fogas rejected belonging to a faction that favoured closer co-operation with Meciar, 
there is clear discord between him and Weiss on questions o f local level cooperation with the HzDS and 
KDH. Both are cited by CTK, in English, 1457 gmt 19 February 1995 (SWB 21/02/95).
142 L. Kohut, Renewal spokesman, cited by CTK in English 0937 gmt June 1995 (SWB 24/06/95).
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Th e  F a r  L e f t; E x t r e m e  R ig h t  a n d  E t h n ic  M in o r it y  P a r t ie s
The KSCM and the ZRS have combined opposition to free market-oriented economic 
policy with ‘ethnic’ approaches to nationalism, with a degree of electoral success. In the 
KSCM’s case, this can be put down to its regional nature and agrarian politics, because 
collectivisation left most peasants classified as workers rather than peasants. The party 
fits the ideal type unreformed communist party, emphasising opposition to free market 
reforms and ethnic nationalism. Its proposed Czech language law is a case in point, as is 
its criticism of the governments’ “vassal policy” towards Germany.143 On economic 
policy, it makes no secret of its attachment to pre-1989 values.144 Hence its focus is on 
expansion of welfare expenditure, but also on a strong agricultural sector.145 When the 
ZRS registered as a political party before the 1994 election, its chairman Jan Luptak 
emphasised the party’s left wing status: a party defending the interests of the ‘people at 
the bottom’.146 Following the election, he made it clear that his party was not prepared 
to join the government unless President Kovac would appoint it in time to halt the 
second step of the privatisation process, stressing that “we, the workers, and our 
party...” were looking for ways to reject it.147 Coupon privatisation was delayed and the 
ZRS duly got the privatisation portfolio.148 It continued to support the Meciar 
government. For its part, the KSCM rejected the Klaus’ government’s relationship with 
West European states, which it criticised in highly nationalist terms.149 Grebenicek 
reacted to the Czech -  German Treaty by charging that the Klaus government falsified 
national history and was a “government of national treason”.150
143 CTK in English 1638 gmt 17 January 1996 (SWB 19/01/96); M. Grebenicek, as per CTK in English 
0839 gmt 30 May 1996 (SWB 31/05/96).
144 M. Grebenicek (KSCM chairman), cited by CTK in English 1331 gmt 20 June 1996 (SWB 22/07/96). 
V. Exner (then KSCM chair) in parliament, as per CTK in English 1321 gmt 15 December 1994 (SWB 
17/12/94); and as per CTK in English 1549 gmt 23 November 1995 (SWB 25/11/95); Grebenicek’s 
address to the 4th KSCM national conference, CTK in English, 1257 gmt 2 December 1996 (SWB 
05/12/96).
145 M. Grebenicek, as per CTK in English 0839 gmt 30 May 1996 (SWB 31/05/96).
146 CTK in English 2009 gmt 27 April 1994 (SWB 02/05/94).
147 Jan Luptak, and presidential spokesman Vladimir Stefko, Slovak 1 Radio in Slovak 1100 gmt 12 
December 1994 (SWB 14/12/94).
148 P. Bisak (ZRS) appointed privatisation minister December 11th, 1994, while coupon privatisation had 
been due to start December 15. Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:25 (15/12/94). The ZRS opposes 
privatisation in principle.
149 J. Navtail on the KSCM’s opposition to NATO and EU membership (KSCM press conference) CTA 
in English 1829 gmt 27 July 1995 (SWB 29/07/95).
150 M. Grebenicek, as per CTK in English 2306 gmt 21 January 1997 (SWB 23/01/97); KSCM 
spokeswoman Vera Zezulkova, CTK in English 1537 gmt 13 April 1996 (SWB 15/04/96).
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The parties on the extreme right share much of the hard left’s platform. All conform to 
the classical West European extreme right, focusing on ethnic nationalism, stressing 
threats to the nation from foreigners and opposing liberal measures in social policy. 
However, while the Scandinavian far right has developed a strong element of libertarian 
economics, their East Central European counterparts emphasise scepticism on the 
economic front. The Czech Republicans (SPR-RSC) are close to their German 
counterparts and the (pre-AN) MSI in Italy, i.e., fiercely hostile to minorities and 
featuring a limited economic agenda. Sladek and Krejsa, SPR-RSC chairman and editor 
of Republika respectively, both had their parliamentary immunity lifted so that they 
could be prosecuted for inciting racial hatred.151 MIEP, the nationalist MDF-breakaway 
led by Csurka, accordingly brandishes an extremist form of Hungarian nationalism, 
which is translated into economic policy, e.g., in accusations to the effect that Western 
Europe has been “colonising” Hungary. In 1993 co-chairman Horvath cast its policy 
in terms of a social market economy, adding criticism of the IMF and pointing out that
1 S3“we will not voluntarily give up the territories that were detached from us.” In 
Slovakia, even the HzDS has found the SNS a problematic coalition partner due to its 
extreme nationalist stand.154 At one point, the party walked out of parliament in 
objection to a law legalising the use of Hungarian Christian names.155 Its line towards 
the minority is summed up in the party leader’s reference to “these Hungarian 
irredentists”.156 Upon entering government, SNS ministers wasted little time in
1 S7alienating the Hungarian community, e.g., over education policy. Nevertheless, even 
the SNS described itself as “progressive in the economic sphere”, favouring 
privatisation, while socially “moderately conservative”, and Cemak was expelled for
1 SRbreaking the coalition agreement with the HzDS by voting against the 1994 budget.
151 CTK, in English 1447 gmt 15 March 1997 and 2011 gmt 10 July 1997 (SWB 17/03/97 and 12/06/97).
152 MTI news agency, Budapest, in English 1650 gmt 9 December 1995 (SWB, 11/12/95).
153 Horvath, interviewed in Nepszabadsag, in Hungarian 20 November 1993 (SWB 26/11/93).
154 CTK in English 1206 gmt 27 June 1995 (SWB 29/06/95). A Huska understatement had it that the SNS 
could be “a little more moderate”, CTK in English 1805 gmt 13 January 1996 (SWB 15/01/96).
155 CTK in English 1311 gmt 27 May 1994 (SWB 31/05/94).
156 Slota, ‘Steps’ party leader discussion programme, Slovak TV1, Bratislava, in Slovak 1129 gmt 25 June 
1995 (SWB 28/06/95). Minority MPs’ use o f Hungarian in Parliament, which required translators and 
headphones, was described as “simply revolting”.
157 Local schools have always been a critical question in minority relations, and SNS Education minister 
E. Slavkovska’s focus on Slovak-language schools in the Hungarian region was hardly a popular move 
there. Eastern Europe Newsletter, 9:1 (04/01/95) and 9:9 (28 April 1995).
158 Cemak, describing his party’s programme, Slovak TV, 1730 gmt 25 April 1993 (SWB 28/04/93). SNS 
policy on privatisation remained close to that o f the HzDS, stressing only increased agricultural subsidies,
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In Poland, the far right was represented only by the KPN during the 1993-97 
parliament. Its economic line has been critical of shock therapy, and it has stressed the 
need for ‘lustration’.159 However, the catch-all nature of the Polish right and the blurred 
boundaries between the Christian national right and the far right are illustrated by the 
KPN’s membership of the AWS. Come 1997 only Olszewski’s more extreme ROP 
remained as a parliamentary competitor to the ‘right’ of the AWS.
The Hungarian minority parties in Slovakia that make up the MK (Magyar Coalition),
the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS), Coexistence (Egyutteles) and the Hungarian
Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) are relatively neutral on the economic and
‘open society’ axis, but have tended to favour the market. Egyutteles is a member of
European Liberal Democratic and Reform Parties (ELDR), and describes itself as
“standing for both liberal and conservative traditions”.160 The MKDH is closer to the
DU. The MK has continuously opposed Meciar’s governments, supporting anti-Meciar
coalitions but requesting, e.g., language laws as a quid pro quo.161 It has found some co-
1operation from the KDH and the DS, and somewhat less from the SDL and the DU.
However, the SDL and DU support the Hungarians’ quest for legislation protecting their
1language rights, in accordance with OSCE requirements. Internal MK problems have 
mainly reflected clashes of personalities, though on one occasion the MOS criticised 
Egyutteles as ‘nationalist’.164 Egyutteles’ defence of Hungarian minority rights is cast 
primarily in collective rather than individual terms, based partly on their membership of 
the Hungarian state until 1918.165 Is classification as ‘civic’ nationalist is therefore
Cemak, as per CTK in English 1520 gmt 1 December 1993 (SWB 04/12/93). Eastern Europe Newsletter, 
8:3 (01/01/94); Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:5 (02/03/94). J. Slota took over the leadership o f the SNS, 
reduced from 14 to 8 MPs as Cemak set up the National Democratic Party.
159 PAP in English 1628 gmt 10 July 1992, 1536 gmt 6 May 1993, 2313 gmt 15 June 1992 (SWB 
13/07/92, 10/05/93 and 17/06/92).
160 Coexistence homepage, http://www.kdnp.hu/coex/ANGOL.HTM.
161 A. Duka-Zolyomi (Egyutteles deputy chairman) on Meciar “rejecting any dialogue”, cited by CTK in 
English 1843 gmt 20 Mar 94 (SWB 22/03/94); CTK in English 2110 gmt 21 March 1994 (SWB 
23/03/94).
162 Egyutteles chairman Duray, as per CTK in English 1341 gmt 19 March 1996 (SWB 21/03/96).
163 TASR in English 1925 gmt 9 January 1996 (SWB 11/01/96); CTK in English 1311 gmt 27 May 1994 
(SWB 31/05/94); CTK in English 2726 gmt 7 June 94 (SWB 07/07/94).
164 CTK in English 0915 gmt 7 July 1994 (SWB 08/07/94).
165 Egyutteles document: “From minority status to Partnership”, http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/AD- 
PARTN.HTM.
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somewhat misleading, as it is based on opposition to ethnic Slovak nationalism rather 
than necessarily on individualistic or ‘civic’ principles.
C o n c l u sio n : Pa r t y  A l ig n m e n ts  in  E a st  C en t r a l  E u r o pe
This overview of parties and party alignments in post-communist East Central Europe 
suggests two broad conclusions. First, a ‘left -  right’ dimension is discernible, i.e., one 
major dimension can be extrapolated from patterns of party competition. However, it is 
better described as a dimension running from commitment to an ‘open’ society to a 
‘closed’ society rather than in terms of left and right. The liberal parties may be located 
on the right, but the traditional right-wing populist parties are on the ‘left’ in this 
schema, with the reform communists and social democrats in the centre. Second, 
competition between parties that are committed primarily to ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ 
approaches to questions that derive from nationalism represents a second significant 
dimension of post-communist party competition. And party positions on nationalist 
questions do not necessarily reflect their position on the ‘open’ -  ‘closed’ dimension. 
The two-dimensional grid therefore provides not only an appropriate device for analysis 
of party alignments, but also a basis for analysis of developments in party strategy and 
theories of coalition building, which is the subject of the next chapter.
The assessment of party alignments set out in Table 7.1 represents an effort to align 
East Central Europe post-communist parties on a cross-country comparative basis, 
based on party programmes, reports, interviews and analysis in the media and activity in 
parliament. For each party the co-ordinates reflect its average position over time, on two 
dimensions: the ‘open’ -  ‘closed’ society dimension and the dimension reflecting ‘civic’ 
and ‘ethnic’ approached to nationalism. In both cases the scale runs from ‘-10’ to ‘10’, 
where ‘0’ is neutral and +/-10 extreme. ‘1’ -  ‘3’ denotes a moderate position, ‘4’ -  ‘6’ a 
considerable position or commitment, and ‘7’ -  ‘9’ a strong position. E.g., ‘3,-8’ would 
indicate a moderate commitment to ‘open’ society and a strong commitment to ethnic 
nationalism.
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Table 7.1 Comparative Party Alignments
P o l a n d S l o v a k ia C z e c h  R e p . H u n g a r y
L i b e r a l
( B u r g e r l i c h )
P a r t i e s
KLD 9,8 
UD 7,8 
UW 8,8 
PPPP/PPG 9,6
DS 8,7 
DU 5,-1
ODA 8,6 
ODS 7,-3 
OH 4,8
SzDSz 7,6 
Fidesz 6,-2
D e n o m i n a t i o n a l
P a r t i e s ZChN -5,-5 KDH 6,5
KDU-CSL 3,2 
KDS 5,-1 KDNP -3,-3
N e w  P o p u l i s t  
P a r t i e s
BBWR -3,-3 
PC -3,-5 
AWS -3,-3
HzDS -5,-7
MDF -4,-1 
MDNP 2,-1
P e a s a n t  P a r t i e s PSL -7,-5 LSU -2,-2 FKgP -6,-7
s o c i a l
D e m o c r a t s  a n d  
t h e  D e m o c r a t ic  
L e f t
SLD 5,-1 
UP -3,2
SDL -6,2 
SDSS 4,4 
SV -3,3
CSSD 1,4 MSzP 4,-3
T h e  F a r  L e f t ZRS -9,-6 KSCM -9,-6
T h e  F a r  R ig h t KPN -5,-7 
ROP -6,-8
SNS -2,-9 SPR-RSC -1,-9 MIEP -5,-8
E t h n ic
M in o r i t ie s
MK 2,4
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 270
C h a p t e r  E ig h t  
B e y o n d  th e  A n a r c h ic  Pa r t y  Sy s t e m : 
T h e  E a st  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e a n  Pa r t y  
Sy st e m s  1989-1998
“To win a governing majority requires action at two levels: policy innovation and alliance building”
- Masimo D ’Alema, Party Conference, July, 1995
The introduction offered a definition of a party system in terms of multiple parties, 
parties’ influence on policy-making, their separation from the state and, most 
significantly, stable patterns of inter-party competition. In post-communist East Central 
Europe, as in early twentieth Century Western Europe, the development of inter-party 
competition is the key to the metamorphosis from a ‘nascent’ to fully developed party 
system. This has been a dynamic process. Parties have responded to their opponents’ 
strategies in the light of electoral performance, thereby developing government -  
opposition competition at the electoral, parliamentary, intra-coalition and inter-party 
level.1 Given the structure of party organisation and the room for leadership discretion 
this development has been driven by the party elites, and often associated very closely 
with specific individuals. The outcome has been well-developed party systems, at least 
in three out of the four East Central European cases. Slovakia provides the partial 
exception.
The party systems that emerged from the collapse of communism could at best be 
descried as ‘anarchic’ during the early years. Party competition did not conform to the 
patterns found in West European politics -  and definitely not to Katz & Mair’s cartel of 
parties (even though the parties may have resembled the cartel party ideal type 
organisationally). Until the 1992-94 series of elections, party competition in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland featured a host of parties competing for votes and office 
without undue concern for coalition politics. The first elections and the subsequent
1 Levels and dimensions of competition are discussed in the introduction, with reference to M. Maor & G. 
Smith “Govemment-Opposition Relationships as a Systemic Property: A Theoretical Framework”, ECPR 
Joint Session o f  Workshops, Leiden April 1993.
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break-up of conglomerate parties compelled the successor parties to form alliances and 
coalitions in an ‘anarchical society’. Parliamentary anarchy has a greater tendency to 
give way to a stable system than Bull’s international ‘anarchical society’, though, as the 
Slovak case illustrates, this development is not inevitable. The process of making and 
breaking of governments tends to force parties to adopt strategies for coalition-building 
in government or opposition. This is the stuff of developed party systems.
So far, three central arguments have been developed. Though party system development 
is approached from a rational choice perspective, party elites operate under constraints 
that influence party competition. First, high electoral volatility and the slow 
development of party identification means that East Central European parties operate 
under fewer constraints than their West European counterparts did in the first decades of 
the century. Their freedom of action is considerable, at least as far as electoral strategies 
are concerned, but the anti-incumbency tendency provides one major constraint on this 
freedom. East Central European governments do not, as a rule, get re-elected. Though it 
will probably change in the medium to long term, this pendulum effect has provided 
most major East Central European parties with government experience. Incumbent 
governments, therefore, compete with prospective governments at election time, and 
every major party has been in government.
Second, despite some differences in party organisation, all East Central European 
parties are leadership-dominated. In West European terms they resemble the ‘cartel’ 
ideal type organisationally. This makes party elites the driving force behind party 
system development. Pappalardo argues that elite motivation and independence are 
requirements for consociational democracy, and this argument can be extended to East 
Central Europe. Strategic choices determine the patterns of competition and co­
operation within and between the government and opposition camps, and can lead to 
consolidation of party systems (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) or continued 
fluidity (Slovakia).
2 The title is borrowed from H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics, (London, 
Macmillan, 1977).
3 A. Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique”, 
European Journal o f  Political Research, 9 (1981), 365-390.
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Third, the left -  right dimension associated with economic transition and ‘liberal* 
politics dominates post-communist party competition. Like their West European 
counterparts, the East Central European party systems feature one dominant dimension. 
Moreover, competition between liberal and authoritarian non-economic policy tends to 
align with this dimension. However, the development of post-communist party systems 
also reflects tension between civic and ethnic approaches to nationalism. Even though 
this may not be manifest in party programmes, it is evident in party competition. Both 
dimensions combine to shape inter-party competition and govemment-formation.
Only with the second elections and the consolidation of political parties, did the party 
systems develop beyond anarchy towards stable competition. Since this competition 
centres on the government - opposition relationship, and competition and co-operation 
within each bloc, coalition theory provides an appropriate staring point. Parties without 
coalition potential, or at least the potential to ‘blackmail’ the coalition, have been 
discounted as irrelevant in several analyses of West European politics.4 The point of a 
party system is that it is more than the sum of its parts. In Mair’s words, “an 
understanding of party system change must focus on that which defines the system in 
the first place: the patterns of interaction between the parties.”5 Therefore, the current 
focus on the development of and change in East Central European party systems is 
based on patterns of interaction: between parties and between blocs of parties. Hence 
the focus on coalition theory.
T h e o r ie s  o f  C o a l it io n  G o v e r n m e n t
The history of coalition theory reveals a development that takes increasing account of 
the influence of the party system. While the early (numerical) approaches assumed a 
considerable degree of anarchy, coalition theories developed in the 1990s are taking 
patterns of competition and the party systems into account. The advantage of the more 
complex coalition theories is that some of them consider party strategies and alliances
4 G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), Chapter Five.
5 P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), p.74. 
On p.51, Mair quotes Sartori’s focus on the system o f interactions between parties with approval. Sartori, 
Parties and Party Systems, p. 44-45; see the Introduction, above.
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as input into the process, not merely as the output of coalition games. The limits of 
many numerical coalition theories derive from their blindness not only to policy, but 
also to the very party system they are designed to analyse.
F o r m a l  C o a l it io n  Th e o r y  a n d  A s s u m p t io n s  o f  Ra t io n a l it y
Two historical traditions in analysis of coalition building are identified in Laver & 
Schofield’s analysis of multiparty government: a West European politics tradition and 
one based on game theory.6 Broadly speaking, the first is derived from single-country 
and comparative studies of coalition politics on Western Europe, while the second has 
been developed from formal models that attempt to go beyond the peculiarities of 
individual cases. However, more sophisticated formal models are being developed, with 
the capacity to incorporate some country-specific elements. Notably, Laver & Shepsle’s 
model focuses on the government portfolios and dimensions of competition that experts 
consider most significant in each case, and gives due consideration to the starting point 
in negotiations.7 The history of formal coalition theories reflects increasing recognition 
that party strategy matters. Formal coalition theories have faced problems precisely 
because party systems are more than just the sum of their parts, i.e., because they are 
systems.
Nevertheless, ‘policy blind’ coalition theories provide significant insight into the 
dynamics of making and breaking governments. The rational choice assumptions behind 
these theories may be vindicated even if no formal theory can explain all the 
peculiarities of each case study. For example, most formal coalition theories suggest 
that the MSzP-SzDSz coalition requires an explanation in terms of the particular 
circumstances, given that the MSzP had a parliamentary majority on its own. The most 
interesting questions for comparative politics derive from cases that contradict game 
theories that are ‘blind’ to national factors.
6 M. Laver & N. Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics o f  Coalition in Europe, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990), Chapter One.
7 M. Laver & K. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in 
Parliamentary Democracies, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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The formal theories are based on a series of assumptions, most of which have been
o
discussed in considerable detail elsewhere. These assumptions are, however, worth 
noting.
1. The basic Downsian assumption that political parties seek office lies at the heart of 
Riker’s approach to coalition theory.9 Parties seek office for the sake of the spoils of 
office, in a zero-sum game. Votes are maximised in pursuit of office, though West 
European history provides several examples of conflict between short term office 
seeking and medium term vote maximisation. Winning entails taking part in a 50%+ 
coalition.
2. Alternatively, de Swaan assumes that parties seek office in order to implement 
policy.10 Taking this one step further, Laver & Schofield note that office is but one 
means by which policy can be influenced.11
3. Finally, the two assumptions can be combined: i) parties seek office in order to 
influence policy, or ii) parties choose to focus on certain policies or aspects of
1 9ideology in order to maximise votes.
4. Several theories assume a degree of consistency, i.e., parties cannot depart too 
radically from the political identity they have developed, even if the original policy
1 3stance was merely opportunistic.
These assumptions are problematic in several ways, particularly due to their blindness 
to the setting within which the coalition games are played and their assumptions of 
perfect information.
i) Formal coalition theories assume that clear preferences are being pursued. 
However, these need not necessarily be hierarchical, let alone well known.
ii) Coalition games are played at several levels, within as well as between parties.14 
Parties are not necessarily unified actors.
8 See in particular, Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, and I. Budge & H. Keman, Parties and 
Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990).
9 W. Riker, The Theory o f  Political Coalitions, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962); A. Downs, An 
Economic Theory o f  Democracy, (New York, Harper & Row, 1957).
10 A. de Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation, (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1973).
11 Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government.
12 One modem ‘classic’ example is (New) Labour’s use o f focus groups, UK 1994 -  1997.
13 Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments, p.248-249.
14 G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, (Berkeley, California University 
Press, 1990).
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iii) Nested games may involve future expectations, which are discounted by time 
and uncertainty.
iv) A party’s bargaining strength may vary with risk aversion, internal unity and its 
perceived margin of discretion.
Moreover, theoretical developments in the 1990s have shifted the focus away from 
minimal winning coalitions and the accompanying suggestion of zero-sum politics 
towards ‘viable coalitions’, a concept developed by Budge & Laver, and elaborated by 
Laver & Schofield.15 A coalition may be viable even if it contains less than 50% of 
parliament’s seats, as long as no majority prefers an alternative coalition that the 
coalition parties cannot veto.
Similarly, the use of Euclidian distances in early coalition theory has been challenged. 
The most significant alternative is ‘city block metric’, developed in Laver & Budge and 
Budge & Shepsle.16 In two-dimensional policy space, two parties may not be able to 
meet in the middle on each policy distance (the unbroken straight line between A and 
B), but may instead have to choose one party’s position on each issue (points ab or ba). 
Budge & Keman dispose with distances altogether, using a non-spatial approach.17
Figure 8.1
15 I. Budge & M. J. Laver, “Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory”, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 11:4 (1986), 485-506; I. Budge & M. J. Laver, “Coalition Theory, Government Policy and 
Party Policy”, in M. J. Laver & I. Budge, (eds.), Party Politics and Government Coalitions, (London, 
Macmillan, 1992); Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, Chapter Four.
16 I. Budge & M. J. Laver, “Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalitions”, in Laver & Budge 
(eds.), Party Politics and Government Coalitions, p.36-38; Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking 
Governments.
17 Budge & Keman, Parties and Democracy.
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More problematically, the West European experience indicates that changes in party 
performance may be more significant than the absolute result of an election. There was 
little reason for Norwegian prime minister Jagland to resign after the DNA lost two of 
its 67 seats in the 165-seat parliament in the 1997 election, other than the party’s failure 
to achieve the 36.9% it had polled four years earlier (it polled 35.0%).18 Though the 
Centre Party abandoned its seven-year support for the minority government, Jagland did 
not even try to negotiate. In other words, perceived victory or loss matters, as do 
commitments to resign if a certain target is not reached. Only the Laver & Shepsle 
model is equipped to deal with such problems, given its focus on the starting point in 
coalition negotiations (which can be an election, a government’s resignation or crisis, or 
a stable situation).
All the assumptions cited above regard parties as primarily instrumental. Yet parties are 
institutions that seek to survive, or even modernise. The survival element stressed by 
Panebianco is frequently forgotten in game theory, which tends not to consider the 
possibility of a player being eliminated (but only winning and losing) and the prize that 
survival represents.19 A more up-to-date version of this would focus on the need or
9 fidesire for modernisation and adaptation. Similarly, the party system can be interpreted
91as an institution which seeks to survive.
Finally, and most significantly, the party system and coalition strategies matter. The 
spatial coalition theories discussed briefly below all assume a degree of anarchy in 
inter-party relations, i.e., parties are free to form coalitions with any other party. 
Nevertheless, the history of coalition theory illustrates a growing concern with the 
impact of factors related to the party system.
18 T. Jagland, NRK, in Norwegian, 00:15 gmt 16 September 1997.
19 A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988).
20 Again the New Labour serves as a dramatic example, though the adaptation and modernisation themes 
were present in earlier debates on the superiority o f different types o f party organisation. M. Duverger, 
Political Parties, (London, Methuen, 1954); L.D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 
(London, Pall Mall, 1967); O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, in J. 
LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1966).
21 G. Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties: A Critical Review”, in O. Stammer (ed.), Party Systems, Party 
Organisations, and the Politics o f  New Masses, (Berlin, Free University o f Berlin, 1968).
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O f f ic e  S e e k in g  a n d  P o l ic y -B l in d  C o a l it io n  Th e o r ie s
Riker’s minimal winning coalition theory holds that coalitions will form that include 
only as many parties as is necessary. In other words coalitions should include no 
parties whose seats are not need to provide a (qualified) majority, because the benefits 
of government will have to be divided among a larger number of parties. This explains a 
number of coalitions (34% in Western Europe, 1945-71), but represents the least
O'X • *sophisticated theory of coalition building. Its explanatory power derives from the high 
number of potential minimal winning coalitions in each case, it is simply a matter of no 
party being able to leave the coalition without its collapsing. Only overweight or 
minority coalitions fail to confirm this theory. Strom adds that “there is no reason 
Riker’s logic should not apply below the majority threshold”, i.e., that the incremental 
process of adding more parties to the coalition may stop before the 50% mark.24 
Minority coalitions can, therefore, be explained in rational choice terms if a party can 
enjoy benefits by way of influence on policy through support for a coalition, without 
incurring long-term costs of being held accountable for the government’s performance.
The minimum winning coalition provides a far stricter, but also less explanatory, 
approach. This version of Riker’s theory suggests that the smallest minimal winning 
coalition will form, i.e., the coalition that contains the smallest number of seats but still 
more than 50%. Alternatively, allowing for the significance of bargaining costs, an 
alternative minimum winning coalition could be based on the smallest number of parties 
required for a coalition commanding more than half the seats in parliament. A seat 
distribution of 49- 16 - 16 - 16- 3  would thus yield the 16 + 16 + 16 + 3 (51 seats) and 
the 49 + 3 (two parties) coalitions respectively. The focus on seats is based on sharing 
out the spoils of government, but bargaining cost might warrant minimising the number 
of parties.
22 Riker, The Theory o f  Political Coalitions.
23 Budge & Keman, Parties and Democracy, p. 14.
24 K. Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p.49.
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 278
In t r o d u c in g  P o l ic y : P o l ic y -O r ie n t e d  Th e o r ie s
Minimal (and minimum) connected winning coalitions attach some weight to policy, 
escaping the blindness of Rikers’ approach. Briefly, Axelrod’s coalitions cannot ‘skip’ 
intermediary parties on a single left -  right scale. This would indicate that a C,D,F 
coalition must also include E. Coalitions that would contain ‘surplus’ parties by the 
above definitions could, therefore, be included.
Figure 8.2
L E F T  A —- B  C  D  E  F -----------R IG H T
De Swaan stresses the significance of policy space, suggesting that parties prefer to join 
parties that are not only adjacent on the left -  right dimension, but that the relative
If*distance is also significant. An alternative, which can avoid the need to estimate
77distances, could be based on Crewe’s work on directional voting. Extended to 
coalition theory, this would suggest that parties are reluctant to join coalitions that 
advocate change in a different direction from a perceived status quo or neutral point. A 
variation would suggest that parties and coalitions gravitate towards the centre, i.e., that 
parties B and C in figure 8.2 would prefer party D to party A as their third partner. 
Finally, minority coalitions (e.g., C-D-E relying on F’s support) could be explained 
because the extreme parties face a dilemma as to whether to support coalitions on their 
side of the spectrum. A classic case would be Norway’s centre-right minority coalition 
in 1985-86, which relied on passive support (i.e. abstention) from the extreme right and 
collapsed when the Progress party voted with the left against increased petrol taxation.
Grofman’s proto-coalitions model assumes that each party forms a proto-coalition with 
the party closest to it in a given policy space, thus according considerable weight to
9 o
policy space. Proto-coalitions cannot break up, and subsequently form new proto­
25 R. Axelrod, Conflict o f  Interest, (Chicago, Markahm, 1970).
26 de Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation.
27 I. Crewe, “Voting and the Electorate”, in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday & G. Peele (eds.), 
Developments in British Politics 4, (London, Macmillan, 1993).
28 B. Grofman, “A Dynamic Model of Proto-Coalition Formation in Ideological N-Space”, Behavioural 
Science, 27 (1982), 77-90.
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coalitions with other parties or proto-coalitions until a winning coalition is formed. 
Modifying this model, Budge & Laver focus on viable coalitions, and invoke non-
90hierarchical cluster algorithms. In other words, they assume that proto-coalitions that 
fail may break up, releasing the parties into new negotiations (the process is not 
hierarchical).
While pure policy orientation excludes the price of office, focusing instead on the 
parties’ pursuit of policy, policy implementation approaches focus on gaining office in 
order to achieve policy. Moreover, office is valuable in itself, and can be used by the 
incumbent to shape the next electoral contest. Laver & Schofield and Laver & Shepsle
a i
stress the importance of portfolio distribution, and the discretion enjoyed by ministers.
N o n -s p a t ia l  C o a l it io n  Th e o r y
Budge & Keman reject the spatial approach to coalition theory in favour of a hierarchy 
of coalitions based on regime support, socio-economic left -  right competition, and 
‘other issues’. The model can be summarised in five assumptions, (the conditions are 
cumulative, unless otherwise stated):
i) If there is an immediate threat to the regime, “all significant pro-system parties 
will join the government excluding anti-system parties.”
ii) If there is no such threat, any majority party will form a single party 
government, or the dominant party of a government excluding anti-system 
parties.
iii) If left -  right issues are salient, the ‘tendance’ with majority support will form a 
government along these lines, supported by the majority (including support 
from, but not coalitions with, anti-system parties).
iv) If these issues are not salient the party which is “manifestly larger” than any 
other pro-system party will form or lead the government.
v) If there is no such party, a coalition will be formed around groups with similar 
views on salient issues (i.e., a minimum connected winning coalition); or
29 Budge & Laver, “Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalitions”.
30 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science, 
(London, Harvester, 1991), p. 119-125.
31 Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, Chapters Two and Seven; Laver & Shepsle, Making and 
Breaking Governments, p. 13 -15.
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minimise the number of parties needed to win a vote of confidence (i.e., a 
minimum winning coalition).
Anti-system parties do not participate in coalitions. Significantly, this model emphasises 
the coalitions’ ability to survive a vote of confidence, i.e., not necessarily containing a 
majority of the deputies. In the East Central European post-1989 context this would 
suggest focus on economic policy once the threat to the regime has been removed. 
Nevertheless, as long as some parties perceive regime change to be relevant, it will 
affect the coalition games. The nationalist dimension could be added as a significant 
third dimension, producing a hierarchy that runs from regime support, to left -  right 
competition, to nationalism. This is not dissimilar to Evan & Whitefield’s analysis,
33
though that approach is not based on coalition theory.
L a v e r  &  S h e p s l e : Th e  Win s e t  Th e o r y
Laver & Shepsle take coalition theory to a new level by incorporating portfolio 
distribution and multi-dimensional politics into spatial models (and rejecting Euclidian 
distances in favour of ‘city block’ metric).34 In figure 8.3, the lowercase letters show the 
six possible coalitions, giving portfolios on the horizontal and vertical dimension to the 
first and second party in each case. For example, coalition be gives party B the 
economic portfolio, and party c the foreign portfolio. However, it is clear from the 
figure alone that both A and C prefer ‘ac’ to ‘be’, so if be is the starting point, a change 
to ‘ac’ would be predicted. In fact, in this case, ac is the only stable equilibrium (even B 
prefers ‘ac’, in which it does not participate, to ‘ba’ and ‘cb’). The potential cabinets 
preferred by a majority to any given cabinet are called lattice winsets, the policies 
preferred by a majority to a given policy make up it policy winset.
32 Budge & Keman, Parties and Democracy, table 2.3.
33 G. Evans & S. Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases o f Party Competition in Eastern Europe”, British 
Journal o f  Political Science, 23 (1993), 521-548.
34 Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments', see also P. Dunleavy & H. Margetts, 
“Understanding the Dynamics o f Electoral Reform”, International Political Science Review, 16:1 (1995), 
9-29.
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Figure 8.3
ca
Foreign policy 
,  !b a ............._
...c ac '
Economic policy
be
I?
cb ab
One advantage of this approach is the search for equilibrium coalitions, i.e., a cabinet 
that remains stable once it is formed because “no political actor with the ability to act in 
such a way as to bring down the cabinet and replace it with an alternative has an 
incentive to do so. Conversely, no actor with the incentive to replace the cabinet with 
some alternative has the ability to do so.”35 The ‘ac’ government in figure 8.3 provides 
an example of such an equilibrium. A second point follows from this. A party that can 
(theoretically) veto all coalitions that are preferred by a majority to a cabinet in which 
the party holds all portfolios is described as a strong party. Very strong parties have an 
empty winset, merely strong parties do not, but can veto all coalitions within its winset. 
The model predicts that strong and very strong parties will dominate coalition 
governments or rule alone as a minority government. Third, the Laver & Shepsle model 
is built on a specific starting point: the existing or outgoing government. This omission 
in other theories can be a serious problem, as many situations have more than one 
equilibrium (a point where the pivotal parties can hold out against change). Which one 
is reached depends on the starting point in negotiations. Finally, Laver & Shepsle’s 
w i n s e t  software permits a rudimentary search for credible and stable coalitions in the 
case of simulated election results. The stability of a party system can be tested against 
simulated shocks, such as a shift in voting patterns or party policy positions, thereby 
indicating how solid or precarious a party’s position is.
35 Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments, p.61.
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 282
Th e  L im it s  o f  F o r m a l  C o a l it io n  Th e o r y
A n a r c h y  a n d  C o n st r a in t s  ...
The debate between ‘West European politics’ and game theory highlights the problems 
of formal coalition theories, which attempt to analyse coalition behaviour outside the sui 
generis context peculiar to each party system. Though formal coalition theories have 
generated considerable insight into the dynamics of coalition formation, most face 
problems inherent in particular party systems when they are applied. Budge & Keeman 
found that commitment to the regime and the socio-economic left -  right dimension 
tends to dominate West European politics. Laver & Shepsle came to a similar 
conclusion: coalition building centres on two or three key portfolios, or sets of 
portfolios. Even minimum connected winning coalition theory takes account of the 
party systems rather than merely the number and size of the parties. The relative 
position of parties clearly matters, as does the ‘starting point’ and the bargaining 
strength of parties that are in hold-out positions. But, as Laver & Schofield ask, are 
these ad hoc constraints (e.g. personality) or generalised constraints (e.g., a pariah 
party)? Exclusion of communist parties in West European politics could be interpreted 
as input into rather than outcome of the bargaining process. Institutional factors such as 
consociational arrangements, the electoral systems, or a requirement for a positive vote 
of confidence matter, but so do legislative -  executive links and the role played by the 
head of state.
What may seem like ad hoc factors, such as parties’ pre-election declarations of intent 
in terms of potential coalition partners or special treatment of some parties on the 
grounds of ethnicity or extremism, may in fact be generalised factors, i.e., properties of 
the party system. The fundamental parameters of coalition games are not only the 
institutional rules and rational pursuit of policy or office, they must also include the 
party system itself. Formal coalition theories tend to assume a degree of anarchy in 
inter-party relations, leaving history (historical institutionalism) to one side (available to 
explain away peculiar outcomes). Hence the tendency to test formal coalition theories 
against random predictions. Theory is better than no theory. In Laver & Shepsle’s case
36 Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, Chapter Eight.
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this is also justified because the theory lacks obvious competitors against which to test 
it.
. . .o r  S yst e m ic  In t e r a c t io n ?
Yet party systems are anything but anarchic. They are characterised by systematic 
competition at several levels -  virtually no election in a multi-party system is entered 
into without a relatively clear set of potential alliances. The parties of formal coalition 
theories enjoy far more freedom than do real party leaders, whose credibility would be 
at stake if they were to ignore principles and/or ideology. In the Norwegian example 
cited above, Jagland’s commitment to resign unless Labour improved on the 1993 result 
effectively removed a ‘very strong’ party from the game and gave way to a coalition 
holding only 42 seats. Though a Labour -  Conservative grand coalition might make 
sense, both parties have an interest in maintaining left -  right competition. Policy and 
office-seeking are elements of a party’s set of preferences, but so is self-preservation 
(which includes avoiding marginalisation). The anarchic assumption in formal coalition 
theory must, therefore, be modified, taking account of the systemic elements of the 
party system (i.e., party competition). In the post-communist cases, the obvious 
example is the refusal of some former regime and opposition parties to co-operate under 
any circumstances. In other words, the rational choice based formal coalition theories 
are subject to historical constraints (regime change).
Yet in one fundamental way the post-communist party systems resemble the anarchic 
party systems in formal theory. During the first parliaments, party competition featured 
a series of parties, each of which attempted to dominate the scene and be recognised as 
the party of the nation -  not unlike an image of six or seven communist parties (or party
oo
factions) competing for the dominant position. A similar parallel can be drawn to 
inter-war party competition in East Central Europe, as well as inter-war Ireland, post­
war Italy and post-junta Greece. The relationships between the parties developed much
37 A WINSET test using economic and foreign (EU) policy confirms Labour as the very strong party. It 
holds 65 seats in the 165-strong Storting. For software, see Laver & Shepsle, Making and Breaking 
Governments, p.97, n.7.
38 This image was presented by G. Schopflin, in conversation in 1994.
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more slowly than the parties themselves. Though Di Palma’s focus on acceptance of the 
rules of the game is crucial to regime consolidation, the consolidation of liberal 
democracy requires acceptance of the legitimacy of opponents. Competition is central to 
both the party system and liberal democracy. Przeworski makes the point forcefully:
i n
liberal democracy is about competition and uncertainty of outcome. But party 
competition in East Central Europe developed only gradually, from competition for the 
dominant position to recognition of the necessity of coalitions and alliances.
A  T h r e e -S t ep  M o d el  f o r  E a st  C e n t r a l  E u r o pe
A three-phase model of party systems based on the development of patterns of inter­
party competition, starting with the development of parties, followed by anarchic party 
competition, and completed by the development of ordered party competition, 
characterises East Central European politics. The first phase was characterised by the 
development of political parties, largely through the disintegration of the conglomerate 
movements that dominated the first post-communist governments in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. The break-up of anti-communist alliances represented the first step 
toward competitive party systems. Even in Hungary, where parties emerged early, the 
round-table parties’ differentiation centred on defining their relationship with each other 
and the communist party. The second phase, during the first and/or second parliaments, 
featured anarchic party systems: alliances were brokered and collapsed, and patterns of 
inter- and intra-bloc competition began to emerge. The third phase, following the 1992 
election in the Czech Republic, the 1993 election in Poland and the 1994 elections in 
Hungary and Slovakia, is characterised by the development of stable patterns of 
competition and cooperation within and between alliances that make up the government 
and opposition.
Two observations are worth noting before proceeding to more detailed analysis of the 
four party systems. First, despite a considerable level of anarchy in inter-party relations,
39 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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average coalition durability has not been radically lower in post-communist East Central 
Europe (30 months) than in post-war Western Europe (37 months). Second, the 
complexity of coalition-building has increased as the party systems have developed, 
warranting application of the Laver-Shepsle or Budge-Keeman models rather than 
variations on the minimal winning coalition theme. Klaus’ second government and 
Horn’s coalition with the SzDSz are better explained by non-spatial and Winset theory 
respectively.
On average, East Central European coalition governments have lasted some four-fifths 
of the average life-time of their West European counterparts, or two-thirds if the three 
SLD-PSL coalitions are counted separately. To be sure, a single decade of post- 
communist politics provides too few cases for this to be meaningful in statistical terms. 
The point is simply that East Central European coalitions have not, on average, been 
excessively unstable. The main exceptions are the 1991-93 Sejm in Poland, Meciar’s 
governments, and the break-up of Klaus’ coalition in November 1997. In table 8.1, 
Lijphart’s approach to cabinet durability based on whether one party withdraws its 
support for the coalition has been applied to East Central Europe.40 This permits 
counting the Hungarian 1990-94 coalition and the Polish 1993-97 coalition as single 
coalitions, despite withdrawal of part of the FKgP’s support and the death and 
resignation of prime ministers respectively. Given the fluidity of East Central European 
political parties, ‘cabinet durability’ is defined in such a way that a coalition does not 
collapse if the government continues in power with support from rebel MPs from 
departing coalition parties. Though elections provide a maximum potential life for 
coalitions, Laver & Schofield’s practice of counting elections as terminating a coalition 
(even if it re-forms afterwards) has not been followed here 41 However, if it were to be 
applied, together with changes in prime minister and changes in coalition status, the 
averages for cabinet durability would be 19 and 21 months in East Central and Western 
Europe respectively.
40 A. Lijphart, “Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 17:2 (1984), 265-279.
41 Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, Chapter Six.
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Table 8.1 Cabinet durability in East Central Europe, first elections 1989/90 -  1997/98.
Western
Europe
average
1945-1 9 8 0 37 months
Poland Mazowiecki
Resigned
Total 26
Bielecki 
Completed term 
Months (16+10)
Olszewski
Fell
6 months
Suchocka
Fell
11 months
PSL-SLD (x 3) 
Full term 
48 months
Hungary Antall/Boross 
Full term 
48 months
Horn 
Full term 
48 months
Czech
Republic
Pithart 
Full term 
24 months
(coalition 
maintained by 
post-OF parties)
Klaus 
Full term 
48 months
Klaus
Fell
18 months
Tosovsky 
Caretaker 
7 months
Slovakia Meciar I 
Recalled/fell 
10 months
Camogursky 
Rest o f term 
14 months
Meciar II 
Fell
21 months
Moravcik 
Caretaker 
10 months
Meciar III 
Full term 
48 months
Czecho­
slovakia
(Federal)
Calfa 
Full term 
24 months +
Strasky 
Interim 
6 months
Source: West European data from Lijphart, “Measures o f Cabinet Durability”.
Notes: Brief failed efforts to form governments, e.g., Olzewski 1990 and Pawlak 1991, have been 
omitted, as has Suchocka’s four-month caretaker government in 1993. Bielecki’s government enjoyed an 
extended life due to a four-month delay in passing the electoral law. It incorporated significant elements 
o f Mazowiecki’s team and policy (notably Balcerowicz’s finance portfolio) and enjoyed support from the 
entire post-Solidarity camp. The SLD-PSL coalition consisted o f three governments, but has been counted 
as a single coalition since the coalition held together despite severe policy differences. Coalitions 
following 1997 and 1998 elections have not been included, as it is too early to estimate their durability.
Minimal winning coalitions (MWC) theories assume a considerable degree of anarchy 
in party competition and therefore require little moderation when applied to East Central 
Europe. In table 8.1, the connected MWC test is based on economic policy (fast or 
moderate economic reform). Both variations are more powerful in the first two phases, 
when they are compatible with more (and more durable) coalitions. By contrast, the 
Budge & Keeman model suggests that regime support should be the paramount 
question, and that left -  right divisions will be reflected in cabinet formation only when 
there is no regime threat. The broad anti-communist coalitions featured during phase 
one are analogous to their grand coalitions facing a system threat (even if the former 
communists might not actually have posed a real threat to the new regime). Budge & 
Keeman’s focus on left-right competition is more problematic, but a comparable 
dimension can be found dividing the advocates and opponents of fast economic reform. 
This theory, therefore, explains coalitions in phase one (anti-communist) and phase two 
(economic reform), but runs into problems with the Hungarian and Polish coalitions led 
by reform communists (which are divided on economic refrom). Laver & Shepsle’s 
Winset theory is not relevant to the first phase, largely due to the conglomerate parties’ 
mixed policy platforms. However, in the second and third phases, the model is
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 287
compatible with most governments as the strong parties are included in cabinets (in two 
Slovak cases there is no strong party, and the model is, therefore, inapplicable). 
Interestingly, it is also compatible with the over-sized MSzP-SzDSz coalition, which 
can be explained in terms of factions within the MSzP. Table 8.2 suggests an increasing 
degree of complexity in East Central Europe party politics, which can be explained in 
terms of the development of patterns of party competition. To the extent that this is 
lacking and party competition is anarchic, minimal winning coalitions (or Strom-type 
minority coalitions) can be expected. However, as a party system develops, its format 
must be taken into account as the system becomes characterised by increasingly stable 
patterns of party competition and coalition-building.
Table 8.2 Coalition Theories Tested on East Central Europe 1989/90 -  1987/88: three phases o f party 
competition and party system development. Bold text indicates when each theory is more powerful (in 
terms o f number o f cases and durability).
T h e o r y
T e s t
P hase O ne  
A ffirm ative
Phase O ne  
N egative
Phase T w o  
A ffirm ative
Phase T w o  
N eg a tiv e
Phase Three  
A ffirm ative
Phase Three 
N eg a tiv e
Minimal
Winning
Coal’tn.
M a zo w iec k i  
M e c ia r  1 
C a lfa f
B ieleck i*
Carnogursky*
Pithart
M ecia r  2**
A n ta ll/B o ro ss
S tr a sk y
O lszew sk i
Suchocka*
K laus 1 
3 x  SL D -P SL  
M eciar 3
M oravcik*  
Horn  
K laus 2
Connected
Minimal
Winning
Coal’tn.
M a z o w ie c k i 
M e c ia r  1 
C a lfa f
B ieleck i*
Carnogursky*
Pithart
M ecia r  2**
A n ta ll/B o ro ss
S tr a sk y
O lszew sk i
Suchocka*
K laus 1 M oravcik*  
H orn  
K laus 2  
M eciar 3 
3 x  SL D -P SL
Non-
Spatial
Theory
(Budge/
Keman)
M a z o w ie c k i  
M e c ia r  1 
P ith  art  
B ie lec k i 
C a r n o g u r sk y
C alfa O lsze w sk i 
S u ch o ck a  
A n ta ll/B o ro ss  
M ecia r  2
Strasky K la u s 1 
K la u s 2  
M o ra v c ik  
M ecia r  3
Horn
3 x  SL D -P SL
Winset
Theory
(Laver/
Shepsle)
N o t
A p p licab le /  
banal due to  
con glom erate  
parties’ 
m ajorities
O lsze w sk i 
A n ta ll/B o ro ss  
M ecia r  2
(Strasky: N/A  
systems
Suchocka
two federal 
incompatible)
3 x  S L D -P S L  
K la u s 1 
H o rn
(Meciar 3: N /A  
no strong
K laus 2
Moravcik:N/A 
party exists)
* These governments would not present negative evidence if the 50% threshold were lowered so as to 
include minority governments that enjoyed tacit support from parties that declines to take part in the 
coalition, as per Strom’s arguments.42
** Meciar’s second government alternated between a minority government and a minimal winning 
coalition.
t The OF -  VPN -  KDH government qualifies because KDH’s votes were required to meet qualified 
majorities required for major legislative initiatives.43
42 Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule.
43 G. Wightman, “The Czech and Slovak Republics”, in S. White, J. Batt & P.G. Lewis, Developments in 
East European Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1993), p.56.
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 288
All governments are identified by their respective prime ministers, except the three SLD-PSL coalitions 
(3 x SLD-PSL). The proto-coalition approach is not included, as it is essentially a variation o f CMWC 
and yields similar results.
P h a s e  On e  - Th e  R i s e  a n d  D e c l in e  o f  C o n g l o m e r a  te-P a r t y  G o  v e r n m e n t
The first phase is relatively similar in all four cases despite the negotiated transitions in 
Hungary and Poland and the swift Czechoslovak ‘velvet revolution’. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were dominated by conglomerate parties, though these began to break 
up and form political parties competing against each other. Like their Hungarian 
counterparts they developed independently of their opponents, inter-party competition 
emerging only gradually. The Hungarian electoral campaigns of 1989 (referendum) and 
1990 (parliament) illustrate the point inasmuch as the SzDSz and Fidesz and the MDF 
did not so much present alternative programmes as compete on entirely different sets of 
issues. Two factors dominated politics during this formative phase: anti-communism 
and conglomerate parties. The result is that spatial coalition theories are less than 
helpful, because all the anti-communist ‘coalitions’ were minimal winning coalitions 
inasmuch as no ‘party’ could leave without causing the government to enjoy less than 
majority support.
Hungary enjoyed the briefest conglomerate phase of the then three East Central 
European cases, as the parties were comparatively well developed by the time of the 
1990 election. Party competition developed through the round-table negotiations, not 
only between government and opposition, but also between the ‘national’ and 
‘democratic’ opposition. Hence the SzDSz and Fidesz’s stance on the November 1989 
referendum, accusing the MDF and its allies of co-operating with the MSzP. While it is 
impossible, or at least pointless, to apply coalition theory to the Nemeth government of 
1989/90, the parliament that was elected in March-April 1990 makes for a good testing- 
ground for coalition theory. However, as that parliament featured a set of well-defined 
and structured parties, it will be considered below as part of ‘phase two’. The opposition 
had metamorphosised into political parties by the end of 1989, leaving only a very brief
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‘conglomerate phase’.44 During the run-up to the 1990 elections, economics and 
national identity emerged as key dimensions of Hungarian political competition, the 
former stressed by Fidesz and SzDSz, the latter by MDF, FKgP and KDNP. SzDSz 
chairman Kis stressed that his party was the MDF’s natural opponent, and this 
sentiment was mutual.45 The FKgP’s focus on agricultural privatisation added a 
dimension of interest-oriented competition, though the party became associated with the 
MDF-led Christian national camp.46
Similarly, coalition theory is of little or no value as far as the formation of the 
Mazowiecki government in Poland in September 1989 is concerned. However, as 
Solidarity began the metamorphosis from conglomerate to multiple parties in the 
Summer of 1990, the question of majority backing for the government became 
increasingly salient. The ROAD -  PC split was interpreted as reflecting differences 
between the prime minister and the solidarity leader, ROAD backing Mazowiecki and 
PC backing Walesa.47 However, the split was largely over non-economic questions,
A O
with Walesa deriding his prime minister for slow political change. Following 
Mazowiecki’s loss in the first round of the presidential elections, and his subsequent 
resignation and founding of the Democratic Union in December 1990, his faction 
continued to support Bielecki’s (KLD) government until the 1991 elections (though the 
UD was divided on his vote of investiture). Though Bielecki’s government commanded 
only a minority, it enjoyed support from the President over the practical elements of the 
Balcerowicz plan and benefited from his legitimacy in contrast to ‘Contractual Sejm’.49 
Bielecki’s resignation over the budget in August was duly rejected by 211 votes to 114 
(35 abstentions and invalid votes), including all the Solidarity factions’ votes.50
44 L. Lengyel, “The Character o f Political Parties in Hungary (Autumn 1989)”, in A. Bozoki, A. 
Korosenyi, & G. Schopflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, 
(London, Pinter Publishers, 1992).
45 Nepszabadsag, 20/03/1990 on Kis, cited in Z. Barany, “The Alliance o f Free Democrats: From 
Underdog to Potential Victor”; A. Reisch “The Democratic Forum on the Finishing Line”, both in 
RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 1:14 (06 April 1990).
46 J. Pataki, “Smallholders’ Party Could Decide the Outcome o f the Elections”, RFE/RL Report on 
Eastern Europe, 1:11 (06 March 1990).
47 PAP in English 2202 gmt 27 July and 1849 gmt 28 July 1990 (SWB 31/07/90).
48 L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism and Transformation, (Budapest, Central European University 
Press, 1995), p.298-306.
49 Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism and Transformation.
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Given the range of parties that gained representation in the 1991 election and the 
resulting coalition negotiations, this election heralded the move to the second phase in 
Poland. With it came increasing competition over the Balcerowicz Plan, including PC 
criticism of the government as insufficiently projectionist, the (post-Solidarity) Peasant 
Alliance’s demand for agricultural protection and Solidarity’s (trade union) demands for 
a ‘windfall tax’.51 During the first phase the new parties thus began to align and 
compete over government performance and the economic transition, a division evident 
in a ZChN and PC vote rejecting Dabrowski’s candidature for the central bank which 
was interpreted as “a referendum for or against Balcerowicz”. Now transformed into a 
Christian democratic party under Walesa’s chief of staff, Kaczynski, the PC combined 
anti-communism with criticism of economic transition, arguing that capitalism was 
being built on a communist foundation, i.e., former communists were too involved in
c'y
the process. Finally the potential for electoral success based on nationalist populism 
had been demonstrated in Tyminski’s presidential campaign, when he beat Mazowiecki 
to the run-off. In short, a differentiated, if less than stable, party system was in place by 
the 1991 elections.
The Czecho-Slovak parties followed a path similar to that taken in Poland, though the 
national question took on a far more significant and immediate role as far as 
government formation and coalition politics is concerned. The main ‘daughter parties’ 
that emerged from Civic Forum and Public against Violence found themselves 
competing with reference to two major questions in 1990-92: the speed of economic 
transition and the structure of the federal state. The latter question was summed up in 
the ‘hyphen-debate’ which lasted until March 1990, when the name ‘Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic’ was adopted.54 The divisions in Civic Forum and VPN were products 
of proto-coalition games over questions threatening the future of the federal and
50 L. Vinton, “Walesa, ‘Special Powers’ and the Balcerowicz Plan” and “Government Wins Contest o f  
Wills with Parliament”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:29 (19 July 1991) and 2:37 (13 September
1991).
51 D. McQuaid, “The Political Landscape before the Elections”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:42 
(18 October 1991).
52 L. Vinton, “A Postcommunist Parting Shot: Round-Table Sejm Rejects ‘Special Powers’”, RFE/RL 
Report on Eastern Europe, 2:40 (4 October 1991).
53 McQuaid, “The Political Landscape before the Elections”.
54 J. Pehe, “The Instability o f Transition”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:1 (04 January 1991).
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national governments, which led to the emergence of early elements of party systems.55 
Though the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats (subsequently to incorporate the 
former satellite People’s Party) and Greens were re-established as independent political 
parties in November-December 1989, the two conglomerate parties dominated the 1990 
elections. Only their disintegration heralded the birth of party systems.
Following the 1990 elections, the Slovak national government could be interpreted as a 
minimal or minimal connected winning coalition inasmuch as it was not oversized, and 
at federal level KDH support was required due to provisions for qualified majorities. 
The Presidium of the Slovak National Council’s decision to remove Meciar from his 
position as prime minister simultaneously reflected and exacerbated the divisions within 
the VPN, laying the foundations for a party system based largely on pro- and anti- 
Meciar positions and competing visions of Slovak nationalism. Moreover, the new 
Carnogursky government did not command a majority in the Slovak parliament, relying 
on support from Coexistence and/or the Democratic Party, and threatening to resign 
should the opposition impede its work.56 By contrast, Pithart’s Czech government 
included the KDU-CSL and the HSD-SMS in an over-sized grand coalition excluding 
only the communists, despite the OF’s absolute majority (127 out of 200 seats).
P h a s e  T w o -  C o a l it io n  B u il d in g  a n d  P a r t y  C o m p e t it io n .
The conglomerate party phase lasted less than two years in East Central Europe. Even 
the Czech and Slovak national assemblies saw emerging multi-party competition in 
1991, though the federal government was maintained until the 1992 elections (it was 
then replaced by an interim government under Strasky, which oversaw the dissolution 
of the Republic). By the 1992 elections Czech and Slovak parties were competing along 
government -  opposition lines, divided into two or three main camps like the Hungarian 
and Polish party systems in the 1990 and 1991 elections respectively. Though this 
indicated the emergence of party systems, the parties were still competing for dominant 
positions. Even the SzDSz presented a campaign poster suggesting that “those who are
55 J. Pehe, “Civic Forum Becomes a Political Party” and ’’Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to 
Federation”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:5 (01 February 1991) and 2:12 (22 March 1991).
56 J. Pehe, “Political Conflict in Slovakia”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2:19 (10 May 1991).
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not with us are with them”. The second phase is therefore the phase during which 
parliamentary politics, and specifically the need to build and maintain governing 
coalitions, forced the parties to engage in more systematic government -  opposition 
relationships, thus laying the foundations of the four party systems. Unsurprisingly, 
Riker’s theories of coalition government apply better to the ‘anarchic’ legislatures of 
second-phase East Central Europe than the ordered party competition common in West 
European politics. Minimal or minimal winning coalitions featured in all four states, 
either formally or informally as minority coalitions enjoying tacit support of other 
minor parties. Accordingly, the Polish and Slovak governments collapsed when these 
minimal coalitions broke up or when supporting parties outside a minority coalition 
withdrew support.
The development of the Polish party system during the first fully competitively elected 
parliament was to a large extent the product of coalition-building, or the making and 
breaking of coalitions. The result of the 1991 election was clear inasmuch as a majority 
of the voters that turned out for the election cast their votes for parties that were critical 
of the Balcerowicz plan and Bielecki’s government. During Suchocka’s eleven-month 
tenure, the 29 parties in the Sejm aligned into five broad blocs: i) a heterogeneous 
government bloc including the liberal parties, supported by ii) the Christian national 
parties and Solidarity, and opposed by iii) a peasant opposition, iv) the reformed 
communists and v) the far right.
Figure 8.4 Polish Sejm 1992/93 civic nationalism
Liberal coalition
Reform communism
Homogeneity Diversity
closed society open society
Christian national bloc
Peasant Opposition
Far right
ethnic nationalism
Apart from the introduction of a 5%-barrier and the election result itself, three major 
events contributed to shaping the party system of the second competitive Sejm, 1993-
57 Z. Barany, “The Alliance o f Free Democrats: From Underdog to Potential Victor”, RFE/RL Report on 
Eastern Europe, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 1:14 (06 April 1990).
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97: the failure of the Olszewski government, the emergence of the Suchocka coalition, 
and her government’s collapse in 1993. Olszewski’s six-month government represented 
an effort to establish a new approach to economic transition, based on rejection of the 
Balcerowicz plan. In this enterprise, Olszewski’s minority government enjoyed support 
from a motley coalition including the PC, the PSL and the ZChN. Mazowiecki’s UD 
abstained in the vote of investiture. The government’s problems became evident when it 
lost the March budget vote. After rescuing the budget, finance minister Olechowski 
resigned, thereby illustrating the difficulties involved in finding a coherent alternative to 
the Balcerowicz approach. Clashing with the president in May, the government relied 
on the PC and the Christian and agrarian parties for survival, but at this point an 
alternative was being developed around the “small coalition” of the KLD, UD and PPG. 
The terminal no-confidence motion in June was not the product of the opposition but an 
intervention from Walesa, who demanded this vote of the speaker following 
Olszewski’s allegations that he had been a secret police informer. This was the final 
blow to a collapsing government. Apart from its minority status, the Olszewski 
government fits most coalition theories, with his PC as a strong party in the Winset 
model, and the government representing an effort to present an alternative to the 
Balcerowicz Plan.
The continuing relevance of the ancien regime -  opposition cleavage was amply 
demonstrated in Pawlak’s failed effort to form a government upon Walesa’s request. 
The ZChN, PC and Rural Solidarity refused to support the PSL chairman because of the 
party’s communist past, a sentiment shared by several UD members, if not the 
leadership. It was left to the surprisingly resilient Suchocka coalition to drive the Polish 
parties into clearer alignment on economic policy, as her new government pursued 
Balcerowicz-style privatisation. The seven-party coalition was based on the ‘small 
coalition’ and the Christian democratic and non-PSL peasant parties, but it fell 36 seats 
short of a majority in the 460-seat Sejm. This was only achieved with the 39 votes of
r  o
Solidarity, the German minority and Christian Democracy. A series of close votes on 
the budget and privatisation minister Lewandowski’s survival by a twelve-vote margin 
illustrated the extent to which economic policy divided the Sejm. Accordingly, the no­
58 L. Vinton, “Poland’s Government Crisis: An End in Sight?”, RFE/RL Research Report, 1:30 (24 July
1992).
Beyond the Anarchic Party System 294
confidence vote in May 1993 was caused by Solidarity’s complaint over low wage 
increases. It passed by one vote, reportedly with recently sacked minister of justice 
Dyka smoking a pipe in the hallway. His presence inside the chamber, even if non­
voting, would have saved the government.59 Agriculture minister Janowski’s resignation 
in April and the departure of 19 PL deputies from the coalition had all but sealed the 
government’s fate. Nevertheless, the Suchocka coalition had prompted alignment of the 
parties into government and opposition camps based on economic policy, thus 
supporting the Budge-Laver theory’s suggestion that if there is no regime threat the 
parties will align into social democrat -  burgerlich camps. However, as the coalition 
excluded the strong PC, the Laver-Shepsle model would not suggest that the 
government would be stable.
Meanwhile, both the Czech and Slovak national party systems developed rapidly from 
conglomerate proto-systems to competitive systems in the year running up to the 1992 
election, to the extent that Czechoslovakia featured two party systems by the time of the 
1992 elections. No party won seats in both regional assemblies. Both electoral 
campaigns featured efforts to build pre-election coalitions, differentiating the future 
government and opposition. However, while the Czech party system moved on to a 
third phase of fully developed government -  opposition competition soon after the 
election, this process was far slower and far less pronounced in the Slovak case. 
Coalition-building continued to centre on Meciar and his HzDS, even after the 1994 
elections. Come December 1994 it was clear that the Meciar/anti-Meciar division had 
formed the basis for party competition in the medium term. In fact the party system 
continued to be dominated by Meciar throughout the 1994-98 parliament.
With the disintegration of the Civic Forum, the Czech party system moved towards a 
competitive government -  opposition scenario, with the former OF parties in the 
government role and the communists cast as the main opposition party. Until the 1992 
election policy took precedence over numerical strength, with an oversized coalition 
government excluding only the communists. Therefore, the Czech government can be 
explained better by proto-coalition or non-spatial theories than the various types of 
minimal coalition theory. After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, two main
59 Economist Intelligence Unit: Poland Country Report, Second Quarter 1993.
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competing camps, one burgerlich and one social democrat, developed a competitive 
two-bloc government -  opposition relationship (flanked by communists and 
republicans) that was to last through the 1996 elections. ODS was the strong party in 
this system, and accordingly furnished the finance and the prime minister.
Similarly, the collapse of the Meciar government precipitated the development of 
coalition bargaining in the Slovak national assembly. Relying on the support of 
Hungarian parties, the Carnogursky minority government held off Meciar until the 1992 
election, only to see the HzDS emerge as the clear winner with 74 of the Assembly’s 
150 seats. Two seats short of a majority, the second Meciar government could count on 
an informal alliance with the SNS and additional support from the SDL. However, the 
achievement of Slovak independence put the SNS -  HzDS relationship under strain, 
leading to Cemak’s resignation as economics minister and the collapse of the tacit 
coalition. Internal divisions caused the departure of eight HzDS deputies to form the 
Alliance of Democrats under Knazko.60 The fluidity of the relationships between the 
parties was amply demonstrated over the Summer of 1993, with the opposition’s failure 
to unite and the opening of talks between the HzDS and first the SNS and then the SDL. 
By October 1993 Meciar’s government, now reduced to sixty-five deputies by Dolgos’ 
departure, signed an agreement forming a coalition with the SNS, which took the 
education portfolio and two deputy prime ministers.61
The bargain that brought majority support for Meciar’s government failed to secure 
stability due to divisions within both parties. This became clear in the tight budget vote 
in December when former SNS-chair and economic minister Cemak led a group of six 
SNS deputies in the vote against the budget. Meciar’s request that his deputies sign a 
“declaration of perpetual loyalty” led to one further resignation, and of the then twelve
/r'y
SNS deputies four openly opposed the coalition. The fall of Meciar’s second 
government, like that of his first, was directly related to personality and leadership style. 
The expulsion of Roman Kovac and Moravcik in February 1994 (for forming a faction)
60 Eastern Europe Newsletter 7:13, 22/6/93.
61 M. Nic, J. Oberman & S. Fisher, “New Slovak Government: New Stability?”, RFE/RL Research 
Report, 2:47 (26 November 1993).
62 S. Fisher, “Controversy in Slovakia over Budget Proposal”, RFE/RL Research Report, 3:2 (1 January 
1994); Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:3 01/01/94.
63 Economist Intelligence Unit: Slovakia Country Report, First Quarter 1994.
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t l iprecipitated Meciar’s defeat in a no-confidence vote on March 11 . The coalition was 
replaced by another minority government, led by Moravcik’s newly formed DEUS. The 
new government’s focus on rapid privatisation and economic change became clear 
during its first 100 days.64
The Slovak case illustrates the continuing problems of party system development in 
East Central Europe, namely the fluid nature of political parties and the relationship 
between these parties. Though the October 1994 HzDS -  SNS agreement brought SNS 
ministers into the cabinet and therefore represented a new coalition, it did not resolve 
tensions within either of the two parties. In fact, it led to high-profile defections from 
both parties and the collapse of the government. The addition of the SNS to the cabinet 
did little to change the government’s medium term status, and the whole period from 
June 1992 to March 1994 is, therefore, better understood in terms of Meciar’s minority 
government struggling to meet the minimal coalition criteria than as two or three 
separate short-lived governments. Having failed this, it was replaced by a nominal 
minority government, an anti-Meciar coalition rather than a coherent alternative. 
Nevertheless, the new government built a degree of consensus centred on speeding up 
privatisation and improving the relationship with the EU. Though the coalition 
comprising the KDH, SDL, Knazko’s ADSR (Alliance of Democrats), Cemak’s SNS- 
breakaway NDS-NA (Democratic Party -  New Alternative), and DEUS (later DU) was 
a minority coalition (67/150 seats), it ruled as a minimal winning coalition due to 
continuous support from the 14 deputies of the Hungarian Christian Democrats and Co­
existence. The absence of a strong party renders the Winset model inapplicable, though 
it identifies the HzDS and SLD as central parties.
The first post-communist parliament saw the brunt of the metamorphosis from a 
collection of parties to a party system in Hungary. The major political parties went 
through several ‘birth-pangs’ during this period, in the form of leadership changes and 
splits or divisions over coalition strategies. Though the MDF-led coalition served the 
full term, its majority was down to two by the time of Antall’s death. Csurka’s defecting 
and setting up the MIEP and Torgyan’s taking part of the FKgP out of the coalition
64 Economist Intelligence Unit: Slovakia Country Report, Third Quarter 1994.
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produced the two main challenges to the coalition’s viability, but in doing so helped the 
relationship between the governing parties solidify. Meanwhile, the opposition parties 
developed their strategies, through top level struggles within Fidesz, the SzDSz and 
MSzP. The development of inter-party competition, therefore, took place at three levels, 
within the coalition, within the opposition, and between two. The MDF emerged as the 
strong party in 1990, but the KDNP would have been a contender for this role had the 
MDF taken about twenty seats less. Though it was located on one side of the coalition 
and not at its centre, the KDNP nevertheless held a position of considerable potential 
strength due to its central position in the party system. On the other hand, the FKgP was 
left at the margins of the coalition and withdrew support in October 1991, though 35 of 
its 45 deputies rebelled and continued to back the government.65 Come the 1994 
election, two Smallholders’ parties competed, reflecting the Omolnar -  Torgyan split.
Four years of opposition prompted a revision of the strategies adopted by the three 
Hungarian parties that lost the 1990 election. The result made it clear that an SzDSz - 
Fidesz alliance could not aspire to form or run a government on their own. A W in s e t  
test that allocates the two liberal parties up to 100 additional seats (together) confirms 
this, as first the KDNP and then the MSzP become the strong party as the number of 
liberal seats increases. Both the liberal parties carried out major reassessments of their 
strategies during the opposition years, a process that brought Fidesz closer to the KNDP 
and SzDSz closer to the liberal wing of the MSzP. The election of Tolgyessy (from the 
SzDSz’s classical liberal wing) after party president Kis’ resignation, prompted the 
resignation of SzDSz parliamentary leader Peto (social democrat wing). However, Peto 
won the presidential post at the January 1993 congress, shifting the balance back 
towards the ‘left’. The dispute over post-election coalition with MSzP exacerbated 
SzDSz divisions, with Tolgyessy opposing the coalition and eventually leaving the 
party and running on the Fidesz list in 1998.66 Fodor’s resignation from Fidesz after his 
failed leadership-challenge against Orban in November 1993 reflected similar disputes 
within that party, and even generated speculation about possible Fidesz -  MDF co-
65 J. Pataki, “Will the Governing Coalition Survive?”, RFE/RL Research Report, 1:48 (4 December 1992).
66 RFE/RL Newsline Vol 2, No. 62, 31 March 1998.
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fnoperation. Fodor eventually joined the SzDSz in the run-up to the 1994 elections.
The MSzP did not escape internal disputes over re-orientation and party strategy. 
Bekesi, the finance minister under last communist government and the author of the 
party’s economic strategy, was described succinctly by one western observer: “at times 
he sounds more liberal than the liberal parties.” The MSzP entered the 1994 elections 
with an economic strategy that was so similar to that of SzDSz that Bekesi refused to 
serve in a one-party government out of fear that his policy might be compromised by 
the MSzP left.69 This internal MSzP division over economic strategy was to become 
more pronounced after the election, when the turbulent Horn -  Bekesi relationship was 
compared to that between Thatcher and Lawson, with Medgyessy cast in the role of
7 nAlan Walters. Nevertheless, the outcome was an orientation towards alliance with the 
SzDSz in the run-up to the 1994 election. In the event the MSzP’s absolute victory at 
the polls made this unnecessary, except for internal MSzP reasons.
P h a s e  Th r e e -  T o w a r d s  F u l l y  D e v e l o p e d  C o m p e t it io n .
The 1993/94 round of elections in Poland and Hungary and the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia set the scene for the development of fully fledged competitive party 
systems, at least in three out of the four cases. Slovak party competition has remained 
centred on Meciar, up to and including the 1998 campaign. If the first parliaments saw 
the development of political parties and alliances, the government -  opposition 
relationships developed fully during the second parliaments. In every case but the 
Czech, the government was replaced by the opposition, and in the Czech case the CSSD 
developed into a single-party alternative to the ODS-led government. The Czech 
government crisis in November 1997 brought down the longest-serving government in 
East Central Europe, introducing an element of instability into the most stable East 
Central Europe party system, and sending the CSSD in search of potential centre-right 
partners. However, the crisis is interpreted here as a classic West-European style
67 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 7:24 (19/10/93).
68 Economist Intelligence Unit: Hungary Country Report, First Quarter 1994, p.8.
69 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:12 (08/06/94).
70 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:18 (01/09/94).
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government crisis, no worse that that which afflicted the British Conservative Party in 
1995-97 or the Norwegian right-wing coalitions in the mid-1980s. If anything, it is a 
sign that the Czech party system has much is common with its Scandinavian 
counterparts.
G o v e r n m e n t  - O p p o s it io n  R e l a t io n sh ip  a s  a  F u n d a m e n t a l  E l e m e n t  o f  th e  P a r t y  
S y s t e m
The government -  opposition relationship, which forms the main component of the 
systematic interaction between the component parts of a party system, is manifest in 
three main forms: i) government coalitions, ii) the development of credible alternatives 
to the government; and iii) the relationship between the two blocs. This entails an 
element of predictability and stability, as patterns of government -  opposition 
competition emerge. In East Central Europe, all three aspects began to develop during 
the second phase, and became fully discernible in the third phase of party system 
development. As they entered the 1997/98 round of elections, all four states featured 
competition between two or three main blocs of parties, with relatively well-defined 
coalition alternatives. Moreover, with the exception of the CSSD and Fidesz, all the 
major parties had government experience and had taken part in coalition games.
G o v e r n m e n t  p a r t ie s  a n d  c o a l it io n  b u il d in g
In Poland and Hungary the reform communist parties, victorious in the 1993/94 
elections, sought to define themselves in relation to other parties that had so far shunned 
them. Both entered coalitions that experienced considerable tension over economic 
policy, though for different reasons. The PSL’s reluctance to pursue aggressive 
economic transition in Poland was matched by the MSzP left’s caution in Hungary, 
though in both cases this had negligible effect on the governments’ economic policy. 
The Czech party system made for clear two-bloc competition, the CSSD versus the 
government, leaving the communists and republicans at the extremes. Though Klaus’ 
coalition’s viability was not in doubt until the middle of 1997, the second parliament 
saw increasing intra-coalition tension. In Slovakia, the collapse of Meciar’s government 
in March 1994 and the brief anti-Meciar coalition under Moravcik settled the party 
system into a state of stability with competition centred on the Meciar -  anti-Meciar
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division. Such competition has not been common in West European politics, though the 
Berlusconi -  anti-Berlusconi struggle in 1992 -  1996 offers one parallel.
Two themes run through the SzDSz -  MSzP coalition as far as the relationship between 
the two parties is concerned. First, the question of long-term co-operation after the 1998 
election remained salient throughout the first two years of the coalition. An alliance was 
only ruled out in late 1996, and then by both parties. Second, and equally significant, 
within the MSzP a struggle persisted between the liberal and social democrat wings, 
which cost two finance ministers their jobs. Within the SzDSz, the defeat of 
Tolgyessy’s opposition to co-operation with the MSzP only settled the question 
temporarily. In fact, the future of the coalition became linked to intra-MSzP politics, 
with the Free Democrats repeatedly threatening to leave the coalition in the event that 
the left wing within the MSzP became too strong. These two themes of inter- and intra­
party politics within the coalition came together in a series of economic decisions. The 
overall result was a victory for the SzDSz and the liberal wing of MSzP, in terms of 
policy if not personnel.
Three events sum up the SzDSz -  MSzP relationship: the struggle over Bekesi’s tenure 
as finance minister, the subsequent struggle over his predecessor’s post, and Horn’s 
attempt to counterbalance the finance minister by establishing a deputy prime minister 
in charge of economic affairs. Despite his membership of the MSzP, Bekesi was very 
much an SzDSz man in the cabinet. The death of Horn’s wealth-tax proposals at the end 
of 1994 indicated a balance of power in Bekesi’s favour, as did his failure to consult the 
union-dominated Interest Coordination Council on the draft budget and MSzOSz trade 
union president Nagy’s failure to get elected to the MSzP executive.71 Commented 
MSzP Presidium leader Vitanyi: “Hungary does not have a social liberal government
79but a social and liberal cabinet”. Bekesi’s continuing struggle against the MSzP left 
led to his resignation in January 1995. This in turn prompted SzDSz warnings that
79economic policy must not be changed. Yet Horn’s quarrels with ministers were not 
limited to his liberal cabinet members, as his dismissal of Pal (trade and industry) in
71 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:22, (18/10/94).
72 Cited in RFE/RL Research Bulletin, 26 September 1994.
73 Peto cited in OMR1 Daily Digest, No. 21,30 January 1995.
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June illustrated.74 Bekesi’s succession by Bokross seemingly represented a victory for 
the MSzP left inasmuch as the SzDSz had promoted Suranyi’s candidacy. However, 
Bokross soon made it clear that he would continue his predecessor’s economic and 
fiscal policy, earning considerable criticism from his party’s left for his ‘Black Sunday’ 
austerity package in March (though only eight coalition deputies actually failed to
nc
support these measures at the vote in June). Meanwhile, Suranyi got the central bank 
governorship, thus providing further support for Bokross’ measures. The struggle over 
the ‘Black Sunday’ package, and new measures following a constitutional court ruling 
against some of its elements, led to his resignation within a year, in February 1995. 
Once again, the new finance minister was expected to relax economic policy. But, like 
his predecessor, Medgyessy vowed to maintain policy continuity.77 Horn’s effort to 
circumvent the finance minister by making Nagy deputy prime minister in charge of 
economic affairs brought the coalition to a breaking point, with SzDSz’s Kuncze
* • 78(interior minister) stating that it was “grounds for divorce.” The situation was only 
defused by Nagy’s withdrawal of his candidacy. In the aftermath of this episode the 
MSzP’s Fourth Congress marginalised Nagy, and by late 1996 it was clear that the two 
parties would co-operate through the parliament’s full term but did not entertain the idea 
of a long-term alliance. Given the MSzP’s majority, the coalition confounds most 
coalition theories, but is explained in terms of intra-party politics. However, the Laver- 
Shepsle model correctly suggested that the MSzP would take the two most significant 
portfolios, prime minister and finance.
Similar themes run through the more turbulent PSL -  SLD relationship in Poland, 1993 
-  97. The SLD’s internal divisions may have been less tense than those evident in the 
MSzP, but its struggle with its coalition partner was definitely not. While internal party 
affairs and the quest for broader international acceptance may have made a coalition 
expedient for the MSzP, the SLD had little choice in the matter (except to rule as a 
minority government). In contrast to its Hungarian counterpart, the SLD faced criticism 
from its coalition partner for its rapid and liberal approach to economic transition and 
therefore faced a two-front struggle: against the PSL on its ‘left’ flank, and the liberal
74 The Hungary Report, No. 1.14, July 3, 1995.
75 The Hungary Report, No. 1.10, June 6, 1995.
76 OMR1 Daily Digest II, No. 229, 27 November 1995, and No. 36 ,20  February 1996.
77 OMR1 Daily Digest II, No. 35, 19 February 1996, and No. 43, 29 February 1996.
78 The Hungary Report, No. 1.19, August 8, 1995.
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and conservative parties on the ‘right’. The Winset model provides some further 
guidance to the problems of Polish coalition politics, inasmuch as the SLD was the 
strong party and a coalition giving the PSL the prime minister should be vulnerable to 
pressure for a more SLD-dominated cabinet (even from the UP and UD). While 
coalition bargaining explains the actual outcome, the model forecast tension over 
economic policy in an SLD -  PSL coalition. Predictably, given the two parties’ different 
economic policy, privatisation and the economy generated considerable intra-coalition 
tension as the PSL aimed to decelerate the pace established by its predecessors.
The tension over economic reform derived from the problem of reconciling the SLD’s 
pursuit of economic reform with the Peasant Party’s effort to defend agrarian interests. 
Hence prime minister Pawlak’s disagreement with Borowski over reform of the 
ministry of finance, which resulted in his dismissing deputy finance minister Kwalec 
without consulting Borowski. The finance minister’s resignation followed within a
70 ,month. PSL -  SLD clashes over privatisation continued, e.g., between privatisation 
minister Kaczmarek (SLD) and foreign trade minister Podanski (PSL) over privatisation 
of the Rolimpex foreign trade enterprise, and over the PSL’s opposition to Kaczmarek’s
O A
privatisation of the tobacco industry. Borowski’s resignation in February 1994 over 
Pawlak’s effort to slow down the pace of privatisation foreshadowed that of Bekesi in 
Hungary. Despite threats that PSL might leave the coalition, Pawlak’s replacement
O |
came from the SLD’s free-market wing. Vital portfolios including industry, 
privatisation and finance went to the SLD, indicating the party’s weight within the 
coalition and its dominance over economic policy. By the end of 1994 Gazeta Wyborca, 
edited by Michnik, even entertained the idea of a UW -  SLD coalition if the PSL were
O A
to defect. Oleksy, in turn, was forced to resign over allegations of co-operation with 
the KGB, but the SdRP congress elected him Kwasniewski’s successor as party leader. 
His successor, Cimosewicz, indicated economic policy continuity by keeping 
Kaczmarek and Kolodko at the ministries of privatisation and finance. Intra-coalition 
tension therefore continued, manifest on topics dear to the PSL such as farmers’ social
79 Gazeta Wyborcza, 29-31 January, 1994 and 3 February 1994.
80 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:15 (21/07/94); Economist Intelligence Unit: Poland Country Report, 
First Quarter 1994; Rzeczpolita, 3 February 1994.
81 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 9:5 (16/03/95).
82 Reported in Eastern Europe Newsletter, 8:23 (16/11/94).
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O'!
security payments, e.g., in the 1997 budget. Economic divisions came to a head over 
tax questions, prompting Cimosewicz to condemn his coalition partners for their 
populism, throwing in criticism of the Catholic Church’s anti-abortion stance at the
a a #
same time. To be sure, similar tension has since been evident in Buzek’s government, 
where the Solidarity Trade Union continues to question Balcerowicz’s economic 
reforms. Examples include a Solidarity sponsored rally at which EU flags were burned,
o r
featuring slogans like “Balcerowicz must go”. Both blocs, therefore, reflect the old 
regime -  opposition divisions rather than the social democrat -  burgerlich division, 
though economic policy continues to cause tension within the blocs. The blocs thus 
conform to minimum winning coalition theory, but do not represent ‘connected’ 
coalitions or blocs that combine all pro-system parties on either side of the social 
democrat -  burgerlich division.
In contrast to the turbulence in the Hungarian and Polish coalitions, the 1992-96 Klaus 
government provided a model of coalition stability. Differences within the coalition 
were on minor points, e.g., an ODA-led defeat of Klaus’ effort to outlaw budget deficits 
in 1994 and ODA criticism of alleged ODS-supervised secret service investigations of
o r
political parties (which was later ruled unsubstantiated). In fact, the more significant 
divisions occurred within the ODS, between Klaus and Zieleniec over the latter’s 
repeated attempt to secure more explicit party programmes since 1993. The run-up to 
the 1996 election saw some differentiation on the part of the junior coalition partners, 
with ODA developing a right wing economic agenda focusing on, e.g., tax cuts, freeing 
rent control, and student fees, and the KDU-CSL setting out a law-and-order agenda and
an # f
emphasising church restitution. On the other hand, the scene had been simplified 
somewhat by Benda’s KDS’ formal incorporation into the ODS before the 1996 
election. Even after the return of the coalition as a minority government in 1996, there 
were no major policy disputes comparable with those within the Polish or Hungarian 
coalitions. The government’s position was strengthened as it was effectively 
transformed into a majority government when two former CSSD deputies, expelled
83 Economist Intelligence Unit: Poland Country Report, Third Quarter 1996.
84 Economist Intelligence Unit: Poland Country Report, Fourth Quarter 1996.
85 RFE/RL Newsline Vol 2, No. 55, 20 March 1998.
86 Economist Intelligence Unit: Czech Republic Country Report, Fourth Quarter 1994; Second Quarter 
1995.
87 Economist Intelligence Unit: Czech Republic Country Report, Second Quarter 1996
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from the party for voting with the government on the 1997 budget, announced that they 
would support the coalition. One of the two, Wagner, maintained his independence, and
oo
formed a centre-right party in January 1998. However, from December 1996 the ODA 
took an increasingly critical stance pressing for acceleration of the privatisation process, 
while the KDU-CSL maintained its policy of never ruling out a coalition with the 
CSSD.89
iL
The collapse of the coalition and the government’s resignation on November 30 1997 
was triggered not by policy differences or intra-coalition competition, but by the party 
finance scandal in which it emerged that in 1995 the ODS had accepted more than 7m 
CKr from Srejber, the part-owner and chairman of the board of a company that had 
recently won the tender for the Trinecke steelworks. Zieleniec insisted he had revealed 
the possible identity of the ‘anonymous’ donor to Klaus, though Klaus denied this.90 
The economic problems of early 1997, which warranted “corrective economic 
measures” in April and had brought Czech unemployment to a record 4.8% by 
September, provided a setting in which this challenge to the government’s credibility 
could break up the coalition.91 RFE/RL’s Pehe identified a “crisis of leadership” one 
year after the 1996 election, exacerbated by the government’s failure in communication 
with the public, lack of dialogue within the coalition, and its reluctance to accept 
responsibility for the economic problems or carry out anything but a cosmetic 
reshuffle 92 By January 14th a breakaway group consisting of 30 of the ODS’ 69 
deputies had formed the Freedom Union (US), led by former interior minister Ruml and 
including former KDS chairman Pilip.
Though the coalition crisis brought down the government and split the ODS, and 
undeniably shook up the party system, it did not lead to wholesale party system change. 
The coalition had been under considerable strain due to its decline in the polls since the 
spring, causing its members to reconsider both policy and coalition strategy. The 
campaign for the (early) 1998 election indicates that the main result of the crisis as far
88 OMRI Daily Digest No. 59,25 March 1997; CTK, 13 January 1997.
89 CTK, 26 February 1997; 30 November 1997.
90 CTK, 11 September 1997; 27 November 1997.
91 RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 1, No. 134, 8 October 1997; The Prague Post, 4 June 1997.
92 The Prague Post, 4 June 1997.
93 CTK, 11 September 1997.
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as the party system is concerned is a division of the non-socialist camp. The Czech two- 
bloc system moved towards a three-bloc system in which the centre contemplated co­
operation with either side. The Winset model cast the KDU-CSL as the strong party 
(1996-98) by virtue of its ability to veto alternatives to KDU-CSL minority government. 
The ODS-dominated government, therefore, went against the Laver-Shepsle model’s 
predictions. Its collapse was predicated on divisions within the ODS and the coalition 
rather than its minority status. These divisions caused the failure of coalition talks after 
the 1998 election, though the ODS, KDU-CSL, and the US hold 102 out of 200 seats. 
The ensuing ODS agreement not to bring down a CSSD minority government prompted 
concerns about an alleged Zeman -  Klaus pact to change the electoral system.94
Meanwhile in Slovakia, the 1994 election confirmed Meciar’s HzDS as the 
‘government party’, heralding another four years of Meciar -  anti-Meciar government -  
opposition competition. In contrast to the development of stable patterns of competition 
in the three other cases, this indicated the consolidation of a pattern of party competition 
centred on Meciar’s premiership and his conflict with president Kovac. The HzDS’ 
search for allies, tacit or explicit, confirmed the continued anarchic nature of the party 
system, in which no party qualified as strong. The ambivalent position of SDL, the ZRS 
and the SNS, all of which entered into negotiations with Meciar, contributed further to 
this anarchic system, though the SDL eventually drew the battle-lines by settling for an 
opposition role. The president -  prime minister division exacerbated this personality- 
oriented competition, but it was destined not to last beyond the expiry of Kovac’s tenure 
in March 1998. It also reinforced the centre-right -  HzDS division, with the ‘blue 
coalition’ backing Kovac and campaigning for direct election of president. This 
question was illegally removed from the May 1997 referendum ballots by interior 
minister Krajci, and though the government was subsequently censored by the 
constitutional court for this nothing was done about it.95 If the 1992-94 parliament was 
dominated by Meciar’s quest for a minimum winning coalition, little changed during the 
1994-98 parliament except for a degree of stabilisation. The ten-week negotiations with 
the SNS and ZRS produced a coalition, but not without continued disputes. The ZRS
94 Mlada Fronta Dnes 22/06/98, Lidove Noviny 22/06/98, as per CTK Press Review, 23 June 1998; CTK 
News Summary, 22 July 1998.
95 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 40, 28 Mayl997; Vol 2, No. 28, 11 February 1998; Vol 2, No. 36, 23 
February 1998.
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went as far as to set up a ‘shadow cabinet’, and the SNS refused to support ratification 
of the bilateral treaty with Hungary (though it finally abstained in 1996). Economic 
policy provided contentious problems, e.g., when both parties joined the opposition in a 
debate on the HzDS-controlled national property fund.96 This crisis prompted Meciar to 
go so far as to enquire about potential opposition support for a minority government. He 
subsequently attempted to reform the electoral system, advocating a mixed system 
which the EIU reported would have changed HzDS’ 1994 result from 61/150 to 
124/150.97
O p p o s it io n  p a r t ie s : t o w a r d s  a l t e r n a t iv e  c o a l it io n s
The defeat of the Hungarian burgerlich parties in 1994 prompted not only a 
reassessment of their respective electoral strategies but also considerable realignment of 
the party system. Fidesz’s re-appraisal of its strategy included an effort to shift the party 
toward the ‘right’, i.e., the position of the former Antall/Boross government. Its April 
1995 congress symbolically added ‘Civic Party’ to the party’s name, thus emphasising 
its burgerlich nature. The 1997 congress re-elected Orban but, in a move that was less 
than ardently Thatcherite, it opposed privatisation of the energy utilities and the air 
lines. The MDF’s initial reaction to its defeat was an effort to modernise the party and 
focus on modem conservatism.98 However, the relations between its liberal and 
Christian national factions deteriorated during the first two years of opposition, leading 
to the division of the party in March 1996. Meanwhile the KDNP and FKgP continued 
to explore coalitions, particularly at local level. By the end of 1995 the FKgP, KDNP 
and MDF had formed a potential electoral alliance in the National Alliance for Hungary 
Association, only for it to collapse after MDF/MDNP split in March 1996. The division 
reflected long-term tension between the party’s liberal and populist wings, which had 
surfaced during the Antall -  Csurka split. Accordingly, the MDNP moved closer to 
Fidesz, signalling the development of a centre-right grouping in Hungarian politics, 
while the right camp that remained in the MDF under Lezak and Boross moved closer
96 Economist Intelligence Unit: Slovakia Country Report, Third Quarter 1996.
97 Economist Intelligence Unit: Slovakia Country Report, Fourth Quarter 1996.
98 Interviews with MDF leaders (Fuer, Boross, Szabo), Hungarian TV1, Budapest, in Hungarian, 1700 gmt 
12 June 1994. (SWB 12/07/94).
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to the FKgP, at least temporarily.
The relationships between the opposition parties continued to develop throughout the 
remainder of the 1994-98 parliament, crystallising around a ‘right’ centred on the FKgP 
and a ‘centre-right’ on Fidesz. The leadership struggle in the KDNP between Giczy and 
Ispey, of the party’s ‘right’ (i.e., sympathetic to the FKgP and MIEP) and ‘centrist’ 
wings respectively, culminated a split in the party that precipitated its demise in the 
1998 election. Ispey took ten of its 23 deputies into Fidesz." The KNDP had been 
expelled from the European Union of Christian Democrats shortly before over its 
unacceptable links with MIEP. The re-organisation of the right prompted by the split in 
the MDF in March 1996 and the KDNP a year later, in both cases reflecting divisions 
between the parties’ Christian national or populist camps and their more liberal 
(centrist) elements, prompted a re-alignment on the right into two broad camps led by 
FKgP on the right and Fidesz on the centre-right. This two-bloc approach was reflected 
in cooperation in the 1998 elections in terms of mutual withdrawal of second-round 
candidates.100 In line with the region’s anti-incumbency trend, the 1998 election 
propelled Fidesz into a minimal winning coalition with the FKgP, though Csurka 
offered the support of his 14-strong MIEP.101
Like its Hungarian counterpart, the new Polish opposition took stock of the situation 
following its defeat in 1993 and embarked on a major effort to reconstitute the ‘non­
communist’ alternative with a view to the next elections, which were due by 1997. The 
two-track opposition, divided into a Christian national and a more liberal camp, 
suggests similarities with the Hungarian party system. However, the Polish party system 
continued to centre on the divisions that were evident during the Mazowiecki 
government, with the anti-communist parties divided between the urban, cosmopolitan 
liberal camp and a more worker-based Christian national camp. In fact this division was 
evident in Solidarity during the 1980s, reflecting the intellectuals from KOR and 
Solidarity’s trade union roots.102 During the 1993-97 period, the UW continued to
99 RFE/RL Newsline, No. 78,22 July 1997; No. 107, 1 September 1997; and No. 112, 8 September1997.
100 RFE/RL Newsline, No. 125, 25 September 1997; No. 126, 26 September 1997; No. 141, 17 October 
1997; and No. 29, 12 February 1998.
101 Aftenposten, 25 May 1998.
102 This point has been developed by A. Prazmovska, and was the subject o f a presentation at the London 
School o f Economics and Political Science, in 1997; see also M. H. Bernhard, The Origins o f
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represent the well-organised, liberal wing of the former broad Solidarity movement, 
while the ‘right’ regrouped to form the AWS. Balcerowicz’s taking over the leadership 
of the UW in 1995 illustrates the continuity with the Mazowiecki government, in terms 
of personnel as well as policy. By 1997, the UW congress concluded that the AWS was 
the most appropriate coalition partner, expressly stating its wish for co-operation. 
This was subsequently realised after the 1997 election, when Balcerowicz took up his 
old cabinet portfolio at the ministry of finance. Efforts to integrate the ‘right’ came to 
little until the AWS was formed in June 1996, with the specific aim of winning the 1997 
election. The potential problems inherent in the UW -  AWS alliance became evident 
soon after the election, when 30 AWS deputies signed a statement to the effect that they 
intended to support their government on a case-by-case basis, and more announced 
similar intentions. Several deputies even failed to attend the vote of investiture in 
protest against the economic portfolios going to the UW.104 In short, economic 
differences are keeping liberal and conservative blocs apart, even if they can unite 
internally and present a joint government.
The CSSD’s opposition role from 1992 to 1998 was unique in the region inasmuch as it 
was the main party of the opposition, joined only by the KSCM and the SPR-RSC on 
the extreme left and right respectively. Following its 1995 party conference decision 
ruling out any coalition involving the two extremist parties, the CSSD had little option 
but to pursue strategy based on being the only credible opposition to Klaus. The main 
division over strategy following the 1996 elections pitted Zeman’s confrontational 
approach, based on winning over voters from the two minor opposition parties, against 
deputy chairman Machovec’s desire to fight the government on the centre ground.105 
This reflected the move away from co-operation with the right, which started when 
Zeman replaced Novak as party chairman in 1993. Its consequences included the 
expulsion of deputies Wagner and Teplik in December 1996, for voting with the 
government to pass the 1997 budget.106 Though the Zeman strategy enhanced the
Democratisation in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Opposition Politics, 1976-1980, (Columbia, 
Columbia University Press, 1993).
103 x v  Polonia, 1900 gmt, 26 October 1997, as per Deutsche Welle Monitordienst (27/01/97).
104 RFE/RL Newsline, No. 159, 13 November 1997.
105 CTK, 11 March 1997.
106 OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 241, 16 December 1996; CTK, 11 March 1997.
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competitive nature of the Czech government -  opposition relationship, the CSSD 
nevertheless kept the option of a warmer relationship with the KDU-CSL open. This 
became clear when Zeman endorsed Lux for prime minister after the 1996 elections, 
and with the election of Pithart (KDU-CSL) as Senate chairman. By March 1997, 
Zeman was talking of an Austrian-style coalition between the two parties. Come the 
1997 crisis and the collapse of burgerlich unity, the prospects for centre-left coalition 
increased as both the KDU-CSL and the (ODA-breakaway) US entertained the 
possibility co-operation with the CSSD (and vice versa). By March 1998, surveys 
indicated that more than half the voters expected the election to lead to such a 
coalition.108
The contrast between developments in the Czech and Slovak republics could hardly be 
more prominent. Whereas the CSSD emerged as a clear alternative to the Czech 
coalition, the Slovak parliament continued to be the setting for the continuous search for 
an anti-Meciar coalition. Most significantly, efforts to unite the non-socialist and non­
nationalist parties led to the formation of the Blue Coalition in 1997, uniting the DU, 
KDH and DS. The three united with the Slovak Social Democrats (SDSS) and the 
Green Party (SZS), both former members of Common Choice, into what journalists 
dubbed the “rainbow coalition” in July 1997, since named the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK).109 This coalition has since worked with the MK, laying the 
foundations for post-electoral co-operation and forming joint expert groups on internal 
affairs, foreign affairs, economics and minority policy.110 Meanwhile, the SDL 
remained divided over the strategic wisdom in supporting Moravcik, raising questions 
as to whether it was a “historic mistake”.111 In other words, the opposition saw limited 
progress beyond the 1994 coalition based on opposition to Meciar. Though the 
burgerlich parties formed a closer alliance and negotiated with the Hungarian parties, 
the SDL remained outside the mainstream opposition, poised somewhere between the 
Blue Coalition and Meciar.
107 CTK, 12 March 1997.
i°8 q t k , 14 March 1998. The poll indicated 36.4% and 25% expecting a CSSD/KDU-CSL and a 
CSSD/KDU-CSL/US coalition respectively.
109 Radio Twist, Bratislava, in Slovak 1000 gmt 3 July 1997, Slovakia 1 radio, Bratislava, in Slovak 1000 
gmt 16 July 1997 (SWB 05/07/97 and 18/07/97).
no c y k  news agency, Prague, in English 1859 gmt 10 September 1997, TASR news agency, Bratislava, 
in English 1634 gmt 3 December 1997 (SWB 12/09/97 and 05/12/97).
1,1 Economist Intelligence Unit: Slovakia Country Report, First Quarter 1995.
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B eyo n d  A n a r c h y ?
P a t t e r n s  o f  C o m p e t it io n  a n d  C o a l it io n  Ga m e s  i n  a  C o m p a r a t iv e  P o l it ic s  
P e r s p e c t iv e .
Come the 1997/98 round of elections, the East Central European party systems 
displayed the characteristics of thoroughly developed party systems. More or less 
permanent alliances are evident, as are stable patterns of inter- and intra-coalition 
bargaining. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the 1993/94 round of elections 
prompted major strategic revisions on the part of the losers. The Hungarian former 
ruling coalition collapsed over divisions that were visible during the first parliament, 
yielding a Christian national bloc around the Giczy-wing of the KPND and the FKgP 
and a more moderate conservative wing based on Fidesz, Ispey’s KPND breakaway 
faction and the MDF. A similar two-bloc division characterises the Polish ‘right’, 
though the UW liberal camp is more attached to radical economic reform than Fidesz. 
Even the Czech party system is heading in this direction, towards a two-bloc 
right/centre-right. If the extremist parties are excluded from the analysis, the pattern of a 
large social democratic party facing a somewhat divided right can be found, though in 
the Czech case the Christian democrats are closer to the centre and the (classic) 
economic liberals in the ODS are on the ‘right’. Though the relationships within each 
camp differ considerably along the three cases, and the Czech right is more cohesive 
than its Polish and Hungarian counterparts, the three party systems display considerable 
similarities as they consolidate. A three-bloc pattern is, of course, the key feature of 
several West European party systems, again with considerable variations within the 
blocs and with a host of smaller peripheral parties. The Slovak case remains less 
conformist, with party competition centred on Meciar’s efforts to build and maintain 
viable coalitions. The closest West European counterpart is the Italian ‘Second 
Republic’, featuring a range of parties that have built loose coalitions around 
Berlusconi, Dini and Prodi, but with a considerable degree of uncertainty due largely to 
the flexible position of Bossi’s Northern League.
When the patterns of competition and co-operation within the government and 
opposition are considered, the East Central European party systems appear comparable
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with their West European counterparts. The Polish two-bloc government -  opposition 
pattern that emerged during the Suchocka period shares several features of the pattern of 
Danish and Norwegian party competition, down to and including the ROP on the far 
right. The UW’s stance compares with that of the Danish Venstre (the Left, classical 
liberals) and the Norwegian Hoyre (the Right, conservative), i.e., liberal economic 
policy constrained by the need to cooperate with less free-market oriented conservative 
partners (the AWS, the Danish Conservatives and the Norwegian Christian Peoples’ 
Party respectively). Like the UW, the Danish and Norwegian liberal right’s social 
democrat adversaries share much of their policy platforms, but history makes them 
unlikely coalition partners. However, a considerable difference lies in the PSL’s 
communist past which continues to provide an obstacle to co-operation between the 
agrarian party and the right, in contrast to the more flexible positions of the Norwegian 
and Danish centre parties which have supported both shades of government. The UP 
comes closer to this type of centre party (which means that the SLD faces little or no 
challenge to its left, in contrast to the Scandinavian social democrats).
Paradoxically, the rapid emergence of a solid party system in Hungary led to 
considerable party system re-alignment in the wake of the 1994 election. Yet the 
continuing search for coalitions in the run-up to the 1998 election produced solid 
patterns of competition, and a Fidesz-FKgP coalition after the election. Though the 
social democrat -  liberal -  Christian national pattern is analogous to Scandinavian, 
German and Dutch politics, no West European party system shares the intra-bloc 
divisions that characterise the Hungarian party system (except Belgium, where the 
system is divided on ideological and ethnic lines). Nevertheless, Danish and Dutch 
party politics provide ample examples of within-bloc competition and changing 
coalition strategies, e.g., with the Danish Centre Democrats re-considering support for 
Rasmussen’s Social Democrat-led government in the run-up to the 1998 election (they 
had withdrawn support two years earlier), the competition between the denominational 
parties before 1976 in the Netherlands, and the exclusion of the CDA for the first time 
in Kok’s 1994-98 coalition with the liberal VVD. Danish Venstre even formed a 
coalition with the Social Democrats alone under Jorgensen in 1978/79.
The patterns of party competition in the Czech Republic also appear unremarkable in a 
comparative politics context. The two-bloc government -  opposition pattern featuring a
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large social democrat party and a three-party opposition flanked by a radical right and a 
communist left mirrors the Norwegian and Swedish post-war party systems to near 
perfection, at least before the fall of the Conservative coalition government in Norway 
in 1987 and the fall of the Czech coalition ten years later. Coincidentally and curiously, 
both governments had a minority of one. More significantly, the collapse of the 
coalition prompted the more centrist partners to consider the potential for co-operation 
with the left, in Norway leading to Centre Party (Sp, agrarian) support for minority 
Labour governments until 1997. Given the ODS’s free-market rhetoric, a comparison 
with the Dutch VVD -  CD A -  D’66 -  PvdA pattern is warranted. The Zeman -  Klaus 
agreement appears less controversial or unusual in the light of the Kok and Jorgensen 
coalitions.
In three of the four East Central European cases the patterns of party competition can, 
therefore, be compared with West European politics and analysed through the 
comparative politics framework. This suggests that the party systems have developed 
beyond the anarchy evident in the early 1990s party competition and government 
formation in the region, and that this development has been driven by party strategy. 
More specifically, the 1993/94 -  1997/98 parliaments saw reviews of coalition strategy 
on the part of the losers and the development of intra-coalition patterns of co-operation 
and competition on the part of the winners. There is no reason to expect that the process 
of reviewing party tactics or strategy will end after the 1997/98 elections. In fact West 
European politics suggests that it will continue. Nevertheless, the development of more 
stable patterns of between- and within-bloc competition indicates the stability of the 
party systems, thereby suggesting that party system change in East Central Europe may 
follow patterns similar to those characteristic of West European politics in the 1980s 
and 1990s -  party system stability, but with scope for coalition bargaining and 
modification of coalition strategies.
The Slovak case is less clear-cut. The dismissal of Meciar’s governments in 1991 and 
1994 yielded broad coalitions united by opposition to Meciar and support for 
accelerated economic transition. A comparison between Meciar and Berlusconi was 
suggested above, in terms of political campaigning and party leadership as well as 
attitudes to the opposition. Moreover, Chapter Six showed that HzDS has much in 
common with Forza Italia, and that this is no coincidence given the two parties’ co­
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operation. Temporarily, during the run-up to the 1994 election and again after the 1996 
election, the Italian party system appeared to be moving towards a potentially stable 
two-bloc pattern of competition pitting Berlusconi’s Polo (FI, AN and LN) against the 
Ulivo bloc led by D’Alema’s PDS. The title of the latter’s book, “A Normal Country”,
119summed up his aspirations. However, a move towards US-style two-party 
competition has been prevented by the Northern League’s ambiguous relationship with 
the right (due to its regionalist agenda), tension in the Fini -  Berlusconi relationship 
(personal rivalry for Polo leadership by the AN and FI leaders), and the amorphous 
nature of the Ulivo bloc. Though the ideologies of Slovakia’s SDL and Italy’s Lega are 
not comparable and the Blue Coalition and the Ulivo’s identities differ considerably 
despite policy similarities and the presence of Christian democrats in both, the patterns 
of party competition share several key features. First, the HzDS/FI position is 
determined as much by personality as by policy, though it is clearly identified as ‘right 
wing’ despite its modest ffee-market economic policy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
parties enjoy support from and co-operate with the far right, the SNS/AN. Second, the 
main opposition is a broad church, including Christian democrats and a series of smaller 
parties that broke away from the right and which were built around one or two key 
personalities. It counters the nationalist elements in the right’s appeal by a focus on the 
EU, focuses on economic policy that includes ‘realistic’ but unpopular measures, and 
faces repeated threats of dissolution.113 Third, and finally, the third party (SDL/LN) 
enjoys a somewhat ambiguous position, is flexible enough potentially to work with 
either camp in terms of economic policy, but has shied away from the responsibility of 
government (partly by choice).
The Italian case offers little by way of prophecy for Slovakia, given the similar age of 
the two party systems (if anything, the Slovak one is older!). But it suggests that the 
peculiarities of the Slovak party system need not be sui generis, and that they could be 
due to systemic factors. The nationalist dimension provides one possible systemic 
factor, which has influenced politics in states like Finland, Ireland and Greece 
profoundly. In Slovakia and Italy the achievement of independence and the threat of
112 M. D ’Alema, Un Paese Normale: La Sinistra e il Futuri d e ll’Italia, (Milan, Amoldo Mondadori 
Editore, 1995).
113 Prodi’s government technically collapsed in the Fall’97, but a new deal was negotiated with the 
Rifondazione Communista. Prodi’s government’s eventual fall came in October 98, when D ’Alema 
replaced him, thus maintaining center-left government.
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federalism respectively have provided opportunities for political appeal centred on 
national questions. Across East Central Europe, and in Italy, electoral volatility and 
weak party identification have provided considerable freedom for the parties, and a 
potential bonus for parties focusing on populist campaigning.114 In terms of party 
organisation, weak institutionalisation and strong leadership contributed further to 
personality-oriented political competition. In short, Berlusconi and Meciar enjoyed 
considerable freedom to shape party competition, and several incentives to adopt a 
nebulous platform (and court support from the far right). This has prompted the 
opposition to unite around an anti-Meciar/Berlusconi platform, though complete unity 
has not been achieved and the SDL/LN continue to act as third parties.
The dynamic of party system development in East Central Europe has been driven 
largely by party strategy, subject to constraints such as the one-term limits on 
government imposed by the pattern of anti-incumbency voting (except in the Czech 
case). This pattern centres on the development of party strategy when parties are in 
opposition and as they attempt to build durable coalitions. However, though the 1993/94 
to 1997/98 period saw considerable reorganisation on the ‘right’ in all four cases 
(counting the Blue Coalition in Slovakia), the ‘left’ (reform communist and social 
democrat) parties have displayed a greater degree of stability. Part of the explanation 
lies in the former communist parties’ more institutionalised structure. This dynamic has 
much in common with Mair’s analysis of the changing Irish party system, where the 
Fianna Fail side remained relatively stable but Fine Gael and Labour’s prospects 
fluctuated considerably and at times saw challenges from minor parties.115 The Irish 
system has shifted away from the ‘FF vs. the rest’ pattern with the rise of the 
Progressive Democrats in 1987 and the FF -  Labour coalition of 1993.116 The Irish 
pattern thus combines change and adaptation with overall party system stability, not 
unlike developments in East Central Europe 1993/94 to 1997/98. Fluctuation and re­
organisation in one ‘bloc’ (the term is used very loosely) reflects adaptation by the 
parties and developments in party strategy rather than party systems change (though
114 N. Sitter, “I vincitori sono degli sconfitti?”/“Are Winners Losers?”, Acque e Terre, No. 1, 1997.
115 P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, (London, Frances Pinter, 1987).
116 B. O’Leary, “Affairs, Partner-Swapping, and Spring Tides: the Irish General Election o f November 
1992”, West European Politics, 16:3 (1993), 401-412.
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unlike the Irish case, aggregate electoral volatility does not disguise this).
The post-communist party systems, therefore, warrant the adjective ‘developed’ as they 
enter their third fully freely elected parliaments. The development of party competition 
has been more driven by party strategy and less by attention to constraints in the form of 
cleavages and extra-parliamentary organisations than was the case in early Twentieth 
Century West European politics. However, the new East Central Europe party systems 
are less peculiar in a comparative European context than the ‘peculiarities of Eastern 
Europe’ or ‘peculiarities of post-communism’ literature discussed in Chapter Two 
suggests. The party systems and patterns of party competition have much in common 
with their West European counterparts, in terms of development as well as patterns of 
stability and change. Perhaps significantly, they share some of the features of the 
‘problematic’ West European cases, such as Ireland, the Italian ‘Second Republic’ and 
post-junta Greece. In terms of cleavages that are translated into party politics (regime 
change, nationalism), the preponderance of leadership-dominated and weakly 
institutionalised parties, and/or electoral markets of a considerable magnitude, these 
West European cases have much in common with the four post-communist East Central 
European cases. The magnitude of these variations from assumptions employed in some 
of the party systems literature may be greater in the post-communist cases, but the 
questions to which they point are relevant to a number of West European cases as well. 
It is to these theoretical conclusions and the implications of the East Central European 
cases for comparative politics that the concluding chapter of this project now turns.
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C h a p t e r  N in e  
C o n c l u sio n
“A state without the means o f  some change is without the means o f  its conservation ”
- Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790
“The urgent question o f  our time is whether we can make change our friend and not our enemy”
- Bill Clinton, Inaugural Address, 1993
Analysis of the four East Central European party systems based on comparative West 
European politics raises a series of questions about party system development, the East 
Central European cases in a comparative perspective, and party systems stability and 
change in general. Hence the following three conclusions. First, the conditions of post­
communism prompted questions about the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage model. A re­
working of the model has been approached from a rational choice perspective, including 
analysis of voters, cleavages (new and old) and party organisation in terms of rational 
choice constrained by institutions to a limited degree. Second, the analysis of 
developments in East Central Europe led to conclusions about the four party systems, 
based on institutions, the legacy of the previous regimes, voters, party organisation, 
cleavage structures, and, most significantly party competition. These factors have 
combined to generate a setting in which parties’ strategic and tactical choices are of 
paramount importance. Third, if theories of party system change and stability contribute 
to the analysis of party system development in East Central Europe, it is perhaps equally 
significant and more interesting that party system development in East Central Europe 
contributes to general theories of party system stability and change. The East Central 
European experience suggests that parties themselves, as in recent cases in Western 
Europe, are the main drivers behind party system change and stability.
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P a r ty  Sy st e m  D e v e l o pm e n t
The process of regime change in East Central Europe in 1989-90 may have shared 
several features with its West European and Latin American counterparts in terms of 
negotiated adoption of new rules of the game. However, the ‘triple revolutions’ also 
contained factors that were more unique, or sui generis. These include structural factors 
such as non-market economies, multi-ethnic states, and few organisations that could 
serve as links between voters and parties, as well as political factors such as a weak 
discredited left, the ‘ideological victory’ of liberal democracy as a normative model, and 
competing approaches to nationalism. Moreover, the main actors, the political parties, 
emerged rapidly in most cases, without strong organisations or organised support. This 
made application of the Lipset-Rokkan model to East Central Europe somewhat 
complicated, particularly as it focuses on translation of cleavages into political 
competition. Links between parties and voters are far weaker than in early Twentieth 
Century Western Europe, parties are less institutionalised, and the ‘translation process’ 
has therefore been more problematic. Yet the result has not been particularly unstable 
party systems. This suggests that although Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavage model is 
specific to the time and place of its core states, its dynamics are relevant to East Central 
Europe. The model provides a useful starting point for analysis of party systems in the 
1990s if new constraints are taken into consideration and the rational-choice 
assumptions spelled out and analysed. This entails five steps.
First, no political system is an island, and post-communist East Central Europe is no 
exception. The development of party systems must take account of the structure o f  
cleavages, the legacy o f  the past, and the international context. In the four cases at 
hand, cleavage structures reflecte long-term national and ethnic conflicts over questions 
of nation-building, the division between the communists and opposition under the post­
war regimes, as well as questions deriving from process of regime change in 1989-90 
(particularly the pace of economic reform). This suggests that regime change and 
nationalism can be far more significant in terms of shaping the trajectory of party 
system development than Lipset & Rokkan assumed. In the post-communist cases, the 
impact of the legacy of the past was not uniform across the party spectrum, but
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permitted each party to focus on national, communist or even West European 
ideological traditions. This illustrates the extent to which parties are in fact, to steal 
Friedman’s phrase, free to choose. However, uniform pressure came from the 
international dimension, in the form of international rules and norms on border changes, 
security and human rights, and a dominant normative free-market, liberal democratic 
model.
Second, the role o f  institutions in party system development is limited inasmuch as 
institutions are the product of regime change (and are not independent variables). 
Though the rules of the game certainly contribute to the freezing of party systems and 
set parameters that limit the range of options available to political parties, they are not 
factors that independently shape the party systems. Only over time do they become 
constraining factors, but even then the rules of the game are open to re-negotiation in 
the event of major party-driven changes (e.g., France 1986-88, Italy 1996-98, UK 1997- 
2002?). The obvious exception to this rule is the constraints that institutions represent 
when they are exogenous factors, i.e., when they have been imposed by external forces. 
Electoral rules in Slovakia, Germany, and Ireland, and for the European Parliament, 
illustrate the point. In a wider sense, international norms and institutions constrict the 
options available to political parties and affect policy making.
Third, the link between voters and parties assumed in the cleavage model has long been 
controversial, in terms of both re-alignment and de-alignment. However, the East 
Central European cases have raised questions concerning party systems that are not 
based on a large degree of voter -  party alignment. The weakness of party identification 
is reflected in relatively high levels of volatility and anti-incumbency voting, patterns 
that have been evident in Italy since 1992 and in direct elections for the European 
Parliament since 1979, as well as East Central Europe.1 The functional approach to 
cleavages has been rejected in favour of a wider definition, which includes ‘non- 
structural’ cleavages that need not feature the same strong links between voters and 
parties.
1 In EP elections, anti-incumbency voting means voting against the parties that govern the respective 
Member States. C. van der Ejik, M. Franklin & M. Marsh, “What Voters Teach US about Europe-Wide 
Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us about Voters”, Electoral Studies, 15:2 (1996) 149-166.
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Fourth, the East Central European parties all feature party organisations that are 
comparatively centralised and highly leadership dominated. Again the similarity with 
some Irish parties and the new Italian parties are striking, as are the similarities with 
‘new populist’ parties in West European politics. The evolution of mass, catch-all and 
cartel parties in Western Europe tells a similar story, in which the development of 
political parties (organisationally) is driven by the success of opponents rather than by 
social change alone. As Blair and Bossi have illustrated in Britain and Italy, the modem 
party leader’s freedom to shape party strategy is considerably higher than his early or 
mid-Twentieth Century predecessor. In both Western and East Central Europe party 
leaders are comparatively free to pursue their target voters rather than appease their 
traditional or safe constituencies. To the extent that parties represent cleavages at all, 
leadership independence works to (potentially) limit orientation to cleavage-politics.
Fifth, and finally, this means that party strategy plays a preponderant role in shaping 
the trajectories of party system development. This is not new, as the importance of the 
SPD’s Bad Godesberg review in 1959, the PvdA’s temporary turn left in response to 
D66’s challenge, and Labour’s ‘modernisation’ in the 1990s illustrate. The post­
communist experience confirms that party system development, change and stability is 
driven primarily by party strategy, and that developments in party strategy are dynamic. 
Parties reconsider and develop their strategy and tactics in the light of major defeats at 
the polls in response to and in anticipation of their opponents’ strategies. With only 
moderate fear of exaggeration, one can, therefore, assert that the history o f party system 
development is the history o f party competition and strategic choice. However, rather 
than contradicting Lipset & Rokkan’s analysis, this indicates the importance of strategic 
decisions on the part of the ‘nation-building core’, i.e., the importance of the translation 
of cleavages into political competition and aggregating these divisions.2 In short, 
cleavages represent parameters within which parties develop and operate, and party 
systems are explained in terms of rational choice within these constraints. To be sure, 
rational choice does not always generate rational outcomes. It is constrained by 
institutions (in the broader sense, including ideas and international factors), negotiation 
and bargaining under conditions of uncertainty, and the one-term limits most post­
2 This is, o f course, Sartori’s point. G. Sartori, “The Sociology o f Parties: A Critical Review”, in O. 
Stammer (ed.), Party Systems, Party Organisations, and the Politics o f  New Masses, (Berlin, Free 
University o f Berlin, 1968).
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communist electorates have imposed on their governments through anti-incumbency 
voting.
The process of party system development in the late Twentieth Century, therefore, 
differs considerably from its counter-part in the core cases of the Lipset-Rokkan model. 
The over-all picture is one of party leaders that are far less constrained by cleavages, 
extra-parliamentary organisations, or even their own parties. However, this is not the 
result of peculiarities of post-communism, but rather a broad set of factors that are 
relevant to varying extents to party system development in general. Some of these are 
linked to the late-Twentieth Century context, such as the role of the media and public 
relations techniques in political campaigns. But even Berlusconi’s (broadcast) media 
empire did nor prevent a surprise centre-left victories in the 1995 Italian regional 
elections (which the press subsequently attributed to the PDS’ organisational strength). 
Similarly, party competition in the Irish Free State suggests that some of the problems 
with the Lipset-Rokkan model are not simply linked to ‘post-industrial’ or late- 
Twentieth Century politics. Hence the two levels of conclusions -  about the East 
Central European party systems in particular and about European party systems theory 
in general.
This has prompted a new cleavage model, based on the Lipset-Rokkan model but 
widened to take account of the assumptions inherent in the original model and a non­
functional approach to cleavages. Cleavages remain the stating point. However, in place 
of the functional approach, the concept has been widened to take account of non- 
structural cleavages. Cleavages thus feature two of Bartolini & Mair’s three elements, 
the normative element and political organisation, but do not require an empirical 
element (i.e., objective social divisions). This allows focus on civil wars and regime 
change, as well as ‘post-materialist’ cleavages and the pro- vs. anti-EU cleavage. To be 
sure, this widening of the concept dilutes the definition of cleavages, and has 
implications for the links between voters and parties. Non-structural cleavages provide 
weaker links than Lipset & Rokkan’s four structural cleavages. Hence the focus on 
rational choice theories of voting, and not exclusively on sociological theories.
Institutions and context provide the second element of the new cleavage model. 
Historical institutionalism points to the importance of patterns of political competition,
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particularly the legitimacy of opposition and the difference between absolute opposition 
and differences that can be subject to bargaining. International institutions limit 
domestic parties’ freedom of action, and help shape patterns of party system formation. 
At state level, the institutions that are established as part of the process of 
democratisation may constrain political competition. Yet the predominance of 
proportional systems in Europe means that thresholds for representation have been 
relatively low. Finally, the context of transition produces sui generis factors, in the East 
Central European case the ‘triple transition’.
Third, political parties play the central role in the new cleavage model. Party 
organisation matters. The parties that have emerged in Western and Eastern Europe in 
the second, third and fourth waves of democratisation have not been classical West 
European mass parties. If parties translate cleavages into political competition, their 
strategy and ideology are significant. The party leaderships have not been as constrained 
by party organisation, ideology and extra-parliamentary organisations as the mass party 
model suggests, and have been free to pursue a range of strategies. If parties do not base 
their appeal on structural cleavages, the close link between parties and electorates that 
characterised the socialist mass parties cannot be expected. The catch-all, interest- 
oriented, new populist and cartel models of party organisation all entail different 
strategies of political competition and electoral appeal.
Finally, the new cleavage model retains the model of party systems developing as 
parties build alliances and aggregate different dimensions of competition. Party systems, 
characterised by systematic patterns of competition between and within blocs of parties, 
develop with the consolidation of government -  opposition competition. As in Lipset & 
Rokkan’s model, they are the product of a series of strategic decisions about alliances, 
coalition-building, and competition. This is a dynamic process, in which parties react to 
defeats and victories by building alliances or blocs, thereby translating cleavages into 
systematic party competition. Party systems are not merely about the number o f  parties 
or their ideology, but also about patterns o f competition.
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T h e  E a st  C e n tr a l  E u r o pe a n  Pa r t y  Sy st e m s  in  th e  1990s
Each of the above points is, of course, relevant to party system development and change 
in East Central Europe since the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989. Though the 
parties have proven relatively free to choose in terms of the historical legacy that they 
invoke (West European and European as well as national), they have all had to deal with 
three central cleavages: i) a historical regime change cleavage that reflects ethnic and 
civic approaches to the political consequences of multi-ethnic states; ii) the political 
regime change o f  1989, i.e., whether to co-operate with formerly communist parties; 
and iii) the economic transition, i.e., whether to promote rapid economic transition or 
opt for a more moderate pace. Moreover, two of these reflect regime change. The 
divisions between the former communist and former opposition are still reflected in the 
party systems, and have shaped some of the coalition games to a great extent. Even if 
these divisions were not over the transition to liberal democracy after 1989, they reflect 
pre-1989 attitudes to the ancien regime. Second, the divisions that reflect civic and 
ethnic approaches to nationalism concern the very nature of the regime, including the 
question of who ‘the people’ is (even if border change may be less salient), and are 
therefore related to both state-building and regime change. However, within the 
parameters set by these cleavages, the parties have enjoyed a considerable degree of 
freedom.
In this context, political institutions (rules of the game) reflected competition between 
the main conglomerate parties (or movements) in 1989-90. Rather than constraining the 
party systems, the systems of proportional representation in elections opened up the 
party systems. Only the introduction of thresholds for representation in parliament and 
the provisions for semi-presidentialism shaped the party systems, excluding small 
parties across the board and punishing divisions in general, and reinforcing the role of 
personality-oriented politics in Poland (centred on president Walesa) and Slovakia 
(prime minister Meciar vs. president Kovacs). As the party systems have entered their 
more well-developed phase the role of institutions in freezing party systems is 
increasingly evident, e.g., as splinter parties have failed to re-enter parliament following 
elections in all four systems.
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Voting patterns in East Central Europe in the 1990’s indicate a clear trend o f  anti­
incumbency voting, albeit more limited in the Czech lands than elsewhere. This trend 
has imposed a constraint on party systems development inasmuch most parties have 
been unable to build up a strategy centred on multiple terms in government or 
opposition. All the major parties have held office at some point since 1989, and most 
have carried out major reviews of party strategy in the wake of electoral defeat. The 
evidence indicates that the parties enjoy weak bases of support in general, and that party 
identification is limited. Part of the explanation lies in the parties’ limited links with 
extra-parliamentary sponsoring organisations, but it is also due to the centralised and 
leadership-dominated party structures and limited quests for mass membership. In other 
words, party organisation is partly a matter of choice, and this in turn provides a 
considerable potential for freedom of manoeuvre for the party leadership. Therefore, 
party system change and instability is as much the cause of volatility as a consequence 
of it. Party system change generates electoral volatility, which then helps shape 
developments in party competition. Voters may constrain a party’s ability to remain in 
office, but on the other hand, the parties are unconstrained by external organisations and 
many have adopted leadership-dominated structures.
The outcome in post-communist East Central Europe has been a party-driven process o f 
party system development and stabilisation. This is summed up as a three-step process, 
where each step reflects major developments and changes in party strategy and the 
nature of competitive politics. First, East Central Europe entered the last decade of the 
century somewhat short of well-organised parties. Only the Hungarian political scene 
featured a clear set of parties, and even these parties owed much to identity and the 
division between the ‘democratic’ and ‘Christian national’ opposition. A similar 
division differentiated the intellectuals and workers in Solidarity, and was later reflected 
in support and opposition for Mazowiecki’s government. Meanwhile the Czech and 
Slovak movements were disintegrating over questions of organisation, leadership, 
economic reform and approaches to the federal question. The federal coalition divided 
over the last two issues. By the time of the 1990 election in Hungary, the 1991 election 
in Poland and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia, sets of parties, if not fully-blown 
party systems, had emerged.
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During the second phase, the process of making and breaking governments during the 
first and/or second parliaments heralded the emergence o f party systems as parties were 
obliged to engage in coalition games. The result was more or less stable coalitions built 
up around programmes of rapid economic transition (Poland, Czech Republic) or 
moderately paced economic reform and an ‘ethnic nationalist’ agenda (Hungary, 
Slovakia). In fact, the Czech coalition and the CSSD’s dominant opposition role 
‘promoted’ this party system directly to phase three: developed party systems featuring 
clear government -  opposition relationships. In the other three cases the coalitions 
remained divided, giving way to the opposition in 1993 and 1994 (albeit temporarily in 
the Slovak case).
The third phase is, therefore, the emergence o f fully developed party systems. This is 
not to say that they are as stable as their West European counterparts, but rather that 
patterns of government -  opposition competition and intra-bloc competition are 
becoming clear. All cases feature parties that can be classified as broadly liberal, social 
democratic, Christian national, and in some cases agrarian. The extent to which the 
terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are applied (however misleadingly) depends on the blocs and 
alliances that have emerged during the first decade of competitive politics. The 
differences within the four systems relate to their respective choice of partners and 
adversaries. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the division in the liberal camp 
generated a three-bloc system, featuring a less than cohesive bloc on the ‘right’ 
(including liberal elements and elements of moderate ethnic nationalism) that refuses to 
cooperate with the social democratic or post-communist left. In both cases intermediary 
parties (KDU-CSL, US, SzDSz) do not rule out such alliances. An interesting difference 
lies in the agrarian parties’ alliance with the communists (KSCM) and nationalist right 
(FKgP) and respectively, reflecting local political history. The Polish system likewise 
features a divided ‘right’ consisting of liberal and Christian national parties, in clear 
opposition to reform communist left (even though the SLD has proven more free-market 
oriented than the AWS). The presence of the PSL makes this a four-bloc system (as the 
agrarian party joins the reform communists), within which each bloc is as divided over 
economic policy as the two main blocs, if not more so! The Slovak system resembles 
the three-bloc structure, though in this case the dominant party is Meciar’s ‘right’ which 
is poised in stark competition with the Blue Coalition’s ‘liberal right’. Curiously the 
‘left’ is located between the two, in less absolute opposition to Meciar than the Blue
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Coalition (and its Hungarian allies). This reflects the importance of nationalist questions 
(Slovak independence, Hungarian minority rights) in the development of the party 
system, but also the extent to which party competition centres on opposition to and 
support for Meciar.
In short, the development of party systems in East Central Europe has centred on the 
emergence of parties and their strategic choice. Though this has been considered largely 
in rational choice terms, this is not to say that party system development in East Central 
Europe is or has been a rational process, let alone that the outcome is rational. Rational 
actors frequently make tactical and strategic mistakes, based on miscalculation, limited 
information, or erroneous analysis. Several parties appear to have underestimated the 
potential danger of an anti-incumbency backlash and of appeal based on ethnic 
nationalism, though Klaus provides a remarkable partial exception. Though a Lipset- 
Rokkan-type cleavage model provides for some interesting observations and 
comparisons across Europe and within East Central Europe, closer comparative analysis 
warrants a rational choice-based comparative politics analysis of party strategy and the 
party leaderships’ decisions.
Pa r t y  Sy st e m  C h a n g e  and  St a bil it y  in  E u r o pe  -  E a st  a n d  W est
This analysis of East Central European party systems has raised a number of theoretical 
questions which are of considerable relevance to West European politics. Several of the 
assumptions that lie at the base of Lipset & Rokkan’s cleavage model do not apply 
equally to all the cases they consider, let alone to politics at the close of the Twentieth 
Century. Regime change has played a significant role in several European party 
systems, East, Central and West, when it has been translated into a dimension of party 
competition. The DC’s portrayal of the PCI as an anti-system party in post-war Italy is a 
case in point. Not all parties have enjoyed the solid organisational structures or links 
with extra-parliamentary organisations that characterise the stronger parties (or ‘wing’ 
parties of the left and right) in Lipset & Rokkan’s core cases. Similarly, the degree of 
iverzuillung> (literally pillarization, or division of society into pillars) is controversial 
even in some of the core West European cases. Though the East Central Europe cases
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may be peculiar in that these factors all work towards enhancing the role of party 
strategy and the party leadership in shaping the party systems, the questions raised 
suggest a number of avenues for analysis of party system change and stability in West 
European politics.
The two points related to the dimensions of political competition, namely nationalism 
and regime change, have been under-estimated in much o f  the comparative politics 
literature, with the exception of the consociationalism debate. As might be expected of 
an analysis that draws on the rational choice literature and comparative politics, this 
project has emphasised parties and party competition over sociological factors as 
explanations for party system stability and change. Hence the wider definition of 
cleavages, which emphasises the role of parties in shaping the trajectories of party 
system development, stability and change. The crucial question is the extent to which 
divisions over regime change are translated into party competition, and a bi-polar 
system is then perpetuated (whether the specific issues are relevant or not). This has 
implications for analysis of, for example, the Irish or Greek party systems. In both cases 
the party systems reflect divisions over regime change, and more specifically, 
approaches to nationalism. Though the original issues may be of little direct relevance, 
the parties in question have maintained the dimension of competition as reflected in the 
party systems. This suggests a potential for rational choice analyses of the means by 
which this line of competition was maintained throughout inter-war Ireland, which 
included reduced district magnitude, ‘double elections’ (the second of which reduced 
the success of the smaller parties), and party competition reflecting the Treaty 
dimension. Likewise, questions of regime change had considerable relevance to party 
competition in the ‘first’ Italian Republic and Fourth French Republic.
Second, the question of the role o f nationalism in party competition follows from the 
regime change dimension. This is particularly important in the post-WWI context 
(democratisation, new states), but it also raises broader questions about the link between 
democracy and nationalism. In inter-war Ireland, Finland and Greece nationalism and 
regime change were mutually reinforcing, but questions about the political implications 
of nationalism are also relevant to Italy’s ‘Second Republic’ (where the Polo fell apart 
partly due to FI and AN’s rejection of the LN’s quest for federalisation). One analyst of 
FI identified it as a “media-mediated personality-party”, but neglected to mention
Conclusion 327
nationalism or the question of national unity despite the party’s invoking it in its name 
(the Italian football chant), its colour (blue -  the national football shirt), and its cabinet’s 
nick-name (Gli Azzurri -  that of the Italian football team). An analogous dimension can 
be found in the Norwegian anti-EU movement, which is based as much on commitment 
to the nation-state as on cost-benefit analysis. This suggests potential questions for 
further research on the relationship between regime change, nationalism and democratic 
legitimacy.4
Beyond the questions of cleavages and nationalism, the East Central European 
experience suggests that high voter volatility is linked not only to social structures, but 
also to government (economic) policy and the bonds between parties and extra- 
parliamentary organisations (or the lack thereof). Increasing volatility in West 
European politics may therefore be explained partly by changes in party competition. 
Two-party or two-bloc adversary politics leaves middle voters divided. There is a 
chance of capturing new centrist voters when parties move to the centre, i.e., adopting a 
strategy of competing for centre voters rather than mobilising the party’s ‘own voters’, 
but this should enhance volatility. The same holds for efforts to appeal above cleavages, 
or to introduce new cleavages (post-materialism) or ‘maverick issues’.5 Party strategy, 
or opponents’ strategies, thus reduces the incentive to present a party as representing 
cleavages and/or aggregation of cleavages, in line with Kirchheimer’s 1966 analysis.6
Both West European and East Central European politics have seen a proliferation o f  
new populist parties over the last two decades, accompanied by considerable 
developments in the older parties’ organisational structure.7 The East Central Europe 
cases indicate some of the potential problems inherent in the new populist strategy,
3 J. Seisselberg, “Conditions o f Success and Personality Problems o f a ‘Media-Mediated Personality- 
Party’: The Case o f Forza Italia”, West European Politics, 19:4 (1996), 715-743.
4 C. Binns, A Critique o f  Ernest Gellner’s Views on Nationalism and Industrial Society, LSE Government 
Department Seminar, 11 November 1998; G. Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and 
West”, in C. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1995).
5 M. Maor & G. Smith, “On the Structuring o f Party Competition: The Impact o f Maverick Issues”, 
(manuscript, The European Institute, LSE, 1993).
6 O. Kirchheimer, “The Transformation o f West European Party Systems”, in J. LaPalombara & M. 
Weiner (eds.) Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966).
7 P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe”, West European Politics, 18:1 (1995), 34-51; R. 
Katz & P. Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies, (London, Sage Books, 1994); and R. Katz & P. Mair “Changing Models o f Party 
Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics 1:1 (1995), 5-28.
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notably that the considerable potential for successful mobilisation based on populist 
appeal may leave a party vulnerable to disunity and failure to deliver. Berlusconi’s 
problems in government and competition with Fini for leadership of the right represents 
a case in point. This in turn prompts questions about how Fianna Fail managed to 
maintain a degree of hegemony in Ireland (at least until 1987), while Berlusconi did not 
in Italy. Apart from country-specific conditions, the East Central European experience 
suggests that part of the answer might lie in the unity of FF and bi-polar competition 
with the national dimension channelled into FF -  FG competition, in contrast to the 
Italian right’s internal divisions over nationalism and its confrontation with the left on 
economic issues (where, incidentally, the ‘left’ proved as free-market oriented, if not 
more so).
Finally, strategies o f  party competition represent an integral feature of any party system. 
The West European norm has been competition with a view to alternation in office, 
though this was not the case in inter-war Ireland (though the 1932 election reversed the 
dominant party and opposition roles), let alone the Italian ‘First Republic’ or inter-war 
East Central Europe. A similar effort to keep the opposition permanently out of office 
on the grounds of its questionable legitimacy was undertaken by several parties in post­
communist East Central Europe, though most now appear to have abandoned this 
strategy in favour of alliance-building and entering the games involved in making and 
breaking governments. This provides a starting point for distinguishing between 
hegemonic party systems where one party governs most of the time, and dominant-party 
systems in which the opposition is excluded. Though these are ideal types inasmuch as 
even if parties aspire to it they may not achieve a dominant position, they suggest 
something about the differences between inter-war Ireland and post-war Ireland, pre- 
and post-1992 Italy, and the role of the social democrat parties in Scandinavia 
(hegemonic, never dominant).
In short, this project indicates that party system stability and change is driven primarily 
by the political parties rather than social change. Social change might stimulate 
changes in party strategies, or prompt the emergence and growth of new parties if the 
existing parties fail to adapt to changing conditions or to their opponents’ developments 
in party strategy. But weak party identification on the part of voters, the dis-aggregated 
nature of organised interest groups, image- and personality-driven campaigns (through
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the media) and party organisation that provides considerable freedom for the leadership 
all limit the translation of social structures into political competition and increase the 
parties’ freedom of manoeuvre. Something similar holds for institutional change, to the 
extent that it is driven by the parties that negotiate it. However, rational negotiation need 
not imply rational change, and existing institutions may limit the scope for or affect the 
trajectory of institutional change. Institutions do matter, but as constraints or parameters 
rather than as independent variables. This project partly represents an effort to bring the 
East Central Europe party systems into the West European comparative politics 
literature, but its conclusions also accord the parties and party competition centre stage 
in comparative analysis of party system change and stability. If comparative West 
European politics is influencing analyses of East Central European party systems, the 
East Central European experience has prompted revisiting comparative party systems 
theory, confirming trends observed in West European politics in the 1980s and 1990s.8 
And the political parties have stolen the show.
8 M. Donovan & D. Broughton, “Party System Change in Western Europe: Positively Political”, in D. 
Broughton & M. Donovan (eds.), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe, (London, Pinter, 1999).
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